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Iraqi Missile Abstracts: 1995
These abstracts are excerpted from the CNS Monitoring Proliferation Threats Missile Abstracts Database.  The material presented here is a representative sample of the material contained in the full database.  Abstracts do not include the full text of the original source, but do include all proliferation-relevant information.  CNS has made no attempt to evaluate the veracity or accuracy of the information provided by the original sources.  Access to the CNS Databases is provided on a subscription basis. For information on how to subscribe, please contact Chris Fitz at

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Saddam Concealing Long-Range Missiles

Washington Times, 2/22/95, pg. A15 
According to General Wafiq Samra'i, who defected from the Iraqi military in late 1994, Saddam Hussein is holding back long-range Scud and Hussein missiles, as well as biological and chemical warheads. Samra'i stated the information in an open letter written to UN envoy Rolf Ekeus, but no specific figures were discussed. 

Checkered Chums

Strategic Digest, 4/95, pp. 493-494, by Pamela Pohling Brown 
China, along with North Korea, continues to transfer missile technology to Iraq. China helped Iran develop the Oghab (Eagle) rocket and also assisted in the establishment of a Scud-B missile manufacturing in Iran. China maintains a recipient/supplier relationship with Israel, which Israel may exploit by persuading China not to sell more weapons in the Middle East. 

UN's Ekeus Investigates Past Weapons Cooperation

FBIS-NES-95-110, 6/7/95  

Voice of the Iraqi People (Clandestine), 6/7/95 

In early 6/95, UNSCOM head Rolf Ekeus visited Egypt to discuss with Egyptian Foreign Minister 'Amr Musa prior missile cooperation between Egypt and Iraq. Ekeus sought to check information received from Iraq regarding the Egyptian/Iraqi/Argentinean Condor II missile program and Egyptian/Iraqi chemical weapons programs. UNSCOM is not leveling any accusations at Egypt, nor is it seeking information regarding Egyptian weapons programs. 

Iraq Asks Delay On Destroying Missile-Linked Machinery

New York Times, 7/9/95, p. 7, by Barbara Crossette 
On 7/7/95, Iraq's representative to the U.N., Nizar Hamdoon, submitted a letter to the Security Council requesting a delay in the destruction of five pieces of machinery which could be used to manufacture ballistic missiles. The letter indicated that Baghdad wants to postpone the destruction of these machines until the issue of Iraq's biological weapons has been resolved. In early 7/95, U.N. Special Commission head Rolf Ekeus told the Security Council that the machinery had been procured by Iraq to produce U.N.-prohibited missile systems. Although the machinery has yet to be destroyed, it has already been disabled and disassembled. 

Iraqis In Surprise Move Over Missile Tooling

Jane's Defense Weekly, 7/29/95, p. 13, by James Bruce 
On 7/20/95, according to U.N. officials, Iraq began destroying five machine tools that could be used in the production of ballistic missile components at an undisclosed location. The U.S. claims to have satellite photos which indicate that Baghdad has rebuilt its al-Kindi missile research and development facility since the Gulf War of 1991. 

U.S. Questions Top-Level Iraqis; Saddam Calls Defectors 'Judas'

Washington Post, 8/12/95, p. 15, by Daniel Williams 
On 8/11/95, U.S. intelligence officials in Jordan reportedly began questioning Lieutenant General Hussein Kamel Hassan Majeed, the defecting former head of Iraq's post-Gulf War industrialization program. Prior to the Gulf War of 1991, Hussein Kamel was responsible for Iraq's military buildup, including the smuggling of military spare parts into the country. The U.S. intelligence officials hope to obtain information from Kamel regarding Iraq's pre-Gulf War efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction. 

Security Sources: `No Chance' Saddam Will Fire Scuds

FBIS-NES-95-162, 8/20/95  

Ma'ariv (Tel Aviv), 8/20/95, pp. 1, 2 

In 8/95, Israeli security sources said there was no chance that Saddam Hussein would launch Scud missiles against Israel. This followed claims by a leader of the Iraqi opposition in an 8/18/95 interview on Israel Television Channel 1 that Iraq possesses 37 operational Scud missiles and Saddam Hussein will launch them against Israel in a "farewell barrage" if his regime collapses. The unnamed opposition leader, exiled in London, said Saddam Hussein was capable of arming his Scud missiles with chemical or biological warheads. According to other unnamed security sources, it is difficult to believe that Iraq possesses the capability to fire dozens of missiles or to fit them with nuclear, chemical, or biological warheads. 

Hasan Said To Take Arms Program Documents To Jordan

FBIS-NES-95-164, 8/24/95  

Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), 8/24/95, p. 2 

In 8/95, an unnamed source close to Iraqi defector General Husayn Kamil said that Kamil told UNSCOM Chief Rolf Ekeus Iraq had hidden a quantity of long-range surface-to-surface missiles. The source said Iraq had concealed information regarding these missiles and the Supergun, the manufacture of which was entrusted to General Kamil in the al-Fathah area near Karkuk Governorate in northern Iraq. Unnamed sources estimate work on the Supergun project cost Iraq more than $3 billion. The UN "dismantled the Supergun before it could be assembled." 

