The Problem of Weapons Proliferation

Das Problem der Waffenverbreitung und -Kontrolle

Some Background Material Related to the Crisis in Iraq

Materialien zur Irak-Krise


Joachim Gruber


Some Web-sites rearrange their documents without leaving a message at the old address pointing to the new one. Therefore I have included a local folder containing the cited reference material and added links pointing from here into that folder. Since some of the contents of the remote document may change over time, the local links represent the reference material as of March 22, 1999.

Section B has been written completely in English. It is an enlargement of the one I posted on the Inspecting Iraq section of the CNN Community Board.

In addition, citations are in English, starting with the ones from Jack F. Matlock's essay "Russia's Leaking Nukes" in the New York Review of Books.
New York Review of Books

File photo of a US-made B61 thermonuclear bomb that can be launched from a range of different aircraft
click on picture to enlarge

File photo of a US-made B61 thermonuclear bomb that can be launched from a range of different aircraft (source). See also The Nuclear Weapon Archive

Note added 18 January 2016
THE RECORD ON CURVEBALL: Declassified Documents and Key Participants Show the Importance of Phony Intelligence in the Origins of the Iraq War, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 234, Edited by John Prados, Posted - November 5, 2007 (in cache, 18 January 2016)
"On February 5, 2003, Secretary of State Colin Powell made a dramatic presentation before the United Nations Security Council, detailing a U.S. bill of particulars alleging that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction that threatened not only the Middle East, but the rest of the world. Unbeknownst to the public at the time, a key part of the U.S. case - relating to biological weapons - was based on the direct knowledge of a single agent known as CURVEBALL, whose credibility had previously been cast in serious doubt. ..."

"According to both of the major official U.S. investigations into Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs-by the so-called Silberman-Robb Commission and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (Note 4) - Powell based this particular claim on data gathered by the CIA, which in turn relied principally on information it had obtained indirectly from CURVEBALL."

Note 4. "Report to the President of the United States" by The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, March 31, 2005; and "Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq” by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, September 8, 2006.

Note added 18 January 2016
'Even if Iraq managed to hide these weapons, what they are now hiding is harmless goo', extract from Scott Ritter's new book, 19 September 2002 (in cache)

"UN weapons inspectors are poised to return to Iraq, but does Saddam Hussein have any weapons of mass destruction for them to find? The Bush administration insists he still has chemical and biological stockpiles and is well on the way to building a nuclear bomb. Scott Ritter, a former marine officer who spent seven years hunting and destroying Saddam's arsenal, is better placed than most to know the truth. Here, in an exclusive extract from his new book [William Rivers Pitt (Author), Scott Ritter, "War on Iraq: What Team Bush Doesn't Want You To Know", September 25, 2002], he tells William Rivers Pitt why he believes the threat posed by the Iraqi dictator has been overstated.

Pitt: Does Iraq have weapons of mass destruction?

Ritter: It's not black-and-white, as some in the Bush administration make it appear. There's no doubt that Iraq hasn't fully complied with its disarmament obligations as set forth by the UN security council in its resolution. But on the other hand, since 1998 Iraq has been fundamentally disarmed: 90-95% of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction capability has been verifiably eliminated. This includes all of the factories used to produce chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, and long-range ballistic missiles; the associated equipment of these factories; and the vast majority of the products coming out of these factories."

Note added 20 July 2020
SCOTT RITTER: Powell & Iraq—Regime Change, Not Disarmament: The Fundamental Lie

by Scott Ritter, Consortium News, July 19, 2020 (in cache here and here)
< font size=-2> during an interview Powell gave to Fox News on Sept. 8, 2002 ... he was asked to comment on a quote from my speech to the Iraqi Parliament earlier that month in which I [Scott Ritter] stated:

“The rhetoric of fear that is disseminated by my government and others has not to date been backed up by hard facts that substantiate any allegations that Iraq is today in possession of weapons of mass destruction or has links to terror groups responsible for attacking the United States. Void of such facts, all we have is speculation.”

Powell responded by declaring,

“We have facts, not speculation. Scott is certainly entitled to his opinion but I’m afraid that I would not place the security of my nation and the security of our friends in the region on that kind of an assertion by somebody who’s not in the intelligence chain any longer… If Scott is right, then why are they keeping the inspectors out? If Scott is right, why don’t they say, ‘Anytime, any place, anywhere, bring ‘em in, everybody come in—we are clean?’ The reason is they are not clean. And we have to find out what they have and what we’re going to do about it. And that’s why it’s been the policy of this government to insist that Iraq be disarmed in accordance with the terms of the relevant UN resolutions.”

Of course, in November 2002, Iraq did just what Powell said they would never do—they let the UN inspectors return without preconditions. The inspectors quickly exposed the fact that the “high quality” U.S. intelligence they had been tasked with investigating was pure bunk. Left to their own devices, the new round of UN weapons inspections would soon be able to give Iraq a clean bill of health, paving the way for the lifting of sanctions and the continued survival of Saddam Hussein.

Powell knew this was not an option. And thus he allowed himself to be used as a vehicle for disseminating more lies—lies that would take the U.S. to war, cost thousands of U.S. service members their lives, along with hundreds of thousands of Iraqis, all in the name of regime change.

Inhalt - Contents

  • C. Appendix - Anhang

    A. Politics

    A 1. UN-Memorandum Of Understanding
    (Memorandum of Understanding Between the UN and Iraq on Inspections)

    The Memorandum of Understanding signed by UN general secretary Kofi Annan and the Iraqi government on February 23, 1998, favors Iraq to an extent that endangers the safety of the world.

    1. Iraq commits itself to cooperate with UNSCOM (UN Special Commision) and IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency), and to allow inspectors immediate, unconditional and unobstructed access to all sites.
    2. UNSCOM will respect Iraq's "sovereignty, security and dignity".
    Das Abkommen, das UNO-Generalsekretär Annan am 23.2.98 mit der irakischen Regierung geschlossen hat, kommt dem Irak in einer Weise entgegen, die die Sicherheit der Welt gefährdet.

    1. Im Abkommen verpflichtet sich der Irak, mit der UNO-Abrüstungs-Kommission und der Internationalen Atom-Energie-Behörde vollständig zusammenzuarbeiten und den Mitarbeitern beider Gremien sofort, bedingungslos und ungehindert Zugang zu allen Anlagen zu gewähren.

    2. Das Abkommen hält aber auch fest, daß die für die Inspektionen zuständige Sonderkommission Unscom "die legitimen Belange der nationalen Sicherheit, Souveränität und Würde des Irak respektieren" soll.

    A 2. Loopholes in the UN-Memorandum
    Schlupflöcher im Abkommen

    In his report in "Hintergrund Politik", aired by the German station Deutschlandfunk on March 3, 1998, Holger Mey, Director of the Institute for Strategic Analyses, Zippelstraße 24-26, D-53227 Bonn, pointed out that this Memo provides president Saddam a new opportunity, backed by international law, to limit UN inspectors' access to sites. In seinem Beitrag in "Hintergrund Politik" des Deutschlandfunks am 3.3.98 wies Holger Mey, Direktor des Instituts für Strategische Analysen, Zippelstraße 24-26, D-53227 Bonn, darauf hin, daß die Einschränkungen (siehe 2.) Präsident Saddam eine neue, durch internationales Recht abgesicherte Möglichkeit eröffnet, die Zusage des ungehinderten Zugangs (siehe 1.) nach Belieben einzuschränken.

    A 3. Constructive Cooperation of Iraq is a Prerequisite
    Konstruktive Zusammenarbeit des Irak ist erforderlich .

    Like Holger Mey also the Henry L. Stimson Center states in a report (Issue Brief, The Chemical Weapons Convention, Constitutionality, and Unwarranted Fears) that effective control is possible only in constructive cooperation with the inspected country: Wie Holger Mey stellt auch das Henry L. Stimson Center in seinem Bericht (Issue Brief, The Chemical Weapons Convention, Constitutionality, and Unwarranted Fears) fest, daß wirksame Kontrollen nur in konstruktiver Zusammenarbeit mit dem zu kontrollierenden Land möglich sind:
    The CWC (Chemical Weapons Convention) stipulates that inspectors must adhere to a defined inspection mandate and conduct themselves with "the least possible inconvenience to the inspected" facility. In the course of a routine or challenge inspection, the inspectors can ask questions and request permission to take photographs or samples. However, any company or individual being inspected has the right to refuse to answer specific questions or allow requested inspection activities if they are deemed to be unreasonable and unrelated to the purpose of the inspection. Alternative means can also be used to satisfy inspectors' requests and provide evidence that a facility is in compliance.

    During all those years after the Gulf war Iraqi Vice Premier Tariq Aziz has emphazised the compliance of his country. Während all der Jahre nach dem Golfkrieg hat Iraks Vize-Premierminister Tariq Aziz die Willfährigkeit seines Landes betont:

    "We have been working day and night strenuously for six and a half years," Aziz insisted late last year. "Give us a chance before stampeding another unjust resolution against Iraq."

    Two in-depth seminars on Iraq's modern technology management schemes:

    1. Nuclear Weapons:
      David Kay, Iraqi Inspections: Lessons Learned", Eye on Supply: Feb. 10, 1993, Monterey Institute of International Studies, 1997.
    2. Chemical and Biological Weapons:
      Jonathan B. Tucker, "Monitoring And Verification in a Noncooperative Environment: Lessons From the U.N. Experience in Iraq", Monterey Institute of International Studies, The Nonproliferation Review: Spring-Summer 1996, Volume 3 - Number 3.

