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Iraqi Nuclear Abstracts: 1997
These abstracts are excerpted from the CNS Monitoring Proliferation Threats Nuclear Abstracts Database.  The material presented here is a representative sample of the material contained in the full database.  Abstracts do not include the full text of the original source, but do include all proliferation-relevant information.  CNS has made no attempt to evaluate the veracity or accuracy of the information provided by the original sources.  Access to the CNS Databases is provided on a subscription basis. For information on how to subscribe, please contact Chris Fitz at


Adherence To And Compliance With Arms Control Agreements

Arms Control And Disarmament Agency (ACDA) Annual Report, 1996 
Concerning Iraq's compliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) the ACDA report to Congress states: "The United States has determined that Iraq violated its safeguards agreement when it pursued an active nuclear weapons development program and that this program violated Iraq's obligations under Articles II and III of the NPT. The United States has further determined that Iraq has continued to undermine the UNSCOM/IAEA inspection process by withholding relevant information, and to preserve s much nuclear- related technology and expertise s possible for a renewed weapons effort. 

"Iraq's Nuclear weapons program violated Article II's requirement 'not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.' Iraq's construction of secret nuclear facilities, including its construction of a facility for nuclear weapons development and assembly, contributed to its violation of Article II. Iraq's failure to apply safeguards to its clandestine program also constituted a violation of Article III, which requires that safeguards be applied 'with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful purposes to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.'" 

Iraq Bars Entry By American Arms Inspectors

Washington Post, 10/31/97 [Online] idx.html, by John M. Goshko 
Iraq denied entry to two American inspectors with the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) on 10/30/97, and drew "sharp, unequivocal criticism" from members of the UN Security Council. The two inspectors, along with a third American working for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) attempted to fly into Baghdad from Bahrain, and were denied permission to debark from their airplane.[1] US State Department spokesman James Rubin said that Iraq faced retaliation, including the use of military force, if it did not admit the American inspectors. "This is a very serious matter, and we are not ruling any option out at this time," said Rubin.[2] 

Iraq had announced on 10/29/97 that it would no longer accept American inspectors on the UNSCOM team, and ordered the 10 to 12 Americans, out of 40 inspectors [2] already in Iraq, to leave within seven days. It also demanded a halt to the use of American U-2 reconnaissance aircraft over Iraq to pinpoint the remnants of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. 

Diplomats at the United Nations said Iraq may have miscalculated UN resolve to continue with UNSCOM inspections. On 10/23/97, Russia, China, and France abstained from a Security Council resolution, sponsored by the United States, threatening new sanctions against Iraq. However, Baghdad's decision to bar American inspectors prompted both France and Russia to call on Iraq to reverse its decision,[2] and Russia called the Iraqi ambassador in Moscow to the Foreign Ministry.[1] 

Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov told US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright that Iraq "cannot pick and choose who the inspectors are and the nationalities of the inspectors." Britain's Derek Fatchett, a junior official with the foreign ministry, said "We're not ruling out any option at this time. We are not going to allow Iraq to rearm itself again." 

Supporting Sources: 

[1] James Bone, The Times (London), 10/31/97 [Online] http://www.Sunday-, "Iraq Bars American Pair In Arms Row With UN." [2] Steven Lee Myers, New York Times, 10/31/97 {online], "Iraq Bars US Arms Inspectors." 

Saddam In Secret UK Arms Offensive

Sunday Times, [Online] http: //, 1/19/97, by David Leppard, Tim Kelsey, and Jason Burke 
Iraq has reportedly reactivated its arms procurement network in the UK and is covertly trying to rebuild its British-made machine tools. According to "Western businessmen" who visited Iraq, British machine tools, which were previously used to manufacture gas centrifuges for enriching uranium, are being used at a former Iraqi missile production plant at Badr. 

BSA Tools chief executive Keith Bailey said that his company was approached five or six times for spare parts by companies he believed may have been acting on behalf of Iraq. The British Department of Trade and Industry said it would investigate the matter. 

Supporting Sources: [1] Reuter, 1/18/97; in Executive News Service, 1/21/97, "Iraq Trying To Buy British Arms." [2] UPI, 1/19/97; in Executive News Service, 1/21/97, "Paper Says Iraq Buying Weapons Machinery." 

