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Iraqi Missile Abstracts: 1992
These abstracts are excerpted from the CNS Monitoring Proliferation Threats Missile Abstracts Database.  The material presented here is a representative sample of the material contained in the full database.  Abstracts do not include the full text of the original source, but do include all proliferation-relevant information.  CNS has made no attempt to evaluate the veracity or accuracy of the information provided by the original sources.  Access to the CNS Databases is provided on a subscription basis. For information on how to subscribe, please contact Chris Fitz at

'Gotcha': U.N. Team Finds Germans Engaged In Missile . . . . . Proliferation

Decision Brief, No. 92-D1, 1/2/92 
UN inspection teams charged with investigating Iraq's nuclear weapons capabilities have disclosed that German companies knowingly assisted in extending the range of Iraqi Scud missiles. A report released by the inspectors referenced both photographic evidence and actual nameplates removed from Scuds in tying German firms to the Iraqi program. This information flatly contradicts denials made by the German Embassy in 3/91 regarding German involvement in the Iraqi Scud program. 

A UN Inspector's Report, shared with the German government in 7/91, revealed that approximately 20% of pressure lines found in Scuds were made in Germany. Three missiles in particular included German-made pressure gauges and had electrical plugs manufactured by Hirschmann of Germany. Additionally, portions of launch vehicles were of German origin. Goldhofer supplied load bearing chassis, Siemans' electrical distributors were present, as was an electrical switch control board manufactured by Polyma. Launchers were also located containing parts manufactured by Mercedes Benz and the Swedish firm SAAB

One On One: Rolf Ekeus

Defense News, 1/6/92, p. 30 
In an interview for Defense News, Rolf Ekeus, the executive chairman of the UN Special Commission on Iraq, revealed the extent of Iraq's nuclear weapons program and UN efforts to destroy Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. Ekeus stated that destruction of missiles is fairly easy and low-cost, though the extent of chemical munitions, including a few Scud missile warheads with nerve gas, makes disposal in this area fairly risky and expensive. He estimated that the 46,000 chemical weapons would be destroyed by the end of 1993 and may cost between $150- 200 million. 

Ekeus further stated that, for the future, the IAEA and the UN Special Commission have harmonized two plans for the monitoring and verification of Iraq's nuclear and non-nuclear programs to ensure that they do not acquire weapons of mass destruction again and that those they do have are destroyed. 

Iraq Arms Aid Traced To US Firms

Los Angeles Times, 2/4/92, p. A4 
US House Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs Committee investigators have identified 13 US firms that supplied equipment to an Iraqi missile program, code-named Project 395. A German intelligence report identifies project 395 as Iraq's effort to develop the Condor-2, a missile capable of delivering a nuclear warhead to a range of more than 600 mi. 

In a letter to President Bush, Committee Chairman Henry B. Gonzalez (D-Tex) said, "Numerous US companies provided critical support to Iraqi weapons programs, including missiles." From 1985-1990, the US government approved sales of technology to Iraq worth $1.5 billion. The US assistance also extended to financial banking-- according to a US Customs internal memo, the Atlanta branch of the Italian bank, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, "is suspected to have provided loans to various firms for export to Iraq of missile related technology for use in the Condor-2 project." These loans were worth $4 billion. 

Export licenses for the Condor project identified the user as the Iraqi Technical Corps for Special Projects, which was also responsible for extending the range of Scud missiles. 

According to Gonzalez, Secretary of State Baker has hampered the Committee's inquiry by refusing to ask the UN and the IAEA for documents naming US suppliers to Iraqi military projects. 

Hussein Said To Rehire Son-In-Law To Battle U.N.

Los Angeles Times, 3/3/92, p. A8 
Saddam Hussein reportedly reinstated his son-in-law, Gen Hussein Kamel Hassan, as chief of Iraq's arms and oil industries on 3/2/92. Kamel Hassan was the main architect of Iraq's clandestine nuclear, chemical warfare and long-range missile programs. In 2/92. Iraq refused to adhere to a UN order to destroy ballistic-missile production facilities. 

