Surveillance@acamedia.info

Eine Zitatesammlung - Fortsetzung

(Teil 1 liegt hier)

Wenn nicht anders vermerkt, sind alle Texte Zitate.
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DigitalCourage (2020)

Projekte


I. Bayerisches Polizeigesetz

I.1 CSU will Polizei in Bayern zum Geheimdienst aufrŸsten

Markus Reuter, 08.02.2018Ê


I.2 Ab Sommer in Bayern: Das hŠrteste Polizeigesetz seit 1945

Marie Bršckling, 24.03.2018Ê


Das Gesetz kommt einem Ausbau der Polizei zum Nachrichtendienst gleich. Die Exekutive darf kŸnftig prŠventive Ermittlungen ohne konkrete Hinweise auf Straftaten fŸhren Ð damit kann die Polizei nun wie der Verfassungsschutz agieren. Zudem dŸrfen die Beamten kŸnftig in AusnahmefŠllen Handgranaten einsetzen, Post von VerdŠchtigen beschlagnahmen, IT-Systeme durchsuchen, V-Leute einsetzen und Bodycams tragen.


... Zur Anhšrung diese Woche im Landtag luden die Parteien ausschlie§lich Juristen als SachverstŠndige. Gefragt wurden sie zur Vereinbarkeit des Gesetzesentwurfs mit Urteilen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts und dem Unionsrecht. Die Experten wagten kein abschlie§endes Urteil Ÿber die VerfassungskonformitŠt des Vorhabens. †ber die ZweckmŠ§igkeit des Gesetzes oder seine Praxistauglichkeit wurde gar nicht erst gesprochen, dafŸr waren keine Fachkundigen geladen.


... Zur Anhšrung diese Woche im Landtag luden die Parteien ausschlie§lich Juristen als SachverstŠndige. Gefragt wurden sie zur Vereinbarkeit des Gesetzesentwurfs mit Urteilen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts und dem Unionsrecht. Die Experten wagten kein abschlie§endes Urteil Ÿber die VerfassungskonformitŠt des Vorhabens. †ber die ZweckmŠ§igkeit des Gesetzes oder seine Praxistauglichkeit wurde gar nicht erst gesprochen, dafŸr waren keine Fachkundigen geladen. Das erweckt den Eindruck, der Bayerische Landtag sei eine Verwaltungsbehšrde und kein politisches Organ.


SachverstŠndige Šu§erten laute Zweifel an der VerstŠndlichkeit des Gesetzes. Der Rechtswissenschaftler Josef Lindner schreibt in seiner Stellungnahme, dass ãdas Polizeiaufgabengesetz (PAG) allmŠhlich das Stadium der Unlesbarkeit erreicht hatÒ. Auch der sachverstŠndige Juraprofessor aus Bayreuth, Markus Mšstl, gab zu Protokoll, dass die FŸlle und KomplexitŠt der vorliegenden VorschlŠge ihn ãan GrenzenÒ fŸhre.

1.3 Gesetz zur Neuordnung des bayerischen Polizeirechts

abgeordnetenwatch.de, 15 Mai 2018


....

Natascha Kohnen (SPD) kritisierte den Gesetzentwurf und das Verhalten der CSU-Fraktion aufs SchŠrfste. Sie warf der Staatsregierung vor, die Bedenken von Verfassungsrechtler*innen sowie des Bundesvorsitzenden der Polizei Oliver Malchow zu ignorieren, die das Gesetz als nicht zielfŸhrend beschrieben hŠtten.Ê


... HierfŸr sollen in Bayern mit dem neuen Gesetz unter anderem Daten aus besonders sensiblen Ma§nahmen, z. B. aus der Aufzeichnung Ÿberwachter TelefongesprŠche, durch eine unabhŠngige Stelle vorab gesichtet werden. Diese neue Zentralstelle wird beim Polizeiverwaltungsamt angesiedelt und prŸft dann, ob der Eingriff in das Privatleben zu tief gehe.


ZusŠtzlich gibt die Staatsregierung als wesentliches Ziel der Gesetzesnovelle die Weiterentwicklung der prŠventiv-polizeilichen Eingriffsbefugnisse an. Der technische Fortschritt und erhšhte Terrorgefahr machten es notwendig, hier Kompetenzen zu erweitern. Die Polizei soll kŸnftig folgende Ma§nahmen umsetzen kšnnen:



Das PAG-Neuordnungsgesetz sieht darŸber hinaus vor, die EinfŸgung der Gefahrenkategorie der ãdrohenden GefahrÒ fŸr bedeutende RechtsgŸter einzufŸhren. Die Bayerische Staatsregierung ist der Auffassung, der Rechtsstaat dŸrfe nicht warten, bis tatsŠchlich etwas passiert, sondern er mŸsse rechtlich dazu in der Lage sein, Taten wie z. B. AnschlŠge im Vorfeld zu verhindern.


Mit Blick auf das Urteil des BVerfG kšnnte dies im Sinne der PrŠvention terroristischer AnschlŠge hilfreich sein. Kritiker*innen bemŠngeln jedoch anhand der nicht ausreichend definierten Gefahrenkategorie auch die Mšglichkeit, diese auf normale Straftaten anzuwenden, bevor diese Ÿberhaupt begangen werden.


2. Ist die BekŠmpfung einer ãdrohenden GefahrÒ nicht eigentlich etwas Gutes?

... nun liegt die Entscheidung darŸber, wer eine Bedrohung darstellt, bei der Polizei. Bisher musste ein Gericht beschlie§en, dass tatsŠchlich Gefahr von einer Person ausgeht. Erst dann durften beispielsweise ihre NachrichtenverlŠufe Ÿberwacht werden. Ohne richterliches Urteil kšnnen Sie auch nach der €nderung nicht auf unbegrenzte Zeit in PrŠventivgewahrsam genommen werden. Trotzdem stellt sich die Frage, welches Verhalten eigentlich als verdŠchtig eingestuft wird, wer das bestimmt und wie €nderungen in der EinschŠtzung vorgenommen werden. Und welche*r Polizeibeamte wann zu welcher EinschŠtzung kommt. Diese neuen Kompetenzen kšnnten auch zu einem hŠrteren Durchgreifen von Polizist*innen fŸhren, warnt Prof. Tobias Singelnstein, Kriminologe der Ruhr UniversitŠt Bochum, in einem Interview mit Krautreporter.de. Sie stŸnden nŠmlich unter umso hšherem Erwartungsdruck, je mehr Entscheidungsfreiheit sie hŠtten.


...




I.4 Thilo Weichert: ãEs geht um das SchŸren von BedrohungsgefŸhlenÒ

Interview mit Thilo Weichert, GesprŠchspartner: Markus Klšckner, nachdenkseiten, 21.5.2018


Das Polizeiaufgabengesetz, das PAG, regelt nicht nur die Aufgaben, sondern auch die Befugnisse der Polizei in Bayern. ... AusweitungenÊ


Neu eingefŸhrt werdenÊ


Viele der informationellen Befugnisse kšnnen schon bei einer ãdrohenden GefahrÒ zum Einsatz kommen, also wenn die Polizei blo§ mutma§t, eine Gefahr kšnnte entstehen (hoheitliche Sicherheit vor demokratische Freiheit).


Es wird also eine neue Runde angesto§en, die das Bundesverfassungsgericht, den bayerischen Verfassungsgerichtshof und voraussichtlich irgendwann einmal den EuropŠischen Gerichtshof erreichen wird.


... Eine Ironie im Ablauf der Ereignisse liegt darin, dass Seehofer die jŸngste Sicherheitsstatistik veršffentlichen musste, die aufzeigt, dass es derzeit weniger Straftaten denn je gibt Ð und das ohne all die neuen PAG-Befugnisse. ... Dabei werden rechtsstaatliche Instrumente geschleift: die UnabhŠngigkeit der Justiz, die Meinungsfreiheit, die Gewaltenteilung, die NeutralitŠt der Staatsgewalt.


... Das Problem dieses Gesetzes besteht darin, dass es keine gravierendsten Eingriffe gibt; alles ist gravierend und erst recht in der Gesamtheit. Es gibt aber neben den klassischen modernen Instrumenten der TelekommunikationsŸberwachung und der Datenbeschlagnahme einige neue Befugnisse, die bisher noch wenig eršrtert wurden und neue †berwachungsdimensionen eršffnen:Ê


Per Drohnen soll †berwachung kŸnftig verstŠrkt aus der Luft zulŠssig sein. Da Drohnen in der Luft kaum erkannt werden kšnnen und damit der šffentliche Raum flŠchendeckend kontrolliert werden kann, wird im Wortsinn eine neue †berwachungsdimension hinzugefŸgt. €hnliches gilt fŸr die Zulassung von Genanalysen, der sog. DNA-PhŠnotypisierung, fŸr die damit geworben wird, dass diese es ermšglichen wŸrde, per Genetik Fahndungsfotos erstellen zu kšnnen. Diese Propaganda ist wissenschaftlich nicht haltbar, zugleich aber hochgefŠhrlich, weil damit ohne jegliche Sicherungen die Pforte zur polizeilichen Genanalyse gešffnet wird. Aus unseren Genen lŠsst sich Hšchstpersšnliches ableiten, etwa Dispositionen fŸr Krankheiten oder fŸr Charaktereigenschaften.


...Ê Europarechtler und Verfassungsjuristen sind sich weitgehend einig, dass das PAG in vieler Hinsicht gegen hšheres Recht verstš§t, gegen die EuropŠische Grundrechtecharta und gegen unser Grundgesetz. Es gibt inzwischen eine weitgehend gefestigte Rechtsprechung des EuropŠischen Gerichtshofs, des EuGH, und des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, die unter Verweis auf die Grundrechte, etwa das Grundrecht auf Datenschutz, viele Regelungen aufhebbar machen.


... Das Bundesverfassungsgericht hat in seiner VolkszŠhlungsentscheidung 1983 und vielen weiteren Entscheidungen darauf hingewiesen, dass †berwachung dazu fŸhrt, dass die Menschen nicht mehr wissen, wer was wann und bei welcher Gelegenheit an Informationen gegen sie sammelt und einsetzt. Wer damit rechnet, dass zum Beispiel seine Teilnahme an einer Versammlung oder einer BŸrgerinitiative behšrdlich registriert wird, der wird mšglicherweise auf die AusŸbung seiner entsprechenden Grundrechte verzichten. Selbstbestimmung ist eine elementare Funktionsbedingung eines auf Handlungs- und MitwirkungsfŠhigkeit der BŸrger begrŸndeten freiheitlichen demokratischen Gemeinwesens.


I.5 Gesellschaft fŸr Freiheitsrechte: Legal challenge against Bavarian Police Act

By Gesellschaft fŸr Freiheitsrechte, 30. May 2018

EDRi observer Gesellschaft fŸr Freiheitsrechte (GFF) is preparing a joint constitutional complaint to be brought before the German Constitutional Court against the newly passed Bavarian Police Act (PAG) and has started a crowdfunding campaign for that case. In the last couple of weeks Germany has seen major protests against the Bavarian Police Task Act (#noPAG) Ð but nevertheless, the law was passed by the Bavarian state parliament on 15 May and went into force on 25 May.


Critics have seized especially on a definition shift in the Christlich-Soziale Union (CSU) governmentÕs law for the threshold for police intervention from Òimminent dangerÓ (konkrete Gefahr) to Òlooming dangerÓ (drohende Gefahr). as the threshold for police intervention. ÒNot only does the police get a whole new set of competences to restrict civil rights, but they can also act much earlier. Previously, there were clear requirements as to when the police should be allowed to act, and police action could be tested by administrative courts. In the future, it can hardly be regulated if a given situation is actually presented a Òlooming dangerÓ, explains Ulf Buermeyer, chairman of Gesellschaft fŸr Freiheitsrechte. ÒNow, the police is in fact almost free to intervene at their own discretionÓ.Ê


This law will impact digital rights on a whole range of issues, likeÊ


I.6 Auf dem Weg zur totalen †berwachung

nachdenseiten, 22.5.2018


China baut derzeit ein System auf, das das Verhalten seiner Bewohner in allen Lebensbereichen bewertet. Das chinesische sogenannte ÒSozialkreditsystemÓ soll mšglichst alles erfassen: Zahlungsmoral, Strafregister, Einkaufsgewohnheiten, Partei-Treue und soziales Verhalten. Das chinesische Big Data Projekt ist in Grš§e und Ausma§ weltweit beispiellos.

II. ãDie Freiheit bleibt vollkommen auf der StreckeÒ

Interview mit Volker Tripp, 05.03.2018 (im Cache)


Staatstrojaner

[Es] sind unterschiedliche Grundrechte betroffen:Ê


Die Eingriffsvoraussetzungen sind in beiden FŠllen hšchst unterschiedlich. Die Frage ist: Ist der Staatstrojaner Ÿberhaupt in der Lage, trennscharf zwischen diesen unterschiedlichen Eingriffen zu unterscheiden und dementsprechend auch die unterschiedlichen Eingriffsvoraussetzungen zu wahren? Das ist technisch recht schwer zu gewŠhrleisten. Ich wŸrde mich also weit aus dem Fenster lehnen und sagen: Es gibt keinen verfassungskonformen Staatstrojaner. Es ist technisch nicht mšglich, ihn auf diese Art und Weise zu programmieren. ...


Vorratsdatenspeicherung


†berwachung

In einer Situation, in der ich in der …ffentlichkeit nicht mehr anonym bin und in der mein Verhalten permanent von Algorithmen bewertet wird, wird zwangslŠufig ein ãChilling-EffectÒ einsetzen. Das hei§t, Menschen werden sich Ÿberlegen, ob sie von bestimmten Grundrechten lieber keinen Gebrauch machen, weil es unter UmstŠnden dazu fŸhren kšnnte, dass man sie als verdŠchtig einstuft. Daher widerspricht speziell eine flŠchendeckende intelligente VideoŸberwachung diametral dem Geist einer freiheitlichen Gesellschaft.


.... In einem Rechtsstaat muss sich der Staat fŸr jede EinschrŠnkung der Freiheiten seiner BŸrger ... rechtfertigen und nicht umgekehrt. In dem Augenblick, in dem der Staat sagt: ãWer nichts zu verbergen hat, hat nichts zu befŸrchtenÒ, muss ich mich als BŸrger aber dafŸr rechtfertigen, dass der Staat nicht in meine Rechte eingreift.


Evidenz-Basieren und Evaluieren

Ich habe ganz erhebliche Zweifel daran, dass die Ÿberbordenden †berwachungsma§nahmen, die wir haben, zu irgendeinem Schutz fŸhren. In Frankreich, wo es seit 2006 die Vorratsdatenspeicherung gibt, konnten sich zahlreiche Attentate ereignen. Ich wŸrde mir wŸnschen, dass wir zu einer evidenzbasierten Sicherheitspolitik zurŸckkehren. Eine, die zunŠchst fragt, was eine Ma§nahme genau bringt, und die Ma§nahmen regelmŠ§ig evaluiert Ð mit der Bereitschaft, diese auch zurŸckzunehmen, wenn die Evaluierung negativ ausfŠllt.


Einfluss der EU

... im Bereich der Sicherheitsgesetze [haben] die Innenminister Ÿber den Ministerrat und auch die Sicherheitspolitiker Ÿber die entsprechenden Gremien im Europaparlament einen relativ starken Einfluss .... Es gibt wenige Institutionen, die aus bŸrgerrechtlicher Sicht dagegenhalten.

Wir haben zwar den europŠischen Datenschutzbeauftragten und die Artikel-29-Gruppe, aber deren Stellungnahmen fallen im VerhŠltnis zu der Vielzahl an Stellungsnahmen, die von der anderen Seite kommen, kaum ins Gewicht. Insofern kann man sagen, dass die Innenminister im Ministerrat starke Treiber der europŠischen Entwicklung zu mehr †berwachung sind.


Auf der anderen Seite haben wir mit dem EuropŠischen Gerichtshof (EuGH) eine Instanz, die im Vergleich zum Bundesverfassungsgericht noch deutlich stŠrker bŸrgerrechtlich orientiert urteilt. Ich erinnere an die bahnbrechenden Urteile des EuGH zur Vorratsdatenspeicherung und auch an das Gutachten zur ãPassenger Name RecordÒ-Vereinbarung mit Kanada. In beiden FŠllen hat der EuGH ganz klar gesagt: Anlasslose massenhafte Datenspeicherungen sind unverhŠltnismŠ§ig. Das Bundesverfassungsgericht hat sich bisher nicht getraut, in dieser Klarheit zu urteilen, gerade was anlasslose Speicherungen angeht.