Iraq Reveals Capability To Manufacture Scud Engine

Flight International, 9/20/95-9/26/95, p. 19, by Allan George 
In 9/95, Iraq told UNSCOM head Rolf Ekeus that it had indigenously produced its own Scud missile engines through reverse engineering. Before the Iraqi revelation, it was widely believed that the only Scud missile engines available to Iraq had been Soviet-supplied. Prior to the 1990-91 Gulf crisis, Iraq was known to have the capability to manufacture its own Scud missile airframes. During the Gulf War, Iraq's shoddily-built Scud missile airframes frequently broke apart upon descent when fired at Israel and Saudi Arabia. 

Supporting Sources: 

[1] Reuter, 8/25/95; in Executive News Service, 8/25/95, "UN What The New Iraqi Disclosures Reveal." [2] R. Jeffrey Smith, Washington Post, 8/24/95, p. A1, A31, "Iraq Reveals Huge Arms Effort." 

Iraqi Flight Testing Revealed By Inspectors

Jane's Defence Weekly, 9/30/95, p. 4 
In 9/95, deputy executive chairman of UNSCOM Charles Duelfer stated that Baghdad had recently surrendered documents which revealed that Iraq had previously manufactured rocket motors for Scud missiles, and had flight- tested chemical warheads. Duelfer said that Iraq had employed a live chemical agent in one of the flight tests, but did not reveal the location of the test site. According to Duelfer, the new data will influence the accounting of Iraq's Scud missile warheads. 

Iraq Buying Missile Parts Covertly

Washington Post, 10/14/95, pp. A1, A20, by R. Jeffrey Smith 
On 10/13/95, U.N. and U.S. officials accused Iraq of covertly purchasing missile components from firms in Russia and Europe via a sophisticated network of "purchasing agents and dummy companies." Iraq is accused of obtaining accelerometers and gyroscopes, special metals and machine tools, and a French supplied furnace worth more than $1 million which is capable of manufacturing missile engine parts. According to U.N. Special Commission head Rolf Ekeus, Iraq has also lied about indigenously manufacturing certain missile-associated materials which, in reality, it had imported. Ekeus also asserted that Baghdad had placed orders for other missile-related "technologies, supplies, and material." Although Ekeus declined to comment on the source of this material, another U.N. official stated that firms from Germany, France, and Ukraine were among the suppliers to Iraq. U.N. officials assert that Iraq does not appear to have assembled any new Scud ballistic missiles, but has stockpiled and concealed materials, possibly to manufacture them in the future. Iraq has admitted obtaining some of the materials to support its Ibn al-Haytham missile research laboratory near Baghdad and two similar sites, but has asserted that the materials were intended for the manufacture of short- range missiles only, which is permitted under the U.N. embargo. According to U.N. officials, these materials could be utilized in the production of both short- and medium-range missiles. Iraq has disclosed to UNSCOM that it had attempted to broaden its 'Ababil-100' missile development program to include the manufacture of SSMs with ranges of between 100 and 150 km [1]. 

According to U.S. officials and court records, a U.S. businessman from Long Island organized a shipment of ammonium perchlorate from China to Iraq in 1993, but the transfer was intercepted en route. Ammonium perchlorate is used in the manufacture of rocket fuel. 

Senior U.S. officials have also expressed concern over Russia's sale of missile-related items to Iraq, in an apparent bid by Moscow to reinitiate its arms provider relationship with Baghdad. According to the head of the Strategic Investigations Office of the U.S. Customs Service Connie Fenchel, Iraq is persevering in, and possibly intensifying, its efforts to acquire missile-related technology embargoed by the U.N. UNSCOM stated that it may need to re-open its inquiries in Iraq because of Baghdad's attempts to conceal its weapons programs [1]. 

Supporting Sources: 

[1] Thalif Deen, Jane's Defence Weekly, 10/21/95, p. 5, "UNSCOM Accuses Iraq Of Purchasing Arms." [2] Flight International, 10/18/95-10/24/95, p. 6, "Iraq Defies U.N. Arms Embargo." 

Iraqi Missile Parts Worth $25 Mln-Jordan Official

Executive News Service, 12/12/95  

Reuter, 12/8/95, by Jack Redden 

On 12/8/95, a senior Jordanian official said missile parts intercepted on route to Iraq included 115 Russian-made guidance components worth $25 million. Jordanian authorities seized the missile guidance components at Amman's airport during the second week of 11/95 [1]. The components were shipped by a Royal Jordanian aircraft in crates identified as electrical equipment [1]. The Jordanian official added that the missile components had been imported by a Palestinian from Gaza, who had since departed from Jordan. The interception indicates that Baghdad is continuing to violate the U.N. embargo on virtually all trade with Iraq. On 12/9/95, the Russian Foreign Ministry denied reports the shipment originated in Russia and emphasized Moscow's compliance with U.N. sanctions on Iraq [2]. 