    Additional Documentation
    • UNSCOM Documents,

    • Security Council Responds to Iraqi Intransigence , News Briefs, ARMS CONTROL ASSOCATION, 1726 M Street, N.W., Suite 201, Washington, DC 20036, email:

    • On February 13 1998, CNN interviewed Charles Duelfer, the Deputy Chairman of the United Nations Special Commission to Iraq in preparation for IMPACT's March 4 special report: "Inside UNSCOM: The Inspectors' Story." Here are portions of that interview.

    • On some other occasion he said:
      An anderer Stelle sagte er:
      "After six years, Iraq has not yet come to the conclusion that they are going to give us the access and material that we need, that's why we have this crisis today."

    • The Swedish diplomate Rolf Ekeus, chairman of UN inspections from the seizefire through summer 1997, said in the beginning of March 1998: Der schwedische Diplomat Rolf Ekeus, der die UN-Untersuchungen vom Waffenstillstand bis zum Sommer 1997 anführte -- sagte Anfang März 1998:
      "... Iraq itself admitted in writing even that it had been lying, cheating systematically from when we started in 1991 up until this very date in August of 1995."

    • According to the NSC (U.S.National Security Council) paper, Iraq continues to hide or cannot verify the elimination of
      • 25 missile warheads filled with anthrax, botulinum toxin or aflatoxin;
      • 45 to 70 missile warheads for use with chemical agents,
      • 134 aerial bombs and
      • a small number of aerosol sprayers for delivering biological agents; and
      • a stockpile of as much as 600 metric tons of VX, sarin, mustard agents and
      • associated munitions and production equipment.

    • Baghdad may also have a small force of SCUD type missiles and the capability to make more.

    • In the nuclear file, Iraq continues "to withhold significant information about enrichment techniques, foreign procurement, weapons design and postwar concealment," suggesting continued interest in nuclear weapons. (Howard Diamond and Erik J. Leklem, "Iraq Strikes New Deal On Inspections at Special Sites", Arms Control Today January/February 1998.

    • Holger Mey quotes an example: Inspectors were kept up at the gate of a building until crates with equipment had been removed from the building by trucks (see also here and here).
    • Holger Mey führt ein Beispiel dafür an: Die Inspektoren mußten vor einem zu kontrollierenden Gebäude warten, bis die am Hinterausgang aus dem Gebäude geschafften Kisten mit Lastwagen abtransportiert worden waren (siehe auch hier und hier).

      For details see

      • S. Ritter, Endgame, Simon & Schuster, 1999).
      • Jonathan Tucker, Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) of the Monterey Institute of International Studies (MIIS) "Monitoring and Verification in a Noncooperative Environment: Lessons from the U.N. Experience in Iraq", Nonproliferation Review, vol. 3, No. 3, 1996:
        ... on June 28, 1991 Iraq tried to conceal several calutrons from an IAEA inspection team. The Iraqis transported the giant electromagnets on flatbed trucks from the Nuclear Research Center at Tuwaitha to the military barracks at Abu Ghraib.
        Although the IAEA team caught a glimpse of the calutrons in transport, they were denied access to the barracks; by the time they were allowed in, the trucks and their secret cargo had vanished. With the aid of U.S. satellite intelligence, however, UNSCOM headquarters in New York was able to track the movement of the trucks to the Military Transport Command facility in Fallujah and conveyed this information to the inspection team through a secure communications link. The IAEA inspectors arrived in Fallujah just as the flatbed trucks were exiting the facility and followed in hot pursuit.
        In a desperate attempt to force the inspectors to back off, Iraqi soldiers fired warning shots over their heads.

    A summary of the technical problems encountered in controlling chemical (CW) and biological weapons (BW), not just in Iraq, was published by the Henry L. Stimson Center in Report No. 24 (in cache, May 2010), "Biological Weapons Proliferation: Reasons for Concern, Courses of Action", and in particular in Tab. 3 of "Verification Provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention and Their Relevance to the Biological Weapons Convention", an analysis of the applicability of the CWC verification measures to a prospective BWC protocol by Dr. Jonathan Tucker of the Monterey Institute. They include
    • Clandestine production of BW is difficult to detect without the help of intelligence (e.g. reports of defectors, spies). Such information is often unsystematic and anecdotal.
    • It is not easy to discover a BW production line, since plants for BW are similar to those for civilian apllications.
    • A vaccine production plant can be turned into plant for BW within a week. An obviously civilian plant can produce BW in interim periods.
    • Monitoring such dual use plants is very demanding and expensive.
    • The shorter the notice prior to inspection, the higher is the probability cleaning up operations are incomplete and inspectors find races of illicit products.
    • In Iraq inspectors have often gained access only after some time. The time between inspections would theoretically suffice to produce BW in relevant quantities.
    Eine Zusammenfassung der (allgemeinen, vom Irak unabhängigen) technischen Kontrollprobleme bei B- und C-Waffen findet sich in Tab. 3 eines Reports "Verification Provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention and Their Relevance to the Biological Weapons Convention" von Jonathan Tucker vom Center For Nonproliferaion Studies des Monterey Institute for International Studies. Einige der wichtigsten Probleme sind:
    • Heimliche Produktion von biologischen Waffen ist ohne nachrichtendienstliche Aktivitäten (z.B. Berichte von übergelaufenem Personal, Spione) schwer zu entdecken. Diese Informationen sind aber häufig unsystematisch und zufällig.
    • Die Absicht, biologische Waffen zu produzieren, kann nicht leicht erkannt werden, weil die Produktionsstätten für friedliche und militärische Zwecke ähnlich sind.
    • Eine Impfstoff-Produktionsstätte kann innerhalb etwa einer Woche in eine militärische umgewandelt werden. Eine offensichtlich zivile Produktionsstätte kann zwischenzeitlich, d.h. für einen kurzen Zeitraum, Material für Waffen herstellen.
    • Überwachung solcher Doppelproduktionstätten ist sehr aufwendig.
    • Je kürzer die Vorwarnzeiten vor einer Inspektion sind, desto größer ist die Wahrscheinlichkeit, daß die Aufräumarbeiten (zum Zweck der Täuschung) unvollständig bleiben und die Inspektoren Spuren von unerlaubter Produktion finden.
    • Während der bisherigen Behinderungen der Inspektoren im Irak reichte die inspektionsfreie Zeit theoretisch dazu aus, militärisch relevante Mengen von biologischen Waffen herzustellen.

    A 4. Jack F. Matlock on "Russia's Leaking Nukes"

    New York Review of Books, Vol. XLV, Number 2, pp. 15 - 18, 5. Februar 1998, search for Title of Article "Russia's Leaking Nukes"
    For an Update see Graham Allison, "Loose nukes", International Herald Tribune, June 12-13, 2004 (Graham Allison is the author of one of the books that Jack Matlock reviewed in his essay "Russia Leaking Nukes".)

    From 1987 through 1991 J.F. Matlock was US-Ambassador to the Soviet Union. He is now (1998) George F. Kennan Professor (Modern International Relations) at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, USA. J.F. Matlock war 1987 bis 1991 US-Botschafter bei der Sovietunion und ist jetzt George F. Kennan Professor (Modern International Relations) am Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, USA.

    A 4.1. Leakage of Nuclear Material From Russia - Leckage von nuklearem Material aus Rußland

    Andrew and Leslie Cockburn wrote an exciting and for laypeople easily comprehensible book Andrew und Leslie Cockburn haben ein spannend und für den Laien gut verständliches Buch geschrieben:

    One Point Safe: A True Story
    by Andrew Cockburn and Leslie Cockburn
    288 pages, $23.95 (hardcover)
    Anchor, 1997

    Search for more titles written by these authors. Read more about this book.

    J.F.Matlock writes on page 3 of his essay:

    "The authors describe their basic propositions as follows:

    1. The leakage of weapons-usable nuclear materials from the former Soviet Union is already occurring and could easily get worse.

    2. No reality of the post-Cold War international environment constitutes a more direct threat to vital U.S. national security interests than nuclear leakage.

    3. The U.S. response to the threat of nuclear leakage through the fall of 1995 has been insufficient.

    4. Finally, if the U.S. government is to reduce the threat of nuclear must enlarge the political latitude available for pursuing anti-leakage efforts, and must be prepared to devote significantly greater resources to the task. "

    A 4.2. No Sufficient Support For US By Other Countries -
    Europa hat den USA nicht ausreichend beigestanden.

    Matlock presents a second book on the web site.

    Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy: Containing the Threat of Loose Russian Nuclear Weapons and Fissile Material
    by Graham T. Allison, Owen R. Cote, Jr., Richard A. Falkenrath, and Steven E. Miller
    292 pages, $16.00 (paperback)
    MIT Press, 1996

    Search for more titles written by these authors. Read more about this book.

    He points out that European countries didn't give this issue sufficient attention. --- Er weist darauf hin, daß die europäischen Länder sich mit dieser Sache unzureichend befaßt haben:

    Both the Bush and Clinton administrations have failed to give the issue the priority it deserves. West Europe and Japan have given inadequate support.