Iraq Agrees To Destroy Missile, Nuclear Equipment

Arms Control Today, 4/92, p. 18 
Avoiding another confrontation with the United Nations, Iraq began destroying "key ballistic missile production, modification, and repair equipment" in late-3/92. Iraqi officials had refused to destroy the equipment in late-2/92 during a UN inspection. However, in mid-3/92, the UN Security Council condemned Iraq's failure to comply with the UN cease-fire resolutions, demanded the disputed equipment be destroyed and that Iraq formally accept a long-term monitoring agreement, and dispatched a missile inspection team to Iraq to monitor destruction of the equipment in question. Inspection team leader Derrick Boothby confirmed on 3/25/92 that Iraq had begun to destroy the equipment in question, "including missile fuel and precursors, missile body production and transport equipment, precision lathes, and even a "unit for filling [Scud] and al-Hussein warheads."" 

Inspectors also sought to verify recent Iraqi claims to have possessed 89 operational ballistic missiles, three training missiles and 135 warheads (including 45 for chemical weapons) in addition to those previously declared and which it claims to have destroyed without UN supervision. The team visited seven "missile graveyards" verifying the remnants of 86 of the declared missiles but has yet to locate the other declared items. Boothby also reported that the Iraqis appear to have adopted a more cooperative attitude toward the UN teams. 

Arabs Accuse Jordan Of Hiding Iraqi Scuds

Washington Times, 4/2/92, pp. A1, A9 
Arab diplomats stationed in Amman, Jordan claim Iraqi Scud missiles were secretly moved to Jordan to escape destruction under UN sanctions. The sources claim the Scud missiles are hidden and maintained by Iraqi soldiers near two air bases, known as H-4 and H-5, in an area called al-Ruweished. They also stated that Iraq had moved the missiles disassembled in trucks disguised as refrigerated tractor-trailers. In addition, they claimed that Iraqi Scud technicians have recently been spotted in Amman. US intelligence agencies have been following up on the claims but have yet to find anything. 

CIA Director Robert Gates said in 3/92 that Iraq has "hundreds" of Scuds that have yet to be destroyed. Many such missiles were found during a UN inspection in late-3/92, but it is still uncertain whether all have been accounted for. Several hundred mobile launch vehicles are also believed to have survived the Gulf war. 

No Evidence Iraq Can Make Own Missile Guidance

Executive News Service, 8/28/92 
On 8/25/92, the United Nations Special Commission on the elimination of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction gave a summary o. the findings by the UN inspection team which visited Iraq from 8/7/92-8/18/92. The summary said that "No evidence was found that Iraq had the capability indigenously to produce complete guidance systems for ballistic missiles.. Nor did the inspection team find any weapons or components forbidden under Security Council resolutions which call for the destruction of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. The inspections at eight sites in Iraq also led the UN inspectors to obtain new information about the range of Iraq's programs to acquire or produce prohibited ballistic missiles and components, including previously undisclosed projects for computer support and missile fuel production. Information about Iraqi organizations and their relationships to various missile projects, as well as data concerning foreign involvement in certain programs, were also made available to the inspectors. 

The 22-member team visited the facility at which all of Iraq's future research and development in ballistic missiles will be undertaken--those with a range of less than 150 km that do not come under the UN ban. "The inspection of this site provided much information that will be of use in designing the ongoing monitoring and verification regime that will need to be applied to ensure that it will not be used for prohibited purposes," the UN commission said. "Much of the information obtained will be useful in assessing the full extent of Iraq's ballistic missiles program." 

Destroying Iraq's Ballistic Missiles

Jane's Intelligence Review, 10/92, pp. 459-462 
This article describes the efforts and activities for the past 18 months of the ballistic missile inspectors who are a part of th. United Nations Special Committee (UNSCOM) in Iraq. On 4/3/91, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 687, which mandated UNSCOM to identify and destroy, under international supervision, Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and their means of production. This included the elimination of all ballistic missiles with ranges greater than 150 km and any related support, production, research and development facilities. 