The Jordanian newspaper Al-Bilad identified the importer as Wi'am Abu- Gharbiyah, a man who operated a trade office in Baghdad and conducted business in Russia [3]. Other reports attribute the shipment to Abu- Gharbiyah, but also to Iraqi businessman `Udayy `Ujam, who resides in Jordan [4]. Abu Gharbiyah is known to have ties with Saddam Hussein's regime [4]. Information from Iraq indicates that Baghdad has instructed Iraqis to shift business from Jordan to Turkey, and is trying to establish a free trade zone between Mosul and Hakho, since the area is free from U.N. supervision [4]. 

On 12/5/95, UNSCOM Chief Rolf Ekeus announced that after examining Iraqi documents he had come to the conclusion that Iraq had produced 80 Scud-type missiles and 10 missile engines remained unaccounted for [5]. According to Ekeus, some of the missile parts were acquired after U.N. sanctions were imposed [5]. On 12/8/95, the U.S. commended Jordan's role in intercepting the shipment to Iraq [6]. 

Supporting Sources: 

[1] Jordan Times (Amman), 12/9/95, pp. 1, 7; in FBIS-NES-95-237, 12/9/95, "Seizure Of Iraq-Bound Missile Parts Confirmed." [2] Interfax (Moscow), 12/9/95; in FBIS-SOV-95-237, 12/9/95, "Iraq Denies Contract Signed For Missile Components." [3] Al-Bilad (Amman), 12/13/95, p. 1; in FBIS-NES-95-238, 12/13/95, "Amman Said Exploiting Seizure Of Iraq-Bound Parts." [4] Voice Of Iraqi People (Clandestine), 12/20/95; in FBIS-NES-95-245, 12/20/95, "Arms Deal Reportedly Reached With Russia." [5] Jack Redden, Reuter, 12/7/95; in Executive News Service, 12/8/95, "Jordan Intercepts Missile Parts For Iraq-Officials." [6] Reuter, 12/8/95; in Executive News Service, 12/8/95, "U.S. Praises Jordan For Seizure." [7] Voice of Iraqi People (Clandestine), 12/7/95; in FBIS-TAC-95-007, 12/7/95, "Authorities Seize `Advanced' Military Equipment Bound For Iraq." [8] JINSA Security Affairs, 11/95-1/96, pp. 1, 9, "Iraq Still Pursuing Missile Program." 

U.N. Is Said To Find Russian Markings On Iraq-Bound Military Equipment

Washington Post, 12/15/95, p. 30, by R. Jeffrey Smith 
In 11/95, Jordanian officials seized a shipment of advanced Russian missile guidance components enroute to Iraq. The U.N. estimated the shipment to be worth in excess of $25 million. The shipment consisted of approximately "100 sets of advanced guidance equipment such as accelerometers and gyroscopes" which may have been "designed for use in long-range intercontinental missiles." According to diplomatic sources, the shipment originated in Moscow and included 30 boxes. It is uncertain whether the Russian government approved the transfer or if the components were shipped by criminals. In early 12/95, a spokesman for the Russian Embassy in Washington said the components "did not belong to Russia." According to U.S. and U.N. officials, the Russian denial is not credible because the missile parts were designed for Russian long-range missiles, although they could be modified for shorter range systems. U.N. documents show the missile parts were ordered by the Karama research center near Baghdad. Iraq is allowed by the U.N. to develop missiles with ranges of less than 150 km and Baghdad claims the parts were to be used in the manufacture of these short-range missiles. Iraq has blamed the incident on a Jordanian businessman who tried to sell the prohibited parts to Iraq on at least two previous occasions. According to a diplomatic source, the intermediary was Wiyam Abu Gharbieh, a Palestinian from Gaza, whose company was listed on the shipping manifests. A U.N. official called Iraq's explanation inaccurate. 

In early 12/95, Ekeus reported that the commission could only account for 70 engines from the 80 intermediate-range Scud missiles that Iraq produced [1]. 

Supporting Sources: 

[1] Washington Post, 12/8/95, p. A44, "Jordan Seizes Missile Parts Meant For Shipment To Iraq." [2] Jack Redden, Washington Times, 12/8/95, p. 18, "Jordan Seizes Missile Parts." [3] Caroline Faraj and Philip Finnegan, Defense News, 12/18/95-12/24/95, pp. 1, 21, "Israel Lobbies White House For Military Aid To Jordan." [4] Andrew Borowiec, Washington Times, 12/12/95, p. A 13, "Iraq's Breaking Of Sanctions Said To Include Missile Parts." [5] Washington Times, 12/9/95, p. A7, "Iraq Fears Confirmed." 


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