    A 4.3. The Threat - Die Gefahren

    According to J. Matlock we are facing enormous dangers if we do not succedd to control the proliferation of nuclear weapons of mass destruction. Nach Meinung von J. Matlock stehen uns Gefahren riesigen Ausmaßes bevor, wenn es uns nicht gelingt, die Verbreitung von nuklearen Massenvernichtungswaffen zu kontrollieren:

    But in view of US policy up to now, it is hard to escape the conclusion that the Clinton administration and the United States Congress are both failing in their highest obligation to the American people: to identify the most serious threats to American security and to do everything reasonable to meet them. They seem to be relying on a miracle without asking whether the Almighty will continue to protect those who stubbornly refuse to help themselves.

    A 4. An Open Letter To The German Minister Of Foreign Affairs - Unser Brief an den deutschen Außenminister

    We are convinced Germany should work towards a control of the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction that is more effective than what UN general secretary Kofi Annan has negotiated. Those more efficient controls are in the interest of all states on this planet, i.e also of Iraq.

    We wish to encourage the reader to write a letter to the German Minister of Foreign Affairs, and perhaps send a copy of it to the President of the U.S.

    Wir sind der Überzeugung, daß Deutschland sich daher für eine Kontrolle der potentiellen irakischen Massenvernichtungswaffen einsetzen muß, die wirksamer ist, als die von Generalsekretär Annan ausgehandelte. Effiziente Kontrollen sind im Interesse aller Staaten dieser Erde, also auch des Irak.

    Wir möchten den Leser dazu anregen, ähnlich wie wir einen Brief an den deutschen Außenminister, und vielleicht eine Übersetzung davon an den Präsidenten der Vereinigten Staaten, Bill Clinton, zu schicken.

    Dr. Joachim Gruber
    Marianne Steenken
    E-Mail: Joachim Gruber

    B. Technical Background

    B 1. Nukleares Material - Nuclear Material

    The following examples of weapons that cannot be conceiled from the inspectors have been chosen from the nuclear arsenal. In the 1970's we were scientists affiliated with the Hahn-Meitner-Institute in Berlin, Germany (then called HMI for Nuclear Research]. We were concerned about nuclear proliferation originating from German industry and financially backed by the German Federal Government. We sent an open letter to our foreign minister, H.-D. Genscher, asking him not to undercut the non-proliferation efforts of the US president, Jimmy Carter. About half the employees of the HMI had signed the letter (Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik 22, "Dokumente zum Zeitgeschehen", Seiten 1156-1157, 1977). Die zunächst (im Abschnitt B 1.) folgenden Beispiele für Waffen, die man auf diese Weise den Inspektoren verheimlichen kann, sind aus dem nuklearen Gebiet gewählt, weil wir uns als Wissenschaftler in den 70'er Jahren im Hahn-Meitner-Institut (damals: für Kernforschung) in Berlin mit der Frage der nuklearen Proliferation (also der unkontrollierten Verbreitung von Nuklearmaterial) befaßt haben -sehr zum Unwillen der Bundesregierung und -von ihr veranlasßt- unter Repressalien der Institutsleitung. Damals hatten wir uns in einem offenen Brief an den deutschen Aussenminister, H.D. Genscher, dagegen ausgesprochen, daß Deutschland die Bemühungen der Administration des jungen US-Präsidenten Jimmy Carter unterlief, der sich für die Begrenzung der Proliferation in die Entwicklungsländer eingesetzt hatte (basierend auf einem Abkommen zur Nichtweiterverbreitung von waffentauglicher Nukleartechnologie, Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, NPT). Diesen Brief hatte etwa die Hälfte der Angestellten des Hahn-Meitner-Instituts unterschrieben (Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik 22, "Dokumente zum Zeitgeschehen", Seiten 1156-1157, 1977).

    In 1977, when half the employees of our nuclear research center in Berlin asked our foreign minister to at least not financially support the breach of the NPT by German industry (if he feels unable to take legal action against that breach), the Brazilian military government publicly admitted aiming at producing nuclear explosives, but declared them as peaceful. Inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency were not allowed, as Brazil was not a member of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). (In September 1990 Brazil's newly elected president Fernando Collor de Mello closed the nuclear test site and admitted in a speech to the UN General Assembly Brazil's secrete 15 year old nuclear bomb program (in cache)-see also the Federation of American Scientists's Report (PIR), 1990;5.) Disregarding the danger of heating up a nuclear arms race between Brazil and Argentina in the thus far nulear weapons free Latin American continent, the social democratic German government under Helmut Schmidt provided German nuclear suppliers with the necessary financial security backing the selling of an entire nuclear fuel cycle to Brazil (6 - 8 reactors, a reprocessing plant to separate plutonium from used reactor fuel and a uranium enrichment facility (based on a singular German design). German and Brazil government officials subsequently signed the sale's agreement. At the same time, Germany was also a major supplier of nuclear technology to Argentina, which had resolved to stay roughly in step with Brazil and by 1974 had acquired heavy water reactors - the type that India had used to produce its plutonium.

    "[The newly elected president of the US, Jimmy] Carter had pledged himself to heading off ther German deal with Brazil. And two days after his inauguration, he dispatched Vice President Walter Mondale to Europe with the new administration's message about nuclear proliferation. In Brussels, only four days later, Mondale said that one of the "central themes" would be "stopping the sales of reprocessing plants as those to Brazil an Pakistan" (W.H. Courtney, "Brazil and Argentina: Strategies for American Diplomacy", in Nonproliferation and U.S. Foreign Policy, ed. J.A. Yager (Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution, 1980), p. 380, citing Bernard Weinraub, New York Times, January 25, 1977). In Bonn, he is said to have told Schmidt that Carter "was unalterably opposed to the transfer of the sensitive technologies to Brazil" (ibidem, p. 381). Schmidt stonily replied by noting his commitment to the Non Proliferation Treaty and the suppliers' guidelines [drawn up at a series of secret meetings of the nuclear suppliers' club in London 1974] , but he also restated his commitment to the agreement with Brazil. Carter's high-visibility, high-level initiative had the predictable effect of souring the atmosphere and further complicating intractable problems. Two weeks later, Warren Christopher, Deputy Secretary of State designate, was in Bonn, trying to persuade Schmidt to defer transferring the enrichment and reprocessing materials to Brazil until its reactors had been "safeguarded"

    [by the International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA. IAEA safeguards include inspections, inventories, and regular audits of sensitive materials to ensure that nuclear technology is used for peaceful purposes only. Years later, the case of Iraq has shown that IAEA does not achieve this goal (look with your browser's Find for the paragraph starting with "Let me be clear" in D. Kay, Iraqi Inspections: Lessons Learned. D. Kay was the team leader for three IAEA inspections in Iraq)].

    Schmidt again said no. A U.S. mission to Brazil drew a cold, uncompromising reception; the Brazilians made their feelings clear by canceling a military cooperation agreement.

    .... He [Carter] planned to cut off American aid to any country that detonated a "peaceful nuclear explosion". He wanted a voice in decisions involving an American client-country's other nuclear exchanges. And he wanted to be able to rule on whether a client-country could develop its own plutonium separation capability (M. Nacht, "Controlling Nuclear Proliferation", in The Eagle Entangled: U.S. Foreign Policy in a Complex World (New York: Longman, 1970), ed. K. Oye, D. Rothchild, and R. Lizber, p. 157)."

    cited from J. Newhouse, "War and Peace in the Nuclear Age", A.A. Knopf, New York, 1989, p. 274 - 275. Text in [ ] added by J. Gruber.

    In Brazil, in the years that followed under democratic rule, scientific groups, citizens organizations, and newly-empowered legislators were able to lobby openly for constraints on wasteful nuclear activities. Scientists of US public interest groups


    • David Albright, now Director of the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), senior scientist at Friends of the Earth in Washington, D.C., member of the Federation of American Scientists and contributing editor to the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (address: The Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), 236 Massachusetts Ave. NE, Suite 500, Washington, DC 20002, phone: (202) 547-3633,
      (David Albright has been chosen as the 2006 recipient of the American Physical Society's Joseph A. Burton Forum Award. The award is for outstanding contributions to the public understanding or resolution of issues involving the interface of physics and society. "For his tireless and productive efforts to slow the transfer of nuclear weapons technology. He brings a unique combination of deep understanding, objectivity, and effectiveness to this vexed area." This honor follows Albright's 2005 election as an American Physical Society (APS) Fellow. The APS Fellowship Program was created to recognize members who may have made advances in knowledge through original research and publication or made significant and innovative contributions in the application of physics to science and technology. Each year, no more than one-half of one percent of the membership of the Society is recognized by their peers for election to the status of Fellow.)

      David Albright, a physicist, is president of the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) in Washington, D.C. He directs the project work of ISIS, heads its fundraising efforts, and chairs its board of directors. In addition, he regularly publishes and conducts scientific research. He has written numerous assessments on secret nuclear weapons programs throughout the world. Prior to founding ISIS, he worked

      1. as a senior staff scientist at the Federation of American Scientists and
      2. as a member of the research staff of Princeton University’s Center for Energy and Environmental Studies.

      He has served as a consultant or contractor to

      • the Environmental Policy Institute,
      • the Congressional Research Service,
      • the International Task Force on Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism,
      • Los Alamos National Laboratory, and
      • the International Atomic Energy Agency.

