SATELLITE PINPOINTS NUCLEAR SITE
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JANE'S DEFENCE WEEKLY, 1/19/91, P. 70 BY GWYNNE ROBERTS |
Commercial KSA 1000 satellite photographs taken by the USSR reveal
a secret Iraqi "facility in the Qarachoq
Mountains, south-east of Mosul in northern Iraq." The Kurdistan Democratic
Party (KDP) claims that the facility is linked to a uranium mine 120 miles
to the north in the Gara Mountains. Hoshyar Zebari, a spokesman for the
KDP, said, "we are absolutely sure this is a nuclear plant." a US nuclear
technology specialist, who examined diagrams drawn by Andrew Garfield of
the National Imagery Analysis Centre in the UK, said that the facility
might be a gas centrifuge or gaseous diffusion uranium enrichment facility.
The facility is located next to hydro-electric plants.
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Hartmut Meyer, a spokesman for Interatom of the FRG, said his company
did not supply experts on nuclear technology or nuclear technology itself
to Iraq.
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DETAILS OF NUCLEAR DEALS WITH IRAQ EXPOSED
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NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENTS, 2/5/91, PP. 37-39
DER SPIEGEL (HAMBURG), 12/24/90, PP. 69-72 |
It has been discovered that Interatom, a subsidiary of the FRG firm
Siemens, has had extensive contact with Iraq,
which has included training Iraqi personnel and developing nuclear technology.
Ali Adbul Mutalib Ali, formerly an economic attache in Bonn, has assisted
in promoting Iraq's nuclear program throughout Europe with the help of
the Iraqi firm Industrial Projects Company (IPC). IPC is part of the Industry
Ministry, yet is managed by Husayn Kamil, Saddam Husayn's son-in-law. From
the War Ministry, he also organizes all arms procurement. On 4/8/89, Ali
and some experts visited Interatom's center at Bergisch Gladbach. Interatom
builds reactors and specializes in enrichment technology, both of interest
to Iraq. In the summer of 1989, Interatom agreed to help Iraq in the area
of construction of industrial pipelines, however it is suspected that in
fact it provided Iraq with nuclear technology, especially concerning uranium
enrichment. Interatom was intended to supply highly sophisticated equipment
such as helium leak detectors and vacuum pumps, with which the Iraqi engineers
were to conduct tests. Months after the agreements were concluded, Bonn
discovered the transaction and, after a meeting between the Foreign and
Economics Ministries, forbade Interatom to carry out the transaction. Prior
to this, other ministries were alerted to the sensitive nature of such
deals, due to the possible political consequences the United States in
particular has increased its criticism due to potential losses inflicted
on its military forces by German-produced technologies. Iraq's nuclear
program is based on centrifuge technology, a specialty of the Germans,
which Pakistan illegally acquired in the 1980s. FRG Economics Minister
Helmut Haussmann commented on the similarity of some components and parts
of the Iraqi ultra centrifuge to various FRG gas centrifuges. Such centrifuges
are produced on flow turn machines like the three supplied to Iraq by the
H and H Metalform company of Drensteinfurt, in which the Iraqis hold a
50 percent share.
Former MAN Technology engineers Walter Busse and Bruno
Stemmler, who are specialists in centrifuges, worked as technological advisors
to Iraq in the 1980s. According to the Federal Intelligence Service, Iraq
was supplied with German technology via Brazil as well, although Interatom
has argued that considering the differences between Brazil's and Iraq's
enrichment techniques (jet-nozzle enrichment vs. gas centrifuge), Brazil
could not have illegally passed on the knowledge to Iraq. The Foreign Ministry
stated that "everything was to be done" to prevent German technology or
supplies, such as those from MAN and Interatom, from reaching Iraq, which
the Finance Ministry has stated as attempting to gain uranium enrichment
components and technology since 1988 at the latest. Interatom and Steag,
also of the FRG, exported a jet nozzle enrichment plant to Brazil which
is to be online by 1992.
IPC has played a leading role in all nuclear projects,
possibly
- buying high quality steel from Schmiedemeccanica,
- special magnets from Inwako,
- or training from the UK firm Magnatech.
However, a manager
of Interatom, Hartmut Mayer, has denied knowledge of Iraqi efforts toward
uranium enrichment prior to 4/23/90, despite its Baghdad chief's obvious
familiarity with Iraq.
According to law, Interatom applied for the Iraqi
project license at Eschborn, where it was approved by Johannes Pfirschke
in 10/89. After approval, though, Interatom changed what had nominally
been a pipeline- related project to one that included experts in "uranium
enrichment plants" and "advanced reactors and energy systems-plant operation."
Interatom also supplied Iraq with the "Handbook of Hydraulics," published
by the US National Nuclear Energy Commission.
Iraq has also shown interest
in desublimation technology. Apparently Iraq has little enriched uranium,
and will be unable to procure or produce enough to make a nuclear weapon
for eight to ten years.
Meanwhile, Bonn has withdrawn the license for the
IPC program due in part to the Eschborn federal office President's (Hans
Rummer) statement that "doubts have emerged" as to activities conducted
in the program. Western intelligence has reported that India has a Siemens
Telperm M control plant system which is used at its heavy water plant.
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GERMAN, US FIRMS ACCUSED OF IRAQ ARMS DEALS: LAX EXPORT CONTROLS,
DUAL-USE
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NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENTS, 2/25/91, PP. 44-46
DER SPIEGEL (HAMBURG), 2/4/91, PP. 33-35 |
The UK engineer Chris Cowley worked on the Iraqi
Saad 16 military research project located at Mosul near the Tigris River.
Among the projects at Saad 16 was a nuclear weapon construction effort.
Gildemeister Projects GmbH (Gipro) of the FRG was the main contractor for
the Saad 16 project. Gipro will be prosecuted by FRG courts for exporting
a computer with a spectrometer and a small computer to Iraq without certificates.
The Bonn Economics Ministry's Federal Economic Office in Eschborn had permitted
Gipro's exports to Iraq, except for the computers.
Litten industries of
the US owned a 17% share in Gipro from 1984 to 1989.
The Sauer Informatic
GmbH company of the FRG, which is managed by Klaus Murmann, exported a
DM 10- million computer plant to Iraq for the Saad 16 project.
Experts
estimate that US companies supplied 40 percent of the high-technology equipment
for the Saad 16 project.