Algorithmen

... Jeder Algorithmus beinhaltet Wertentscheidungen und †berlegungen, die seine Programmierer ihm bewusst oder unbewusst eingepflanzt haben. ... die Freiheit bleibt dabei aber vollkommen auf der Strecke. Die Freiheit, jederzeit entscheiden zu kšnnen ãjetzt verhalte ich mich andersÒ, ist jedoch der Kern menschlichen Seins. Daher halte ich eine kybernetische Betrachtungsweise der Gesellschaft fŸr grundweg unvereinbar mit einer wirklich freiheitlichen Gesellschaft.


Mit dem Staatstrojaner ist der Weg in einen †berwachungsstaat wie China geebnet

Sven von Storch, 2. Juni 2018


PETITION:Ê

GEGEN DIE AUSSP€HUNG DURCH DEN STAATSTROJANER

Deutschland ist zu einem totalen †berwachungsstaat geworden. Versteckt in einem anderen Gesetz hat die Bundesregierung ohne parlamentarische Debatte und šffentliche Diskussion das weitreichendste †berwachungsgesetz in der Geschichte der Bundesrepublik durch den Bundestag verabschieden lassen.

Demnach dŸrfen jetzt nicht nur TerrorverdŠchtige und Mitglieder der organisierten KriminalitŠt durch einen Staatstrojaner Ÿberwacht werden, sondern praktisch die gesamte Onlinekommunikation aller BŸrger. Ein Staatstrojaner wird dazu heimlich auf das Smartphone, Tablet, Notebook oder PC installiert und kann dann die gesamte Kommunikation auslesen, speichern und das gesamte berufliche und private Leben ausspŠhen. Bemerken tun wir das nicht. Wenn wir auf unserem Computer unsere Gedanken schriftlich niederlegen, dann kšnnen also auch unsere Gedanken kŸnftig ausgelesen werden.

Das Gesetz ist verfassungswidrig und noch dazu ohne jede šffentliche Debatte unter VortŠuschen falscher Tatsachen im Bundestag verabschiedet worden. Kommen Sie Ihrer Pflicht als HŸter des Grundgesetzes und der Demokratie nach und leiten Sie eine verfassungsrechtliche PrŸfung ein.

HINTERGRUND

SO FUNKTIONIERT DER STAATSTROJANER

Bei einer Online-Durchsuchung dringt der Staat mittels einer Schad-Software, einem sogenannten Trojaner, unbemerkt in Smartphones oder Computer ein, um die Daten auszuspŠhen. Die Nachrichten etwa aus Messenger-Diensten wie WhatsApp werden dann direkt vor der VerschlŸsselung an die Behšrden Ÿbermittelt. Damit kann auch die gesamte vergangene Kommunikation ausgelesen werden. Bei dem Grad der Vernetzung durch soziale Netzwerke und Messenger-Dienste kommt dieses Vorgehen einer TotalŸberwachung gleich.

DURCH TROJANER K…NNEN AUCH FALSCHE BEWEISE UNTERGESCHOBEN WERDEN

Der Chaos-Computer-Club hat belegt, dass es durch den Einsatz von Staatstrojanern technisch mšglich ist, auch Bilder und anderes kompromittierendes Material hochzuladen. Dadurch kšnnten etwa auch Beweise untergeschoben werden.


JEDER B†RGER KANN IN DEN FOKUS DER TOTAL†BERWACHUNG GERATEN

Der Staatstrojaner soll nicht nur gegen TerrorverdŠchtige oder die organisierte KriminalitŠt eingesetzt werden, sondern bei einer ganzen Reihe von Delikten, einschlie§lich Steuerdelikten. Und betroffen sind von den Ma§nahmen nicht nur die VerdŠchtigen, gegen die ermittelt wird, sondern auch alle, die mit ihnen in Verbindung stehen. Kšnnte es sein, dass ihr Nachbar Steuern hinterzieht? Dann mŸssen Sie damit rechnen, dass kŸnftig Kamera und Mikrofon Ihres Handys auf dem Nachttisch aus der Ferne eingeschaltet werden und Bilder und GerŠusche aus ihrem Schlafzimmer in irgendein Behšrdenzimmer funken. Jeden kann das treffen. Die †berwachung ist totaler, als sŠ§e der Beamte auf Ihrer Bettkante: denn dann wŸssten Sie wenigstens, dass er da ist.

DAS GESETZ WURDE UNTER UMGEHUNG ALLER KONTROLLINSTANZEN VERABSCHIEDET

Der Bundestag hat das Gesetz ohne eine šffentliche Debatte oder auch nur eine Aussprache im Bundestage faktisch heimlich verabschiedet. Die Bundesregierung versteckte die TotalŸberwachung in einem €nderungsantrag zu einem Gesetzentwurf Ÿber Fahrverbote. Damit vermied die Koalition bewusst eine Beteiligung des Bundesrates und umging den Bundesdatenschutzbeauftragten und die Ÿblichen parlamentarischen HŸrden.

Ulrich Schellenberg, der PrŠsident des Deutschen Anwaltsvereins kommentierte das Vorgehen wie folgt: ãPraktisch ohne šffentliche Debatte wird versucht, mit Rechtsgrundlagen fŸr Online-Durchsuchung und Quellen-TelekommunikationsŸberwachung schwerste Grundrechtseingriffe in die Strafprozessordnung einzufŸhrenÒ.


Copyright Update #1: Debatte um Upload-Filter im EU-Urheberrecht spitzt sich zu

Leonhard Dobusch, netzpolitik.org, 01.02.2018Ê


Mit dem Wechsel der EU-RatsprŠsidentschaft hat die Diskussion Ÿber eine Reform des EU-Urheberrechts neue Fahrt aufgenommen. Im Zentrum der Debatte stehen die VorschlŠge der Kommission zur EinfŸhrung von Upload-Filtern und eines EU-Leistungsschutzrechtes. Sie bedrohen die digitale Meinungs- und Kunstfreiheit.


meine Email an deutsche MEPs vom 7.5.2018


EU-Parlament stimmt fŸr die ÒZensur-MaschineÓ und ignoriert Eure Bedenken, aber wir bleiben dran!

Save The Internet, 13. Sept. 2018


... heute stimmte die Mehrheit der Abgeordneten des EU-Parlaments fŸr die geplante Urheberrechtsreform und wir sind ma§los enttŠuscht. Die Abgeordneten des EU-Parlaments haben heute 995.000 Bedenken - EURE Bedenken - ignoriert.


Die heutige Abstimmung ist ein Armutszeugnis fŸr die europŠische Demokratie und die Meinungsfreiheit im Netz. Die deutschen Abgeordneten von CDU/CSU und SPD, welche mit ÔJAÕ stimmten, stimmten heute damit auch gegen den Koalitionsvertrag ihrer Parteien in Berlin.

Das Leistungsschutzrecht wurde verschlimmert. Es wurde gut versteckt eine Lizenzpflicht fŸr Links durch die HintertŸr eingeschmuggelt. Das Leistungsschutzrecht ist realitŠtsfern und gefŠhrlich. Es bedroht Informationsanbieter wie Blogger, Nachrichten- oder Wissensportale in ihrer Existenz.

Die Umsetzung des 13. Artikels der Richtlinie sieht eine eine Echtzeit-Filterung der Inhalte, die kŸnftig im Netz hochgeladen werden, vor. Letztlich bedeute das: Jeder Upload wird in Zukunft von einem potentiell fehleranfŠlligen Algorithmus automatisiert geprŸft, gegebenenfalls falsch eingestuft und sodann gelšscht. Dadurch wird die freie MeinungsŠu§erung ŸbermŠ§ig eingeschrŠnkt, bevor Ÿberhaupt von ihr Gebrauch gemacht werden kann. Der Upload-Filter gleicht einer Zensur-Maschine, respektiveÊist mit kleinen €nderungen auch dazu geeignet unliebsame Meinungen zu unterdrŸcken.

Aber wir haben auch etwas bewirkt. Unser Einsatz im Juni und Juli, der zur Verschiebung der Abstimmung fŸhrte, brachte auch Verbesserungen. So wurden nun beispielsweise Start-ups mit einem Umsatz unter 3 Millionen Euro, von Uploadfiltern ausgenommen. Dank euch!Ê


++ Hier seht Ihr unseren Video-Kommentar aus dem EuropŠischen ParlamentÊauf TwitterÊ++Ê


Schaake disappointed in copyright reform vote

by Marietje Schaake, 12 September 2018

The Parliament squandered the opportunity to get the copyright reform on the right track. This is a disastrous result for the protection of our fundamental rights, ordinary internet users and Europe«s future in the field of artificial intelligence. We have set a step backwards instead of creating a true copyright reform that is fit for the 21st century."

Earlier Schaake proposed compromise amendments on 5 key issues

  1. a limited Article 13 without upload filters,Ê
  2. a beefed up presumption right for press publishers,Ê
  3. a broad exception for text and data mining,Ê
  4. a new broad exception to enable freedom of panorama,Ê
  5. a new broad exception for user generated content in order to protect the meme.


New opportunity to get the EUÕs copyright directive on the right track

Marietje Schaake, 6 September 2018

Throughout the summer a coalition of ÊMEPs from ALDE, S&D, EPP and ECR have exchanged ideas on finding a compromise for which we work to reach a majority vote in the Parliament. The amendments we tabled focus on five priority areas:Ê


1.Addressing the rights of creators without installing upload filters

in case there is no majority for it, we propose the following proportionate solution, which would Êlimit the scope of the proposal to active platforms which give access to audio-visual content only. This option gives rightsholders strong claims to platforms such as YouTube, without endorsing a filtering mandate. Those platforms would be obliged to conclude licensing agreements with rightholders.


2. A beefed up presumption right for press publishers

a presumption to allow the publisher to be regarded as the person entitled to conclude licences on and enforce the rights of reproduction and making available to the public concerning the digital use of the publication.


3. A broad exception for text and data mining

Europe can only develop a successful Artificial Intelligence strategy if a wide variety of organisations, including start-ups and SMEÕs, are able to carry out text and data mining to content to which they obtained lawful access. The right to read is the right to mine. The JURI proposal would limit this possibility only to a narrow category of organisations. Ê


4. A new broad exception for Êfreedom of panorama

Freedom of panorama Êgives people the right to take photos of landmarks (for instance the Eiffel Tower) and post them online. In countries where that freedom does not exist, photographers must first get permission from the copyright holder or risk being fined.


5. A new broad exception for user generated content.

This amendment Êwill better protect the creation and use of memes, gifs or other types of remixes. ÊDigital use of protected content would be possible for the purposes of pastiche, parody, criticism, or entertainment. It requires that content be legally available, and that the user provide an indication of the source.





William Binney, Technical Director of the World Geopolitical and Military Analysis and Reporting Group, NSA (with some 6000 analysts and reporters)



Mindblowing Corruption at FBI - NSA Whistleblower Reveals

William Binney at the Jimmy Dore Show , March 2018 (USB-sticks: INTENSO#9/Binney/Mindblowing Corruption At FBI - NSA Whistleblower Reveals.mp4 (The Jimmy Dore Show) - full transcript


time 2:22Ê

Jimmy Dore: "Nobody talks about that we have a secret court. Does that bother you?"


William Binney: "That court should be disbanded in my view. It doesn't belong to the Article III Courts. The differencxe between an Article III court and this court is:Ê


That means that they are totlally trusting the government that lies to them and anybody else. That's part of the felonies that are going on here, and have been going on since September 11, 2001."


time 4:07Ê

JD: It turns out the FBI has even admitted a bunch of times like back in 2002, correct me if I'm wrong, that they actually did provide false information to the FISA court all the time [WB: "that's right."]. Can you tell me about that?"


WB: "That came out in August, I think, of 2002, when they were talking about that FISA court. It came out that they had basically misrepresented evidence in the court at least 75 times that the court found out. That was at that time. Now since then they've gone through about 30 some thousand requests, and they refused some 5 or 10, that's about it.Ê

...Ê

time 4:30

There is another program going on here that's not even adressed by the FISA court, and it's done in secret. Also, in the Article III courts, the regular courts, what they've been doing - this is a program that's called "parallel construction". That is they will use the NSA data for common crimes committed inside this country. With all the data on everybody they can do this. They can find drug dealers, everything."


time 5:20

JD: "That's against the Constitution, You can't do that."


WB: "They are doing it in secret, and they never tell you. That's why they know it's a crime, and that's why they are keeping it secret from us. That's the whole point of it. They doing it regularly. The FBI and the Drug Enforcement Administration [DEA], including the IRS. They are all looking at this NSA data to find common crime."


JD: "Are you kidding me: That's blatantly unconstitutional, illegal. My hair should be on fire about this, right? That's sounds crazy to me that they're allowed to do that."


WB: "It even gets worse now: Once they find common crime in the NSA data, they tip off local and state police to go arrest these people. They don't give them the evidence. They say: 'Go arrest them, go here when they come up in the truck or something, parking it. Go arrest them, bring in the drug dogs and find the drugs'. Then, in order to justify the arrest, what they do is what is called the "parallel construction". And this is policy run by the Department of Justice of the United States.Ê


What it is, is: They say 'OK, we know these guys were criminals. We have it in the NSA data. But you can't use that data in a court of law, because it wasn't acquired with a warrant. So, it's not admissible. So we have to go find the same similar kind of data, since we know where it is, this makes it easier, and we seek the police out to do our own little investigation, assemble that evidence, and say 'now we're going substitute this evidence with the NSA data in a court of law when we try them. When we do that we can't put any of this statements of where the original source was from NSA, we can't give the court, the lawyers or anybody in the criminal process the understanding that that was the original basis.Ê


time 7:08

So, that's perjury, every time they did it. And according to Senator Feinstein -she stumbled and bubbled and gave this away- she said "Well, this program's been so valuable we put hundreds of people in jail every year with it. Well, that's thousands of people in jail based on perjury by the Department of Justice of the United States.Ê


And that's been going on since 9/11. They have been using that domestic spying program, the Stellarwind program, in NSA to do it."


JD: "They are supposed to be using this NSA spying, in theory, to catch terrorists. Isn't that what it is ...Ê and why we are willing to give up this certain amount of rights, it's because they are supposed to be spying to get terrorists. But you are saying is that they are using the surveillance state for regular crimes [WB nods] and then they are telling the cops, tipping off the cops, the local cops, about the crime, and then telling them ... do they tell them to scrub where you got this originally from and then construct your own parallel investigation ... or just go ahead and here is the information you have, now go find some of your own evidence. That's what they are doing?"


time 8:16

WB: "They do that for them. They create the parallel construction. They don't give them the raw data from NSA. All they do is tell them what to do, because they know what's goint to happen from the NSA data. "


JD: So, they say "Hey, there's going to be a drug dealer", and when they show up, ..."


WB: "When Reuters reported this -they interviewed one of the federal agents involved in the program- he said "This is such a great program, I just hope we can continue in secret". This is destroying our judicial system."


time 9:05

WB: "They are talking about doing something now because it seems to be used against the politicians in Washington. It's the only reason why they talk about it. On the common people ... we don't matter. We're dealing with the Department of Justice here, and we're not included in that."

...

JD: "Why isn't there more people screaming about [it]. You would think there would be people on the Left and Right who would be upset about the government intrusion in privacy like this. Because here is the problem, so, why this matters: If people go 'I don't care if the government reads my emails, if they catch a criminal. I'm not a criminal, who cares!' Well, let's say you caught the government committing a crime and they knew it, and now they know that you know it, because they're spying on you [WB nodds]. And then they can now smear you or arrest you or charge you with something before you get to give them ... Is that's what you are saying? That's one possibility, right?"