      Albright holds a Masters of Science in physics from Indiana University and a Masters of Science in mathematics from Wright State University. In addition to the Outstanding Alumni Award, Albright also received an Honorary Doctorate of Humane Letters from Wright State University in 2007.

    • the Nuclear Control Institute
    • funds from US foundations such as the W. Alton Jones Foundation
    provided members of the Brazilian parliament and Physical Society with the necessary technical expertise. Many of these efforts helped to build a political climate more conducive to the implementation of bilateral and international safeguards.

    Brazil's deal with West Germany gradually fell apart of its own weight. The Brazilians couldn't afford the reactors and never managed to make the German-design enrichment technology work for them. ... Brazil and Argentina still refuse to sign the NPT, and in either country an immoderate regime could doubtless acquire the weapons option.
    cited from J. Newhouse.

    Finally, in September 1990, when -before the UN General Assembly- Brazil publicly revealed and revoked its nuclear weapons ambitions, the German government (under the Christian and Free Democrats, Chancellor Helmut Kohl) announced that "current and future" nuclear exports would be approved only if full-scope safeguards were in effect in the recipient country.

    (For more details see "Nuclear Confidence Building between Argentina and Brazil" by the Henry L. Stimson Center, on which some of the above outline relies.)

    Internationally, Germany has been continuously blamed of proliferating weapons-grade technology. The case for Iraq has been documented by The Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, California, USA and summarized below.

    B 1.1. Small Physical Dimensions of Hydrogen Bomb - Geringe Größe von Wasserstoffbomben

    100 megaton hydrogen bomb

    Source of photograph: Alan Lightman, "Megaton Man", New York Review of Books 69, 9:34-37 (May 23, 2002)

    The SANDIA Laboratory Science Museum in Albuquerque, New Mexico, USA, shows a hydrogen bomb having a yield of approximately 1 megaton TNT. It has a diameter between 1/2 and 1 meter and has a length between a bicycle and a compact car.

    The hydrogen bomb on the left that Edward Teller puts his arm on, has a yield of 100 megatons.

    Im Museum des US-amerikanischen Waffenlabors SANDIA in Albuquerque, New Mexico, USA ist eine Wasserstoffbombe von der Stärke etwa einer Megatonne TNT ausgestellt. Sie hat einen Durchmesser von 1/2 bis einem Meter und ist nicht länger als ein Kleinwagen.
    Die nebenstehende Wasserstoffbombe hat eine Stärke von 100 Megatonnen.

    See also

    B 1.2. Suitcase-Sized Bombs Disappeared Into The International Weapons Market - Nukleare Kofferbomben sind in den internationalen Waffenmarkt verschwunden.

    There are suitcase size nuclear bombs. Of these more than 100 have disappeared from the depots of the Russian military. Es gibt koffergroße Nuklearbomben. Davon sind mehr als hundert aus den Depots des russischen Militärs verschwunden.

    In September (1997), General Alexander Lebed, the defeated presidential candidate who was briefly the head of Russia's Security Council, said in a television interview that more than a hundred suitcase-sized nuclear bombs were missing from Russian military inventories.

    The Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, 425 Van Buren Street, Monterey, CA 93940, USA reports in
    Databases & Publications

    Lebed has stood by his statement, however, and his charges have been backed by a former advisor to President Yeltsin, Aleksey Yablokov, who told a US Congressional subcommittee on 2 October 1997 that he was "absolutely sure" that such ADMs (small atomic demolition munitions) had been ordered in the 1970s by the KGB (CNS-Report: "Are Suitcase Nukes on the Loose?").

    ... these ADMs, which could be carried in a case approximately 60x40x20 cm, in September and October 1996, when he was serving as secretary of the Russian Security Council. Since the ADMs, which have an explosive yield of around one kiloton (TNT equivalent), could be "activated by one person" and are "easy to transport", Lebed concluded they were "an ideal weapon for nuclear terror".[Interfax, 8 September 1997; in "Lebed Says Individual Warheads in CIS Pose Danger", FBIS-TAC-97-251.]

    Obviously, it is a question of finances, whether or not president Saddam can afford such physically small weapons of mass destruction as soon as they appear on the weapons market. Es ist offensichtlich im wesentlichen eine finanzielle Frage, ob sich Präsident Saddam solche von den Abmessungenen her kleine Massenvernichtungswaffen leisten kann, wenn sie auf dem Waffenmarkt erscheinen.

    B 1.3. Weapon-Grade Nuclear Material Can Easily be Diverted and Carried and is cheap. - Nukleares Bombenmaterial kann leicht gestohlen und umhergetragen werden und ist billg.

    Matlock points out a further way for the uncontrolled proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, via highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium (if you have subscribed to the New York Review of Books electronic edition, see page 1 of Russia's Leaking Nukes). The radiation emitted from these materials is minor, and therefore a single person can carry a quantity in his suitcase that suffices for the construction of a Hiroshima size (20 kt TNT) bomb. Russia now has a stockpile of about 150 tons of weapons grade plutonium and 1000 tons of HEU [S. Weinberg, Can Missile Defense Work?, New York Review of Books, Febr. 14, 2002, pp. 41-47]. Matlock weist auf einen weiteren Weg der unkontrollierten Verbreitung von Massenvernichtungswaffen hin, nämlich über hochangereichertes Uran (HEU) oder Plutonium. Wegen der geringen von diesen Materialien ausgehenden radioaktiven Strahlung kann ein einzelner Mensch davon ohne weiteres eine Menge in einem Koffer tragen, die zum Bau einer Bombe ausreicht, deren Stärke der über Hiroshima abgeworfenen gleicht:

    (Note: A rough order of magnitude estimation of the price for the HEU necessary for a Hiroshima size bomb arrives at $ 6000. Iraq possesses an implosion technology that allows her to ignite a Hiroshima size bomb. (D. Kay, Iraqi inspections: lessons learned, talk given for the Program of Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies on February 10, 1993, CNS Special Collection on the Iraqi Crisis). (Anmerkung: Eine grobe Größenabschätzung des Preises für die Menge des hochangereicherten Urans, das man für eine Hiroshima-Bombe braucht, kommt auf 6000 Dollar. Irak hat eine weit vorangeschrittene Implosionstechnologie entwickelt, die eine 20 kt TNT Nuklearbombe (Hiroshima-Stärke) zünden kann (D. Kay, Iraqi inspections: lessons learned, talk given for the Program of Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies on February 10, 1993, CNS Special Collection on the Iraqi Crisis).

    Furthermore, leakage of fissile materials can be almost as dangerous as diversion of the weapons themselves. Even if we accept official assurances that nuclear weapons are adequately protected, we would have no basis for assuming that stocks of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium receive comparable protection.

    B 1.4. Technical Effort To Produce and Handle Nuclear Weapons

    Question: What is the technical effort and the time necessary to produce/handle nuclear weapons, and could such an effort can be concealed from inspectors?

    My Answer:

    1. On the one hand, the recipe for the construction of a moderately sized nuclear bomb is available in the literature. On the other hand, production of nuclear weapons material needs a major technological and time effort: running a military reactor, building and running an isotope separation plant, possibly a reprocessing plant, radiation shielding. That has been suppressed by International Atomic Energy Agency inspections.

    2. Proliferation can give Iraq immediate access to nuclear material, if Saddam can pay for it. The material can either be "suitcase bombs" or weapon-grade uranium and plutonium . Handling weapon-grade material is simple, since, apart from a non-hazardous weak halo of neutrons, it emits alpha-radiation which can be shielded by wrapping the material in aluminum foil.
      Source: Above mentioned review by Jack F. Matlock and the books he reviewed on diversion of nuclear material from Russia
      • Andrew Cockburn and Leslie Cockburn: "One Point Safe: A True Story", 288 pages, $23.95 (hardcover), Anchor, 1997,
      • Graham T. Allison, Owen R. Cote, Jr., Richard A. Falkenrath, and Steven E.Miller:" Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy: Containing the Threat of Loose Russian Nuclear Weapons and Fissile Material", 292 pages, $16.00 (paperback), MIT Press, 1996.
      • Peter Montague: "The Fourth Horseman: Nuclear Technology", RACHEL'S ENVIRONMENT & HEALTH WEEKLY 473, Environmental Research Foundation, 1995.

    B 2. Biological Weapons

    B 2.1. The Poor Man's Weapon Of Mass Destruction

    Question: What is the technical effort and the time necessary to produce biological weapons, and could such an effort be concealed from inspectors?

    To find an answer, I used the information provided by the Henry L. Stimson Center. For further reading you might visit the center's web site and check out the links to the Center's reports:

    • Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Project
      Geneva - Last Fall (1997 ?, J. Gruber), when Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein blocked UN Special Commission inspectors hot on the trail of Iraq's biological weapons program, the United States responded by deploying two carrier battle groups to the region and urging the Security Council to stand firm in support of the 1991 cease-fire resolution. However, a new report says that Washington risks losing a crucial opportunity to strengthen front line defenses against the proliferation of biological weapons - the Biological Weapons Convention. President Bill Clinton has called for the conclusion of a verification protocol for the Convention by 1998, but the U.S. delegation still did not have a detailed negotiating position when talks resumed on January 5th in Geneva.

    • What's New at the Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Project?