Hewlett Packard and Electronics Associates both
participated in the projects. In 1986, the US Defense Department banned
the delivery of a large computer for Saad 16. But in 2/90, the US commerce
Department approved the delivery of the computer. Between 10/86 and 8/90,
the US commerce Department granted 500 permits for dual-use exports, including
high-tech electronics equipment, from the US to Iraq involving $728 million.
A mass spectrometer made by the Thermo Jarell Ash Corporation from the
US was seized at the Frankfurt Airport in the FRG before it could be shipped
to Iraq.
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TUWAITHA THREAT DOUBTED, ISRAEL SAYS IRAQI BOMB WAS YEARS AWAY
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NUCLEONICS WEEK, 2/28/91, PP. 6-7 BY MARK HIBBS |
On 2/18/91, Carson Mark, former head of the Theoretical Division at
Los Alamos National Laboratory, said that the two research reactors at
the Tuwaitha facility were not very useful for Iraq's nuclear weapons development
program. During the first week of the Gulf War, Iraq's 5-MW (th) IRT-5000
pool-type research reactor and 500 KW (th) Tammuz-2 pool-type critical
assembly were "totally destroyed," according to US military officials.
Iraq's ambassador to the IAEA, Rahim Alkital, called the bombings of the
two safeguarded research reactors a "major blow to the credibility of the
safeguards regime." In 2/91, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) reported
that Iraq had already "used the two
reactors for research and development of nuclear weapons." A 2/6/91 report
from IDF claimed that Iraq's effort to manufacture uranium enrichment gas
centrifuges at the Factor 10 facility north of Baghdad was "apparently
unsuccessful." During the first three weeks of the Gulf War, according
to the IDF report, Factory 10 was heavily damaged. Israeli sources last
week said that reports that Iraq had 26 operating centrifuges were based
on "misinformation or disinformation." The Israeli sources claimed that
Israel's Military Intelligence Agency in 1990 said that Iraq had manufactured
26 centrifuge outer casings at Factory 10 and planned to build entire centrifuges
there. In 1981, after Israel bombed Iraq's Tammuz-1 research reactor, US-Israeli
nuclear intelligence sharing was broken off, only to be renewed in 1990
after the Gulf Crisis developed. After Iraq
invaded Kuwait, the US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) obtained information
from Israel that Iraq could manufacture centrifuges. But one US official
said that US agencies "never saw any evidence that Iraq possessed 26, or
any number" of centrifuges. Iraq attempted to develop bottom centrifuges
bearing but apparently failed. The IDF report concluded that Iraq would
need "up to two years to produce a primitive weapon," which would spread
"radioactive fallout without a full-fledged nuclear blast." Iraq "probably
lacks beryllium," which is used as a neutron reflector, and would need
five years to develop a five-kiloton nuclear weapon, according to IDF.
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IRAQ AND THE BOMB: WERE THEY EVEN CLOSE?
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THE BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, 3/91, PP.17-25
BY D.ALBRIGHT & M.HIB |
On 1/16/91, US President George Bush announced that the US intended
to "knock out" Iraq leader Saddam Hussein's
nuclear bomb potential. However, one US official said earlier that Iraq's
nuclear program was not a good reason to go to war, and the article suggests
that this program was "so primitive that the international sanctions put
in place [by the U.N.] may have had more substantive effect than the tons
of bombs dropped by U.S. and allied planes five months later." After the
8/90 invasion, the German foreign office ordered cessation of a training
program run by three FRG firms, including Interatom GmbH, for Iraqi employees
of the Industrial Production Company (IPC). Israel's intelligence agency
believes the IPC is central to Iraq's military procurement system, and
the company is "behind" Al Fao General Establishment in Baghdad, which
has worked to get missile technology for Iraq and also asked Interatom
for centrifuge components.
Although export of nuclear know how from the
FRG to Iraq is forbidden, Interatom said that IPC had expressed strong
interest in getting such information. Hussein said in 7/90 that although
his country did not possess nuclear weapons, it would be acceptable to
use western aid in acquiring them to counter the Israeli nuclear threat.
According to information from officials and experts in the US, Europe,
Israel and the FRG, Iraq was 5-10 years away from producing nuclear weapons
before the war started, the article contends. Bush said in 11/90 that this
figure could be lower than 1 year.
Iraq had a small amount of highly-enriched
uranium (HEU) under IAEA safeguards. Despite the fact that it had signed
the NPT, Iraq seemed prepared to develop nuclear weapons, starting in 1987.
According to FRG intelligence, Al Qaqaa State Establishment in Baghdad
was developing non-nuclear components for the weapon, and Nassr State Enterprise
in Taji was developing uranium enrichment processes. IPC attempted to buy
weapon and uranium enrichment technology and equipment in Europe. Iraq
has no known plutonium and cannot produce it in large quantities; Israel
bombed the Osiraq reactor in 1981, which would have produced plutonium.
Iraq is attempting to develop a gas centrifuge plant to produce HEU. The
IAEA did a safeguards inspection of Iraq's safeguarded fuel in 11/90 and
found it to be intact. Article states that an Iraqi bomb would probably
be a fission device based on an implosion design, but could do so only
if it used the 12.3 kg of safeguarded uranium (93%) in combination with
10 kg of 80% enriched uranium at the IRT 5000 reactor supplied by the USSR,
the latter either enriched (a long process) or combined in its current
state, which might be barely adequate to make a crude bomb. Carson Mark,
of the US Los Alamos National Laboratory, says that Iraq would need at
minimum "one year of hard work" to make a bomb from the 12.3 kg.
In 12/90,
a US official said that it took Pakistan several years to transfer an implosion
system despite reported help from the PRC in nuclear weapons design.
In
the last five years the US approved sales of $1.5 billion to Iraq in equipment,
some of which could be used for nuclear and ballistic missile developments.
In 3/90, Iraq was caught smuggling detonation capacitors from the US CSI
Technologies through the UK. In 1989, scientists from Al Qaqaa participated
in a symposium in the US and inquired about krytons.
After the 3/90 smuggling
attempt, Hussein stated that Iraq's Ministry of Industry and Military Industrialization
managed to produce similar capacitors, and Iraq also purchased lower quality
capacitors from Maxwell Electronics (US) in 1989, William Higinbotham,
also of Los Alamos, said that Iraq may have the know-how but its success
will depend on the trained personnel responsible for making weapons components.
It could take Iraq six months or longer to make the capacitors he said.
Article states that Iraq will probably be able to design a "deliverable
nuclear weapon" eventually, but an embargo could slow down that process.