Brazil Blocking Extradition Of Iraq's German Centrifuge Expert

Nucleonics Week, 3/20/97, pp. 17-18, by Mark Hibbs 
Germany has been unable to extradite Karl-Heinz Schaab, a German uranium enrichment expert who aided Iraq's secret nuclear program, from Brazil. Schaab was arrested in Rio de Janeiro in late 1996, based on evidence uncovered in 1995 showing he sold Urenco design blueprints to Iraq. Schaab had been an employee of MAN Technologie, a development firm in Urenco's uranium enrichment program. 

Germany has charged Schaab with treason, which Brazil considers to be a political crime. Under Brazilian law, the country is not required to extradite a suspect charged with political crimes. German federal attorneys said the charges against Schaab are based on evidence that he sold classified information for profit; an economic crime. Unnamed sources speculate that the treason charge may have to be dropped in order to have Schaab extradited. Schaab had previously been convicted of export control violations relating to his "centrifuge freelancing" for Iraq; under German law, he can not be retried on the same charge

Lessons From Iraq Spur Tougher Atomic Inspections

Executive News Service, 5/16/97  

Reuter, 5/16/97, by Steve Pagani 

On 5/16/97, the IAEA Executive Board of Governors approved a new protocol to establish a strengthened nuclear inspection program for the IAEA. Under the protocol, IAEA inspectors have the authority to check non-declared installations, including research-and-development facilities. Inspectors need give only 24-hours notice to visit a facility, and under exceptional circumstances an expert working on-site can request to inspect a facility immediately. The IAEA will also set up remote surveillance of sites that will provide information directly to IAEA computers in Vienna. 

Supporting Sources: 

[1] AFP (Paris), 5/15/97; in FBIS-TAC-97-135, 5/15/97, "Austria: IAEA Governors Seek More Powers Of Site Inspection." 

Iraq Blocks Three U.N. Weapons Inspection Searches

Reuter, 6/12/97, by Evelyn Leopold 
Rolf Ekeus, chief inspector for UNSCOM, reported that Iraqi officials blocked inspectors from suspected military sites on 6/5 and again on 6/10. According to Charles Duelfer, deputy chief of the commission, "...we were told by a high Iraqi official we were not going to get access...." On 6/22, Duelfer accused Iraq of removing documents from sites during inspections.[1] 

Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz said on 6/29 that, "I can and I will guarantee their access to any site that is within their mandate (but) not beyond their mandate." Aziz further said that Iraq will not grant UN weapons inspectors unrestricted access to all sites, despite threats to increase sanctions.[2] 

Supporting Sources: 

[1] Waiel Faleh, Associated Press, 6/22/97, "Iraq-UN." [2] CNN, 6/30/97, "Iraqi Official: UN Inspectors Will Not Have Unlimited Access to Sites", [online] 

France Says IAEA Should Close Nuclear File On Iraq

Reuter, 10/17/97, by Evelyn Leopold 
France's ambassador to the United Nations, Alain Dejammet, said on 10/17/97 that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is not producing any new information on Iraq, and recommended that the IAEA "close its file" on Iraq. Dejammet said that any remaining questions on Iraqi nuclear materials should be placed under the UN's long-term monitoring program in Baghdad, and should no longer "be a factor in the Security Council's discussions of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction." 

White House, UN Warn Iraq On Weapons 

CNN Interactive, 10/28/97, [Online] 
The United States warned Iraq that serious consequences would result if UN arms inspectors were not allowed to inspect its facilities. A White House spokesman declined to say what the consequences might be; however, he said that the United States has a wide range of options to choose from. 