WB: "That's what they did to us, Jimmy. They made up information. The only difference is, I caught them at it. So I threatened them with malicious prosecution. If I didn't have that evidence against them -and I gave them the evidence so they knew I had a good one on them- so they backed off. It's the only reason they did that. And somebody at the Department of Jusitce felt so bad about what they were doing to us, they sent us a copy of their draft endictment on us. And so they didn't give us even more evidence of their lying and perjury and affidavit going to the court. That's a felony."Ê Ê


time 10:34

JD: "It seems like no-one gets in trouble any more for committing fe..., , you know people like Clapper. Clapper famously lied to Congres on TV and nothing happened. People see what they do, when Petraeus, when he gives up classified information, he gets a job teaching at NYU [New York University], and when someone else does it, like they take a selfie on a nuclear sub, they get thrown in the cling. So we see these two tiers of justice. And now you're saying that secret process and this parallel construction and the secret FISA court is now coming back to bite politicians in the ass. That's what you're saying. So now, you're saying, people actually talking about it. What are they saying. Who's talking about this and what are they recommending?"


time 11:24

WB: "The Nunes memo shows the connection with Christopher Steele, his connections with the DNC [Democratic National Committe] and the FBI and the Department of Justice and the collusion between them. They fabricated evidence to present to the FISA court. That's another fabrication going forward to the FISA court, to get a warrant to go and spy on just a person in the Trump campaign.Ê


Let me tell you what that does. The intelligence community was allowed to spy on somebody like that: They can go 2 hubs from that person: every friend of that person and every friend of that friend, but it goes even beyond that. Because I opposed originally the 2 hub principle back in January 2014 when President Obama was trying to do something to limit the scope of the spying, and limited it to 2 hubs. But it didn't include the little restriction on that, that I was trying to get to him to say. The restriction is for the 2nd hub: you can't use commercial business or a department of government to go through for that 2nd hub. Because, for example, if in the 1st hub they consider going to Google, for example, then the 2nd hub from Google out is to 1.5 billion people per day. Which means, in a very few days you have everybody on the planet. That means that from that 2 hub principle without excluding businesses or government agencies you can go to basically everybody on the planet. That opens it up to everybody."


time 12:59

JD: "So let me clarify. If they get a warrant to spy on 1 person, that includes or implied in that warrant is that they can also spy on people 2 separations away from them?"


WB: "Yes. Like I call you, that's the 1st hub. You call somebody else, that's the 2nd hub."


JD: "So they get to listen in on all those conversations?"


WB: "That's correct."


JD: "What! I didn't know that. So they get a warrant on 1 person in the Trump administration, that's as good as getting a warrant on everybody in the world."


WB: "That's right."Ê


JD: "And so, when Trump said that the Obama administration had bugged the Trump Tower - was he wrong or was he kind of right or ..."


WB: "He is absolutely right. I wouldn't use the word "bugged" because they're doing it through the switch network. So it means that all they do is remotely from NSA. The can tie into everything from there remotely by attaching to the switches. So, all they do is say 'Give me everything out of this building, Give me everything on all the Trump people (and they know all those and all the phone numbers). Just give me all of it."Ê


time 14:12

JD: "And so, the Nunes memo about this process of getting this warrant which gave the government, the FBI and everybody ...Ê the ability to spy on the Trump campaign and administration. And the Democrats didn't like them to release it because -they said- it would jeopardize the national security. They released it and it didn't jeopardize any national security. So now ...


WB: "That's right."Ê


JD: "... so now their credibility is impugned over this memo, as far as I'm concerned. Right?"


WB: "Yes."


JD: "They lied about it. So now it comes out. And what that memo reveals is what you're saying that the FBI didn't give the judge all the information it was supposed to, and that's a felony."


WB: "That's a felony to misrepresent evidence in a court of law."


JD: "You're going even one step further and say that the FBI actually misrepresented the evidence to the FISA judge to get this warrant."


WB: "Yes, just like all the other parallel constructions since 2001 that they've been running, the FBIÊ and the DEA. That's been felonies all along. That's perjury in a court of law, perjuring and presenting false evidence. Because it denies the defendant the right to discover and challenge any of the evidence used against him. Because it's false evidence, not the evidence that was really the basis for the arrest. It was the NSA data - that was the basis. But they can't introduce it because it's not admissible. So they have to do this parallel construction, and it ends up making them perjure themselves in a court of law. "Ê


JD: "... Just lay out very briefly how does this Nunes memo reveal treason?"


WB: "It's the fact



...


time 22:28

WB: "And, I would point out, one of my friends in the VIPS [Veteran Intelligence Professionals for Sanity], Ray McGovern, was listening to a talk given by Mueller about a year or two ago. He went up to him after the talk, asked him a question. "Director Mueller, do you have any problems with parallel construction?" and Mueller said "no, not at all". Mueller even admitted to his using the domestic spying program in an interview with Bart Gellman in 2011 in Time Magazine [Barton Gellman, "Cover Story: Is the FBI Up to the Job 10 Years After 9/11?", Thursday, May. 12, 2011, in cache]. It was written up there where he said, he and his FBI have been using Stellarwind since 2001. Well, that tells you that for 10 years he was approving this use of illegally collected domestic content and metadata on US citizens for prosecuting crime, common crime, any crime in the United States.Ê


This is this pure guy Mueller, ok, that everybody is hollering about. Comey was also a part of that. He and Mueller were together at the hospital visit in 2004 when they were talking about this Stellarwind program. That was what is was all about. They all went on and proceeded with this parallel construction, this concept of using the Stellarwind data for common crime as well as anything else. [see also paragraph "The Comey/Mueller Myth" in Russia-gate's Mythical 'Heroes' by Coleen Rowley, June 6, 2017] And they used it [in] the IRS sought against the Tea Party, they used it against the Occupy group, they used it against Eliot Spitzer, against the news people Jim Risen, Jim Rosen, the Associated Press. Giving this kind of power to people, eventually they do use it, and this is the kind of things that they use it against. When they said nobody is being hurt, a hell of a lot of people are being hurt."Ê


time 24:30

"I can also go to Joe Nachio, the former CEO of Quest Communications. In a court of law it was testified he was approached in Febuary of 2001, before 9/11, by NSA and they were asking him to turn over all data on his customers at that time. Well, that's even before 9/11. So, they had a plan on spying on the US citizens even before 9/11. "


"So what happened to Joe Nachio [when he didn't comply]? He told me this - I talked to him: They fabricated evidence about him and put him in jail for 5 years. They did that to us but we caught them at that. So in that case he went to jail for 5 years. Now what did that do? That told every other CEO of every communications company 'if you don't cooperate with us, this is the kind of things that happens to you. So, shape up and participate or else ...'

...

WB: "Actually, a lot of them feel there's nothing they can do."


JD: "That's how I feel right now. "


time 28:56

WB: "Well, I think there's room. People don't realize the power they have. All they have to do is ... you lnow a squeaky wheel needs oil? You have to act like a squeeky wheel. And confront these people in town meetings or wherever you can in public. Make it public so that you can expose them and put them on the spot. And say, "If you guys don't start changing this stuff, we're going to fire you, get somebody else and come after you." That's the way I do it. I'm already involved in 3 separate law suits against the US government for constitutional violations of everybody's privacy, the Fourth Amendment. First, Fourth and Fifth and Sixth Amendments. Yes. I've sworn affidavids for that, too. "


JD: "What's the progress on these law suits?" .Ê


WB: "Government is still dragging them out. That's the whole point. They think they've got more money and more time, so they keep dragging it out. Because, the point is, if the case gets into the Supreme Court, one case did already, I'll talk about it in a minute. If the case does get in the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court rules it unconstitutional, everything they've done falls. All that retroactive immunity, that falls. Everything falls, is no longer valid. You can't pass a law that violates the Constitution, and that would be a violation of the Constitution right there.Ê


If the Supreme Court rules that unconstitutional, all retroactive immunity falls. All those laws will fall and all those telecoms, everybody would be liable for their actions abd criminal acts against the constitutional rights of the citizens of this country."


time 30:21

JD: "So tell me about the case that did get to the Supreme Court."


WB: "That was the AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL VS. CLAPPER. Chris Hedges was a member, a plaintiff in that law suit. What happened in that law suit was this issue of parallel construction came up. The fact that the NSA data was used against people in a court of law, in criminal cases, when that came up, the Solicitor General of the United States lied to the Supreme Court to get it thrown out. He said, anybody in a criminal case where NSA data was used, they will be told that NSA data was used against them, so that they can challenge the discovery of that data in a court of law. In fact, no-one was told. If I was on the Supreme Court I would say "I'm reinstating this case with prejudice against the United States and hold the United States government in contempt of the Supreme Court." I would have done that."


JD: "Are you telling me that John Roberts is aware that that guy lied?"


WB: "Now, he's aware of it. He went along with it."


JD: "And so they just go along? "


WB: "They go along to get along. I assume that NSA has something against him."


JD: "It's like we're living in a land of J. Edgar Hoover, but it's on steroids, to the tenth power of that thing."


WB: "It's on supersteroids."

...

Ê

Whistleblowers: Congress Has Entrenched the Surveillance State

Thomas Drake and Coleen Rowley at The Real News Network, January 18, 2018

...

THOMAS DRAKE: I mean, itÕs facile in terms of manufacturing different definitions of words in order to fit what they want to fall under the blanket of something they claim is legal. This is ultimately a general warrant. ItÕs not permitted by the Constitution, but as I was told a long time ago, ÒHey, why let the Constitution stand in the way when National Security takes primacy?Ó I mean, to me, itÕs just a huge Kabuki dance here, Aaron. It really is.

AARON MATƒ: We have to wrap, but Coleen Rowley, final thoughts?

COLEEN ROWLEY: Well, I think IÕll go out on a limb and worry that we are going to return to the 1960 era that lead to the Church Committee. Yesterday was Martin Luther King Day and we forget that he was himself a huge target of the FBI and other intelligence agencies merely for his dissent on issues. I think with the McCarthyism going on, that we are unfortunately going to be returning to that dark era unless people really wise up quickly because this is very dangerous.

VIPS Plead for Humanitarian Asylum for Julian Assange

August 6, 2018 (in cache)

Memorandum for: The US Embassies of Ecuador and the United Kingdom, and the U.S. State Department

... Recently obtained emails show that Sweden would have dropped the case years earlier but for pressure from UK authorities.[Bowcott & MacAskill.ÒSweden tried to drop Assange extradition in 2013, CPS emails show.Ó The Guardian, 11 Feb 2018, CPS = Crown Prosecution Service]. In summary, Assange has been confined for six years over allegations that never resulted in charges, much less a criminal conviction.Ê


On July 12, 2018, the Organization of American StatesÕ (OAS) Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) sent out a ruling11 that was virtually unnoticed by US news media. The IACHR found Òit is the duty of nations to allow for the passage of successful asylum seekers from embassies to the mainland territory of the state that has granted an individual asylum.Ó


For Julian Assange, this would mean that, according to the CourtÕs decision, Britain has a legal obligation to allow Julian Assange to exit the Ecuadorian Embassy in London in peace and allow for his safe transit to an airport from which he would be able to fly to Ecuador, the country that has granted Assange asylum and where he now also holds formal citizenship12


Ò[I]t is imperative,Ó the ruling states, Òthat Assange is allowed to make the safe passage to Ecuador demanded by the Court as his physical and mental health conditions have been described as deteriorating rapidly. If, nevertheless, UK authorities insist on arresting Assange, Òthe British government will have wantonly failed to uphold AssangeÕs rights as a legitimate receiver of asylum by Ecuador.Ó13


The IACHR ruling suggests further that outright abuses occurred when Ecuador removed security assigned for Assange;14 when the UK rejected EcuadorÕs request for safe passage of Assange to Ecuador15; and when the US obstructed efforts to end AssangeÕs virtual imprisonment.16 ...


Collectively, the governments of Sweden, the UK, the US, Ecuador (recently) and, through its silence, AssangeÕs home country of Australia have imposed six years of suffering on Assange and possibly life-long damage to his health. With their proxies, they pound Assange with threats, ad hominem attacks and misleading statements. He cannot defend himself because the government of Ecuador terminated his access to communications systems. This may have a temporary effect of confusing the public; but as more legal experts and human rights authorities hazard coming to his defense, the public may recognize these assaults as the desperate flailings of governments that lack credible defenses for their actions.


Public dissatisfaction with governments worldwide is currently high, as evidenced by numerous massive street protests, passages of referendums against centralized power, and wide-spread elections of anti-establishment candidates. Any additional erosion of public support risks a tipping point with unforeseeable consequences. Brutality against Julian Assange, particularly as his health declines, can only increaseÊ


The involved governments have arrived at a fork in the road. They can continue the persecution of Assange, risking catastrophe for diminishing returns. Or, they can let Assange proceed to Ecuador, or home to Australia if it provides suitable guarantees,24 and boost their public standing as self-described supporters of human rights, the rule of law, and a free press.


We the undersigned members of Veteran Intelligence Professionals for Sanity urge all governments to honor the OHCHR and IACHR directives with respect to Julian Assange and other asylum seekers.


For the Steering Group, Veteran Intelligence Professionals for Sanity (VIPS)

William Binney, Technical Director, NSA; co-founder, SIGINT Automation Research Center (ret.)

Richard H. Black, Senator of Virginia, 13th District; Colonel US Army (ret.); Former Chief, Criminal Law Division, Office of the Judge Advocate General, the Pentagon (associate VIPS)

Marshall Carter-Tripp, Foreign Service Officer (ret.) and Division Director, State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research

Bogdan Dzakovic, former Team Leader of Federal Air Marshals and Red Team, FAA Security (ret.) (associate VIPS)

Philip Giraldi, CIA, Operations Officer (ret.)

Mike Gravel, former Adjutant, top secret control officer, Communications Intelligence Service; special agent of the Counter Intelligence Corps and former United States Senator

Matthew Hoh, former Capt., USMC, Iraq & Foreign Service Officer, Afghanistan (associate VIPS)

Larry C. Johnson, former CIA and State Department Counter Terrorism officer.

Michael S. Kearns, Captain, USAF (ret); Wing Commander, RAAF (ret); Intelligence Officer and Master SERE Instructor

John Kiriakou, Former CIA Counterterrorism Officer and former senior investigator, Senate Foreign Relations Committee

Karen Kwiatkowski, former Lt. Col., US Air Force (ret.), at Office of Secretary of Defense watching the manufacture of lies on Iraq, 2001-2003?

Linda Lewis, WMD preparedness policy analyst, USDA (ret.) (associate VIPS)

Edward Loomis, NSA, Cryptologic Computer Scientist (ret.) Ray McGovern, former US Army infantry/intelligence officer & CIA

analyst (ret.)

Elizabeth Murray, Deputy National Intelligence Officer for Near East, CIA and National Intelligence Council (ret.)

Todd E. Pierce, MAJ, US Army Judge Advocate (ret.)

Coleen Rowley, FBI Special Agent and former Minneapolis Division Legal Counsel (ret.)

Kirk Wiebe, former Senior Analyst, SIGINT Automation Research Center, NSA

Sarah G. Wilton, Intelligence Officer, DIA (ret.); Commander, US Naval Reserve (ret.)

Robert Wing, former Foreign Service Officer (associate VIPS) Ann Wright, Col., US Army (ret.); Foreign Service Officer (resigned)


Cryptocurrency will survive as US dollar and euro collapse Ð BitCoin Cash ÔCEOÕ

Published time: 10 Aug, 2018 06:00 (in cache)

Sophie Shevardnadse interviews Rick Falkvinge, CEO of BitCoin Cash and founder of the Swedish Pirate Party


... When IÕm buying a bottle of water with a credit card someone in the background thereÕs a bank giving me permission to buy a bottle of water with a credit card. And that is a horrifying thought. Because that means that the bank can also deny me permission to buy a bottle of water. Nobody thinks of this, but itÕs there. With Bitcoin this is not true. There is nobody needing to give permission in the background. ThereÕs nobody who gets to say no to a transaction. No money can be forced. No money can be seized. And hereÕs a big problem for governments in the future. Taxes can no longer be forced....


VIPS Asks Twitter to Restore Van BurenÕs Account

Consortiumnews, August 7, 2018 ¥ 98 Comments (in cache)

Ê

The Veteran Intelligence Professionals for Sanity in a memo to the Twitter board of directors questions its decision to suspend the account of one of its members without due process.


"Censorship Does NOT Work!" Tucker Goes Off on the Alex Jones Ban

August 17, 2018Ê

(INTENSO#9/docus/Censorship Does NOT Work!- Tucker Goes Off on the Alex Jones Ban.mp4)


Censorship Is What Happens When Powerful People Get Scared

Michael Krieger | Posted Monday Aug 13, 2018 at 2:06 pm (in cache)


ÒOnly the weak hit the fly with a hammer.Ó


Linke Sammlungsbewegung, wohin?

Mohssen Massarat, nachdenkseiten, 28. August 2018 (im Cache)


#Aufstehen als Anreiz, selbst zur Feder zu greifen, sich Ÿber die Inhalte einer solchen Bewegung Gedanken zu machen und dadurch einen Unterbau fŸr #Aufstehen zu schaffen.