Currently, no foreign country appears to be assisting Iraq in nuclear weapons
development. After the embargo is lifted, the USSR may again sell Iraq
HEU. France at one point attempted to deliver low-enriched uranium in place
of HEU, but Hussein objected. Also, the USSR might need assistance from
the US and other western countries in converting its research reactors
to produce lower enriched fuels; the US has done so for a number of other
countries. Japan has a civilian plutonium program. A firm in Italy negotiated
with Iraq to sell plutonium in the early 1980s, but then turned out not
to have any plutonium. Iraq tried to purchase desublimer technology from
the FRG firms which had given this technology to Urenco, but did not succeed
in doing so; however, Iraq's major goal has been to develop centrifuge
technology.
Inwako GmbH of the FRG exported ring magnets, a non-rotating
component of a centrifuge, to Iraq. The FRG's export controls, put in place
before the war started, had slowed down Iraq's uranium enrichment program.
In the past, the German
Export Union GmbH had sold Iraq 250-grade maraging
steel (of marginal use in centrifuge rotors). Before 1988,
H & H Metalform
GmbH (FRG) sold Iraq flow- forming machines used to shape rotor tubes and
Schaublin of Switzerland sold Iraq spin-forming machines used to shape
endcaps. Iraq ordered maraging steel preforms from Schmiedemeccanica, also
of Switzerland, but this deal was halted by the international embargo.
These parts are all required for centrifuge rotor assembly construction.
According to some reports, Pakistan acquired a G2 centrifuge from Urenco.
Bruno Stemmler, who worked at
MAN Technologien GmbH in the FRG, discussed
centrifuge design with engineers from Iraq and saw a centrifuge test stand
which he concluded could only be used for elementary tests of a centrifuge
rotor. Walter Busse, another FRG engineer, also visited the centrifuge
production facility. He also said that Iraq would need five more years
to develop an operational centrifuge.
Italy supplied a hot cell for Iraq's
Tuwaitha reactor and another hot cell there is "associated" with the USSR's
IRT-5000.
Iraq's Al Qaqaa State Establishment is used for top-secret weapons
work by the Ministry of Industry and Military Industrialization. The FRG
says non-nuclear components of nuclear weapons are developed at this facility.
Iraq has received blueprints for some FRG centrifuges. Iraq's Technology
Development Group, based in the UK, bought an 18% share in Schmiedemeccanica,
which had made centrifuge endcaps and baffles for Iraq.
Brazil made its
first attempts to produce a centrifuge in the late 1970s; by 1982 it was
producing slightly enriched uranium in indigenously-developed centrifuges,
and was operating its first cascade in 1984. In Ipero enrichment plant
was opened in 1988, and Brazil intends to expand this plant further.
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IMPORTANT IRAQ NUCLAR FACILITIES SURVIVED, DEFECTOR SAYS
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LOS ANGELES TIMES, 6/4/91, P. A8 BY DOYLE MCMANUS AND
ROBIN WRIGHT |
A senior Iraqi nuclear scientist
defected to the US and told US Pentagon officials that a significant part
of Iraq's nuclear research facilities survived the US bombing raids, US
officials said on 6/3/91. In 1/91, US General H. Norman Schwarzkopf said
that the US-led bombing raids had "neutralized" Iraq's "nuclear manufacturing
capability." After the war, Iraq denied possessing any weapons-grade uranium,
but later admitted that it possessed 91 pounds of the material. The US
Defense Department is leading the debriefing of the defector. US officials
were not happy that the news on the defector was revealed. In 4/91 and
5/91, IAEA inspectors found 98 pounds of weapons-grade uranium at the Tuwaitha
nuclear research facility. US officials suspect that Iraq is still hiding
smaller quantities of nuclear materials.
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US BELIEVES IRAQ HAS BUILT MAGNETIC ISOTOPE ENRICHMENT PLANT
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NUCLEONICS WEEK, 6/20/91, PP. 2-3 BY MARK HIBBS AND GAMINI
SENEVIRATNE |
In 6/90, US experts briefed an Iraqi
nuclear official who defected from Iraq. The US experts now believe that
Iraq has at least one secret calutron uranium enrichment facility. US satellite
photos taken several months ago may reveal calutron equipment. Since 1988,
Iraq has been importing gas centrifuge uranium enrichment equipment from
several western countries. In 1990, the US Department of Commerce blocked
the sale to Iraq of vacuum diffusion pumps from CVC, a US company in NY,
after US Customs determined that the pumps could be used in Iraq's centrifuge
program. US officials now believe the pumps were intended for Iraq's calutron
program. In the late 1980's, another US firm exported to Iraq $1.2 million
worth of 5-ampere, 40 to 45 kilovolt electrical generators, claimed to
be for induction welding. US officials now believe that Iraq imported the
generators for use as calutron power supplies. The generating equipment
does not fall under dual-use technology US export control laws. Export
and import of centrifuge-related dual use technology is strictly controlled
by US export laws, while calutron-related equipment is not controlled.
In 1949, the US declassified calutron equipment. Calutron equipment is
not on the Zangger "trigger list," or the Nuclear Suppliers Group commodity
control list. The Iraqi defector claims that Iraq produced 40 kg of weapons-grade
uranium from its calutrons, but US officials believe that Iraq only produced
1 to 5 kg.
In late 1990, press reports in the US claimed that Saddam Hussein
had constructed
centrifuge plants,
- uranium hexafluoride conversion facilities,
- a uranium mine, and
- an underground plutonium production reactor,
all located
in northern Iraq. US officials have not confirmed these press reports.
A calutron plant may be located near a hydroelectric power station in northern
Iraq, but US officials say this facility is non-nuclear. None of the "fingerprints"
of any large calutron facilities have been observed by US satellites, one
western expert claims.
On 6/22/91, a UN Special Team of 10 experts and
5 support personnel will begin inspections of Iraq nuclear facilities at
the request of the US. UN Resolution 687 calls for dismantling Hussein's
nuclear program. Maurizio Zifferero, a former IAEA Deputy Director General
for Research and Isotopes, will head the inspection team. IAEA spokesman
David Kyd said the team will inspect the Tuwaitha reactor site, which an
IAEA team inspected in 5/91. It found all declared Iraqi nuclear materials
but did not find any materials that hadn't already been declared. The team
will also inspect other sites in Iraq and Iraq's ambassador in Vienna,
Rahim Alkital, will be kept informed.
