Doc. Code: 17388
Bibliography: NuclearFuel, vol. 23, no. 1, 12 January 1998, p. 3, by Mark Hibbs
Headline: France Expected To Help Russia Terminate IAEA Investigation In Iraq
Orig. Source:
Date: 12 January 1998

ABSTRACT:

The Russian Federation has drafted a resolution for the UN Security Council (UNSC), proposing that UNSC Resolution 687 be modified to terminate investigative activities in Iraq. However, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is still unclear about certain aspects of Iraq's prewar program, such as the gas centrifuge enrichment program and the status of progress in weaponization. The IAEA does not have a complete picture of Iraq's procurement network, and some documents seized by the IAEA are still untranslated.

There are still questions about the group of Iraqi nuclear scientists left in place after Iraq's nuclear weapons program was dismantled. David Albright, head of the Institute for Science and International Security in Washington, said, "many of Iraq's nuclear experts are essentially prisoners."

<<>>

Doc. Code: 17501
Bibliography: Washington Post, 23 January 1998, p. 5, by John M. Goshko
Headline: 3 Powers At UN Disagree On Iraq's Nuclear Status
Orig. Source:
Date: 23 January 1998

ABSTRACT:

The United States differed sharply with Russia and China over an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report on 23 January 1998 on whether to certify that Iraq has halted its nuclear weapons program. Russian Ambassador Sergei Lavrov and Chinese Ambassador Qin Huasun reiterated assertions that the UN Security Council should close its file on whether Iraq still has a capacity to produce nuclear weapons. Huasun said that it was "time to close the nuclear file." US Ambassador to the United Nations Bill Richardson, however, said that there were "significant gaps" in the IAEA's information and that there was "no justification for closing the nuclear files." Gary Dillon, an IAEA official, reiterated the agency's earlier findings that Iraq appeared to have halted its nuclear weapons program. He also stated that Iraq still might be withholding information. Lavrov said that Dillon's statement "confirmed our conviction that the file is closed for all practical purposes."

<<>>

Doc. Code: 16759
Bibliography: Ha'aretz (Tel Aviv), 9 February 1998, by Ze'ev Schiff and Amnon Barzilai, [Online] http://www3.haaretz.co.il
Headline: Cohen To Mordechai: Israel Can Strike Back
Orig. Source:
Date: 9 February 1998

ABSTRACT:

On 8 February 1998, Israeli Defense Minister Yitzhak Mordechai told US Secretary of Defense William Cohen that Israel reserved the right to full freedom of action in protecting itself from any attack by Iraq that might result from its confrontation with the United States and the United Nations (UN). En route to Saudi Arabia, Cohen backed off from earlier statements that Israel must not retaliate in the event of an Iraqi attack, stating that "Israel obviously has the right of self-defense and will exercise that right as it sees fit."

<<>>

Doc. Code: 17508
Bibliography: RIA Novosti, 18 February 1998, by Oleg Lebedev
Headline: Russia And Iraq Do Not Cooperate In Nuclear Energy, Says Viktor Mikhailov
Orig. Source:
Date: 18 February 1998

ABSTRACT:

Russian Nuclear Power Minister Viktor Mikhailov said in a news conference on 18 February 1998 that "Russia does not cooperate with Iraq in nuclear energy." He went on to say that the research reactors in Iraq had been shut down and the fuel supplied for them had already been taken back to Russia and reprocessed.

<<>>

Doc. Code: 17585
Bibliography: [Online]http://www.wideopen.igc.org/nci/ib21998.htm, 4 March 1998
Headline: Iraq And The Bomb; The Nuclear Threat Continues
Orig. Source: Nuclear Control Institute, 19 February 1998, by Steven Dolley
Date: 4 March 1998

ABSTRACT:

An International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report of October 1997 to the UN Security Council declared that there were no important differences between the IAEA's findings and Iraq's own statement of its nuclear program. The IAEA stated that even though its findings are based on seven years of IAEA inspections, the result is not guaranteed to be entirely complete.

With the IAEA's findings as a base, Russia, China and France are insisting that the UN Special Commission to Iraq (UNSCOM) end investigations on Iraq's nuclear weapons program.