Viertens stellt das durch die Verfassung garantierte Recht auf Arbeit das Pendant zur ebenso radikal wie einleuchtenden škologischen Forderung der GrŸnen dar, den Klimaschutz im Grundgesetz zu verankern

Dadurch entstŸnde ein inhaltlich fundiertes BŸndnis mit den GrŸnen fŸr eine Verfassungsdebatte, um fŸr einen lŠngst fŠlligen Strukturwandel die erforderliche Rechtsgrundlage zu schaffen. Die Kombination beider radikaler Forderungen hŠtte auf jeden Fall den Charme, die GrŸnen mit den linken Reformern in der SPD und der Linkspartei als Ganzes inhaltlich zusammenzufŸhren und die Protagonisten beider Lager vom gemeinsamen Eintreten fŸr beide Projekte zu Ÿberzeugen.


... So wŠre die Aussicht realistisch, die MŠrkte endlich den BedŸrfnissen der Gesellschaft unterzuordnen und den politischen Debattenraum fŸr zukunftsfŠhige VerŠnderungen und die Weiterentwicklung der Demokratie signifikant zu erweitern. ...


... Auch die Tatsache, dass die GrŸnen den Klimaschutz in das Grundgesetz festschreiben wollen, zeigt, dass auch sie hinsichtlich der Wirkungskraft von Marktinstrumenten desillusioniert sind. Offensichtlich versprechen sie sich von diesem Vorsto§ ein deutlich stŠrkeres politisches Handeln in Sachen Klimaschutz. Dieses kann aber eine zielgerichtete Regulierung des Energieangebots sein, in dem der sofortige Ausstieg aus der Kohle der erste Schritt sein mŸsste.Ê


... Der Inhalt der Regulierung [des Energiemarkts] wŠre dann logischerweise die schrittweise Reduktion des Angebots von allen Formen fossiler EnergietrŠger, so dass die naturwissenschaftlich festgelegten Klimaschutzziele auch zielgenau erreicht werden. Bei einer solchen Regulierungskonzeption, so sie politisch definiert und gesetzlich festgelegt ist, bleibt fŸr fossile Energiekonsumenten kein Entrinnen mehr, weder fŸr die gro§en und reichen noch fŸr die einkommensschwachen Konsumenten.Ê


Erst auf der Basis eines solchen aus den Klimaschutzerfordernissen abgeleiteten Regulierungskonzepts beginnen die MŠrkte richtig zu funktionieren. Erst dann steigen die Preise der fossilen EnergietrŠger auf jenes Niveau an, das hoch genug sein wird und fŸr die Konsumenten den erforderlichen Anreiz liefert, um auf den alternativen Pfad der regenerativen Energietechnologien umzusteigen.Ê

Wie man sich leicht vorstellen kann, bleibt die Regulierung auf die Angebotsreduktion beschrŠnkt. Alle anderen Bereiche, vor allem die TechnologiemŠrkte, bleiben unreguliert und mŸssen auch unreguliert bleiben, damit sich die besten Technologieoptionen zur Energiewende im Wettbewerb durchsetzen kšnnen. Ein wirksamer Klimaschutz braucht mit oder ohne dessen Verankerung in der Verfassung auf jeden Fall einen Masterplan zur systematischen Reduktion des fossilen Energieangebots, national und international.


... Die Schaffung neuer WeltwŠhrungen, z. B. durch die StŠrkung des Euro und damit die Beseitigung der Monopolmacht des Dollars als gegenwŠrtig einzige WeltwŠhrung, wŸrde einen wichtigen Hebel zur zwangsweisen AbrŸstung der USA darstellen, da diese ihre unvorstellbaren RŸstungsausgaben nicht durch Steuern der US-BŸrger, sondern durch die Monopolmacht des Dollars finanzieren.Ê


... Dadurch sollten ZahlungskanŠle entstehen, die von den USA unabhŠngig sind und damit so auch ein wirkungsvoller Schutz der europŠischen Unternehmen vor US-Sanktionen ermšglichen. Vor diesem Hintergrund mŸsste sich eine linke Sammlungsbewegung auch die gegenwŠrtig zentrale Forderung der Friedensbewegung AbrŸstung statt AufrŸstung zueigen machen und diese noch radikaler vertreten. Denkbar wŠre dazu beispielsweise die verfassungsmŠ§ige Fundierung einer jŠhrlichen Senkung der RŸstungsausgaben.


Being Julian Assange

Consortiumnews, September 25, 2018Ê¥Ê45 Comments (in cache)

As Julian AssangeÕs fate may soon be resolved, hereÕs an in-depth look at the history of WikiLeaks, the infiltration of activist communities and the strength & vulnerability of the world-changing publisher whose freedom is at stake, by Suzie Dawson.

Julian Assange - Selected Correspondence

IQ.org,Ê


Julian Assange's last video before communications cut at Ecuadoriam Embassy

Transcript by Marianne Steenken, 8 October 2018


A small victory

DiEM25

16. Okt. 2018 ÑÊ (in cache)

The new ÒprotocolÓ regulating Julian AssangeÕs visits, communications and right to medical assistance is a small victory, but remains inhumane.ÊDiEM25Êwill continue advocating for our founding memberÔs freedom until he is released.

Our efforts as a legal team demanding respect for the basic rights of DiEM25 Advisory Panel member Julian Assange have achieved a small victory. Our requests were heard out by both the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and the UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression. Both share theÊrole of ensuring that countries live up to their international legal obligations, without exception. The government of Ecuador, after meeting them, then lifted some of the restrictions he is subjected to, and restored access to his electronic communications (read the official new ÒprotocolÓ regulating JulianÕs visits, communications and medical assistance here & in cache).

While we welcome this development, we want to call your attention to the fact that we have ongoing concerns over and above these restored communications. We refer to the restrictions imposed by Ecuador on JulianÕs freedom to speak, his work as a journalist and his private life, including major intrusions on his privacy and on the privacy of his visitors.Ê

We believe the new ÒprotocolÓ regulating JulianÕs visits, communications and right to medical assistance are insufficient and remain inhumane. In addition, we strongly suspect that such a new ÒprotocolÓ is not about genuinely restoring JulianÕs rights to free speech and improve his living conditions. Instead, this latest development seems to be more of an Ecuadorian GovernmentÕs PR operation that aims to:Ê

1. appease the loud voices denouncing the systematic violation of JulianÕs human rights, as well as calling for his immediate release, andÊ

2. ÊSet up an arbitrary legal minefield to easily trigger Ð and justify Ð JulianÕs ejection from the Ecuadorian embassy.

This protracted situation needs urgent action from both the government of Ecuador and the government of the UK, both of whom should take serious steps to end this situation by simply respecting international law.Ê

The UK continues restricting even the most basic and humane access to sunlight and fresh air. It continues to refuse safe passage. It continues to break international human rights law by blocking Julian from his right to asylum.Ê

Refugees like Julian Assange have no restrictions on their rights, and the UK should bring this situation to a prompt end by abiding by the UN ruling, which ordered his immediate release more than two years ago, guaranteeing that he wonÕt be extradited to the US.

As DiEM25, we will continue advocating for our founding member Ôs freedom until he is released.

Text by Renata çvila - a member of DiEM25Õs Coordinating Collective, and Julian AssangeÕs legal team.


The Constitutional Rubicon of an Assange Prosecution

by Elizabeth Goitein, JustSecurity.org.May 9, 2017


.... FBI Director JamesÊComeyÕs hearingÊbefore the House Intelligence Committee last Wednesday.

... asked ... whether ÒAmerican journalists [who] court and solicit [classified] informationÓ have violated the law, ... Comey responded that the Department of Justice would not prosecute such activity.


...So why, in ComeyÕs mind, is it permissible to bring charges against Assange? He explained his reasoning as follows: Publishing classified information Òcrosses a line when it moves from being about trying to educate a public and instead becomes just about intelligence porn, frankly. Just pushing out information about sources and methods without regard to interest, without regard to the First Amendment values that normally underlie press reporting.Ó That, to Comey, describes WikiLeaksÕ behavior: Ò[I]n my view, a huge portion of WikiLeakÕs activities has nothing to do with legitimate newsgathering, informing the public, commenting on important controversies, but is simply about releasing classified information to damage the United States of America.Ó


... How will the government decide which outlets have an acceptable motivation? Comey didnÕt go into detail, but he pointed to one indicator: ÒAmerican journalists . . . will almost always call us before they publish classified information and say, is there anything about this thatÕs going to put lives in danger, thatÕs going to jeopardize government people, military people orÑor innocent civilians anywhere in the world. And then they work with us to try and accomplish their important First Amendment goals while safeguarding those interests.Ó


This exchange should send chills down the spine of every reporter and media representative. To be clear, I believe anyone who intends to publish classified informationÑassuming the information is not facially innocuous, as much classified information isÑshould consult with the executive branch in an effort to minimize harm. He or she should also exercise judgment and not publish potentially harmful information of negligible public interest. That is nothing more than morally responsible journalism. But acknowledging these professional obligations is a far cry from saying that the Department of Justice may prosecute someone who does not adhere to them.

To state the obvious, allowing the government to decide whether the intent behind a media disclosure is to Òharm the United StatesÓ would throw open the door to viewpoint based discrimination. A reporter may well be opposed to certain U.S. government policies, or even to entire administrations, and have an intent to undermine them through her reporting. Regardless of whether that is model journalism, it is certainly protected under the First Amendment. Yet what a blogger considers to be opposition to a particular administration could easily be consideredÑor portrayed asÑÒintent to harm the United StatesÓ by an FBI agent.

That is not to say that journalists can print anything they want. The mediaÕs First Amendment rights are no greater than those of any ordinary private citizen. They can be sued for libel, for instance. And if they knowingly print information that presents a Òclear and present dangerÓ to public safetyÑthe equivalent of incitement, or of yelling ÒfireÓ in a crowded theaterÑthey could presumably be prosecuted (although no such prosecution has ever taken place). But the threshold for prosecution must be much, much higher than a nebulous claim of potential national security harm. Moreover, as Steve Vladeck noted in a previous post, the existence of such a danger would not depend on the motive of the publisher. Someone who hates the United States cannot be prosecuted for releasing documents if the New York Times could release the same documents with impunity.

Officials who leak classified information are in a different position. As a condition of their employment, government employees may be subject to certain restrictions on speech and political activity that would be unconstitutional if applied to private citizens. In general, an employee who signs a non-disclosure agreement in order to gain access to classified government information may be prosecuted for leaking that information. Drawing the line between those who leak classified information and those who publish it thus makes constitutional sense in a way that drawing the line between ÒgoodÓ publishers and ÒbadÓ publishers does not.

If anything, a line between leakers and publishers may been drawn too far in the direction of non-disclosure. Not all restrictions on government employeesÕ speech are constitutionally permissible. For instance, a person cannot be prohibited from criticizing the government as a condition of government employment. Although the Obama administration prosecuted a record number of national security whistleblowers, there is a strong argument to be made that a government employee cannot constitutionally be required to forego disclosure of unlawful government conduct. Certainly, as a policy matter, such disclosures should not be prosecutedÑor prosecutable. ...

Judges Hear Warning on Prosecution of WikiLeaks

by MARIA DINZEO, July 24, 2018 (Tuesday)


ANAHEIM, Calif. (CN) Ð Prosecuting WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange for publishing leaked documents related to the 2016 presidential election would set a terrible precedent for journalists, the top lawyer for The New York Times said Tuesday.


Addressing a room full of federal and circuit judges at the Ninth CircuitÕs annual judicial conference, David McCraw, the deputy general counsel for The New York Times, explained that regardless of how one feels about Assange and traditional news outlets receiving the same kind of deference over publishing leaked materials, his prosecution would be a gut punch to free speech.


ÒI think the prosecution of him would be a very, very bad precedent for publishers,Ó McCraw said. ÒFrom that incident, from everything I know, heÕs sort of in a classic publisherÕs position and I think the law would have a very hard time drawing a distinction between The New York Times and WikiLeaks.Ó


McCraw went on to clarify that while Assange employs certain methods that he finds discomfiting and irresponsible, such as dumping unredacted documents revealing the personal information of ordinary people, Assange should be afforded the same protections as a traditional journalist.


ÒDo I wish journalism was practiced in a certain way, like it is with The New York Times, The Washington Post, or The Wall Street Journal? Of course. But I also think new ways of publishing have their value. Our colleagues who are not only challenging us financially but journalistically have raised an awareness that there are different ways to report,Ó McCraw said.


ÒBut if someone is in the business of publishing information, I think that whatever privilege happens to apply Ð whatever extension of the law that would apply Ð should be there. Because the question isnÕt whether heÕs a journalist. ItÕs in that instance was he committing an act of journalism.Ó


Assange has long considered himself a journalist operating no differently than other news outlets. This has complicated matters, because if Assange can be prosecuted for publishing leaked information, why not prosecute news organizations like The New York Times? . ..


U.K. and Ecuador Conspire to Deliver Julian Assange to U.S. Authorities

by Gareth Porter, Nov 26, 2018 (in cache)


The accidental revelation in mid-November that U.S. federal prosecutors had secretly filed charges against WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange underlines the determination of the Trump administration to end AssangeÕs asylum in the Ecuadorian Embassy in London, where he has been staying since 2012.


Behind the revelation of those secret charges for supposedly threatening U.S. national security is a murky story of a political ploy by the Ecuadorian and British governments to create a phony rationale for ousting Assange from the embassy. The two regimes agreed to base their plan on the claim that Assange was conspiring to flee to Russia.

Trump and his aides applauded Assange and WikiLeaks during the 2016 election campaign for spreading embarrassing revelations about Hillary ClintonÕs campaign via leaked DNC emails. But all that changed abruptly in March 2017 when WikiLeaks released thousands of pages of CIA documents describing the CIAÕs hacking tools and techniques. The batch of documents published by WikiLeaks did not release the actual ÒarmedÓ malware deployed by the CIA. But the ÒVault 7Ó leak, as WikiLeaks dubbed it, did show how those tools allowed the agency to break into smartphones, computers and internet-connected televisions anywhere in the worldÑand even to make it look like those hacks were done by another intelligence service.

The CIA and the national security state reacted to the Vault 7 release by targeting Assange for arrest and prosecution. On March 9, 2017, Vice President Mike Pence called the leak tantamount to Òtrafficking in national security informationÓ and threatened to Òuse the full force of the law and resources of the United States to hold all of those to account that were involved.Ó ...


From: Jesselyn Radack <whisper@exposefacts.org>

Subject: TheyÕre supposed to PROTECT, not PROSECUTE whistleblowers

Date: 15. Dezember 2018 16:59:35 MEZ

To: Jochen Gruber <jochen.gruber@acamedia.info>

Reply-To: Jesselyn Radack <whisper@exposefacts.org>


Dear Jochen,

It isnÕt something you often hear about in the press, but a big part of our work defending whistleblowers involves the Inspector General offices of government agencies.


The Inspector General (IG) system was created by Congress in 1978 as a way to provide strong independent oversight to investigate waste, fraud, abuse, incompetence, and illegality. It is supposed to be a protected place for whistleblowers to report wrongdoing. But the IG system is badly broken. Too many times, an agency Inspector General has actually investigated the whistleblower instead of the wrongdoing that was alleged. Our clients are often criticized for Ònot going through internal channelsÓ when they blow the whistle, when in reality, they often did report through these channels, but found them to be a source of danger, not protection.


The most infamous example was the case of our client, Thomas Drake, who attempted to blow the whistle on the glaring waste and unconstitutionality of the mass surveillance of Americans after 9/11. Drake took these concerns to the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, but instead of protecting Drake, the IG referred him to the Justice Department for criminal prosecution and then told the Justice Department evidence of his disclosures had been destroyed. The treatment of Thomas Drake was so egregious, that it drove an Assistant Inspector General, John Crane, to become a whistleblower himself.


We are currently representing yet another whistleblower, herself a former employee of an Inspector General, who was investigated by Department of Defense IG after making major disclosures of waste, fraud, and misrepresentations to Congress. We hope to share more about that case soon.


In the meantime, we need your help to be able to provide pro-bono representation to these clients as they are targeted by the very internal channels that are supposed to protect them. We are a small team, so every donation is impactful, and currently we have an opportunity to receive an extra $20,000 challenge grant if we can raise that much from our donors.


Donate Now

Thanks to all of you who have donated so far, we are currently at 20% of our goal already. The legal bills faced by whistleblowers can often be financially ruinous, so I donÕt want to leave any funding opportunity on the table.