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IRAQIS FIRE WARNING AT UN TEAM
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THE WASHINGTON POST, 6/29/91, PP. A1,A16 BY CARYLE MURPHY |
On 6/22/91, the second UN team to visit Iraq
under the UN Resolution 687 inspection effort arrived in Baghdad and informed
the Iraqis that they wanted to inspect the Abu Ghraib military camp, ten
miles west of Baghdad. On 6/23/91, the UN team was denied access to Abu
Ghraib but was able to view workcrews, trucks, forklifts, and cranes moving
large crates that could have contained electromagnetic isotope separation
equipment used to enrich uranium. On 6/25/91, the UN team again attempted
to access the Abu Ghraib site, but the Iraqis prevented them from entering.
On 6/26/91, the UN team finally was granted access but found that the crates
had been cleared.
On 6/28/91, the UN team requested access to the Fallujah
military base, about 30 miles west of Baghdad, where "intelligence reports
indicated that the crates had been moved," according to David Kay, the
UN team spokesman. The UN team was denied access but was allowed to view
the Fallujah site from a water tower, from which they photographed another
moving operation. Shortly after this, two UN team members were able to
photograph from close range a truck convoy that exited the Fallujah site
from a rear gate. The Iraqis fired shots into the air apparently to try
to scare off the two UN inspectors. David Kay said that the photographed
equipment was electromagnetic isotope separation equipment that could manufacture
weapons-grade uranium. After the shooting incident, the Iraqi News Agency
reported that Iraqi President Saddam Hussein had ordered all Iraqi officials
to allow the UN representatives "to see or inspect what they wish." US
Pentagon officials said on 6/27/91 that the US is preparing a range of
military options against Iraq. The article describes a wide range of US
military equipment in the region that could be used to destroy Iraq's remaining
nuclear equipment and materials. Related Articles: The San Francisco Chronicle,
6/29/91, pp. A1, A18, "UN Inspectors Again Kept Out of Iraq Base"; San
Francisco Examiner, 6/30/91, p. A7, "UN Sends Ultimatum to Iraq on Nuclear
Arms"
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SATELLITE SPOTS IRAQ BURYING ATOMIC GEAR
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THE WASHINGTON TIMES, 7/10/91, PP. A1, A10 BY BILL GERTZ |
In early 7/91, US spy satellites photographed Iraqi
forces burying calutron equipment at a secret military base at Yerbaz near
Baghdad. The Iraqis buried several large magnetic discs, each 12 to 15
feet in diameter, which are believed to be parts from one of 30 calutrons
that Iraq admitted it possessed. Iraq made this admission in a 29-page
letter to the IAEA on 7/8/91. On 7/9/91, State Department Spokeswoman Margaret
Tutwiler said that the Iraqi letter fell short of US expectations. Tutwiler
said the letter had "significant omissions and distortions." Pentagon spokesman
Pete Williams spoke about the importance of continuing "full and complete
visits" by inspection teams to search for Iraq's nuclear items. On 7/9/91,
Iraq showed UN inspectors uranium enrichment equipment. The buried discs
are believed to be from the same calutrons that a UN inspection team was
blocked from examining on 6/28/91 at the Fallujah military base. US officials
said Iraq set fires nearby newly discovered nuclear sites to hide the facilities.
Near Tuwaitha, UN inspectors found a crane that had been magnetized because
it moved calutron discs. The Iraqis broke up the concrete floor at another
nuclear facility to try and hide traces of radioactivity, but UN inspectors
were able to measure it anyway. An Iraqi electrical engineer who was involved
in Iraq's nuclear weapons program recently defected. The engineer revealed
four secret nuclear sites and claimed that Iraq had hidden 88 pounds of
highly enriched uranium. The Iraqi letter, written by Ahmed Hussein Khudayer,
said that Iraq hid its nuclear program for national security reasons. The
letter said that Iraq had three types of uranium enrichment programs underway,
including electromagnetic (calutron), chemical and centrifugal. ..... Related
Article: On 7/10/91, President George Bush criticized Iraq for burying
nuclear materials and for "hiding and cheating and lying on nuclear matters."
Bush said the US was "deadly serious" about enforcing UN demands that Iraq
dismantle its non-conventional and ballistic missile weapons programs.
(The Washington Times, 7/11/91, pp. A1, A8 by Bill Gertz and Paul Bedard,
"US warns Iraq to disarm.")
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IRAQ REPLIES TO U.N. PRESSURE, ADMITS IT ENRICHED URANIUM
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NUCLEONICS WEEK, 7/11/91, PP. 4-5 BY MARK HIBBS |
On 7/2/91, in a meeting with UN officials, the chairman of the Iraqi
Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC), Homan Abdul Khaliq, said that there was
"no program for enrichment of uranium in Iraq at the Iraqi Atomic Energy
Commission." Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz then told UN officials
that the IAEA official program was the only nuclear program in Iraq. On
7/7/91, however, the UN received a 29-page report from Iraq which described
Iraqi efforts to enrich uranium using three different techniques: gas centrifuge,
magnetic isotope separation, and chemical separation. Iraq admitted that
it had enriched 0.5 kg of uranium to 4 percent U-235. US Department of
State spokesperson Margaret Tutwiler said that Iraq admitted that it had
eight operable calutrons, a "laboratory scale" chemical isotope separation
program, and an "incomplete centrifuge program." A senior White House official
said that the 37 IAEA officials now in Iraq are "certain" that a truck
convoy in Iraq last week contained calutron equipment, specifically heavy
metal rings which could function as magnets. IAEA inspectors in Iraq are
currently looking for the calutron equipment. US officials said the recent
admissions by Iraq are consistent with recent statements by a defecting
Iraqi nuclear official. The IAEA reportedly is angry because the US has
refused to provide the IAEA information on suspected secret nuclear-related
sites. ..... Related Articles: Dimitri Perricos is the head of the UN inspection
team currently in Iraq. Perricos said that Iraq has indicated that it has
eliminated, damaged, and buried a large portion of the equipment listed
in the 29-page document. Diplomatic sources said that the listed equipment
included 30 calutrons. UN officials tried to inspect a 60 truck convoy,
on 6/28/91, that may have concealed calutron equipment. White House Press
Secretary Marlin Fitzwater said the 29-page document shows that Iraq had
previously not complied with UN Resolution 687 and that "Iraq continues
to engage in various activities related to weapons of mass destruction."