<<>>

Doc. Code: 16785
Bibliography: FBIS-TAC-98-064, 5 March 1998
Headline: Court Blocks Extradition Of Iraq-Connected Scientist
Orig. Source: NetEstado (Sao Paulo), 5 March 1998
Date: 5 March 1998

ABSTRACT:

On 4 March 1998, Brazil's Federal Supreme Court turned down an extradition request for German scientist Karl-Heinz Schaab, who was charged with selling German uranium enrichment technology to Iraq before the 1990-91 Gulf War. The court ruled that Schaab is being charged with a politically motivated crime, which under Brazilian law, prevents his extradition.

<<>>

Doc. Code: 17566
Bibliography: NuclearFuel 23 March 1998, p. 5, by Mark Hibbs
Headline: Ex-MAN Gas Centrifuge Expert Said Higher-Ups Helped Iraq
Orig. Source:
Date: 23 March 1998

ABSTRACT:

Karl-Heinz Schaab, a former employee at a German centrifuge company, was convicted in 1992 for having exported carbon-fiber rotors to Iraq without a license. Schaab has now "accused his former employers at Urenco centrifuge partner MAN Technologien AG of having been behind the plan to aid Iraq's clandestine nuclear program." However, an interview with the IAEA in 1997 showed that Schaab could not offer any new or useful information on the accused men's involvement in Iraq's nuclear program.

What is known by IAEA officials is that several ex-MAN experts, including Schaab, Bruno Stemmler, and Walter Busse, worked secretly for Iraq. These men, as well as an unidentified ex-MAN centrifuge expert, may have passed Urenco data on to Brazil, where Schaab sought political asylum.

<<>>

Doc. Code: 17600
Bibliography: The Times, 14 April 1998, by James Bone, [Online] http://www.Sunday-times.co.uk/
Headline: Iraq Given All-Clear By Nuclear Agency
Orig. Source:
Date: 14 April 1998

ABSTRACT:

Russia and France are expected to propose a UN Security Council resolution suspending any further IAEA investigations of Iraq's alleged nuclear weapons program. Russia and France propose that the IAEA should focus on routine monitoring to ensure that Iraq will not restart its nuclear weapons program. The United Kingdom is not expected to obstruct the proposal. However, the United States is expected to object, arguing that more information is needed from Iraq.

According to an IAEA report published on 13 April 1998, inspectiors found no evidence of any illegal activity or prohibited materials or equipment related to Iraq's nuclear weapons program after inspecting 93 locations since October 1997. The IAEA suggested in the report that it should continue ongoing monitoring and verification inspections, as well as testing air samples, particularly focusing on isotopes used for medical purposes. The IAEA will also "continue to look into any offers of international assistance to Iraq's clandestine nuclear program."[1]

Supporting Sources:

[1]CNN, 13 April 1998, [Online] http://www.cnn.com/; "UN Agency Says Iraq Has No Nuclear Program."

<<>>

Doc. Code: 17570
Bibliography: India Express, 15 April 1998, [Online] http://www.expressindia.com/
Headline: Iraq Presidential Site Access Still A Problem, Says UNSCOM
Orig. Source:
Date: 15 April 1998

ABSTRACT:

In a report by United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM), members Jayantha Dhanapala (head of the diplomatic team) and Charles Duelfer (the American leader of the inspection team) discussed open-ended access to weapons sites. Both UNSCOM members said that access to key Iraqi sites remains an unresolved problem for weapons inspectors. The problem of unfettered access arose "in connection with a problem in defining the boundaries of the Presidential palace at Radwaniyah."

<<>>

Doc. Code: 17815
Bibliography: Indian Express, 8 May 1998, [Online] http://www.expressindia.com/
Headline: Iraq Denies Receiving Nuke Bomb Designs From Pak
Orig. Source:
Date: 8 May 1998

ABSTRACT:

Iraq has denied accusations that it received nuclear weapon designs from Pakistan. However, Iraq did say that an offer was made by a Greek person to sell nuclear weapon designs that he allegedly obtained from senior Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan. Iraq said it turned down the offer because it suspected that it was an "intelligence ploy."