    Provided the 5 questions below can be answered correspondingly, here is what I conclude from what I found in these reports:

    1. Producing and concealing biological weapons seems to be cheap and easy.
      Biological Weapons Proliferation: Reasons for Concern, Courses of Action

      This report features the following chapters, for which executive summaries may be downloaded:

      1. The Threat of Deliberate Disease in the 21st Century, a detailed biological weapons threat assessment by Dr. Graham Pearson, former director of Great Britain's Chemical and Biological Weapons Defense Establishment;
      2. Industry's Role, Concerns, and interests in the Negotiation of a BWC Compliance Protocol, an industry perspective on a verification protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention by Dr. Gillian Woollett, Assistant Vice President at the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America;
      3. Doubts About Confidence: The Potential Limits of Confidence-Building Measures for the Biological Weapons Convention, a comprehensive overview of the utility of confidence-building measures for treaty monitoring by Dr. Marie Chevrier of Harvard University;
      4. Verification Provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention and Their Relevance to the Biological Weapons Convention, an analysis of the applicability of the CWC verification measures to a prospective BWC protocol by Dr. Jonathan Tucker of the Monterey Institute. At that time -1998- Dr. Jonathan Tucker is Project Director, Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Project, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Montery, California, USA:
      5. "... important differences between chemical and biological weapons limit the applicability of Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) verification measures to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC).
        • The fact that certain microbial and toxin agents are highly potent per unit weight means that a militarily significant quantity is measured in kilograms, compared with tons for chemical nerve agents.
        • Moreover, whereas production of a chemical arsenal requires a fairly large industrial plant, a stockpile of biological or toxin agents could be produced to order in a pilot-scale factory over a period of weeks.
        For theses reasons, the threshold for militarily significant cheating, or "treaty breakout", is considerably lower for the BWC than for the CWC. Finally, the ambiguities between offensive and defensive research on infectious agents and the lack of well-defined indicators of biological or toxin production make it more difficult to distinguish between "treaty-prohibited" and "treaty-permitted" activities at dual-capable biological facilities. For this reason, assessing intent is as important as physical evidence in determining BWC compliance. Table 3 describes the differences between chemical and biological weapns and shows where these differences complicate BWC compliannce monitoring."
      6. Man Versus Microbe: The Negotiations to Strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention, an examination of the obstacles facing the negotiations to bolster the BWC and recommendations for progress by Dr. Amy E. Smithson of the Stimson Center.

      The entire publication may also be downloaded. (Note: this is a 600kb PDF file.)

    2. When states claim they do not have nor do they produce biological weapons, efficient verification of that statement seems not possible. You can find a more detailed statement in Tab. 3 of Dr. Tucker's report.
    3. Dr. Tucker's Tab. 3 ends with the statement:
      "The shorter the advance warning prior to a challenge inspection of a suspected biological-weapon production facility, the greater the probability that clean-up will be incomplete and the inspectors will detect traces of illicit agents."
    4. Biological weapons are the "poor man's weapons of mass destruction". Therefore key states are hesitant to agree to a ban and effective enforcement of the ban (p. 7, Ch. 1 of above mentioned Report).
    From item 3 and the time necessary to produce relevant quantities of weapons material (see Question 2 below) I conclude with respect to the inspections in Iraq:
    The time delays forced onto the inspections by Iraq have been sufficiently large to enable Iraq to produce military relevant quantities of biological weapons. The newly scheduled inspections will not be able to find out whether or not Iraq has used this opportunity.

    B 2.2. Delayed Inspections May Be Useless Inspection

    I can see at least 5 open technical questions on biological weapons in Iraq
    1. Background:
      CNN reported that Iraq had bought (and inspectors found) some 34 tons of a growth medium, of which she needed an order of magnitude less for protein production.
      Could that growth medium be used to grow Anthrax?
    2. Background:
      Military significant quantities of agent can be produced to order in a few days or weeks, obviating the need for long-term storage. (Tab. 3, Dr. Tucker's report).
      In a November 5 letter to the Security Council's president, Qin Huasan of China, UNSCOM Executive Chairman Richard Butler complained of Iraq's blockage of inspections and its moving of dual use items away from the view of UNSCOM monitoring cameras during the standoff. Butler warned the council that, in the absence of inspections, it would take Iraq "only a matter of hours to adapt fermenters to produce seed stocks of biological warfare agent." (Erik J. Leklem, "Iraqi BW Program May Be Key to Standoff with UN".

      The basic doubling times (times between one generation and the next, depend on the type of bacterium) of the corresponding bacteria lie around a few (near 4) hours, i.e. one can produce one million bacteria from one or two bacteria in around 20 days.
      Multiplication by one million would be the order of magnitude necessary for producing weapons quantities (less than tens of kilograms - Tab. 3, Dr. Tucker's report).
      Is the doubling time similar when you increase the size of the production device from test tube to barrel or field plot (with some hundred kilograms of growth medium)?
    3. Background:
      Military significant production of biological and toxin agents in small-scale facilities may elude detection. Stockpiles may also be small enough to permit easy concealment. (Tab. 3, Dr. Tucker's report).
      Based on this, could Iraq hide a military relevant bio-production plant from inspections?
    4. Background:
      Fermentation equipment used to make vaccines, antibiotics, and other legitimate products can be converted to production of warfare agents. ... Conversion of a vaccine plant to biological agent production would take about a week, or periodic production could occur in an ostensibly civilian facility (Tab. 3 of Dr. Tucker's report).
      Could Iraq delay inspections in the usual manner and get a relevant amount of bacteria ready while inspectors are waiting outside the restricted complex for clearance from UN or the international community? Inspectors have had to wait at the front entrance while noticing people (Iraqis?) removing crates and boxes via the back exit onto a truck. They were allowed access after the truck had left.
    5. Background:
      same as in question 4
      If a relevant plant needs to be too large to escape inpectors' notice, would "cascading plants" be feasable, meaning: Once ready, could the hazardous amount simply be divided into subquantities, each shipped to some other location in the next restricted complex and then be used to continue multiplying bacteria, again with inspectors and international community being entangled in diplomatic discussions?

    C. Anhang - Appendix

    C 1. Weitere Information - Further Information

    C 1.1. Literatur - Literature and Web Sites

    • United Nations Special Commission

    • US Government

    • News Media

      • Public Broadcasting System (PBS):
        Jim Lehrer Newshour Inspecting The Deal, Febr. 25, 1998.
      • NBC:
        Robert Windrem, NBC News "Dr. Rihab Rashida Taha", a woman among the most important of a new breed of Third World weapons designers. United Nations inspectors
        say that despite her friendly demeanor, Dr. Rihab
        Rashida Taha has built one of the world's
        most lethal stockpiles of biological weapons.
      • The Washington Post
        • Washington Post Special Report:
          The team identified past and present activities at Iraqi sites by cross-referencing information from reports by the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) arms inspectors, Congressional Research Service reports, Los Alamos National Laboratories, the CIA's Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs report released February 13, 1998, and reporting by Washington Post writers R. Jeffrey Smith, Barton Gellman, John Mintz and others.
        • Main Page.
        • Iraq Cooperating on Inspections, by Barton Gellman, March 20, 1998; Page A27.
        • Russia Challenged To Disclose Status of Biological Weapons, by David Hoffman, February 26, 1998; Page A17.

    • Research Centers and Organizations

      • Arms Control Association.
        The Arms Control Association (ACA), founded in 1971, is a national nonpartisan membership organization dedicated to promoting public understanding of and support for effective arms control policies. Through its public education and media programs and its magazine, Arms Control Today, ACA provides policy-makers, the press and the interested public with authoritative information, analysis and commentary on arms control proposals, negotiations and agreements, and related national security issues. In addition to the regular press briefings ACA holds on major arms control developments, the Association's staff provides commentary and analysis on a broad spectrum of issues for journalists and scholars both in the United States and abroad.
        Related Reports

      • Carnegie Corporation of New York:
        Carnegie Corporation of New York was created by Andrew Carnegie in 1911 to promote the advancement and diffusion of knowledge and understanding. The Corporation's Program:
        Education and Healthy Development of Children and Youth
        Preventing Deadly Conflict
        Cooperative Security and Nonproliferation:
        The Corporation supports work to develop an international security strategy based on principles of cooperation, integration, and transparency. Primary emphasis is placed on encouraging more robust efforts by the United States, Russia, and other nations to curb the spread of advanced weaponry and weapons technology.
        Strengthening Human Resources in Developing Countries
        Special Projects
        Related Report

      • Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
        The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace was established in 1910 in Washington, D.C., with a gift from Andrew Carnegie. As a tax-exempt operating (not grant-making) foundation, the Endowment conducts programs of research, discussion, publication, and education in international affairs and U.S. foreign policy. The Endowment publishes the quarterly magazine, FOREIGN POLICY.
        Carnegie's senior associates - whose backgrounds include government, journalism, law, academia, and public affairs - bring to their work substantial first-hand experience in foreign policy. Through writing, public and media appearances, study groups, and conferences, Carnegie associates seek to invigorate and extend both expert and public discussion on a wide range of international issues. These include worldwide migration, nuclear non-proliferation, regional conflicts, multilateralism, democracy-building, and the use of force. The Endowment also engages in and encourages projects designed to foster innovative contributions in international affairs.