(Los Angeles Times, 7/9/91, pp. A1, A13 by Stanley Meisler, "Iraq Admits
It Can Produce A-Bomb Fuel.") ..... The 29-page document was provided by
Iraqi Foreign Minister Ahmed Hussein. The document contended that Iraq's
nuclear program is devoted to peaceful purposes. The document detailed
a list of material and equipment Iraq has in its possession. Sources said
that items on the equipment list include 30 calutrons, plus associated
electrical power generators. The list also admits the possession of four
kg of enriched uranium. (Washington Post, 7/9/91, pp. A1, A16 by John M.
Goshko, "Iraq Gives Information to U.N. on Extensive Nuclear Program.")
..... Dimitri Perricos, the Greek leader of the UN team currently inspecting
Iraq, is quoted extensively in this article. Perricos said that the list
provided by Iraq admits for the first time that Iraq has a uranium enrichment
program. Perricos said that the UN team would inspect a mine at Akashat
in northwest Iraq near the Syria border. This site is not on the new list,
or on the old list, which Iraq provided in 5/91. (Washington Times, 7/9/91,
p. A8 by Nicholas Phythian, "Iraq admits wider, secret nuclear ability.")
..... The Iraqi document received by the UN on 7/8/91 revealed sites where
uranium enrichment activity was taking place, as well as intermediate installations
for preparing large amounts of uranium ore. One installation produced 100
tons of uranium dioxide and had the capacity of producing 185 tons of uranium
per year. US Administration officials believe that Iraq has produced enough
weapons-grade uranium using calutrons to build at least one nuclear bomb.
Iraq's calutrons were produced indigenously. (New York Times, 7/10/91,
p. A6 by Elaine Sciolino, "Iraqi Atomic Admission: Mixed Blessing for Bush.")
..... On 7/9/91, Margaret Tutwiler said that recent information "makes
us believe strongly that Iraq has a program to develop nuclear weapons."
Iraqi officials described their calutron enrichment program as peaceful,
but cited "national security reasons" for having kept it secret. Analysts
believe that Iraq was operating calutrons at Tuwaitha, Tarmaiya, and an
unspecified third site. Analysts estimate that Iraq produced roughly 25
pounds of highly-enriched uranium. US Pentagon spokesman Pete Williams
on 7/9/91, "Clearly ... we are learning now from a variety of intelligence
sources things we didn't know when we did the target planning for the war
about elements of their nuclear capability." (Washington Post, 7/10/91,
pp. A1, A16 by R. Jeffrey Smith, "U.S. May Have Misjudged Iraq's Nuclear
Capability.") ..... On 7/9/91, Margaret Tutwiler said that Saddam Hussein's
29 page report contained "significant omissions and discrepancies" although
it will be useful for the investigative teams inspecting Iraq. The report
claimed that 3 uranium purification plants were destroyed and two damaged
during the war. See this article for Tutwiler's comments on the report.
(Los Angeles Times, 7/10/91, p. A4 by Norman Kempster, "U.S. Rips Iraqi
Nuclear Report.") ..... Iraq's permanent representative to the UN, 'Abd-al-Amir
al-Anbari, met with UN official Rolf Ekeus on 7/13/91 in order to review
the progress of inspection operations currently under way in Iraq. Al-Anbari
said that the list Iraq provided to the UN was accurate and that Iraq has
fully complied with international resolutions and is fully cooperating
with the international inspectors now in Iraq. (Proliferation Issues, 7/24/91,
p. 20; original source: INA (Baghdad), 7/13/91) ..... On 7/9/91, Demitri
Perricos, an IAEA official, said that Iraq was cooperating with a current
inspection of Iraq's nuclear facilities. Perricos said that the equipment
photographed on 6/28/91 by UN inspectors included huge calutron magnets.
(Washington Post, 7/10/91, p. A14 by Caryle Murphy, "U.N. Team Inspects
Iraqi Nuclear Sites.") ..... On 7/9/91, Demitri Perricos said that the
IAEA was conducting an inspection of a phosphate strip mine and processing
plant at Akashat, near the Syrian border. Perricos said that Iraq was extracting
uranium from phosphate. The US-led coalition bombed the mine during the
gulf war. (New York Times, 7/10/91, p. A6, "UN Team Sees Iraqi Plant.")
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IAEA HEAD SAYS IRAQ COULD HAVE ENRICHED URANIUM IN 2 YEARS
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THE WASHINGTON POST, 7/16/91, PP. A8, A14 BY TREVOR ROWE |
Hans Blix, head of the IAEA, said that Iraq's nuclear program was too
expensive to be peaceful. Blix estimated that Iraq
has spent between $4 to $8 billion on its nuclear program. Blix and Rolf
Ekeus, head of the UN Special Commission on Iraq, said that a UN team had
inspected two major industrial sites in Iraq that could have begun large-scale
uranium enrichment within 18 months to two years. Jay Davis, of the Livermore
Research Laboratory, estimated that each of the two facilities could have
produced enough material for one bomb per year. Professor Maurizio Zifferero,
deputy IAEA director, said that Iraq would have to expend five times the
energy to enrich uranium to 3 to 3.5 percent using calutrons, compared
to the amount of energy that would be produced in a nuclear reactor from
this enriched uranium fuel. US Ambassador Thomas Pickering said that Iraq's
latest list appeared to be incomplete. ..... Related Articles: Blix and
Ekeus said that Iraq's list of nuclear sites, provided to the UN on 7/14/91,
added nothing new to a list of sites released on 7/7/91. Blix said that
Iraq has not complied with the UN resolution. Thomas R. Pickering said
the new list included "more details rather than revelations." Iraq's Prime
Minister Saadun Hamadi predicted a US attack on Iraq. Sir David Hannay,
the UK representative to the UN, said the UN was not discussing military
action against Iraq, but that Iraq's nuclear program must be removed. Blix
said that Iraq's calutron program was in the pilot program stage. One of
the installations designed for industrial production may have been destroyed
in the war and the other had not been started up. (The New York Times,
7/16/91, p. A9 by Frank Prial, "U.N. Inspectors Report Iraq Still Conceals
Atom Program.") ..... Maurizio Zifferero said that an undisclosed uranium
enrichment plant, found by UN inspectors near al-Sharqat between Mosul
and Tikrit in northern Iraq, was identical to a plant the Iraqis did report
at Tarmia, near Baghdad. Dr. Jay Davies, a US nuclear expert, said that
Iraq probably had spent up to $8 billion to build its calutron uranium
enrichment facilities. IAEA inspectors found that both calutron facilities
were empty and both had been bombed. (Financial Times (London), 7/17/91,
p. 6 by David Fishlock and Michael Littlejohns, "IAEA calls emergency talks
on Iraqi N-programme")
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INSPECTORS FIND FOUR CALUTRON ENRICHMENT PLANTS IN IRAQ
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NUCLEAR FUEL, 7/22/91, PP. 6-8 BY MARK HIBBS |
According to an IAEA inspection report, Iraq
has four clandestine calutron uranium enrichment facilities at three different
sites. The facilities include a pilot calutron plant at Tuwaitha, a large-scale
calutron facility at Tarmiyah, another large-scale calutron facility at
Al Sharqat, and a smaller calutron facility, which is located next to the
large-scale facility at Tarmiyah. On 5/24/91, an IAEA inspection team visited
the Tarmiyah site, which is located about 60 kilometers north of Baghdad,
after an Iraqi defector provided secret
information to US intelligence. The inspectors saw no specific nuclear
activity, but did find that electrical and ventilation equipment had been
removed. On 6/28/91, IAEA inspectors revisited the Tarmiyah site and found
a multibillion-dollar large-scale calutron facility. US satellite photos
had revealed the facility, called building 33, which was over 100 meters
long. Inside the building, the IAEA inspectors found large cranes, a 100MW
installed power supply, and purified chilled water. The IAEA determined
that building 33 had the capability to support about 100 calutron units.