An Iraqi spokesman for the Ministry of Culture and Information said that the US allegations were the result of a premature leak to the press after the IAEA stated that Iraq no longer had any prohibited nuclear related activities.

<<>>

Doc. Code: 18086
Bibliography: New York Times News Service, 28 July 1998, by Barbara Crossette and Judith Miller [Online] http://www.desnews.com
Headline: Iraq May Have The Ability To Make N-Weapons, Agency Says
Orig. Source:
Date: 28 July 1998

ABSTRACT:

An International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report to the UN Security Council on 27 July 1998 said there was no longer any evidence that Iraq has a nuclear weapons program. However, the IAEA says that since Iraq has failed to account for key nuclear equipment and technology, the possibility still exists that it may have "hidden the necessary expertise and material for future use."

The report indicated that "effective, ongoing monitoring and verification in Iraq... must be comprehensive and rigorous and, as a result, is intrusive."

<<>>

Doc. Code: 18390
Bibliography: Fort Worth Star-Telegram, 15 August 1998
Headline: Defector Reveals Iraqi Bomb Secrets
Orig. Source:
Date: 15 August 1998

ABSTRACT:

Iraqi scientist Khidhir Abdul Abas Hamza, who defected to the United States in 1994, publicly described the inner working of Iraq's nuclear program. Hamza said that Iraqi President Saddam Hussein personally supervised the nuclear weapons program since its inception 27 years ago.

Hamza stated that Iraq had completed all the research and development necessary for an atomic bomb and was nearly finished with construction of one using uranium from civilian reactors [probably means plutonium]. However the coalition bombing during the 1990-91 Gulf War halted their efforts, otherwise Iraq could have produced a bomb in several months, Hamza said.

<<>>

Doc. Code: 18094
Bibliography: The Nation (Lahore), 31 August 1998, [Online] http://www.nation.com.pk
Headline: India Rejected Iraqi, Libyan Requests For Nuclear Tech
Orig. Source:
Date: 31 August 1998

ABSTRACT:

Air Commodore Jasjit Singh, director of India's Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses, told French press on 30 August 1998 that India had repeatedly turned down requests from Iraq and Libya to buy nuclear weapons technology. Singh said that Iraq had made urgent requests over the years to get nuclear technology, for which they were willing to pay a high price in hard currency. He said that Libya had also attempted to acquire technology, but that India refused the requests, not out of international obligation, "but because we think that this is the wrong thing to do."

<<>>

Doc. Code: 18326
Bibliography: Ha'aretz, 9 September 1998, by Ze'ev Schiff, [Online] http://www3.haaretz.co.il
Headline: Iraq Now Has Three Virtually Complete Nuclear Bombs
Orig. Source:
Date: 9 September 1998

ABSTRACT:

Former UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) inspector Scott Ritter, who resigned on 26 August 1998, revealed during a meeting at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy several UNSCOM discoveries related to Iraq's weapons of mass destruction program. According to Ritter, Iraq is hiding three nuclear bombs, which are technically complete, but which lack fissionable material.

Ritter said that the inspection team knew where the bombs were being hidden, but no order was ever given to conduct a surprise inspection of the site. Ritter said that the team also had information on the method used to conceal weapons, the system used to transport them, and their guards.

<<>>

Doc. Code: 18333
Bibliography: Washington Post, Barton Gellman, 30 September 1998, http://www.washingtonpost.com
Headline: Iraqi Work Toward A-Bomb Reported
Orig. Source:
Date: 30 September 1998

ABSTRACT:

US officials said on 29 September 1998 that former UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) arms inspector Scott Ritter reported twice that he had credible intelligence that Iraq built "three or four implosion devices." They lacked only the uranium cores to create 20-kiloton nuclear weapons.

Ritter testified before US Senate and House committees on 5 September and 15 September 1998. US policy makers did not regard the testimony as credible as they "had never received such a report." However, evidence emerging the week of 28 September 1998 to 2 October 1998 shows that Ritter had spoken with members of the CIA in 1996 and passed the information on in writing to an interagency weapons inspectors group in May 1997.

<<>>