Iraqi Foreign Minister Mohammed Saeed Al-Sahaf said that Iraq has implemented all UN resolutions, and will now accept nothing less then the lifting of sanctions imposed on it after the Gulf War. Al-Sahaf also said: "Iraq has not threatened anybody and does not wish to threaten anybody. But we will be forced, if the siege is not lifted soon, to look for other alternatives." Al- Sahaf did not say what the alternatives were. [1] 

[1] Reuters Ltd.,10/23/97, Iraq Says To Accept Nothing Less Than Embargo End 

IAEA Cannot Say If Iraq Scrapped Nuclear Program

Reuter, 11/4/97 
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has said that it cannot rule whether Iraq has dismantled its nuclear weapons program because members of the UN Security Council cannot agree on what constitutes a dismantled program. IAEA head Hans Blix said that his agency was sure Iraq's infrastructure for producing nuclear weapons had been removed following six years of on-site inspections. However, Security Council members Britain and the United States seek further proof of the end of Iraq's program than do France, Russia, and China. "It's for them to say; they have to take the political decision," said Blix. "It's not a decision that is suitable for a technical agency." 

UN Diplomats Say Baghdad Resistant

The Washington Post, 11/07/97, by John M. Goshko 
Richard Butler, executive chairman of the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) reported that Iraqis were moving equipment beyond the range of surveillance cameras and obstructing camera operation. 

US State Department spokesman James Rubin said, "Iraqi President Saddam Hussein continues to exploit this period, to raise the prospect that he is hiding and moving weapons of mass destruction." [1] 

In the Iraqi's defense, Mohammed Said Sahaf, Iraqi Foreign Minister denied that Baghdad had obstructed UN arms monitoring. However, Sahaf said that equipment had been moved to protect it from US air strikes and that UN surveillance camera had been damaged when a short-range missile engine exploded. 

[1] Reuters Ltd., 11/06/97, "Focus-Iraq-UN Talks End Positively, Diplomat". 

After 7 Years Of Evasion, Iraq Has Tons Of Illicit Arms

New York Times International, by Tim Weiner, 11/11/97, [Online] 
United States officials said that if political and economic sanctions are lifted, the Iraqi President, Saddam Hussein could manufacture destructive arsenal independently. Officials added that Hussein could produce this arsenal with the material and expertise that has been concealed from weapons inspectors for the last seven years. 

Gary Milhollin, a private analyst of weapons proliferation, said, "Hussein's production capability has been put on hold" since the gulf war. "But his research effort has gone forward. We have to assume his scientists have progressed in understanding how to make better weapons of mass destruction." 

US Defense Secretary William Cohen said that ever since the Gulf war, Iraq "has continued to try to develop chemical and biological weapons, and possibly even acquire nuclear materials," while "playing a hide and seek game" with the United Nations inspectors. 

The Iraqis presented to the United Nations last month a declaration of "full, final and complete disclosure" of the biological warfare program. The United Nations said," the report fails to give a remotely credible account" of the program. 

How Arms Sleuths Battle Iraqi Deceit

The Christian Science Monitor, 11/20/97, by Ann Scott Tyson 
On August 20, 1995, Rolf Ekeus, the former chairman for the UN Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM), received an unusual request from an Iraqi official. The official asked Ekeus to stop by a chicken farm before leaving Baghdad and "hinted it could be interesting." Ekeus, along with eight UNSCOM inspectors, searched the chicken coop and found a cache of documents detailing Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. 

Ekeus said, "The documents verified that Iraq had a crash program on nuclear weapons, a secret missile program, biological weapons testing, and a lot on chemical equipment imported for weapons purposes." 

A major concern, most experts say, is Iraq's ability to resume production of weapons of mass destruction and this dilemma suggests that UN monitors will remain in Iraq for years. 

According to an UNSCOM report, inspectors are monitoring more than 300 sites, ranging from sophisticated manufacturing plants, to pesticide factories. They also track thousands of pieces of "tagged equipment" and missile systems, tons of chemicals, and weapons related imports. 

Panel Reports On Iraq Arms

New York Times International, 11/23/97, By Barbara Crossette [Online] 
The governing board of the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) briefed the UN Security Council on 11/23/97 at the United Nations. The Security Council learned that Iraq had not yet met the requirements for reducing its surveillance of its biological, chemical or missile systems but did seem to end its nuclear program. 

The Special Commission's board was not in favor of Russia's request to end surveillance on Iraq so that sanctions could be lifted. The board recommended that inspectors be given better equipment and more cooperation from Baghdad. 