The building was 6 to 18 months away from being operational. On 7/15/91,
another IAEA team found an almost identical large-scale calutron facility
at Al Sharqat, which is located on the Tigris River in northern Iraq
between Mosul and Tikrit. IAEA officials said that the Al Sharqat facility
could also hold about 100 calutrons. The IAEA said that Tarmiyah is also
the location of a third calutron facility, which would serve as a "topping
off" plant. This second-stage plant would take enriched uranium from the
first-stage large-scale calutron facilities, and would enrich it to weapons-grade.
The smaller calutron facility is located in Building 245 and consists of
40 MWs of power, a large control room, and room for about 20 calutrons.
The IAEA said the second-stage plant was "12-18 months from completion."
The Tarmiyah complex also included other calutron-related facilities including:
chemistry labs, possibly, "designed for uranium tetrachloride processing";
a building for washing heavy calutron parts, such as vacuum boxes; and
a building for the recovery and recycle of uranium. In late 6/91, the IAEA
inspected a site named Zaafarniyah, located about 300 km southeast of Baghdad.
A facility at Zaafarniyah, called Al Dijjla, under the control of the Iraqi
Ministry of Industry and Military Production, contained manufacturing equipment
capable of coil winding, designing and fabricating electronics, and other
electrical components which could be used for calutrons. Another facility
at Zaafarniyah, called Al Rabeeh, contained metal shops capable of producing
the metal components of calutrons. The Iraqi
defector said that the Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center served as the initial
calutron research and development effort for Iraq in the 1980's. During
the IAEA's second inspection of Tuwaitha in late 6/91, they found equipment
for 5 to 10 calutrons. The IAEA concluded that Tuwaitha had hosted research
and development work on ion sources, magnets, and insulators. The IAEA
determined that Iraq's calutron program was indigenous and that had the
capability to "manufacture all required components" for calutrons. If five
of Iraq's calutrons had operated continuously for two years they might
have produced about 3 kg of HEU. In 5/91, the IAEA inspected Building 80
at Tuwaitha. In Building 80 they found that all equipment had been removed,
although they found that it was equipped with a 7.4 MW power supply. The
IAEA also inspected Tuwaitha's Building 85, which might have had the capability
to demonstrate calutron process chemistry. In late-6/91, the IAEA inspected
Tuwaitha's Al Hamath Workshop, which was equipped with large cranes similar
to those at Tarmiyah. The inspection team determined that this was a "magnet
test facility" that performed "lab/pilot scale uranium isotope separation
with approximately five units for some unknown period of time."
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EXPERTS BELIEVE IRAQI PROGRAM FOCUSED ON URENCO'S G-1 CENTRIFUGE
|
NUCLEAR FUEL, 8/5/91, PP. 6-7 BY MARK HIBBS |
Iraq pursued several centrifuge
designs in the late 1980s, but apparently concentrated on Urenco's G-1
centrifuge. The article describes the G-1 centrifuge as "an early, subcritical
centrifuge designed in the late 1960s for the Gronau enrichment facility
operated by Uranit GmbH, with a design throughput of less than 2 SWU/yr."
A former engineer of Machinenfabrik Augsburg-Nuernberg AG (MAN) saw G-1
centrifuge design blueprints in Iraq in 1988. The IAEA concluded its third
inspection of Iraq's nuclear program on 7/28/91. Iraq gave the IAEA a centrifuge
rotor made of maraging steel with a diameter of about 250 millimeters and
a length of 350 "mmm" (sic). These dimensions do not match the G-1 design,
indicating that Iraq was experimenting with pre-Urenco centrifuge designs.
On 7/7/91, Iraq claimed that it had built only one centrifuge model, an
"oil type (Beams type)" centrifuge designed in the 1930s and 1940s before
the US and Europe classified centrifuge know-how. The US did not believe
the 7/7/91 claim. The IAEA obtained a second rotor tube from Iraq.
This second tube had a diameter of 150mm (matching the G-1 design diameter),
but was made with carbon fiber instead of maraging steel. The Iraqi carbon
fiber rotor tube was damaged, so the length could not be determined. (The
G-1 design calls for a length of 500 centimeters). Iraq may have used carbon
fiber because it was unable to obtain enough maraging steel. In 1990, all
but a test sample of a 50-metric-ton shipment of maraging steel from
Export
Union GmbH of the FRG was held up by the UN embargo against Iraq. Carbon
fiber is on the US Commodity Control List. In the late 1980s, perhaps with
the help of an Egyptian agent named Abdul Kadeer Helmy, Iraq obtained some
carbon fiber. In 1990, Helmy was caught by a US sting operation when he
tried to smuggle carbon fiber from the US to Iraq. The IAEA also obtained
from Iraq centrifuge end caps and baffles
made by Schmiedemeccanica of Switzerland. The endcaps and baffles were
made of maraging steel and designed to G-1 specifications. In 1990, FRG
customs halted an export of several hundred endcaps and baffles from Schmiedemeccanica
to Iraq from the FRG. Iraqi officials said in 7/91 that Iraq planned to
test a single bench-model centrifuge and then build a 100- centrifuge cascade.
Western officials have found no evidence that Iraq had actually started
industrial construction of centrifuges. The IAEA's fourth inspection team
is currently searching Iraq for more information. Brazil was able to build
a cascade of only 8 centrifuges, after a decade of development efforts.