        Non-Proliferation Project.
        The Non-Proliferation Project serves as an independent source of information and analysis on nuclear affairs and conducts a wide array of professional and public-education activities promoting international efforts to curb the spread of nuclear arms.
        In Washington, the Project's ongoing program of research, analysis, and commentary includes two major survey publications: Tracking Nuclear Proliferation, a book-length periodic review of the global spread of nuclear arms, and Nuclear Successor States of the Soviet Union: Nuclear Weapon and Sensitive Export Status Report, a semi-annual report on nuclear controls and disarmament in the former Soviet Union (prepared in cooperation with the Monterey Institute of International Studies).

      • The Federation of American Scientists
        The Federation of American Scientists is engaged in analysis and advocacy on science, technology and public policy for global security. A privately-funded non-profit policy organization whose Board of Sponsors includes over 55 American Nobel Laureates, FAS was founded as the Federation of Atomic Scientists in 1945 by members of the Manhattan Project who produced the first atomic bomb.

        The Federation of American Scientists conducts analysis and advocacy on science, technology and public policy, including nuclear weapons, arms sales, biological hazards, secrecy, and space policy. FAS is a privately-funded non-profit policy organization whose Board of Sponsors includes half of America's living Nobel Laureates.

        FAS was founded as the Federation of Atomic Scientists in 1945 by members of the Manhattan Project who produced the first atomic bomb, to address the implications and dangers of the nuclear age. FAS is the oldest organization dedicated to ending the arms race and avoiding the use of nuclear weapons, and much of its work has been in nuclear arms control and disarmament. In addition, throughout its history FAS publications and projects have addressed a wide range of science and society issues, including those of population, energy, agriculture, medical care, and ethnic conflict (in countries such as Cambodia, Peru and Yugoslavia (see also research on Yugoslavia by the US Institute of Peace). FAS combines the scholarly resources of its scientists, including 41 Nobel laureates, with a knowledge of practical politics. As a non-profit organization licensed to lobby in the public interest, FAS is uniquely qualified to bring the scientific perspective to the legislative arena through direct lobbying, membership and grassroots work, and expert testimony at Congressional hearings. FAS is administered by its President, Jeremy J. Stone who also serves as a senior staff member and director of research. The Federation's primary publication is the F.A.S. Public Interest Report.

        The FAS Fund, the Federation's tax deductable arm, is a publicly supported foundation under IRS section 509a3 and tax-deductable under 501c3 working for FAS, which is a 501c4 civic organization. The FAS Fund engages in research analysis and public education on a broad range of science, technology, and public policy issues. Dr. Stone is also President of the FAS Fund. Currently, his primary endeavor is developing new FAS projects devoted to global security generally to complement existing FAS work in peace and national security. As it enters its second half century FAS is expanding the scope of its activities, with new projects being organized involving agriculture, medicine and a range of other issues.

        Our strategic partners include U.S. Newswire which provides media support, our primary computer consultant Randy Winn ClarkNet where this website is hosted, and The Institute for Global Communications (IGC) Peacenet, which also provides us Internet access services.

        The Federation of American Scientists is located on Capitol Hill, two blocks away from the United States Senate office buildings.

        Related Report
        • David Albright and Mark Hibbs "Iraq's nuclear hide-and-seek, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 47, No.7, September 1991.
          .... Everyone agrees that the amount of fissile material Iraq possesses under internal safeguards would be enough for an experienced nuclear weapons state to make into more than one nuclear device with an explosive yield of many kilotons. But how quickly Iraq could do so remains a matter of conjecture. ...

          In all, only about 14 kilograms of the 80 and 93 percent enriched uranium were unirradiated and could quickly have been made into a weapon, if Iraq was ready to do that. In addition, the nearly 12 kilograms of slightly irradiated 93 percent material and the partially irradiated 4.4 kilograms in the reactor might also have been recoverable. ...

        Documentation about making queries is available.
        FAS Homepage | Index | Search | Join FAS

      • The Monterey Institute of International Studies, Research Facilities:
        Business and Economic Development Center (BEDC)
        Center for East Asian Studies (CEAS)
        Center for Language Education and Work (CLEW)
        Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS)
        Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies (CRES)
        Center for Trade and Commercial Diplomacy (CTCD)
        International Interpretation Resource Center (IIRC)
        International Trade Research Center (ITRC)
        Project OCEANS
        Small Business Institute (SBI)

        The Center for Nonproliferation Studies:
        The Center for Nonproliferation Studies of the Monterey Institute of International Studies is the world's largest non-governmental organization devoted to combating the spread of weapons of mass destruction.  With a full-time staff of more than 35 specialists located in Monterey and Washington, the Center's six research programs examine all aspects of nonproliferation, publish online databases, and train graduate students.  The Center also publishes The Nonproliferation Review, a journal featuring the latest research on nonproliferation.

        Selected Reports

      • The Nuclear Control Institute (NCI)
        Founded in 1981, NCI is a research and advocacy center for preventing nuclear proliferation. Non-profit and non-partisan, we play a watchdog role in a complex and dangerous field. Active both at home and abroad, we engage government and industry officials, public-interest organizations and the media in our work.
        seeks to address four basic contributors to the spread of nuclear weapons: the growing presence of atom-bomb materials in civilian nuclear power and research programs; behavior of the nuclear-weapon states that stimulates or facilitates other states to go nuclear; loopholes in U.S. nuclear-export laws and international nuclear agreements, and tensions that drive regional rivals to acquire nuclear weapons. In particular, we focus on the urgency of eliminating weapons-usable materials, plutonium and highly enriched uranium, from civilian nuclear programs.

      • Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI)
        Fact Sheet: NTI - Working for a Safer World
        "NTI's mission is to strengthen global security by reducing the risk of use and preventing the spread of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. NTI seeks to raise public awareness, serve as a catalyst for new thinking and take direct action to reduce these threats.

        Since governments have most of the resources and authority in addressing the threats from nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, it is not just what NTI can do directly to reduce threats that matters -- it's also what NTI can persuade others to do.

        That's why NTI's focus is on leverage. By combining its influential voice with direct action projects that show the way, NTI has motivated governments and private organizations to invest additional resources and take additional action to increase global security."

      • The Henry L. Stimson Center
        The Henry L. Stimson Center is a nonprofit, nonpartisan institution devoted to public policy research. The center concentrates on particularly difficult national and international security issues where policy, technology, and politics intersect.
        Selected Reports

      • The W. Alton Jones Foundation
        The W. Alton Jones Foundation is a private grantmaking foundation focusing on global environmental protection and the prevention of nuclear war or other massive release of radioactive material.
    • Organizations Dedicated to the Nonproliferation of Chemical and Biological Weapons (in cache)

    C 1.2. Iraq - Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction:
    Germany's Weapons Component Proliferation to Iraq

    Milhollin G, Building Saddam Hussein's Bomb, The New York Times Magazine, March 8, 1992, p. 30., Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Armament Control.
    In the five years before the Persian Gulf war, for example, the Commerce Department licensed more than $1.5 billion of strategically sensitive American exports to Iraq. Many were for direct delivery to nuclear weapon, chemical weapon and missile sites. Companies like Hewlett-Packard, Honeywell, International Computer Systems, Rockwell and Tektronix sold high-performance electronics either to Saad 16, Iraq's major missile research center; to the Ministry of Industry and Military Industrialization, which set up Al Atheer; to the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission, responsible for atomic-bomb research; or to Nasr State Enterprise, in charge of Iraq's missile and nuclear procurement. Honeywell even did a feasibility study for a powerful gasoline bomb warhead, intended for an Iraqi-Egyptian missile.

    As bad as the American record is, Germany's is worse. Germany supplied more of Iraq's mass-destruction machinery than all other countries combined. Germany not only sold Iraq most of its centrifuge equipment, it also furnished an entire chemical weapon industry and was Iraq's greatest supplier of missile technology, including a flood of parts that enabled Iraq to extend the range of its Scud missiles. During the Persian Gulf war, enhanced Scuds hit Tel Aviv and a United States Army barracks in Saudi Arabia, killing 28 sleeping soldiers.

    To develop an even longer-range missile, Iraq turned to the German armament giant Messerschmitt, now doing business as MBB (Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm). MBB supplied the know-how for a 600-mile nuclear-capable missile called the Condor II that Iraq tried to develop jointly with Egypt and Argentina before the war. The missile's range and configuration are similar to that of the American Pershing, which MBB worked on at the Pentagon. The same MBB employee who worked on the Pershing at the Pentagon also represented MBB in Iraq for the Condor, and thus was in a position tn transfer American missile technology to Baghdad.

    • -
      (an update might follow from Hans Blix's 27. January, 2003 brief, in which he states:
      ... Also associated with these missiles and related developments is the import, which has been taking place during the last few years, of a number of items despite the sanctions, including as late as December 2002. Foremost amongst these is the import of 380 rocket engines which may be used for the Al Samoud 2.
      Iraq also declared the recent import of chemicals used in propellants, test instrumentation and, guidance and control systems. These items may well be for proscribed purposes. That is yet to be determined. What is clear is that they were illegally brought into Iraq, that is, Iraq or some company in Iraq, circumvented the restrictions imposed by various resolutions.)
    • Einzelheiten recherchiert von Report München.