Iraqi Spies Know UN Inspectors' Next Moves, Officials Say

The New York Times, 11/25/97, by Tim Weiner, [Online] 
US intelligence officials said that Iraqi intelligence agents spied on UN weapons inspectors. The officials said that the intelligence gathered enabled the Iraqis to determine which facilities the inspectors would be inspecting, allowing the Iraqis enough time to hide suspected weapons caches. 

There is still some speculation as to what kinds of methods the Iraqis are using when spying on the UN inspection teams. However, US officials believe that they have been doing this for over a year and a half. 

INC Lists Iraqi Nuclear, BW, CW, Facilities

FBIS-TAC-97-334, 11/30/97  

Iraqi National Congress, 11/25/97 

The following is a list of Iraqi facilities that work on nuclear weapons (NW), biological weapons (BW), and chemical weapons (CW). Some of the facilities are not operational but will start up again when sanctions are lifted. 

Name of Facility Location Products and Specialization's 

1.Badr General Est. Al-Yusufiyah missile casings, mobile launchers, spare parts for casings 

2.Qa'qa' Gen. Est. Al-Yusufiyah missile fuel, warheads 

3.Al Wafa' Gen. Est. Jurf al-Sakhr missile research 

4.Al-Faris Gen. Est. Abu Ghurayb mechanical parts, outer structures of missiles 

5.Al-Wathig Gen. Est. Al-Taji epoxy and fiberglass for missile casings 

6.Ibn Majid Gen. Est. Al-Basrah missile structures, distilling vats, large metal parts 

7.Heavy-Industry Al-Dawrah nuclear reactor parts, high pressure equipment for reactors 

8.Al-Harith Gen. Est. Al-Tarmiyah missile research, chemical weapons containers 

9.Al-Sawari Al-Taji missile production 

10.Oxide Magnesium Khawr heavy water Al-Zubayr 

11.Metal Conversion Al-Tajiyah nuclear fuel for PWR reactors 

12.Al-Kindi Mosul UCL4 for the production of U-235 for nuclear weapons 

13.Jabir Bin Hayyan Mosul UF6 for the production of U-235 for nuclear weapons 

14.Al-Asil Al-Tuwaythah Headquarters of the Iraqi Nuclear Commission 

15.The Iraqi Factory Al-Taji houses the new engineering center for the NW program 

16.Salah-al-Din Gen. Tikrit mechanical spare parts for NW/ Est. BW programs 

17.Al-Mansur Est. Al-Muthanna equipment for laser guided weapons 

18.Al-Yawm Sakhar ramp; D for Scud missiles 

19.Al-Jazirah Skarkat chemicals for the CW program 

20.Ibn-al-Athir Jurf al-Sakhr nuclear warheads for the future 

21.Technical Salman Pak support and research for BW Baghad program 

22.Sabah Nisan Est. Jurf al-Nidaf equipment for NW program 

23.Saddam Gen. Est. Al-Yusifiyah nuclear parts, lasers and optical equipment, Tammuz missile 

24.Bilet al-Shuhada' Al-Taji ramp; D for Scud missiles 

25.Al-Muthanna Al-Tharthar biggest factory for production lake of CW 

26.Hittin Gen. Est. Al-Latifiyah different types of ammunition, missile parts 

27.Al-Faw Est. Locations digging equipment, building around Baghdad underground sites 

28.Sabi' Ashr Nisan different delicate measuring instruments locations 

29.Nasr Est. Abu Ghurayb ramp; D of missile control systems 

30.Ur Gen. Est. Al-Nasiriyah metal casings for missiles 

31.Al-Fida' Est. Al-Za'faraniyah nuclear warheads, containers for missile and nuclear fuel 

32.Al-Qadisiyah Diyala centrifuges for production of U235 

33.Al-Yarmuk Al-Yusufiyah missiles parts, ammunition with special specifications CW equipment 

34.Sa'd 16 Est. Mosul CW equipment 

35.Project 946 Al-Tarmiyah U-235 production 

36.Al-'Izz Est. Baghdad computer center for missile control systems ramp; D 

37.Al-Rafah Est. Jurf al-Sakhr permanent launchers for surface to surface missiles 

38.Al-Jihad Baghdad construction of military industrial facilities 

39.Al-Mujahid Al-Rashidiyah biological weapons facility 

40.Al-Walid South of training school for military Baghdad industrial organization 

41.Umm Al Marik Al-Yusufiyah missile fuel and warheads 

42.Project 710 under Pres- production of long-range dential Palace missiles (over 710 km) in Baghdad 

43.Project 707 as above production of short-range missiles (under 707 km) 

44.Project 505 Al-Sharqat heavy water 

45.Al-Rashid (Khanbari) moldings and technical equipment for Nasr Est. 