Experts are currently performing materials testing on the carbon fiber
that the IAEA obtained from Iraq.
|
IRAQI NUCLEAR EQUIPMENT SAID SENT TO ALGERIA
|
PROLIFERATION ISSUES, 8/8/91, P.16
AL-AHRAR (CAIRO), 7/22/91, P.1 |
Western security agencies are investigating reports that Iraq
may have transferred its nuclear facilities and material to Algeria by
air a few days after the UN Security Council issued its first resolution
imposing a blockade against Iraq. The US is convinced that Iraq has transferred
its "nuclear arsenal" to Arab countries. Iraqi nuclear experts and scientists
may have been transferred to Algeria. The US decision to appoint Mary Ann
Casey, an intelligence and research expert, as ambassador to Algeria to
succeed Christopher Ross, may have been motivated by the above information.
|
IAEA INSPECTORS LEARN OF PLUTONIUM SEPARATION
|
NUCLEAR NEWS, 9/91, PP. 76, 78 |
The fourth IAEA inspection team to be sent to Iraq
was given information that Iraq had fabricated and irradiated natural uranium
oxide fuel at Tuwaitha. The fuel was irradiated in Iraq's 5 MW IRT-5000
research reactor. Three grams of plutonium were separated from the spent
fuel. The first IAEA inspection team had earlier been told by Iraq that
2.26 grams of plutonium had been separated. The plutonium separation experiments
were a serious noncompliance with Iraq's safeguards agreement as they were
carried out at a safeguarded facility. Between 1987 and 8/90, the UK had
granted licenses for export to Iraq
of plutonium, thorium, thorium oxide, uranium, uranium acetate, zirconium,
and zirconium rod. The UK's Department of Trade and Industry submitted
this list to a Parliamentary Select Committee. The quantities were very
small, including a milligram of plutonium and two grams of uranium in isotope
calibration sources. These quantities are insignificant in relation to
Iraq's indigenous plutonium separation research program.
|
EVIDENCE REVEALS IRAQI NUCLEAR POTENTIAL
|
DEFENSE NEWS, 9/30/91, PP. 1,52 BY GEORGE LEOPOLD |
Forty-four IAEA inspectors uncovered sensitive nuclear documents at
the temporary administrative headquarters of Iraq's Atomic Energy Commission
in Baghdad. The documents contained design information for shaped explosive
charges, implosion packages, and neutron initiators. On 9/27/91, Maurizio
Zifferero, [director of the UN Special Commission on Iraq],
said that the seized documents are "certainly evidence that a weaponization
program was being carried out" in Iraq. Zifferero said that "all the components
were in place for [a nuclear weapon program]." Leonard Spector, a nuclear
proliferation specialist at Carnegie, said that the documents are "the
ultimate smoking gun," although it remains unclear whether Iraq used the
design information to advance its nuclear weapons program. IAEA inspectors
also uncovered personnel records which could help determine Iraq's nuclear
weapon program infrastructure, Zifferero said. He also confirmed that IAEA
inspectors discovered 3 grams of plutonium that Iraq produced at its Tuwaitha
reactor in violation of the NPT. Zifferero said that Iraq has a "laboratory
capability to produce plutonium." ..... Related Articles: Rolf Ekeus, head
of the UN commission responsible for eliminating Iraq's weapons of mass
destruction, said on 9/27/92 that the UN would not release to the public
the documents which reveal the names of foreign companies and governments
which may have contributed to Iraq's nuclear weapons program. Ekeus said
that a classified list would be given to the UN Security Council, which
would then provide limited details to any government that asked for information
on itself or its companies. Ekeus said his commission might reconsider
this policy. The commission does not intend to publish the names of individual
scientists who worked in Iraq's nuclear program. The Iraqi government fears
the scientists could become the objects of assassination attempts by Israeli
agents. (Los Angeles Times, 9/28/91, p. A15 by Stanley Meisler and Jim
Mann, "Iraq's Nuclear Suppliers May Never Be Named.") ..... On 9/28/91,
Iraq agreed to free a group of 44 UN nuclear inspectors that had been detained
in a parking lot in Baghdad for three days. David Kay, the team leader,
said that the agreement allows the inspectors to return to their hotel
with all the documents they have collected and the videotapes they have
made. In return, the inspectors are to provide Iraq with an inventory list
of all this material. (New York Times, 9/28/91, pp. 1,6 by Paul Lewis,
"44 U.N. Inspectors Return to Hotel After Baghdad Lets Them Go Free.")
..... On 9/29/91, the UN nuclear inspection team resumed its work and visited
four locations in Baghdad. David Kay said that the team finished its inventory
on 9/29/91 and flew all the documents out of Iraq. The documents consisted
of 5,000 pages of records, 19 hours of videotapes, and 3,000 photographs.
Kay also said that Iraq's "uranium enrichment process was about 18 to 24
months away form full-scale, large-scale production." (Financial Times,
9/30/91, p. 6, "UN team resumes arms inspection in Baghdad.") ..... On
9/25/91, an Iraqi letter to the UN proposed that the inspection team draw
up a list of the documents and photographs before removing them. On 9/27/91,
the UN agreed to Iraq's proposal. (New York Times, 9/27/91, p. A6, "Texts
of Iraqi Letter to U.N. and the Council President's Reply." ..... On 9/24/91,
Iraq criticized David Kay and his inspection team and warned that their
activities would endanger the lives of Iraqi personnel who are named in
the documents. On 9/24/91, Iraq's representative to the UN, Abdul Amir
Al-Anbari, sent a letter to the UN Security Council saying that Iraq would
allow the UN inspections teams to use helicopters to carry out their work.
(New York Times, 9/26/91, p. A9, "Iraq's Letters to U.N.: 'Not Within the
Team's Competence.'") ..... On 9/23/91, the 45-member IAEA team inspected
a Central Baghdad building, where they found documents related to Iraq's
nuclear weapons program. After a 5-hour standoff, Iraqi officials seized
all of the documents from the team. (Washington Times, 9/24/91, p. a1,
by Peter Gregson, "Iraq detains team, seizes nuclear notes.") ..... US
hopes to learn from documents gathered by a UN inspection team whether
Iraq has bought low-grade uranium "feedstock" illegally from foreign suppliers.
The PRC may have supplied Iraq with uranium "feedstock." The PRC, however,
denies involvement in Iraq's nuclear program. (New York Times, 9/30/91,
p. A3 by Michael Wines, "Documents Said to Name Iraq Suppliers.") .....