In 7/91, UNSCOM began its first ballistic missile inspection at the Al Taji military camp where the Iraqis presented the team with 62 Scud/Al Hussein missiles, six Soviet made MAZ 543 Scud transporter erector launchers (TELs) and two Al Nidal and Two Al Waleed TELs. Ten days later, the team conducted an undeclared inspection at the same site and discovered that the Iraqis were hiding 11 decoy Scud missiles and a number of missile storage racks from UNSCOM. All of the prohibited items were then destroyed by the Iraqis under the direction of UN inspectors. 

In 8/91, the inspectors travelled to the Balad-al-Suhada factory complex at Taj al-Ma'arik, the Dhu Al-Fiqar motor casing and nozzle factory, and the Yawm al-Izim rocket motor test and assembly plant. 

In 10/91, one of the sites the inspectors visited was near H2 airfield and the rest were out in the desert. Each site contained six to eight fixed Scud launchers. The team found that about half of the 25 launchers they discovered had been completely destroyed by coalition bombing and the remainder were damaged to varying degrees. UNSCOM then supervised the total destruction of all the launchers. 

Two months later, the UNSCOM inspectors visited 17 sites including the ballistic missile research facility Sa'ad 16. During this time, the team discovered that Iraq had started to rebuild some sites, and missile production equipment was found at two other locations where the team made undeclared visits. A number of Scud TELs were also found to have been converted to launch short range missiles. Due to UNSCOM's apprehensions about Iraq's affirmations on the number of Scuds they possessed before 8/90, the next inspection team went out to 13 sites in western Iraq and one site near Baghdad to search for any remains of Iraqi mobile Scud units attacked by the coalition during the Gulf war. 

In 2/92, the inspectors were tasked with verifying the destruction of items and missile production facilities earmarked by previous inspections, but Saddam Hussein did not allow any of the equipment to be destroyed. However, during this inspection, the team was able to visit some more missile production facilities where they noticed that the Iraqis continued to extensively repair the equipment. The director of one of theses facilities said that within six months his plant would be able to resume the production of rocket motors for short-range Abadil 100 and Sakr 200 missiles. 

After the US threatened to use military action in order to force Iraq to destroy nuclear related facilities, Iraq declared more ballistic missile related equipment to UNSCOM. The Iraqis said that in 7/89 they destroyed operational Scud missiles, three Scud training missiles, five MAZ 543 TELs, four Al Nidal TELs, three training vehicles, 45 Scud chemical warheads and numerous support vehicles and then buried the remains in pits at Dawrah. UNSCOM inspectors excavated the site to verify the contents and they found that at least 86 missile had been destroyed. 

In 4/92 and 5/92, the inspectors oversaw the destruction of 45 ballistic missile production items and 10 buildings, including most of the equipment that was to be destroyed in 2/92. A number of surprise inspections to undeclared facilities led to the discovery of large quantities of imported material used in the production of ballistic missiles. In 5/92, the inspectors verified the destruction of one TEL, five decoy missiles, 25 missile support vehicles, production equipment for the first stage of the Badr 2000 missile, and three buildings used for ballistic missile production. Other items for the Badr 2000 that were destroyed included a second mock-up of the Badr 2000, missile transport dollies, two horizontal test vehicles, two independent test vehicles, two training test vehicles, a maintenance vehicle, an erector arm for the training vehicle and a number of fuel vehicles. Five prototype Iraqi manufactured, guidance units for Scud type missiles and 33 pages of documents relating to construction work at Sa'ad 16 were removed from Iraq for further analysis. 

After a month long standoff in front of the Iraqi Ministry of Agriculture in Baghdad, which ended once again with Saddam Hussein yielding to the threat of US military action, UNSCOM was able to enter the ministry and other buildings in 8/92 and make significant finds relating to Iraq's missile programs. 