46.Babil Est. secret responsible for supergun locations in now NW programs Hamrin Mts. 

47.Optical Center Al-Jadiriyah lasers, headed by Saddam's nephew Dr. Nafa'al-Tikriti 

48.Sad al-Adham Project Hamrin Mts. disguising and transporting equipment associated with NW 

49.Lithium Collection Hamrin Mts. headed by Dr. Ahmad 'Abd-al Project Jabbar Shanshal 

50.Heavy Water Project Hamrin Mts. See above 

51.High Pressure Project Al-Qadisiyah generators for making U-235 

52.'Uqbah Bin-Nafi' Al-Yusufiyah metal casings for Project 946 project 

53.Project 212 Jurf al-Sakhr production of chemicals used in making U235 

54.Sa'd 13 Est. unknown electronics for weapons with help from CSF Thompson France 

55.Project 2000 Jurf al-Sakhr missiles over 2,000 km range 

56.Pure Lead Project Al-Tuwaythah insulation for NW program 

57.Industrial Thermal (Falujahigh) temperature ovens (over 2,000 degrees C.) 

58.Al-Shamouq Baghdad ramp; D for Lithium Project 

59.Oxide Aluminum Al-Taji missile casings Project 

How Saddam Hussein Almost Built His Bomb

Jane's Intelligence Review, 12/97, by Al J. Venter, p 1-13 
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), said that when Coalition forces went into Iraq, approximately 14 kg of fresh Russian-supplied 80% enriched uranium, 11.9 kg of lightly irradiated 93% uranium and almost half a kilo of 93% highly enriched uranium (HEU), were found. Dr. David Kay, chief inspector of the UN's Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) in post-Gulf War, reported that his main concern was the fact that Saddam Hussein was in possession of HEU. 

An unexpected discovery of the post-war IAEA inspections was the reappearance of the substantial electromagnectic isotope separation (EMIS) program. David Kay, in his testimony before the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 10/91, said that there were approximately 7,000 scientists and 20,000 workers involved with the program. UN inspectors reported that the EMIS program had enabled Iraq to obtain enough material to be within 18 to 30 months of developing a nuclear weapon. 

The UN inspectors found sophisticated European centrifuge technology. This indicated a leak from the triple-nation (Germany, the Netherlands and Britain) Uranium Enrichment Company (Urenco). 

UN inspectors also found detailed plans for building an "implosion nuclear device". This device would contain HEU at its core and have conventional explosives around the central mass that would detonate simultaneously. When the fissile material is compressed into a supercritical mass, neutrons are injected into the material to initiate a chain reaction and explosion. 

An IAEA inspector reported that Iraqi scientists were also planning to build an atom bomb, which would have been significantly smaller and lighter than the devices built by Robert Oppenheimer and his Los Alamos team in the mid-forties. These discoveries revealed major weaknesses in inspection routines, export controls and intelligence gathering and sharing. Because of these discoveries, IAEA inspection procedures have tightened considerably. 

Kay commented on evasion techniques used by the Iraqis, which enabled them to successfully hide their nuclear weapons program from US intelligence analysts. Kay said the techniques include, "construction of buildings within buildings (Tuwaitha); deliberately constructing buildings designed to the same plans and for the same purposes to look different (Ash Sharqat and Tarmiya); hiding power and water feeds that mislead the facilities use (Tarmiya); diminishing value of a facility by apparent low security and lack of defenses (Tarmiya); severely reducing off-site emissions (Tuwaitha and Tarmiya); moving critical pieces of equipment as well as dispersing and placing facilities underground." 