    Until 1992 Germany's manufacturers did not fully comply with UN Iraq embargo and German export laws (for details see pages 13 and 14 of Bill of Indictment by the district court in Augsburg, Germany, in 1992)

    [In 1992] German authorities have begun investigating possible violations of export control laws by several German firms. In 4/92, 27 supplier countries agreed to strengthen the rules for transfer of sophisticated dual-item technology (Michael Wise, The Washington Post, 5/19/92, P. A15). ... Foreign individuals driven by a profit motive provided key know-how to Iraq. To limit such participation in the future, the FRG recently [1992] approved "citizens participation" laws that make it illegal for German citizens to take part in potential proliferation countries' nuclear weapons program (David Albright, Mark Hibbs, Arms Control Today, 7-8/92, PP. 3-11).

    Source of the following compilation is from the CNS Database of the CNS SPECIAL COLLECTION ON THE IRAQ CRISIS (local link)), as excerpted in their "Iraqi Nuclear Abstracts" and "Iraqi Missile Abstracts", published by The Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, California, USA.

    Nuclear Components
    Source: The Iraqi Nuclear Abstracts 1991 ... 1998.

    Probable range of proliferation: uranium enrichment technology applicable to the production of weapons-grade uranium, advanced reactors and energy systems-plant operation.

    • Federal Republic of Germany (companies' names not released):
      1. 1991
      2. 1992
        1992 - 1, 1992 - 2, 1992 - 3, 1992 - 4, 1992 - 5, 1992 - 6, 1992 - 7, 1992 - 8 (IAEA identifies dozens of firms, mostly German, whose products were used in the Iraq nuclear program. US companies supplied 40 percent of the high-technology equipment for the Saad 16 project.) 1992 - 9, 1992 - 10, 1992 - 11, 1992 - 12, 1992 - 13,
      3. 1994
        1994 - 1, 1994 - 2 (smuggling of fissile material?),
      4. 1996
        1996 - 1, 1996 - 2, 1996 - 3,
    • Degussa AG: furnace
      1991 - 1, 1992 - 1, 1996 (12/95 UNSCOM 500-pages report accuses a total of 16 managers and employees of Degussa, Reutlinger and Leybold, total deals worth more than 21 million German mark),
    • Dornier GmbH: centrifuge work
    • Export Union GmbH: maraging steel and carbon fibers for centrifuge rotors
      1991 - 1, 1992 - 2,
    • Gildemeister Projects GmbH (Gipro): main contractor for Saad 16 nuclear weapon construction project, prosecuted by FRG courts for exporting a computer with a spectrometer and a small computer to Iraq without certificates
      1991-1, Litten industries of the US owned a 17% share in Gipro from 1984 to 1989
    • H & H Metallform Maschinenbau and Vertriebs GmbH - a company subsidized by the German Government -: flow forming machines, magnetic bearings, enrichment cascade technology
      1. 1991
        1991 - 1, 1991 - 2, 1991 - 3,
      2. 1992
        1992 - 1, 1992 - 2, 1992 - 3 (B. Stemmler, W. Busse), 1992 - 4, 1992 - 5, 1992 - 6 (B. Stemmler),
      3. 1996
        1996 (K.-H.Schaab),
    • Interatom GmbH: enrichment technology, amongst others a virtually complete picture of the centrifuge, advanced reactors and energy systems-plant operation
      1. 1991
        1991 - 1, 1991 - 2 (cheating on export licence?),
      2. 1992
        1992 - 1, 1992 - 2, 1992 - 3, 1992 - 4 (cheating on IAEA),
      3. 1996
        1996 ("most serious nuclear export violation Germany has ever had to face", German government official said),
    • Inwako GmbH: magnetic suspension bearing, AlNiCo-magnets
      1. 1991
      2. 1992
        1992 - 1, 1992 - 2, 1992 - 3,
    • Leybold-Heräus AG: fixture for rotor tube, electron beam welder for attaching maraging steel caps to rotors
      1. 1991
        1991 - 1, 1991 - 2,
      2. 1992
        1992 - 1, 1992 - 2,
    • Maschinenfabrik Augsburg-Nürnberg (MAN) Technologien GmbH: technology advisors B. Stemmler, W. Busse, carbon fiber rotors, carbon fiber winding machines
        1991 - 1, 1991 - 2,
      1. 1992
        1992 - 1, 1992 - 2, 1992 - 3,
      2. 1996
        1996 - 1, 1996 - 2, 1996 - 3,
      3. 1998
        (see also Karl-Heinz Schaab, Rosch GmbH)
    • Neue Magdelburger Werkzeugmaschinenfabrik GmbH: computer numerically controlled machines, 3 large centrifuges
      1. 1991
      2. 1992 - 1, 1992 - 2, 1992 - 3, 1992 - 4,
    • Arthur Pfeiffer Vakuumtechnik GmbH: very high temperature vacuum induction furnaces
      1991, 1992,
    • C. Plath: parts and tools for centrifuge development program
    • Dr. Reutlinger und Söhne KG: horizontal and vertical centrifuge balancing machines, valves capable of handling uranium hexafluorite (the gas being enriched in ultracentrifuges)
      1. 1991
        1991 - 1, 1991 - 2,
      2. 1992
    • Rhein-Bayern Fahrzeugbau GmbH: purchase middleman (see below)
    • The Sauer Informatic GmbH: (managed by Klaus Murmann) exported a DM 10-million computer plant to Iraq for the Saad 16 project.
    • Rosch GmbH, consulting firm (owner: Karl-Heinz Schaab, former employee of MAN): sentenced in 1992 to over 11 months on probation for selling classified centrifuge technology, pipes, high-vacuum tech, carbon fiber-filament winding machines (for rotor tubes in 1989)
      1. 1996 reports on his activities, hiding after been sentenced
        1996 - 1, 1996 - 2, 1996 - 3, 1996 - 4, 1996 - 5,
      2. 1997 reports
        1997 (Schaab arrested in Brazil in late 1996),
      3. 1998
        1998 - 1 (Brazil's Federal Supreme Court declines extradition of S), 1998 - 2 (accuses MAN of aiding Iraq's nuclear program),
    • Siemens AG: 1992 (see Interatom),
    • Straßenbau AG (Strabag): construction work at nuclear facility
      1992 - 1, 1992 - 2,
    • Uranium Enrichment Company (URENCO):
      1. 1991
        1991 (delivered G2 ultracentrifuge to Pakistan),
      2. 1992
        1992 - 1 (MAN and Dornier partners in U), 1992 - 2 (Iraq obtained design info from U), 1992 - 3 (suppresses info from IAEA to state governments about involvement in Iraq's nuclear program, U gas centrifuge is backbone of Iraq's centrifuge program), 1992 - 4 (Iraq copied U design), 1992 - 5 (no evidence for Iraq having acquired blueprints from U),
      3. 1996
        1996 (Swiss shipment of a [U] carbon fiber production machine to Jordan, for end use by Iraq),
      4. 1997
        1997 (UN inspections indicate a leak from U to Iraq).
    A few specific details:

    Iraq enriched uranium to weapons-grade, i.e. separated the (lighter) uranium isotope needed in weapons from the remaining (heavier) uranium isotopes, by employing all established technical processes.

    Iraq has produced at most 3 kilograms of weapons-grade uranium. Carson Mark, Theoretical Division, Los Alamos National Laboratory, New Mexico, estimated the yield of a uranium bomb Iraq could have manufactured from the weapons-grade uranium they had bought (that was more than the mentioned 3 kg): the bomb would have weighed at least 1 ton and had a maximum yield of 10 kilotons TNT, i.e. half the yield of the Hiroshima bomb (David Albright and Mark Hibbs, Iraq's nuclear hide-and-seek (local link), Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist, September 1991, Vol. 47, No. 7)

    Technical terms used:
    For a rather comprehensive glossary see "Annex I, Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Weapons: An Introductory Guide" in: MCIS NPT BRIEFING BOOK, April 2004 Edition, Mountbatten Centre for International Studies (MCIS) in association with the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS). (local link)

    In principle, separation of uranium isotopes (the so-called "enrichment" of uranium isotope U-235 in the natural U-238/U-235 mixture of isotopes) is achieved by centrifugation of the (natural isotope mix of) uranium gas or uranium ions (more). The major two are the gas ultracentrifuge program, which largely utilized technology, material, and experts from Germany, and the calutron, almost entirely developed by the Iraqis and its most successful program:

    1. In the gas ultracentrifuge a gaseous chemical compount of uranium is spun around by mechanical forces. Because of the low efficiency of a single ultracentrifuge, this process needs a cascade of a very large number of such centrifuges.
    2. In the calutrons the ions are spun around by electromagnetic forces. The calutron was the major uranium enrichment device in Iraq. Cal-u-tron is an acronym composed from the words California -the device, a synchrotron, was invented by Ernest O. Lawrence in Berkeley (California), uranium and synchrotron. The latter is basically an electrical capacitor. The electrical field between its entrance and exit plate accelerates the ions. Magnets bend the ion path to a circle, thus forcing the accelated ions leaving the capacitor's exit plate back through its entrance plate. This way, the ions are accelerated again and again. This old, expensive, energy-intensive technology was developed in World War II in the US and produced the weapons-grade uranium for the Hiroshima bomb (local link).

    Missile Components (some companies supplied both missile and nuclear technology.)
    Source:The Iraqi Missile Abstracts 1991 ... 1998.

    Missile component trade with Iraq violates a UN embargo and German export laws.