Another UN inspections team is scheduled to arrive in Iraq on 9/29/91,
but their arrival may be delayed if the UN inspectors being held in a parking
lot in Baghdad are not released. (Los Angeles Times, 9/27/91, pp. A1, A7
by Stanley Meisler, "U.N. Accepts Iraq Plan to End Crisis.") ..... When
IAEA inspector David Kay visited Iraq on an inspection tour in 8/91 Iraq
declared 17.6 pounds of irradiated uranium it had kept hidden on a truck
for 4 months. (Washington Times, 9/25/91, pp. A1, A12 by Peter Gregson,
"Inspectors Camp Out, Refuse to Return Tapes.") ..... Ambassador Yuliy
Vorontsov of the USSR advised waiting a little longer for an Iraqi guarantee
that UN helicopters will be allowed to help conduct inspections in Iraq.
Vorontsov said that Soviet officials are "talking in Baghdad" about such
matters. (Washington Post, 9/21/91, pp. A17, A19 by Ann Devroy, "Bush Advised
to Set Arms Search Deadline: Concern Expressed Over Iraqi Delays.") .....
On 9/23/91 US President George Bush addressed the UN Security Council offering
to provide a US Air Force escort into Iraq for UN helicopters trying to
carry out inspections for nuclear weapons. Bush suggested giving Iraq 48
hours to allow the helicopters into their territory unescorted, before
providing the armed escort. (Washington Times, 9/24/91, pp. A1, A9 by Frank
J. Murray, "Bush Vows Saddam Gets No Compromise.")
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MASTERMIND OF IRAQ NUCLEAR EFFORT IS SOUGHT
|
NEW YORK TIMES, 10/1/91, P. A4 BY PAUL LEWIS |
UN inspectors raided Iraqi Atomic
Energy Commission (IAEC) personnel files in an attempt to learn who headed
Iraq's nuclear weapons program. The No. 2 official at the IAEC, Jaafar
Dhiah Jaafar, appears to only know about efforts to produce highly enriched
uranium by 3 separate methods, not about weapons design. Inspectors discovered
clear evidence of a weapons design program, including designs for building
detonators. UN Special Commission chairman Rolf Ekeus commented that "there
must be someone who links the enrichment and design sides." Ekeus sent
a general order to inspectors to suspend contacts with Washington after
reports that US team members had been in contact with Washington by satellite
phone. Team leader David Kay and Special Commission deputy chairman Robert
L. Galluci are from the US. The team has also obtained records regarding
nuclear materials purchased by Iraq from foreign countries. ..... Related
Article: An IAEA spokesman said that IAEC vice-president Dr. Ja'far Dhiah
Ja'far "is not considered Mr. Big, but he is the most senior person we
have so far contacted," and called him a "highly-respected scientist."
Dr. Ja'far's former colleague at London's Imperial College, Dr. John Hassard,
said he was a "brilliant physicist" and that "we should take the potential
of the Iraqi nuclear programme very seriously." (Proliferation Issues,
11/7/91, p. 42 by Michael Chilvers, "United Kingdom." Original Source:
Press Association (London), 10/2/91 by Michael Chilvers.)
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IRAQ TESTED MISSILE TO CARRY A-BOMB, A U.N. REPORT SAYS
|
NEW YORK TIMES, 10/5/91, P. 2 |
Iraq has tested missile delivery
systems as part of its nuclear weapons development program, according to
a preliminary report of the UN Special Commission in charge of destroying
Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. Other Iraqi programs involved enriching
uranium and assembling nuclear bombs. David Kay, chief of the UN inspection
team which went to Iraq last week, said documents seized by Iraq indicated
an Iraqi program to use centrifuges to enrich uranium. Maurizio Ziffero,
a scientist with the atomic energy agency, said there may have been mistakes
in lax export policies that allowed Iraq to acquire machine tools from
Western countries to support its centrifuge programs. Iraq may have utilized
complex jet-nozzle enrichment technology. The director general of the IAEA,
Hans Blix, refused to comment on Iraq's possible nuclear trading partners.
|
IAEA TEAM EMERGES WITH WEAPONS RESEARCH DATA
|
NUCLEAR NEWS, 11/91, P. 65 |
Material seized by IAEA inspectors indicated that the Iraqi
nuclear weapons program was much more extensive than previously believed.
The purpose of this inspection was to determine how far the Iraqis had
progressed with their advanced centrifuge enrichment development. An earlier
inspection team found a facility for centrifuge fabrication which was described
as "better than Urenco's." The IAEA estimates that Iraq was about 18 months
away from production of nuclear weapons material. Iraq was also found to
possess advanced technical knowledge on the assembly of actual weapons
following the production of fissile material. It had designs for weapons
with shaped conventional explosives and neutron sources. There is concern
that Iraq's future weapons production capability will not be eliminated
by the removal of fissile material and destruction of facilities. Iraq
still has a large team of qualified scientists and technicians within the
Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission. The IAEA has sent a proposal to the UN
regarding a continuing program to monitor Iraqi nuclear activities.
|
13 FIRMS NAMED IN PROBE OF IRAQ'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM
|
LOS ANGELES TIMES, 12/12/91, P. A9 BY STANLEY MEISLER |
The IAEA released a list of 13 firms that supplied materials used in
Iraq's nuclear program. IAEA director Hans Blix cautioned that materials
manufactured by these companies were found in Iraq,
but that the IAEA does not know whether the companies sent the materials
to Iraq or whether Iraq used clandestine intermediaries.
Since the IAEA seized documents in Iraq while performing
an inspection in September, it has been under pressure to release the names
of the companies involved as suppliers to Iraq. A Du Pont spokesman put
the value of the oil it supplied to Iraq at $30,000, and explained that
it obtained an export license in 2/89 without objection from the State
or Energy departments. Congressional investigators have criticized Bush
and Reagan's export policies on high-technology goods to Iraq. .....
Related
Article:
An electron-beam welder produced by Leybold-Heraeus AG, which
is said by the IAEA to have "a special fixture for holding the rotor tube,"
was shipped to Iraq by Leybold's US subsidiary in Export, PA. The machine
was used in Iraq's illicit enrichment of uranium.
Valves supplied by Dr.
Reutlinger & Soehne are said to be "capable of handling uranium hexaflouride."
(Washington Post, 12/12/91, pp. A43, A51 by R. Jeffrey Smith, "13 Firms
Named as Sources of Nuclear Items for Iraq.")
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