Thank you for your support,


Jesselyn Radack

Director

Whistleblower & Source Protection Program (WHISPeR)

ExposeFacts


Twitter: @JesselynRadack



Bill Binney on intimidation by government

John Kiriakou, Loud & Clear, 14.12.2018 (in cache)


Now we turn to the CIA and the Vault 7 revelations.Ê


Joshua Schulte is a former CIA computer engineer who has being held in New York's Metropolitan Detention Center. He was arrested after an FBI raid on his apartment in connection with the "Vault 7" leak of cyberweapons, but the government charged him with possessing child pornography. In a recent letter to US District Court Judge Paul Crotty, Schulte says that he is being tortured in prison, and he's being denied medication, writing materials, and access to his attorneys. Furthermore, the government is demanding that if Schulte were to meet with his attorneys, he would have to be shackled, chained to a bolt in the floor, and denied access to the classified documents necessary to defend himself. Brian and John speak with Bill Binney, a former NSA technical director who became a legendary national security whistleblower.


John Kiriakou: "I'm having trouble understanding this case. Now, first I want to tak about htese child pornography charges, because I think we might be able to dispense with these. I'd noticed a pattern -and I have no inside information here at all, I'm just speculating- but I'd noticed a pattern beginning with Matt Duhart that the government will come out and say, at the time of arrest, that they found child pornography on a target's computer. In the case of Matt DeHart that was a bald face lie. The Judge actually reprimanded the prosecutor, because there was zero evidence of child pornography.Ê


I don't know if there's child pornography on Josh Schulte's computer. I have no idea whatsoever. But in order to keep him locked up, that's what they charged him with. They didn't charge him with the Vault 7 release. So now we've got a situation where he somehow got a cell phone into his cell, and he was defending himself from prison using this cell phone on social media sites. And so now he's been declared essentially an Enemy of the State.Ê


So the latest reporting, and it's only on alternative media, we're not seeing any of this in the mainstream media, the alternative media is saying that the FBI and the Justice Department have put these onerous controls on him. So in order to defend himself he's only allowed to see his attournees in a Justice Department conference room, only during normal work hours, which are 9 to 5, only in the presence of an FBI agent who is not allowed to report what he hears to the prosecutors, with CCTV -although the CCTV is supposed not to have sound associated with it. The attournee is going to be searched for recording devices every day going into this conference room, and Josh Schulte is going to be shackled to a bolt in the floor. He's not allowed to touch any documents, he's not allowed to touch a computer, He's not allowed to have private conversations with his attournees, and he's supposed to somehow defend himself in this way.


Now, you and I have gone through this -in different ways. I've never heard of anything like this. Does it make sense to you in order to protect information or is the goverment just going overboard?"


Bill Binney: "well, this is a form of more intimidation. That's what they did to Chelsea Manning. Same thing, same torture. They tortured her. It's just a matter of intimidation. That's what they are doing. I would also add in the case - in other cases, for example, they use anything they can to try to get at people like sexual harrassment, all kinds of things, as they did with Julian [Assange] or what they did with Jacob Appelbaum. The same kinds of things. "


John Kiriakou: "Now, that's a good point I hadn't actually considered. Especially with somebody like Jacob Appelbaum, who was never charged with a crime. And yet the guy had his reputation utterly ruined."


BB: "That's right. And my thought on that was: it was a way that the government, both the British and US government, were breaking up Tor, and taking control of Tor. They had to get rid of the people in it. That meant Jacob and his compatriots. So they had to do something to break it up. That's the kind of thing they are doing."


JK: "I think that's exactly right. And, Bill, can you explain to us what exactly Vault 7 was, and why the government is so apoplectic that the information was released?"


BB: "The whole setup compromises, several hundred million lines of source codeCof different kinds of attacks, breaking through firewalls, implants in servers and switches, and weaknesses in all kinds of operating systems - so it's a host of attacks. One of them, Wannacry, was a derivative of some of that. There's thousands of them. The problem is -like I kept saying over and over, for years I've been saying this: the government let those weaknesses exist so we're all vulnerable, and instead of fixing them and giving us cybersecurity, every time they get an attack they would saying "We need more money for cybersecurity." So, this is another form of a swindle. Then at the same time it lets them look into all kinds of people's communications."


Brian Becker: "It shows, once you create these tools, and the tools aren't controllable and anyone who really wants them can access them ..."


BB: "That's right."


BrB: "So, it's not about defense, it's not about security. I mean, I really wonder, Bill, is it just simply they don't care, or do they have sort of a sense of "We are the CIA, and thus nothing really bad can happen to us, even though bad things keep happening"? In other words: Do they have a recklessness about it, a sort of a sense that all will go well? Because otherwise it would seem to me just on a logical point of view, it's completely predictable that if you create these kind of tools in this era, somebody's going to leak, somebody's going to hack them, somebody's going to be able to use them and leak them, and then all the other parties in the world whom you might characterize as adversaries not only know what you can do, but they have the same toolkit."


BB: "That's right. And by the way, it simply says that they don't care about our privacy or anything else, or any of the laws. For example the idea that you have to have a warrant based on probable cause, they don't do that. And look at Brennan who spied on the Senate Intelligence Committee when they were working on a report on CIA torture. What happened to him? Nothing. What happened to Clapper when he lied, and Alexander and any [of the] others who lied to the Congress about spying on US citizens? What happened to them? Nothing. That's because they're all part of Department of "Just Us". This is the secret shadow government in action."


JK: "Let's talk about that, actually. Because that's an important point. There's an incredible and very clear and public double standard here, where John Brennan can commit very obvious crimes. Says up to the crimes finally, after lying about them for weeks, and then just walk away with impunity. The same with Clapper, who lied directly to the face of Senator Ron Widen of Oregon, lied and said that NSA was not spying on Americans, lied under oath, which is clearly contemps of Congress or perjury, because he was under oath."


BrB: "And the only reason we know he was lying is because of Snowden. Julian Assange, Wikileaks, they are the targets now, Bill Binney. But anybody who is blowing the whistle or revealing government misconduct is the target. It seems to me that it's a critical moment for the United States and for the whole concept of a democratic society."


BB: "All they are trying to do is say 'We, the government, are not accountable to the people of the country. We are a government with a country, we are not a country with a government.' And so what they are doing is simply taking over, they have power over everybody by accumulating all this knowledge, and they can exercise it anytime they want with anybody they want because they can retroactively look at everything you've ever done."


Stoppen wir die geplante zentrale Datei, in der alle Menschen in Deutschland erfasst werden sollen!


Gesellschaft fŸr Freiheitsrechte (GFF Admin), 21.12.2018


Stichtag 13. Januar 2019: Der Bund plant eine zentrale Datei aller Menschen in Deutschland! Helfen Sie uns, eine der grš§ten DatenŸbermittlungen in der Geschichte der Bundesrepublik zu verhindern.


VolkszŠhlungen sind fŸr den Staat meist willkommene AnlŠsse, in gro§em Umfang die Daten seiner BŸrger*innen zu sammeln und auszuwerten. Nicht umsonst begrŸndete das Bundesverfassungsgericht 1983 in seinem berŸhmten ãVolkszŠhlungsurteilÒ das ãDatenschutz-GrundrechtÒ: die informationelle Selbstbestimmung.


Die Grenzen des Datensammelns, die das Bundesverfassungsgericht dem Staat seit 1983 immer wieder deutlich machte, sollen nun in einem sogenannten ãTestlaufÒ fŸr den fŸr 2021 geplanten Zensus umgangen werden: Der Bund plant eine Zentral-Datei aller Menschen in Deutschland.


Dies mšchte die GFF gemeinsam mit dem AK Zensus mit einem Eilantrag zum Bundesverfassungsgericht stoppen! Helfen Sie uns, diesen schweren Versto§ gegen den Datenschutz zu verhindern.


Ein im Schnellverfahren durch den Bundestag geschleustes €nderungsgesetz zum Zensusvorbereitungsgesetz 2021 bestimmt, dass zum Stichtag 13. Januar 2019 alle deutschen MeldeŠmter umfassende DatensŠtze zu allen bei ihnen gemeldeten Personen an die statistischen €mter der LŠnder Ÿbermitteln sollen. Auf diese Daten soll dann das Statistische Bundesamt zentralen Zugriff bekommen. Und diese Daten sind weder anonymisiert noch pseudonymisiert!


Das Beunruhigende daran: Erstmals werden die gesamten Meldedaten dann in einer zentralen Datenbank des Bundes ansteuerbar sein Ð trotz entgegenstehender Rechtsprechung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts. Hierbei wird jeder gemeldeten Person erstmals eine Kennnummer zugewiesen, sodass die personenbezogenen Daten (hier u.a. Name, GeschlechtsidentitŠt, Familienstand, Scheidungstermine und Religionszugehšrigkeit) eindeutig verknŸpft werden kšnnen. So entsteht im Zuge eines vermeintlichen Testlaufs durch die HintertŸr der Wunschtraum eines jeden †berwachungsstaats: der katalogisierte und zentral abrufbare BŸrger. Und machen wir uns nichts vor: Beim Zugriff des Statistischen Bundesamts wird es nicht bleiben Ð viele andere Behšrden werden ÒBedarfÓ anmelden.


GFF und AK Zensus wollen die zentrale Erfassung aller Menschen in Deutschland mit einem Eilantrag vor dem Bundesverfassungsgericht verhindern. DafŸr benštigen wir Ihre Hilfe!


Das Gesetz enthŠlt keine detaillierten Begrenzungen dazu, wie der Bund die Daten in dieser beispiellos umfangreichen Datenbank weiterverarbeiten kann. Die VerknŸpfung von Daten durch Kennnummern ist ein gro§er Schritt dahin, individuelle Persšnlichkeitsprofile eines jeden Menschen in Deutschland zu erstellen.


Die GFF findet: Das verletzt das Recht auf informationelle Selbstbestimmung!


How NSA Can Secretly Aid Criminal Cases

By Ray McGovern (Originally published on June 12, 2014), May 18, 2017Ê¥Ê39 Comments

From the Archive: Official Washington is thrilled by the choice of ex-FBI Director Mueller as Russia-gate special counsel, hailing him as a straight-shooter, but he cut some legal corners in office, ex-CIA analyst Ray McGovern wrote in 2014.


Rarely do you get a chance to ask a just-retired FBI director whether he had Òany legal qualmsÓ about what, in football, is called ÒGovernment wordsmiths have given us this pleasant euphemism to describe the use of the National Security AgencyÕs illegal eavesdropping on Americans as an investigative tool to pass on tips to law enforcement agencies which then hide the source of the original suspicion and ÒconstructÓ a case using ÒparallelÓ evidence to prosecute the likes of you and me.


For those interested in ÒquaintÓ things like the protections that used to be afforded us by the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution, information about this Òparallel constructionÓ has been in the public domain, including the Òmainstream media,Ó for at least a year or so.


... Bottom line? Beware, those of you who think you have Ònothing to hideÓ when the NSA scoops up your personal information. You may think that the targets of these searches are just potential Òterrorists.Ó But the FBI, Internal Revenue Service, Drug Enforcement Administration and countless other law enforcement bodies are dipping their cursors into the huge pool of mass surveillance.


... And, chances are that if some of your scooped-up data gets shared with law enforcement and the Feds conclude that youÕve violated some law, youÕll never become aware of how they got onto you in the first place. TheyÕll just find some ÒparallelÓ evidence to nail you.


After all, itÕs altogether likely for a great majority of us that some dirt can be retrieved with the NSAÕs voluminous files an inviting starting point. AT&T, for example, apparently has kept metadata about its customers, as well as all other traffic going through its switches, for the past 27 years.


For those who are CaesarÕs-wife pure and whose loved ones also approach perfection, ÒconstructingÓ a prosecutable case may be more of a challenge. But relax not. If for some reason the government decides to get you if youÕve popped up as somehow an obstacle to Ònational securityÓ it is not impossible. Even in recent decades, critics of government policies have ended up facing dredged-up, if not trumped-up, criminal charges over some past indiscretion or misdeed.


...Ê

Separation of Powers?


We cannot escape some pretty dismal conclusions here. Not only have the Executive and Legislative branches been corrupted by establishing, funding, hiding and promoting unconstitutional surveillance programs during the Òwar on terror,Ó but the Judicial branch has been corrupted, too.


The discovery process in criminal cases is now stacked in favor of the government through its devious means for hiding unconstitutional surveillance and using it in ways beyond the narrow declared purpose of thwarting terrorism.


Moreover, federal courts at the district, appeals and Supreme Court levels have allowed the government to evade legal accountability by insisting that plaintiffs must be able to prove what often is not provable, that they were surveilled through highly secretive NSA means. And, if the plaintiffs make too much progress, the government can always get a lawsuit thrown out by invoking Òstate secrets.Ó


... The Separation of Powers designed by the ConstitutionÕs Framers to prevent excessive accumulation of power by one of the branches has stopped functioning amid the modern concept of Òpermanent warÓ and the unwillingness of all but a few hearty souls to challenge the invocation of Ònational security.Ó Plus, the corporate-owned U.S. media, with very few exceptions, is fully complicit.


...Ê Wolfgang Schmidt, a former lieutenant colonel in the Stasi, in Berlin: ÒIt is the height of naivete to think that, once collected, this information wonÕt be used. This is the nature of secret government organizations. The only way to protect the peopleÕs privacy is not to allow the government to collect their information in the first place.Ó


The Prisoner Says ÔNoÕ to Big Brother

By John Pilger, Consortium News, March 4, 2019 ¥ 20 Comments (Video)

John Pilger gave this speech at a rally for Julian Assange organized by the Socialist Equality Party in Sydney on March 3 2019 organized by the Socialist Equality Party


The refusal by AustraliaÕs foreign ministry to honor the UNÕs declaration that Julian Assange is the victim of Òarbitrary detentionÓ is a shameful breach of the letter and spirit of international law.


... WikiLeaks has also revealedÊ


That explains why he is being punished.


WikiLeaks has also published more than 800,000 secret files from Russia, including the Kremlin, telling us more about the machinations of power in that country than the specious hysterics of the Russia-gate pantomime in Washington.


... The persecution of Julian Assange is the conquest of us all: ofÊ


Comment by Curious, March 5, 2019

This may be a naive question, but after you spoke of the rulings from the UN I wondered whether it would be possible for the UN to send in its peace keeping force and make their presence known around room #101, and be a force in the face of the Brits. If the International Court of Justice, along with the UN itself has made these rulings, why can they not send in a blue helmet force to get Julian out of the Embassy? I havenÕt thought of this before, and the UK/US would be super POd, but so what? Has the UN lost all its authority? They are still in the Golan and this Embassy fiasco is of equal concern for many.

IÕm just wondering.


Media Serve the Governors, Not the Governed

Consortium News, March 4, 2019Ê¥Ê28 Comments

Joe Lauria gave this speech at a rally for Julian Assange organized by the Socialist Equality Party in Sydney on March 3 2019 organized by the Socialist Equality Party (video).


In his 1971 opinion in the Pentagon Papers case, U.S. Supreme CourtÊJustice Hugo Black wrote: ÒIn the First Amendment the Founding FathersÊgave the free press the protection it must have to fulfill itsÊessential role in our democracy. The press was to serve the governed,Ênot the governors. The GovernmentÕs power to censorÊthe press wasÊabolished so that the press would remain forever free to censureÊtheÊGovernment.Ó


(In that Pentagon PapersÕ decision,Ê


ThatÕs what WikiLeaks and Julian Assange have been doing since 2006:Êcensuring governments with governmentsÕ own words pried from secrecy by WikiLeakÕs sourcesÑwhistleblowers. In other words, WikiLeaks has been doing the job the U.S. constitution intended the press to do.

One can hardly imagine anyone sitting on todayÕs U.S. Supreme CourtÊwriting such an opinion. Even more troubling is the news media havingÊturned its back on its mission. Today they almost always serve theÊgovernorsÑnot the governed.Ê


The question is why.



... The abdication of the mainstream media of their constitutionalÊresponsibility to serve the governed and not the governors has left aÊvoid filled for more than a decade by WikiLeaks.