Although UNSCOM has not disclosed a full account of their findings, the information that has been made public confirms that Iraq was trying to develop guidance systems, had produced chemical warheads for their Scuds, were at an advanced stage of developing the Badr 2000 long-range missile and were developing a three-stage missile called the Abid which was intended to carry satellites or re-entry vehicles. 

Along with the bombings by the coalition, UNSCOM has destroyed a significant amount of Iraqi ballistic missile production, repair, research and development infrastructure. However, Iraq's actions and attempts over the past 18 months to conceal missiles, TELs, productions facilities and data from UNSCOM are clear signs that Saddam Hussein still wants to maintain Iraq's ballistic missile capability. The fact that no TELs or operational Scuds have been found during undeclared inspections leads the inspectors to believe that Iraq has been successful at hiding some Scuds and possibly with chemical warheads. UNSCOM sources say that the press reports about Iraq still secretly storing hundreds of Scud missiles are "way off the mark.. It appears that only a few dozen Scuds and a handful of TELs seem to remain. 

Since UNSCOM began its inspections, it has demonstrated an expertise in monitoring Iraq's on-going compliance with the UN resolutions of the Gulf war. The unprecedented results its inspectors have achieved make the UNSCOM operations a paragon for arms control regimes to follow in the future. 

UN Inspectors Monitor Chemical Weapons Capability

Proliferation Issues, 10/7/92, p. 22  

Le Monde (Paris), 9/24/92, p. 6 

LE MONDE outlines Iraq's chemical munitions capabilities and briefly discusses the Iraqi Scud missiles which can carry chemical agents. The report states that due to their design, the Iraqi manufactured chemical warheads located on the Scud missiles do not seem capable of withstanding "the rise in temperature linked to the missile's reentry into the atmosphere." 

Disarming Iraq: Preparing For The Long-Term Monitoring Of . . . . Iraq's Nuclear

Washington Council On Non-Proliferation, 10/26/92, p. 6 
During a discussion on "Disarming Iraq" on 10/26/92, Michael Newlin, the Deputy Executive Chairman for the UN Special Commission on Iraq, said that UNSCOM has destroyed or verified the destruction of several hundred Iraqi Scud missiles. Nevertheless, he added that the Commission is still investigating the rumors that Iraq is concealing as many as 200 of their Soviet supplied Scud missiles. Newlin stated that the Russians have provided UNSCOM with a thorough list of the Scuds shipped to Iraq by the former Soviet Union, including serial numbers, spare parts, erector launchers and fuel. 

The Deputy Chairman informed the discussion group that UNSCOM is now entering into the long-term monitoring and compliance phase of the UN Resolution 687. However, he added that "UNSCOM will continue to conduct intrusive inspections whenever the circumstances warrant them.. Newlin went on to say that in order to develop an effective data base on Iraq's ballistic missile capabilities, UNSCOM must search practically every large scale production type plant, including those that manufacture dual-use items. 

Iraqi Long-Range Missile Plan Used UK Technology

Independent, 10/28/92 
The newspaper Independent obtained documents that revealed Iraq was trying to manufacture a long-range ballistic missile capable of carrying a nuclear warhead 1,500 mi. The Space Research Corporation (SRC), a Brussels, Belgium based armaments design company played a large part in devising what was called "Project Bird.. SRC compiled a long list of high technology components which western companies, including more than 20 in Britain, would supply to Iraq without even knowing that the goods were for a missile system. There was no evidence the orders were made or delivered. On 2/17/90, western intelligence intercepted correspondence from SRC to Iraq that turned out to be documents outlining the project's technical goals. 