Paul Stokes, one of the IAEA Action Team deputy leaders reported that frequent inspections have deterred Iraq from continuing their nuclear weapons program at declared sites since the Gulf war. However, the Iraqis have often refused IAEA members entrance into sites, which has enabled the Iraqis time to remove incriminating evidence. David Kay reported on the Iraqis ability to deceive inspectors. Kay said, "What is clear is that this Arab nation has been remarkably devious throughout the inspection period." Another inspection team member said, "The Iraqis lied fluently from day one, it is common knowledge that they stalled, obfuscated, covered up or confused wherever and whomever they could bid to establish a true picture of what had been going on." 

When Saddam's son-in-law, General Hussein Kamal, former head of the Ministry of Industry and Military Industrialization (MIMI), defected he exposed Iraq's nuclear program. Following Kamal's defection, Iraq was forced to give the IAEA half a million pages of secreted documents. 

Beginning in the late 1980's, Iraqi scientists started working on centrifuge enrichment as a source of LEU for EMIS. The Tarmiya and Ash Sharqat complexes were designated to support industrial-scale EMIS production. If both plants had operated successfully, estimates show that Iraq would have had the capability to build up to four atomic bombs a year. 

Kay reported that Iraq used deception techniques to obtain technology for the chemical enrichment (Chemex) of uranium from France. "Iraq engaged the European company in lengthy negotiations which would soon take a familiar pattern. Each time Iraq would indicate that it needed only a little more technology on which to make a decision. The French would reveal more data. The cycle would begin again and this went on for several years. Finally, after the French had revealed essentially all the details involved with the process, Baghdad announced that it was too expensive and was abandoning all interest in pursuing it. Iraq was then able to begin the clandestine development of Chemex." 

In response to Iraq's attempts to build a nuclear bomb, David Kay said, "the failed efforts of both the IAEA safeguards inspectors and national intelligence authorities to detect prior to the Gulf war a nuclear weapons program of the magnitude and advanced character of Iraq's, should stand as a monument to the fallibility of on-site inspection and national intelligence when faced by a determined opponent." 

John Deutch, former US Director of Intelligence, in Foreign Affairs in 1992 reported, "The point is not how wrong the United States was about the Iraq's timetable for acquiring a bomb, but rather how greatly the United States underestimated the magnitude of the Iraqi covert effort. As it stands, such a massive miscalculation of a nation's ability, high or low, can surely happen again." 

UN Agency Head Sees No Iraqi Nuclear Activity

Washington Post, 12/04/97, p. 34 
Mohammed Baradei, the new head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), said that Iraq did not resume its nuclear weapons program in the absence of Western inspectors. Baradei said, "We can now say that we have managed to remove or destroy or render harmless all nuclear items that came to our knowledge." 

Iraqi Nuclear Designs 'Missing'

MSNBC, 12/5/97, by Bob Windrem, [Online] 
The UN Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) was designed to destroy Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, not its nuclear program. The Iraqi nuclear program is monitored by the UN's International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The nuclear agency has said it has a "technically coherent picture of Iraq's past nuclear program," but also that "it is not possible to guarantee the picture is complete, nor that there could not be some concealed components, activities and facilities." 

Rolf Ekeus, former chairman of UNSCOM, reported in 06/97 that the key component needed for Iraq to build a nuclear weapon was 35 pounds of highly enriched uranium. Ekeus said, "it is clear that the Iraqi specialists managed to acquire a considerable understanding of weapons design and warhead designs." 

Iraq sent a letter to the IAEA, in 09/97, that said Iraq "had been unable to locate any additional documentation that might have indicated the extent of development of the nuclear weapon and associated technologies at the time of the program abandonment." Also, the IAEA reported in 09/97, that Iraq was, "unable to provide a verifiable explanation of the missing drawings" or a missing, "drawing register which should have recorded the title of each drawing." 

David Kay, UNSCOM's first chairman, estimates that Iraq, during the Gulf war, was six months away from building a crude nuclear weapon and two years away from a refined weapon. 

Gordon Oehler, former director of the CIA's Non-proliferation Center, said that despite UN and US intelligence efforts, some of the materials removed from Iraq's main uranium enrichment facility at Tarmiyah "have still not been found." 

In response to these allegations, Iraq insists that "all nuclear program activities were practically terminated and abandoned during April 1991, three months after the Gulf war." 


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