... Now the traditional media can be bypassed. WikiLeaks deals in the rawÊmaterialÑthat when revealedÑgovernments hang themselves with. ThatÕsÊwhy they want AssangeÕs head. They lust for revenge and to stopÊfurther leaks that threaten their grip on power. That the corporateÊmedia has turned on Assange and WikiLeaks revealsÊ


Misguided Spying and the New Zealand Massacre

Suzie Dawson, Special to Consortium News, Friday, March 15, 2019Ê¥Ê97 Comments


While intelligence agencies were looking in all the wrong places, a conspicuous target slipped through the cracksÊÊ


ÒQuestions are being asked of the nationÕs security services in the wake of a mass shooting described as Ôone of New ZealandÕs darkest days,Ó Stuff.co.nz reports and quotes a University of Waikato professor of international law, Alexander Gillespie, as saying: ÔIf itÕs a cell we need to ask why werenÕt they detected, because thatÕs why we have security services and it may be that those services have been looking under the wrong rocks.Õ Ó


In the NZ Herald, veteran intelligence reporter David Fisher asked many pertinent questions in an opinion piece titled ÒChristchurch massacre Ð what did we miss and who missed it?Ó


ÒWe need answers,Ó says Fisher. ÒThe NZSIS [New ZealandÕs equivalent of the FBI] Ð and its electronic counterpart, the Government Communications Security Bureau Ð have more funding than ever, and almost double the staff numbers they had six years ago. They also now have the most powerful legislation they have ever had.Ó


We know thanks to the findings of an inquiry by the State Services Commission last December that as many as a dozen government agencies, including the NZ Police, were too busy squandering their resources spying on NGOs such as Greenpeace NZ; political parties such as the New Zealand Green Party and then-Internet Party aligned Mana Movement, as well as on anti-TPP protesters and activists such as myself.


The government contractor engaged to perform the on-the-ground victimization of targets is the notorious Thompson & Clark Investigations Limited Ñ a company I had been publicly naming since April of 2012 for having targeted my independent media team and me. A company that we now know was illegally granted access to New Zealand police databases on thousands of occasions, and that has been linked to the NZ Security Intelligence Services.


Their nefarious activities are not isolated to the private sector. The NZ Police have also been found to have made thousands of warrantless data requests.


In 2014 acclaimed New Zealand investigative journalist Nicky Hager Ñ himself judged by a court to have been wrongfully targeted by the NZ Police as a result of his reporting Ñ revealed in his seminal book ÒDirty PoliticsÓ that a political network that went as high as the Office of the prime minister of New ZealandÐ under ex-Prime Minister John Key, who was then minister in charge of the NZ security services Ñ had targeted dozens of journalists,Êas well as other political targets and issue-based dissenters.Ê


What the police and intelligence agencies of New Zealand must recognize is thus: Journalism is not terrorism. Non-violent pro-democratic activism is not terrorism. Dissent is not terrorism.


Arming yourself with weapons and violently attacking innocent people is terrorism.


Holding to Account

Agencies that for too long have been blurring the distinction between what is and isnÕt terrorism, must now be held to account.


I was spied on for my independent journalism and my legal, pro-democratic activism despite having no history of violence, no access to weapons, no weapons training and no extremist ideological beliefs.


Internet entrepreneur Kim Dotcom, founder of the Internet Party of New Zealand of which I am party president, was spied on by both the New Zealand and United States governments for as little as a suspected civil violation, alleged copyright infringement.



On Friday, the mania and obsessive hatred of an actual terrorist in Christchurch in possession of automatic weapons, culminated in his posting a racist manifesto online and then live streaming his hate crime in real time. Yet he was never spied on.


Anmerkung J. Gruber:

Geheimdienste sammeln seit 2001 anlasslos und massenhaft Daten. Nach dem Mathematiker und ehemaligen technischen NSA-Direktor William Binney werden ihre Analysten damit bei ihrer Suche nach potentiellen Terroristen zur UnfŠhigkeit verdammt, weil sie die Datenflut ihres Umfangs wegen nicht analysieren kšnnen. Mit dem Programm XKeyscore suchen die Analysten heute aber in diesem Datenwust, in dem wir alle erfasst sind, mit SchlŸsselwšrtern nach Informationen, mit denen die staatliche Exekutive ihre BŸrger, Firmen, fremde Staaten manipulieren oder erpressen kšnnen. Die Exekutive kann, wie sie es in unserer Vergangenheit tat, diese Daten beliebig oder sogar bewusst falsch verwenden.


William Binney (Biographie bei Whistleblower.org) bei hat mit seiner Arbeitsgruppe "Signal Intelligence Automation Research Center" (SARC) innerhalb derÊ NSA schon Ende der 1990er Jahre ein Programm ThinThread fertiggestellt und erfolgreich erprobt, das all das vermeidet. Auch Ÿber den Rahmen des SARC hinaus haben Fachleute festgestellt, dass ThinThread die AnschlŠge vom 11. September 2001 hŠtte verhindern kšnnen (s. z.B. den Friedrich-Moser-Film A Good American, auf YouTube).Ê


Michael Hayden hat sich als damaliger Direktor der NSA nach Diskussionen im Wei§en Haus gegen ThinThread entschieden. In Wikipedia (21. MŠrz 2019) wird er mit der von William Binney widerlegten Aussage zitiert, dass ThinThread unzureichende KapazitŠten bereitstelle.Ê


"The project was ended by General Michael Hayden after successful testing, and while the privacy elements were not retained, Hayden admitted that the analysis technology is the underlying basis of current NSA analysis techniques, saying in an interview: "But we judged fundamentally that as good as [ThinThread] was, and believe me, we pulled a whole bunch of elements out of it and used it for our final solution for these problems, as good as it was, it couldnÕt scale sufficiently to the volume of modern communications .[16]"Ê


Nach Binney hat die NSA direkt nach 9/11 in Ermangelung einer Alternative zwar ThinThread im Rahmen von "Stellar Wind" eingesetzt, es dabei aber zum massenhaften und in den USA damals illegalen Sammeln von Daten missbraucht, indem man das gezielte Speichern und den Schutz der PrivatsphŠre von eindeutig unverdŠchtigen BŸrgern in ThinThread ausgeschaltet hat.


Statt des sofort einsetzbaren ThinThread gab die Leitung der NSA ein Programm Trailblazer in Entwicklung, das um den Faktor 1000 teurer war und letztendlich zu dem totalitŠren †berwachungssystem gefŸhrt hat, das wir heute haben. Terrorismus-Verhinderung wird bewusst ausgeschlossen (Ÿber die institutionell verankerte LŠhmung der Analysten durch den "Heuhaufen" von nicht gezielt erhobenen Daten): Terroristen mŸssen erst einen Anschlag machen, bevor die Geheimdienste sie in ihrem Datenheuhaufen finden kšnnen.Ê


Im Detail:


ÊMit dem †berwachungsprogramm ThinThread kšnnten die Geheimdienste


Die Tatsache, dass Neuseelands Geheimdienst den Anschlag von Christchurch nicht verhindert hat, deutet nach meiner Ansicht (in †bereinstimmung mit William Binneys EinschŠtzung) daraufhin, dass die Five Eyes wie oben beschrieben nicht gezielt suchen kšnnen und dies auch nicht ihre Aufgabe ist.Ê



Vault 7: CIA Hacking Tools Revealed

7 March 2017 (in cache)


Contents

¥ Press Release

¥ Analysis

¥ Examples

¥ Frequently Asked Questions


Today, Tuesday 7 March 2017, WikiLeaks begins its new series of leaks on the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. Code-named "Vault 7" by WikiLeaks, it is the largest ever publication of confidential documents on the agency. ...


[The first full part of the series,]"Year Zero" introduces the scope and direction of the CIA's global covert hacking program, its malware arsenal and dozens of "zero day" weaponized exploits against a wide range of U.S. and European company products, include Apple's iPhone, Google's Android and Microsoft's Windows and even Samsung TVs, which are turned into covert microphones.


... the quantity of published pages in "Vault 7" part one (ÒYear ZeroÓ) already eclipses the total number of pages published over the first three years of the Edward Snowden NSA leaks.


Analysis

CIA malware targets iPhone, Android, smart TVs

CIA malware and hacking tools are built by EDG (Engineering Development Group), a software development group within CCI (Center for Cyber Intelligence), a department belonging to the CIA's DDI (Directorate for Digital Innovation). The DDI is one of the five major directorates of the CIA (see this organizational chart of the CIA for more details).


The EDG is responsible for the development, testing and operational support of all backdoors, exploits, malicious payloads, trojans, viruses and any other kind of malware used by the CIA in its covert operations world-wide.


The increasing sophistication of surveillance techniques has drawn comparisons with George Orwell's 1984, but "Weeping Angel", developed by the CIA's Embedded Devices Branch (EDB), which infests smart TVs, transforming them into covert microphones, is surely its most emblematic realization.


The attack against Samsung smart TVs was developed in cooperation with the United Kingdom's MI5/BTSS. After infestation, Weeping Angel places the target TV in a 'Fake-Off' mode, so that the owner falsely believes the TV is off when it is on. In 'Fake-Off' mode the TV operates as a bug, recording conversations in the room and sending them over the Internet to a covert CIA server.


As of October 2014 the CIA was also looking at infecting the vehicle control systems used by modern cars and trucks. The purpose of such control is not specified, but it would permit the CIA to engage in nearly undetectable assassinations.


The CIA's Mobile Devices Branch (MDB) developed numerous attacks to remotely hack and control popular smart phones. Infected phones can be instructed to send the CIA the user's geolocation, audio and text communications as well as covertly activate the phone's camera and microphone.


Despite iPhone's minority share (14.5%) of the global smart phone market in 2016, a specialized unit in the CIA's Mobile Development Branch produces malware to infest, control and exfiltrate data from iPhones and other Apple products running iOS, such as iPads. CIA's arsenal includes numerous local and remote "zero days" developed by CIA or obtained from GCHQ, NSA, FBI or purchased from cyber arms contractors such as Baitshop. The disproportionate focus on iOS may be explained by the popularity of the iPhone among social, political, diplomatic and business elites.


A similar unit targets Google's Android which is used to run the majority of the world's smart phones (~85%) including Samsung, HTC and Sony. 1.15 billion Android powered phones were sold last year. "Year Zero" shows that as of 2016 the CIA had 24 "weaponized" Android "zero days" which it has developed itself and obtained from GCHQ, NSA and cyber arms contractors.


These techniques permit the CIA to bypass the encryption of WhatsApp, Signal, Telegram, Wiebo, Confide and Cloackman by hacking the "smart" phones that they run on and collecting audio and message traffic before encryption is applied.

Ê

CIA malware targets Windows, OSx, Linux, routers

The CIA also runs a very substantial effort to infect and control Microsoft Windows users with its malware. This includes multiple local and remote weaponized "zero days", air gap jumping viruses such as "Hammer Drill" which infects software distributed on CD/DVDs, infectors for removable media such as USBs, systems to hide data in images or in covert disk areas ( "Brutal Kangaroo") and to keep its malware infestations going.

Many of these infection efforts are pulled together by the CIA's Automated Implant Branch (AIB), which has developed several attack systems for automated infestation and control of CIA malware, such as "Assassin" and "Medusa".

Attacks against Internet infrastructure and webservers are developed by the CIA's Network Devices Branch (NDB).

The CIA has developed automated multi-platform malware attack and control systems covering Windows, Mac OS X, Solaris, Linux and more, such as EDB's "HIVE" and the related "Cutthroat" and "Swindle" tools, which are described in the examples section below.

CIA 'hoarded' vulnerabilities ("zero days")

In the wake of Edward Snowden's leaks about the NSA, the U.S. technology industry secured a commitment from the Obama administration that the executive would disclose on an ongoing basis Ñ rather than hoard Ñ serious vulnerabilities, exploits, bugs or "zero days" to Apple, Google, Microsoft, and other US-based manufacturers.

Serious vulnerabilities not disclosed to the manufacturers places huge swathes of the population and critical infrastructure at risk to foreign intelligence or cyber criminals who independently discover or hear rumors of the vulnerability. If the CIA can discover such vulnerabilities so can others.

The U.S. government's commitment to the Vulnerabilities Equities Process came after significant lobbying by US technology companies, who risk losing their share of the global market over real and perceived hidden vulnerabilities. The government stated that it would disclose all pervasive vulnerabilities discovered after 2010 on an ongoing basis.

"Year Zero" documents show that the CIA breached the Obama administration's commitments. Many of the vulnerabilities used in the CIA's cyber arsenal are pervasive and some may already have been found by rival intelligence agencies or cyber criminals.

As an example, specific CIA malware revealed in "Year Zero" is able to penetrate, infest and control both the Android phone and iPhone software that runs or has run presidential Twitter accounts. The CIA attacks this software by using undisclosed security vulnerabilities ("zero days") possessed by the CIA but if the CIA can hack these phones then so can everyone else who has obtained or discovered the vulnerability. As long as the CIA keeps these vulnerabilities concealed from Apple and Google (who make the phones) they will not be fixed, and the phones will remain hackable.

The same vulnerabilities exist for the population at large, including the U.S. Cabinet, Congress, top CEOs, system administrators, security officers and engineers. By hiding these security flaws from manufacturers like Apple and Google the CIA ensures that it can hack everyone &mdsh; at the expense of leaving everyone hackable.

'Cyberwar' programs are a serious proliferation risk

Cyber 'weapons' are not possible to keep under effective control.

While nuclear proliferation has been restrained by the enormous costs and visible infrastructure involved in assembling enough fissile material to produce a critical nuclear mass, cyber 'weapons', once developed, are very hard to retain.

Cyber 'weapons' are in fact just computer programs which can be pirated like any other. Since they are entirely comprised of information they can be copied quickly with no marginal cost.

Securing such 'weapons' is particularly difficult since the same people who develop and use them have the skills to exfiltrate copies without leaving traces Ñ sometimes by using the very same 'weapons' against the organizations that contain them. There are substantial price incentives for government hackers and consultants to obtain copies since there is a global "vulnerability market" that will pay hundreds of thousands to millions of dollars for copies of such 'weapons'. Similarly, contractors and companies who obtain such 'weapons' sometimes use them for their own purposes, obtaining advantage over their competitors in selling 'hacking' services.

Over the last three years the United States intelligence sector, which consists of government agencies such as the CIA and NSA and their contractors, such as Booz Allan Hamilton, has been subject to unprecedented series of data exfiltrations by its own workers.

A number of intelligence community members not yet publicly named have been arrested or subject to federal criminal investigations in separate incidents.

Most visibly, on February 8, 2017 a U.S. federal grand jury indicted Harold T. Martin III with 20 counts of mishandling classified information. The Department of Justice alleged that it seized some 50,000 gigabytes of information from Harold T. Martin III that he had obtained from classified programs at NSA and CIA, including the source code for numerous hacking tools.

Once a single cyber 'weapon' is 'loose' it can spread around the world in seconds, to be used by peer states, cyber mafia and teenage hackers alike.

...

Evading forensics and anti-virus

A series of standards lay out CIA malware infestation patterns which are likely to assist forensic crime scene investigators as well as Apple, Microsoft, Google, Samsung, Nokia, Blackberry, Siemens and anti-virus companies attribute and defend against attacks.

"Tradecraft DO's and DON'Ts" contains CIA rules on how its malware should be written to avoid fingerprints implicating the "CIA, US government, or its witting partner companies" in "forensic review". Similar secret standards cover the use of encryption to hide CIA hacker and malware communication (pdf), describing targets & exfiltrated data (pdf) as well as executing payloads (pdf) and persisting (pdf) in the target's machines over time.


CIA hackers developed successful attacks against most well known anti-virus programs. These are documented in AV defeats, Personal Security Products, Detecting and defeating PSPs and PSP/Debugger/RE Avoidance. For example, Comodo was defeated by CIA malware placing itself in the Window's "Recycle Bin". While Comodo 6.x has a "Gaping Hole of DOOM".

CIA hackers discussed what the NSA's "Equation Group" hackers did wrong and how the CIA's malware makers could avoid similar exposure.

ConsortiumNews on Assange


Commentary, Foreign Policy, Great Britain, Intelligence, International, Legal, The Bush-43 Administration, Trump Administration, U.S., WikiLeaks

AssangeÕs Judge a Disgrace to the Bench, Former UK Ambassador Says

April 15, 2019Ê¥Ê14 Comments

Craig Murray asks you to imagine Western media reaction if a Russian opposition politician were dragged out by armed police, and within three hours convicted on a political charge by a patently biased judge.

Australia, Britain, Ecuador, Human Rights, Intelligence, International, Legal, Media, United Nations, WikiLeaks

Julian AssangeÕs Nightmarish Future

April 15, 2019Ê¥Ê73 Comments

The WikiLeaksÊpublisher is in a maximum-security prison that has been called the UKÕs Guantanamo Bay, Elizabeth Vos reports.