The proposed Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) would have had four times the range of a single Scud missile because its launcher system was to be composed of innovative clusters of five to eight Scud missiles. The head of SRC and the man in charge of Project Bird was Gerald Bull, the designer of "Project Babylon"--the high altitude Iraqi supergun. In 4/90, one month after Bull was murdered, British Customs officials seized components destined for the Iraqi supergun. The director of Project Babylon between 1988-1989, Chris Cowley, said that when he worked for SRC, he uncovered details of the clustered Scud missile system. Though Iraq could produce three types of Scud missiles, Cowley said, "the Bird would have given Iraq a three-stage rocket system capable either of putting data-gathering satellites in orbit, or delivering a 150 kg warhead." Cowley also said that even though there were thermo-chemical problems to overcome, the project would have reached an advanced level within a year. Bull's attempt to acquire a factory in Northern Ireland that produced low weight\high strength carbon fibres that would have reduced the missile's weight, was thwarted in late 1989 by the British government. 

The documents obtained by the Independent say that the missile would have had three stages, each lighter than the last, with a Scud as the third stage carrying the warhead. The documents go on to say that such an "orbital launcher" can be produced from the existing missiles and that the first launches, which would be "restricted to relatively simple payloads," would be commencing one year after work began. However, there were still "considerable mechanical design problems" that had to be resolved, including stage intercoupling and separation techniques. 

Saddam Said To Play Hide-And Seek With Scud Missiles

Washington Times, 11/6/92, p. A7 
In a game of hide-and-seek, Saddam Hussein is suspected of moving his prohibited Scud missiles around on camouflaged trucks so that the UN weapons experts cannot find them during their inspections in Iraq. US intelligence officials believe that Saddam Hussein is hiding close to 200 of the 819 Scud-B missiles acquired from the Soviet Union during the 1980-88 war with Iran or the Iraqi developed longer range al-Hussein and al-Abbas versions. UN officials think that Iraq is concealing around half this number from the UN inspectors. Tim Trevan, the spokes- person for the UN Special Commission charged with dismantling Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, said 151 ballistic missiles have been destroyed by the inspectors or the Iraqis or are awaiting destruction. In 3/91, Iraq conceded that it had 52 Scuds, but later admitted that it possessed another 92 ballistic missiles, for a total of 144. UN officials believe that Iraq fired 487 of the Soviet Scuds during the Iran-Iraq war and launched 92 missiles in the Persian Gulf war. The Pentagon admits that the allied bombings of the Gulf war did not destroy any missiles. 

An unidentified engineer, who claimed to have worked on Iraq's weapons program prior to the Gulf war, said that the Iraqis have buried a large number of rocket boosters under the Habaniyah air base west of Baghdad as well as in the basements of mosques, hospitals and other buildings where the Iraqis believe the UN inspectors will not visit. The engineer also claimed that immediately after the war, a number of missiles were disassembled and hidden with 6 ft rocket boosters, guidance systems and other important missile components. He argued that actual missile production equipment and copies of files on Iraq's weapons programs are stashed away in private homes. Intelligence sources say they have received similar information. 

Trevan could not comment on the engineers claims and said that "Iraq most recently has given us a very full account of all 819 missiles supplied to it by the Soviet Union." 

UN Team Gains Information On Ballistic Missiles

Proliferation Issues, 11/12/92, p. 17  

AFP (Paris), 10/30/92 

On 10/30/92, the team leader of a UN missile inspection team in Iraq, Nikita Smidovich, said that the team had filled in "many gaps" about Iraqi weapons capability following team visits to over 50 sites and hours of conversation with Iraqi officials; the team was following up reports that Iraq still had as many as 200 Scuds. UN sources said that the team was to find out whether Iraq still had the capability to launch missiles with ranges in excess of 150 km, which are to be eliminated according to the 1991 Gulf War ceasefire resolutions. Smidovich refused to say whether any hidden missiles were discovered, instead commenting that this mission was "a bit different," and that the Iraqis' attitude had become "positive" and that they were "open and candid.. Smidovich couldn't say whether another UN missile team would be necessary, but he did say that a lot of information had been collected and that the conclusion of some of the issues regarding Iraq's ballistic missiles may depend on its analysis. Smidovich "reckoned" that the UN would now move to verifying Iraq's long term compliance with the ceasefire resolutions. 


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