    • German companies, names not always specified:
      • UN inspection teams charged with investigating Iraq's nuclear weapons capabilities have disclosed 1991 that German companies knowingly assisted in extending the range of Iraqi Scud missiles. In particular,
        • 20% of the pressure lines found in Scuds were made in Germany,
        • 3 missiles in particular included German-made pressure gauges and had electrical plugs manufactured by Hirschmann of Germany,
        • portions of launch vehicles were of German origin.
        • Goldhofer supplied load bearing chassis,
        • Siemans' electrical distributors were present,
        • an electrical switch control board manufactured by Polyma.
        • launchers were located containing parts manufactured by Mercedes Benz.
        The German embassy had denied this in early 1991.
      • Iraqi Embassy worked with Germany to purchase new European military technology, said Vafik Samari in 1998, a former Iraqi military intelligence agent who defected to the West.
      • 16 German companies allegedly under German investigation for illegal exports of nuclear and Scud missile technology, according to Washington Times, 1997.
      • Since 1990, firms in Germany have supplied Iraq with advanced machine tools and trade continues, said UN officials in 1995.
      • German and Saudi inspectors confiscated over 100 barrels of ammonium perchlorate from a German-registered ship in 1993, a component for solid-fuel long range ballistic missiles.
      • 1992 sale of computerized machine tools from Germany to Iran (sic)
      • CNC (computer numerical control) machine tools and a liquid nitrogen plant operate under German licence as UN seeks to stop production of conventional arms in 1992.
      • Argentina delivered Condor II "elements" to Iraq through Egypt prior to the 1991 Gulf War. "There has not been any transfer of Argentinean technology to Iraq, as the technology in question was fundamentally German", said Argentine defense minister Oscar Camilion in 1993. German technicians had worked on Condor II in Argentina. Condor missile, a more modern European version of Iraq's aging Scud missile, basically the old German V-2 rocket. The Condor is capable of carrying a 500kg payload and hitting targets in Israel and several NATO countries (range 1000 km).

    • German Federal Intelligence Service (BND):

    • Concen Group, a new partner of Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm, sells rocket technology worldwide:

    • H & H Metalform GmbH:
      • The company was a major contributor of technology, machine tools, and specialized equipment to Iraq's missile and nuclear programs, centrifuge deals being only small part, said Bruno Stemmler in 1993, former employee of MAN Technologies and Dornier.
      • In 1992, two business managers under investigative custody since 2/92 are accused of
        • supplying Iraq with 27,436 individual parts for Scud-B missiles and a range of machinery for the production of artillery rockets, all valued at 46 million German marks in 1988 - 1990,.
        • attempted smuggling 2,284 more parts after enforced embargoes,
        • attempting to convey information on technology and production of weapons-grade uranium by means of the gas ultracentrifuge process.
        • Company also is suspected to have gotten computer numerically controlled (CNC) machines from the German firm Neue Magdeburger Werkzeugmachinenfabrik GmbH to send to Iraq. In late 1991 IAEA inspectors found the CNC machines in Iraq; they were used with computer programs from another firm to produce centrifuge parts such as end caps. Iraq could not have developed the programs alone.

    • Maho:
      Maho's, SHW's, Dorries' and Hauser's are manufacturers of dual use machine tools with known nuclear end use found by International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors in Iraq's Al Rabiya plant. They are relevant in the production of calutrons and centrifuges. Iraq's military-industrial infrastructure is mostly composed of dual use equipment that can produce everything from chemical and nuclear weapons to long-range missiles.

    • Messerschmitt -Bölkow-Blohm: This aerospace company is connected with the Concen Group,

    • Rhein-Bayern Fahrzeugbau GmbH and Co., KG:
      1994, owner Anton Eyerle, Walter Dittel, both German nationals, and Subramanian Venkataramanan, an Indian citizen, jailed for up to 5 1/2 years because of his firm's continued delivery of missile components to Iraq before 1991, enough ignition systems for Styx and Scud missiles "to wipe out the entire Middle East.", German judge said. "By exporting such war weapons to a war and crisis zone, the defendants caused considerable international attention to be focused on the Federal Republic of Germany and thereby made it more difficult for the FRG to realize its foreign policy goals. Such exports also served to support Iraq in its war efforts directed against the peoples of the Middle East, "said the district attorney.
      Bill of Indictment (local link) details:
      • Company illegally reverse-engineered (copied) and sold components for the Russian-made ship-to-ship Styx missile and Scud-missile.
      • sold
        • containers for chemical agents ("floating bodies") to be placed into 122 mm warheads,
        • 240,000 ferrite and 10,000 ringband cores and a complete stator (the part into which the cores are placed) for approx. 10,000 ultracentrifuges. These gas centrifuges are used to enrich uranium to weapon-grade quality.
        • 50 tons of high-quality graphite (0.3 million German Mark) suitable for electromagnetic uranium enrichment equipment and missile use (for other nuclear use of graphite, use your browser's Find to look for "graphite" in Iraq Inspections: Lessons Learned).
      • Company's technologies helped Iraq increase Soviet Scud-missiles' range (total sales 2.1 million German mark). Illegal sales totaled an estimated 30 million German mark (local link).

    • Telemit Electronic GmbH of Munich: The company possibly employs BND agents suspected of equipping Iraq, Libya with miltary electronics, said CIA, Mossad in 1998.

    • Water Engineering and Trading GmbH of Hamburg (Watec Ingenieurbüro, Fachlaboratorium und Fachhandel für Wassertechnik und Luftreinhaltung, Dieter-Joachim Becker?):

    Biological and Chemical Weapons Components

    C 1.3. Namen - Names

    Rolf Ekeus

    After more than six years as the executive chairman of the UN Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM), Ambassador Rolf Ekeus is stepping down to become Sweden's ambassador to the United States. As the United Nations' chief weapons inspector in Iraq, Ekeus has led the international effort to eliminate Baghdad's nuclear, biological and chemical weapons programs and proscribed ballistic missile activities since UNSCOM was established by the UN Security Council in April 1991. Ekeus has also directed UNSCOM's program to implement a monitoring system to prevent Iraq from reacquiring any such capabilities in the future. As Ekeus was preparing to turn over the reins of UNSCOM to his successor, Ambassador Richard Butler of Australia, on July 1, Arms Control Today caught up with the Swedish diplomat to ask him about his tenure at UNSCOM and the agency's accomplishments.

    During his distinguished diplomatic career, Ekeus has played a major role in a number of disarmament negotiations. Among his assignments, from 1978 to 1983 Ekeus was Sweden's permanent representative to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. In 1984 and 1987, he chaired the UN Committee on Chemical Weapons, and in 1985 he chaired the Drafting Committee at the nuclear NonProliferation Treaty Review Conference. In 1996, Ekeus was a member of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons. He is expected to take up his new post in Washington on September 12.
    (from: Ambassador Rolf Ekeus: Leaving Behind the UNSCOM Legacy in Iraq, Arms Control Association, Washington, DC. USA.)

    C 2. Vorschläge für Briefe - Drafts Of Letters

    C 2.1 Brief an den deutschen Außenminister

    An den deutschen Außenminister
    Postfach 1148
    D 53001 Bonn

    Datum: 8.3.98

    Sehr geehrter Herr Außenminister!

    Der von den UN mit dem Irak ausgehandelte Vertrag zur Kontrolle der Rüstung im Irak läßt Präsident Saddam Hussein weiterhin die Möglichkeit, die Inspektoren schwer zu behindern und Massenvernichtungswaffen zu entwickeln.

    Andere Staatsführungen mit ähnlichen Ambitionen, wie wir sie bei Präsident Saddam erkennen, könnten dadurch zu ähnlichen Schritten ermuntert werden.

    Wirksame Kontrollen dieser Waffen sind jedoch im Interesse aller Staaten dieser Erde, also auch des Irak.

    Bei der entschlosseneren Auseinandersetzung mit dieser Problematik der Entwicklung und Proliferation von Massenvernichtungswaffen sollte, so meinen wir, Deutschland nicht nur wie bisher die im Hinblick auf die Krise im Irak gebildete internationale Koalition unterstützen, sondern -wenn möglich- ihr beitreten, wie es z.B. Belgien, Dänemark oder die Niederlande getan haben.

    Dr. Joachim Gruber, Adresse:
    Marianne Steenken, Adresse:

    C 2.2 Übersetzung des deutschen Briefs für den Präsidenten der USA, Bill Clinton

    Man kann ihn per E-mail verschicken:

    • entweder mithilfe eines WWW-Formulars auf der Web-Site des Weissen Hauses

    • oder indem man den unten stehenden Vordruck mit "Kopieren" und "Einfuegen" in eine eigene E-mail direkt an den Präsidenten umwandelt.
      (dabei meinen Text durch entsprechenden eigenen ersetzen)


      Vordruck vom Weißen Haus für E-Mail

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      Express approval of the efforts on the side of the US Government to reinforce UN control of the weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.


      We have sent the German original of the following opinion to the German Secretary of State

      The arms control agreement between the UN and Iraq allows President Saddam Hussein to further impede the inspections and to continue developing weapons of mass destruction.

      Leaders of other countries with similar ambitions, as we see President Saddam having, might feel encouraged by this and head in a similar direction.

      Efficient controls on these weapons is in the interest of all countries on this earth, also in the interest of Iraq.

      In dealing with this problem of development and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, Germany should, as to our opinion, not only continue to support the coalition formed in view of the crisis in Iraq but should actually join it if possible, as did e.g. Belgium, Denmark or the Netherlands.

      Joachim Gruber
      Marianne Steenken

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