Commentary, Ecuador, Intelligence, International, Trump Administration, U.S., United Kingdon, WikiLeaks

CHRIS HEDGES: The Martyrdom of Julian Assange

April 14, 2019Ê¥Ê74 Comments

Assange and WikiLeaksÊallowed us to see the inner workings of empire Ñ the most important role of a press Ñ and for this they became empireÕs prey, writes Chris Hedges of Truthdig.

Commentary, Intelligence, Iraq, Legal, Media, WikiLeaks

The Assange Arrest: You Have the Right to Remain Silent

April 13, 2019Ê¥Ê46 Comments

The arrest of Julian Assange was an act of revenge by the U.S. government that strikes at the heart of journalism, writes Pepe Escobar.

Britain, Campaign 2016, Campaign 2020, Commentary, Ecuador, Media, Trump Administration, WikiLeaks

AssangeÕs Lynch Mob Commenters in the NYT

April 13, 2019Ê¥Ê89 Comments

The Gray Lady now seems to be against press freedom, writes James Howard Kunstler.

WikiLeaks

Watch Assange Vigil Day After his Arrest

April 12, 2019Ê¥Ê10 Comments

Among the guests were Daniel Ellsberg, Daniel McAdams, George Smazuely, Margaret Kimberely, Peter B. Collins and Michel Collon. Hosted by Elizabeth Vos and Joe Lauria.

Australia, Britain, Commentary, Ecuador, Human Rights, Intelligence, International, Legal, WikiLeaks

JOHN PILGER: Assange Arrest a Warning from History

April 12, 2019Ê¥Ê105 Comments

Real journalism is being criminalized by thugs in plain sight, says John Pilger. Dissent has become an indulgence. And the British elite has abandoned its last imperial myth: that of fairness and justice.

Campaign 2016, Commentary, Foreign Policy, Intelligence, International, International News Analysis, Media, Propaganda, Russiagate, Secrecy, The Bush-43 Administration, Trump Administration, U.S., United Kingdon, United Nations

7 Years of Lies About Assange WonÕt Stop Now

April 12, 2019Ê¥Ê32 Comments

One of the few towering figures of our time was reduced to nothing more than a sex pest and scruffy bail-skipper, writesÊJonathan Cook.

Media, WikiLeaks

Emergency Meeting for Assange

April 11, 2019Ê¥Ê40 Comments

Kim Dotcom led an emergency meeting on the day Julian Assange was arrested.

Media, WikiLeaks

Emergency Meeting for Assange

April 11, 2019Ê¥Ê40 Comments

Kim Dotcom led an emergency meeting on the day Julian Assange was arrested.

Britain, Ecuador, Human Rights, Intelligence, International, Legal, Media, WikiLeaks

Moreno Withdraws Asylum as Assange is Arrested

April 11, 2019Ê¥Ê161 Comments

The WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange has been arrested after the Ecuadorian president, Lenin Moreno, withdrew AssangeÕs asylum, in a move that runs counter to international asylum law.

Britain, Ecuador, Human Rights, Intelligence, Legal, Media, U.S., WikiLeaks

Spanish Police Probe Extortion Scheme Involving Surveillance on Assange

April 10, 2019Ê¥Ê17 Comments

UPDATED: Suspects are being investigated in Spain for having tried to extort Û3 million from WikiLeaks in exchange for a huge cache of documents and surveillance videos of Assange inside EcuadorÕs London embassy, including with his doctors and lawyers.

RAY McGOVERN: Unaccountable Media Faced with Dilemma in Next Phase of Deep State-gate

April 9, 2019Ê¥Ê86 Comments



ãTrŸgerische SicherheitÒ

Von Gerwald Herter, Deutschlandfunk, 26.2.2018 (im Cache)


Ein ganzes Jahrzehnt lang war Peter Schaar der Datenschutzbeauftragte des Bundes: von 2003 bis 2013. In dieser Zeit beschloss der Bundestag einen Gro§teil der deutschen Anti-Terrorgesetze. Viele davon hat Schaar immer wieder kritisiert, so auch im aktuellen Buch ãTrŸgerische SicherheitÒ.


... Keine Datenstaubsauger in Deutschland also, sondern gezielte Ma§nahmen zur †berwachung einzelner. Trojaner, die auf Smartphones eingesetzt, Dialoge Ÿber Messenger-Dienste auslesbar machen, wŸrden in dieses Schema passen.



Datenbank fŸr Sicherheitsbehšrden

Gefahren von InformationsverbŸnden

Peter Welchering im GesprŠch mit Manfred Kloiber, Deutschlandfunk, Computer und Kommunikation, 27.4.2019

Wichtige Aufgaben wie Terrorabwehr bearbeiten Nachrichtendienste, Polizeibehšrden und andere Regierungsstellen gemeinsam. Dabei werden zunehmend Sicherheitsdateien zu InformationsverbŸnden zusammengelegt. Doch wenn es so lŠuft wie bisher, kšnnten sie eine Gefahr fŸr den Rechtsstaat werden.


Die Sicherheitsbehšrden wollen weg von den logischen Daten, hin zu InformationsverbŸnden. Damit steigt der Personalaufwand und die Kontrolldichte. Ulrich Kelber, der Bundesbeauftragte fŸr den Datenschutz und die Informationsfreiheit, sieht viel Arbeit auf sich und sein Haus zukommen. Die grš§te Gefahr: Einzelne Behšrden arbeiten oft mit fehlerhaften EintrŠgen, die weitreichende Konsequenzen haben kšnnen.

Ein Beispiel dafŸr ist der Entzug der Akkreditierungen von insgesamt 32 Journalisten auf dem G20-Gipfel 2017 in Hamburg. Kelber sieht hier Handlungsbedarf und mšchte zunŠchst die ErfŸllung bestehender Vorgaben voranbringen. Durch Beratung und Kontrolle sollen unsauber gefŸhrte Sicherheitsdateien ausgesiebt werden. Zudem fordert der DatenschŸtzer mehr Kompetenz fŸr sich und sein Haus, um Fehler schneller abstellen zu kšnnen.

Ê

Der Bundesdatenschutzbeauftragte, Ulrich Kelber, will unsauber gefŸhrte Sicherheitsdateien aussieben (dpa / picture alliance / Monika Skolimowska)


Beratungsresistente Sicherheitsbehšrden sollen stŠrker kontrolliert werden Ð auch, indem Informanten ermutigt werden sollen, Fehltritte zu melden. Die rechtsstaatlichen Risiken einzudŠmmen, dŸrfte jedoch schwierig werden Ð denn einige FehleintrŠge scheinen durchaus politisch gewollt. Doch es gibt auch Grund zur Hoffnung, denn Kelber genie§t gro§es Vertrauen. Zudem gibt es Anzeichen dafŸr, dass die Zivilgesellschaft sich fŸr die Problematik sensibilisiert hat und Druck ausŸbt, damit der Gesetzgeber im Sinne des Datenschutzes handelt.


VIPS Memo to the President: Is PompeoÕs Iran Agenda the Same As Yours?

June 21, 2019 ¥ 108 Comments (Consortiumnews, Volume 25, Number 181ÑSunday, June 30, 2019,  - in cache) 


Mr. PresidentÑListen to Bill Binney. Russiagate is a Worse Hoax than You Thought

LaRouchePAC Videos, Published on Mar 4, 2019 (in cache: STICK#10/William Binney/Mr. PresidentÑListen to Bill Binney. Russiagate is a Worse Hoax than You Thought.mp4)


In den ersten 18 Minuten dieses Interviews (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-9TyASfZV0c) stellt William Binney


(*) das Programm (ThinThread) vor, mit dem er (als Technischer Direktor von 6000 NSA-Analysten) und seine kleine NSA-Entwicklergruppe in 3 LŠndern des Westens (darunter Deutschland) das Internet gezielt nach Terroristen durchsucht haben. Er stellt fest, dass mit ThinThread der Anschlag vom 11. September 2001 und alle folgenden TerroranschlŠge hŠtten verhindert werden kšnnen. 


(*) dar, dass die NSA (ebenso wie der deutsche Bundesnachrichtendienst BND) mit dem Teil von ThinThread, der Daten aus dem Internet speichert, den gesamten Internet-Verkehr aufzeichnen. Die Geheimdienste haben also von ThinThread die beiden wesentlichen Teile eliminiert:

(1) die auf Terroristen zielende Suche,

(2) die in der Verfassung vorgeschriebene Anonymisierung der Daten Ÿber die eigenen BŸrger. 


Das Resultat ist nach Binneys Aussagen:

(1) Die Analysten in den Geheimdiensten fŠnden im viel zu gro§en Datenpool ("Heuhaufen") die Terroristen ("Nadel") nicht. Bevor ein Terrorist gefasst werden kšnne, mŸsse sein Anschlag stattgefunden haben und seine IdentitŠt festgestellt worden sein. Folglich kenne die Polizei ja auch nach jedem Terroranschlag das Verhalten des Terroristen vor dem Anschlag. Die Behauptung der Regierungen, der BŸrger bekŠme mehr Sicherheit, wenn er etwas von seiner PrivatsphŠre aufgebe, sei daher eine LŸge.

(2) Die Geheimdienste haben Material Ÿber alle BŸrger im eigenen Land, nicht nur Ÿber die mšglichen, aber namentlich nicht bekannten Terroristen. Da -anders als bei potentiellen Terroristen- die Namen aller BŸrger bekannt sind, kšnnen die Geheimdienste auf jeden BŸrger einwirken. 

(3) Zugang zu diesen Daten hat (nach den Snowden-EnthŸllungen) die Polizei, die Justizbehšrden, die Steuerbehšrden und andere Behšrden auf Antrag bei der politischen FŸhrung des Landes. Damit verletzen Geheimdienste, Polizei, Justiz und Politik die Verfassung und Gesetze ihrer HeimatlŠnder. 

(4) Die Politik verwendet mit "Parallel-Konstruktion" die verfassungswidrig erhobenen Daten bei der Bedrohung, Erpressung und Verfolgung von beliebigen BŸrgern. Angesichts der faktisch unbegrenzten finanziellen Mittel des Staats (aus unsern Steuern) hat der BŸrger viel zu wenig Mittel. Ein -beliebiger- Angriff des Staats ruiniert also das Opfer finanziell. 

(5) Die Demokratie in unseren Staaten sei jetzt aus Šhnlichen GrŸnden zusammengebrochen wie in der DDR oder der Nazi-Zeit (NSA = New Stasi Agency).


Anschlie§end 

(1) (ab Interview-Zeitpunkt 18:00) beweist Binney mit Argumenten aus der Informatik, dass die Anschuldigungen gegen die russische Regierung, die demokratische Partei der USA bei den letzten US-Wahlen beschŠdigt zu haben, ohne Substanz sind. (Ab Zeitpunkt 37:00 bis 38:40, dann wieder ab Zeitpunkt 40:00) Die Absicht sei vielmehr die Schaffung eines neuen Kalten Kriegs.

(2) (Interview-Zeitpunkt 38:40 - 40:00) weist Binney darauf hin, dass die Regierungen absichtlich Schwachstellen in der IT-Hard- und Software aufkaufen und belassen, damit sie Cyberattacken fŸhren kšnnen. Auf diese Weise geschehen Zehntausende von Attacken. 


Demasking the Torture of Julian Assange

Nils Melzer (UN Special Rapporteur on Torture), 26 June 2019 (in cache)

Interview with Robert Scheer 

(in cache: STICK#10/Julian Assange/KCRW-scheer_intelligence-the_media_is_complicit_in_julian_assanges_torture-190712.mp3)


...what I found is that he has never been charged with a sexual offence. True, soon after the US had encouraged allies to find reasons to prosecute Assange, two women made the headlines in Sweden. One of them claimed he had ripped a condom, and the other that he had failed to wear one, in both cases during consensual intercourse Ñ not exactly scenarios that have the ring of ÔrapeÕ in any language other than Swedish. Mind you, each woman even submitted a condom as evidence. The first one, supposedly worn and torn by Assange, revealed no DNA whatsoever Ñ neither his, nor hers, nor anybody elseÕs. Go figure. The second one, used but intact, supposedly proved ÔunprotectedÕ intercourse. Go figure, again. The women even texted that they never intended to report a crime but were ÔrailroadedÕ into doing so by zealous Swedish police. Go figure, once more. Ever since, both Sweden and Britain have done everything to prevent Assange from confronting these allegations without simultaneously having to expose himself to US extradition and, thus, to a show-trial followed by life in jail.


.... the only arguable hacking-charge against him relates to his alleged unsuccessful attempt to help breaking a password which, had it been successful, might have helped his source to cover her tracks. In short: a rather isolated, speculative, and inconsequential chain of events; a bit like trying to prosecute a driver who unsuccessfully attempted to exceed the speed-limit, but failed because their car was too weak. 


... Well then, I thought, at least we know for sure that Assange is a Russian spy, has interfered with US elections, and negligently caused peopleÕs deaths! But all I found is that he consistently published true information of inherent public interest without any breach of trust, duty or allegiance. Yes, he exposed war crimes, corruption and abuse, but letÕs not confuse national security with governmental impunity. Yes, the facts he disclosed empowered US voters to take more informed decisions, but isnÕt that simply democracy? Yes, there are ethical discussions to be had regarding the legitimacy of unredacted disclosures. But if actual harm had really been caused, how come neither Assange nor Wikileaks ever faced related criminal charges or civil lawsuits for just compensation?


... In the end it finally dawned on me that I had been blinded by propaganda, and that Assange had been systematically slandered to divert attention from the crimes he exposed. Once he had been dehumanized through isolation, ridicule and shame, just like the witches we used to burn at the stake, it was easy to deprive him of his most fundamental rights without provoking public outrage worldwide. And thus, a legal precedent is being set, through the backdoor of our own complacency, which in the future can and will be applied just as well to disclosures by The Guardian, the New York Times and ABC News.


... This Op-Ed has been offered for publication to the Guardian, The Times, the Financial Times, the Sydney Morning Herald, the Australian, the Canberra Times, the Telegraph, the New York Times, the Washington Post, Thomson Reuters Foundation, and Newsweek. None responded 

positively.


Verfassungsschutz darf dafŸr in Wohnungen einbrechen

Redaktion, Freie Welt, 22.8.2019

ÈDas Bundesamt fŸr Verfassungsschutz darf Wohnungen auch betreten, um Ma§nahmen nach den AbsŠtzen 1 und 5, nach ¤ 11 Absatz 1a des Artikel 10-Gesetzes oder ¤ 9d vorzubereiten.Ç (aus "Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Harmonisierung des Verfassungsschutzrechts", Referentenentwurf des Bundesministeriums des Innern, fŸr Bau und Heimat, MŠrz 2019). Zu diesen Ma§nahmen gehšrt, Daten Èohne Wissen des Betroffenen unter ein Eingriff in ein informationstechnisches SystemÇ vorzunehmen.


...VerschŠrfend tritt hinzu, dass das Eindringen in die Wohnung durch VS-Mitarbeiter keinem Richterbeschluss unterliegen muss. Statt Richtern soll laut MDR-Bericht die sogenannte G 10-Kommission entscheiden, ein geheim tagendes Gremium, das sich vorrangig aus ehemaligen Bundestagsabgeordneten zusammensetzt. 



Einbrechen fŸr Staatstrojaner: Verfassungsschutz soll mehr Befugnisse erhalten als bisher gedacht

Maria von Behring, netzpolitik.org, 22.08.2019 um 13:02 Uhr

Der im MŠrz bekanntgewordene Gesetzentwurf fŸr den Verfassungsschutz enthŠlt neben Staatstrojanern noch andere weitreichende Befugniserweiterungen. Um die Schadsoftware auf GerŠten zu installieren, soll der Inlandsgeheimdienst in private Wohnungen eindringen dŸrfen.

Wir veršffentlichen den Gesetzentwurf: Seehofer will Staatstrojaner fŸr den Verfassungsschutz

Andre Meister, Anna Biselli, netzpolitik.org, 28.3.2019 (im Cache)


IT-GerŠte hacken und mit Trojanern infizieren: Das ist die intensivste †berwachungsmethode im Arsenal von Polizei und Geheimdiensten. EingefŸhrt wurde das staatliche Hacken, um internationalen Terrorismus zu verhindern. Seit zwei Jahren darf die Polizei damit AlltagskriminalitŠt verfolgen.

Noch wŠhrend Verfassungsbeschwerden gegen diese Ausweitung laufen, legt Innenminister Seehofer nach und will auch den Geheimdiensten Verfassungsschutz und BND Staatstrojaner erlauben. Wir veršffentlichen den vollstŠndigen Gesetzentwurf des Innenministeriums.

Marble Framework

Vault 7

Description: The Marble Framework is designed to allow for flexible and easy-to-use obfuscation when developing tools. When signaturing tools, string obfuscation algorithms (especially those that are unique) are often used to link malware to a specific developer or development shop. This framework is intended to help us (AED) to improve upon our current process for string/data obfuscation in our tools. The framework utilizes pre and post-build execution steps to apply obfuscation to the tool. If the tool breaks the build, the post build will always be able to repair it. The pre-build execuion step will store clean copies of the code before making modifications. The post build execution step restores the files to a clean-copy state. The framework allows for obfuscation to be chosen randomly from a pool of techniques. These techniques can be filtered based upon the project needs. If desired, a user may also, select a specific technique to use for obfuscation. A receipt file is generated on run (and replaces any previous receipts). The receipt file identifes the algorithm used as well as all of the strings/data that was obfuscated. The post-build step will also double check to make sure none of the obfuscated data appears in the binary.


The framework's integration into the EDG [Engineering Development Branch]  Project Wizard will set up the appropriate project and solution properties needed to run. Currently, the obfuscation framework will only be set for release builds. If it is so desired to debug the obfuscated strings you may manually set the pre and post build events.


Exklusiv: COMPACT-Interview mit Stefan Schubert (Autor)

COMPACTTV, 1 Febr. 2019

Anis Amri und die CIA: Es ist einer der grš§ten Geheimdienstskandale der letzten Jahrzehnte. Bestsellerautor Stefan Schubert enthŸllt im Interview fŸr die Februar-Ausgabe von COMPACT-Magazin, wie der US-Geheimdienst die deutschen Sicherheitsbehšrden dazu erpresste, Amis Amri nicht rechtzeitig vor seinem Anschlag auf den Berliner Breitscheidplatz zu verhaften. DafŸr mussten 12 Menschen sterben.


Anis Amri und die Bundesregierung

Stefan Schubert, Kopp, 2019

Die neuen Recherchen des investigativen Bestsellerautors Stefan Schubert enthŸllen Unglaubliches: Der Fall Amri war in Wirklichkeit eine Èinternationale GeheimdienstoperationÇ, die dazu dienen sollte, Kommandostrukturen des IS und Bombenziele gegen libysche Terrorcamps zu identifizieren!

Der renommierte Sicherheitsexperte stŸtzt seine exklusiven Rechercheergebnisse auf geheime Akten und Dokumente von Behšrden, Polizei und Geheimdiensten sowie auf Aussagen von beteiligten Terrorermittlern.
Damit erscheint der Fall Amri in einem gŠnzlich anderen Licht, als ihn die Bundesregierung der …ffentlichkeit bis heute prŠsentiert.

Einer der grš§ten Politik- und Geheimdienstskandale der zurŸckliegenden 70 Jahre!

Die eingesehenen Dokumente legen schonungslos offen: Der Terroranschlag geschah wissentlich unter den Augen von fŸnfzig deutschen Behšrden, und die tunesischen, marokkanischen und US-Geheimdienste waren daran beteiligt.

Die zwšlf Toten und siebzig Verletzten des Breitscheidplatzes waren offenbar von den Amerikanern als KollateralschŠden im ÈWar on TerrorÇ mit einkalkuliert und von der Bundesregierung hingenommen worden.

Terrorermittler brechen ihr Schweigen

Die dem Autor vorgelegten geheimen Ermittlungsakten enthŸllen, dass


Stefan Schubert beleuchtet mit brisanten Fakten, geheimen Dokumenten und exklusiven Zeugenaussagen, was Ihnen bis heute Ÿber Anis Amri verschwiegen wird.

Whistleblowers & Journalists to Support Jeremy Hammond at 11/15 Sentencing for Anonymous Hack Exposing Extralegal Corporate Surveillance by Stratfor

the sparrow project, oversight, 15. November 2013


... Jeremy HammondÕs actions as civil disobedience, motivated by a desire to protest and expose the secret activities of private intelligence corporations.


... Many of the supporters plan to be present at Mr. HammondÕs sentencing to voice their concern and to raise public awareness of the disproportionate sentences associated with the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA), which grants greater protection to corporations than those it affords to individuals. Private companies like Stratfor account for 70 percent of the government intelligence budget and often operate without public scrutiny or government oversight.


... Jeremy HammondÕs attorneys have submitted a sentencing memorandum on his behalf asking for a sentence of time served, a call supported by 5,000 people in petitions hosted by Change.org and Demand Progress. Additionally, over 250 letters addressed to the Judge from friends, family, journalists, academics, the tech community, and prominent whistleblowers have been included with the memorandum. Among these is a letter cosigned by 17 editors and journalists representing international media outlets in fifteen countries with a combined audience of 500 million people. ...


"The information released by Mr. Hammond for the first time gives the American people and others in the world a picture of the role that private intelligence corporations play in surveillance of legally and constitutionally protected activities and the activists involved. The Stratfor documents have given us the understanding that private intelligence companies may be a bigger problem for civil liberties than our own government and it is these companies that we ought to be suing as we pursue government accountability for surveillance,Ó said Michael Ratner, President Emeritus at The Center for Constitutional Rights.


In a letter of support for Mr. Hammond, Pentagon Papers whistleblower Daniel Ellsberg wrote: ÒMy decision to go public with the Pentagon Papers was a difficult one. At my own risk, I released them, just as Jeremy Hammond has done. I believe the actions taken by Jeremy Hammond need to be viewed in a context that considers the profound consequences of private surveillance of political activists in the United States.Ó


Ò[Jeremy Hammond] performed an act of civil disobedience out of a deeply held belief that the people have a right to know what the government and unregulated corporations are doing behind closed doors against them,Ó wrote Jesselyn Radack, a whistleblower and former ethics adviser to the Department of Justice, in a letter of support for Jeremy. ÒHe is a patriot who only sought to provide transparency and expose the surveillance crimes being perpetrated on the American people.Ó


A longtime social activist and proponent of ethical hacking, Jeremy has stated that he revealed the information about Stratfor because Òpeople have a right to know what governments and corporations are doing behind closed doors.Ó


Support Jeremy Hammond #freehammond, freehammond.com, facebook.com/supporthammond

on Vimeo

John Knefel

(John Knefel is an independent journalist whose work has appeared in The Nation, The New Republic, Rolling Stone, and Buzzfeed. He is a co-host of the daily podcast Radio Dispatch, and was a writer on Comedy Central's The President show)

... "in 2011 over 90 Million documents were classified. 4 Million people both in government and in the private sector haveaccess to that classified information, and there is incredible profit to be made by increasing the national security state, not to mention the profits to be made with the constant erosion of civil liberties that we have seen in ? of color at least since the 1980s with the racist war on drugs and now being moved to muslim communities and activists' communities as well. ... Further what we see here is symptomatic of a larger problem. The justice system is no longer a tool for accountability or for oversight. It's often a shield that protects the most powerful and at the same time brings the hammer down on those who seek to resist it. What we see here is what happens in federal courts all the time. It's just a littel bit more obvious and tactic than in normal cases. further the incentives for the government to continue to classify material, to continue to keep things secret. ... So we have now the situation that the people's subjectivity is actually treated as classified. ... It is only through non-traditional methods of seeking transparency that we learn what our government is doing." (Source)


Statement read in the name of Chris Hedges

"The security and surveillance state is creating a hermetically closed system of power. It is doing this be rewriting laws, subvert the Constitution and grant itself the ability to criminalize all forms of dissent, the FISAAA, the Authorization to use Military Force Act, the enhanced terrorism laws and the misuse of the Espionage Act to silence whistleblowers, and the National Defense Authorization Act Section 1021, which empowers the government to use the military to seize and detain US citizens, strip citizens of due process and hold them in indefinite detention are chilling examples of a new America, anAmerica where freedom and liberty have become a hollow cliche. Nearly all of the government's actions and decisions, many of which violate our most cherished civil liberties and defy the constitutional call for a separation of powers are now effectively hidden from the public. These decisions are beyond scrutiny of the press or the judiciary At the same time we as citizens have no privacy left. The government has handed to itself the capacity to carry out the warrantless wiretapping, monitoring and eavesdropping on tens of millions of citizens. Our personal data, correspondence, history, employment data, private activities, phone calls,email exchanges, travel logs and political views are stored in perpetuity in government supercomputers. We are the most monitored, spied on, photographed, listened to and watched population in human history...."


Andy Bichelbaum, Co-Creator of The Yes Men

"The leaked Stratfor emails tell in-depth -despite repeated assertions that the state has no oustanding liability for Bhopal, the corporate giant Dow Chemical decided to hire the intelligence surveillance company Stratfor to spy on and monitor Bhopal activists from 2004 to 2011. In fact as late as March Dow CEO Andrew Leverre (?) stated that the ongoing outrage about Bhopal absolutely does not put a threat to Dow.   Stratfor was also spying on Occupy, ?, Wikileaks, Anonymous and The Yes Men. ..."



ÔCanadian eyes onlyÕ intelligence reports say Canadian leaders attacked in

by Sam Cooper, GlobalNews, 10 Dec. 2019


"A small number of nation states" are involved in cyber campaigns against Western democracy, but the national security assessment warns the threat and range of actors involved are growing.



And the tactics used by Canada's adversaries include "human intelligence operations," online and cyber influence campaigns and the use of "state-sponsored or influenced media."


... The attacks on Freeland, who is now deputy prime minister, were partly meant to combat her support of laws targeting corrupt Russian oligarchs and leaders, the CSE [Communications Security Establishment] records say, and included allegations that her Ukrainian grandfather had edited a newspaper with ties to Nazis.


The laws referred to are Canada's version of the Magnitsky Act, named after a Russian lawyer who died as a result of his corruption investigations.


... "In early spring 2017 and spring 2018, sources linked to Russia popularized MFA Freeland's family history, very likely intended to cause personal reputational damage in order to discredit the Government of Canada's ongoing diplomatic and military support of Ukraine, to delegitimize Canada's decision to enact the Justice for Victims of Corrupt Foreign Offices Act, and the expulsion of several Russian diplomats."


The CSE records obtained by Global News appear to document for the first time direct allegations from Canada's government that Russia directed these cyber campaigns.


When asked in 2017 by Ottawa reporters to comment on the Russian reports, Freeland said: "I don't think it's a secret [that] American officials have publicly said, and even [German Chancellor] Angela Merkel has publicly said, that there were efforts on the Russian side to destabilize Western democracies, and I think it shouldn't come as a surprise if these same efforts were used against Canada."


... According to a secret CSE intelligence document, titled Threats and Risks to Democracy, the small number of nation-states that are attacking Canada have different objectives in their cyber influence campaigns, "depending on their domestic situations and threat perceptions."


The report includes a threat assessment of a number of countries targeting Canada, but country names are redacted. Nation case studies disclosed in the CSE records obtained by Global News only reflect examples of Russian interference.


But the records suggest nations targeting Canada include authoritarian governments seeking to "influence or damage our democratic process and system of government."


"(Redacted are) motivated by the pursuit of strategic interests and spheres of influence, regime protection and domestic legitimacy (including by discrediting foreign democratic institutions); asymmetric power projection and deterrence; and status and reputational gains."


... A spokesperson for [Canadian Minister of Defense] Sajjan emailed a statement, that says "the Communications Security Establishment (CSE) was asked to provide an updated cyber threat report to Canada's Democratic Process in advance of the 2019 General Election ƒ (and a panel involving Canadian intelligence agencies) did not observe any activities that affected Canada's ability to have a free and fair election."


Cyber campaigns don't only target Canadian politicians seen as threats to foreign powers. The CSE documents assert "foreign states" are also likely interfering in Canada's democracy by "promoting politicians and parties they perceive as sympathetic to their interests ƒ to try to develop levers for future influence."


"Cyber-enabled influence activities have the potential to affect the popularity of candidates, dissuade some from running for office, embarrass or discredit political figures, and exacerbate political and social divides," the CSE records say.


"In the longer-term, influence activities, both cyber and human, are likely to challenge the transparency and independence of the decision-making process."


The CSE records say that foreign cyber campaigns are evolving rapidly, and the scope of targets and strategic objectives is expanding.


In comparison to a 2017 threat assessment, in 2019, "cyber capabilities have become another means for nation-states to further their economic interests," the CSE records say. And while politicians and political parties remain popular targets, increasingly Canadian voters and media are targets.


All of this means that "measuring the cumulative impact" posed by a growing number of "threat actors" is difficult, the CSE records say. But analysts have laid out a range of expected outcomes to Canada's system of government on a timeline.


The immediate goal of cyber influence campaigns is to damage or boost the popularity of certain candidates, which could promote desired election outcomes, the records say. The mid-term goal of these attacks is to polarize political discourse in democracies and weaken confidence in leaders.


And the long-term goal is to create divisions in international alliances, promote foreign economic, military and ideological interests, and "push policy in directions inimical to Canadian interests."


Offener Brief zu den ReferentenentwŸrfen ãGesetz zur €nderung des NetzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetzesÒ und ãGesetz zur BekŠmpfung des Rechtsextremismus und der HasskriminalitŠtÒ


Offener Brief gegen Passwortherausgabepflicht und StrafverschŠrfungen (pdf) 

Veršffentlicht am 12. Februar 2020 von Elisabeth Niekrenz


Pressemitteilung: 



Offener Brief

... In einer Welt, die laut Freedom House seit 13 Jahren immer unfreier wird, kommt unserer Demokratie eine besondere Verantwortung zu, diese bŸrgerlichen Freiheiten zu schŸtzen.


Die vom Bundesministerium der Justiz und fŸr Verbraucherschutz (BMJV) in kurzem zeitlichen Abstand vorgelegten GesetzentwŸrfe fŸr ein 


tragen dieser Verantwortung jedoch nicht Rechnung. Sie sollen zwar erklŠrterma§en dem Schutz der Meinungsfreiheit dienen, schaffen jedoch selbst eine enorme Gefahr fŸr die bŸrgerlichen Freiheiten.


Wir, die Unterzeichner dieses Briefes, wollen heute jedoch nicht nur auf den Inhalt der EntwŸrfe eingehen, sondern mŸssen auch die offensichtlich fehlende Bereitschaft kritisieren, die vor einem Beschluss des Bundeskabinetts eigentlich gebotene fachliche und gesellschaftliche Debatte zur Wirksamkeit des NetzDG zu fŸhren. Grundlage der Debatte hŠtte die Evaluierung des NetzDG sein kšnnen, die seit der Verabschiedung des Gesetzes angekŸndigt wurde. Mittlerweile ist bekannt, dass eine rechtswissenschaftliche Evaluierung des NetzDG stattfindet Ð die Ergebnisse liegen allerdings noch nicht vor und kšnnen somit weder zum šffentlichen Fachdiskurs noch zu den veršffentlichten ReferentenentwŸrfen beitragen.


Daher mšchten wir Sie dringend dazu auffordern, die vorgelegten EntwŸrfe einer grŸndlichen †berarbeitung zu unterziehen, bevor das Kabinett hier das Gesetzgebungsverfahren initiiert. 


Dies ergibt sich vor folgendem Hintergrund:

  1. [Fehlende †berprŸfung der Wirksamkeit]
  2. [Gesetz zur BekŠmpfung des Rechtsextremismus und der HasskriminalitŠt]
    1. [Vorverlagerung strafrechtlicher Verfolgung]
    2. [Verpflichtende Herausgabe von Passwšrtern]
    3. [Aufnahme von Teilnehmerinformationen in ein polizeiliches Zentralregister]
  3. NetzDG


Unterzeichner


Lambrechts PlŠne zur Passwort-Herausgabe

Hacker interessieren sich nicht fŸr Stopp-Schilder

31.01.2020 um 10:40 Uhr - Lucia Parbel, netzpolitik.org

...

Thorsten Schršder: 

Ich vermute, dass Ermittlungsbehšrden gerne die Passwšrter einer verdŠchtigen Person haben mšchten, um langfristig auf deren jeweilige Online-Konten zugreifen zu kšnnen. Das ist fŸr die Behšrden natŸrlich ziemlich attraktiv, denn das kommt einer Online-Durchsuchung gleich, ohne den Rechner der Person infizieren zu mŸssen.


... Das Bundesamt fŸr Sicherheit und Informationstechnik (BSI) gibt vor, dass Passwšrter nie im Klartext auf Servern gespeichert werden sollen. Auch die verschlŸsselte Speicherung von Passwšrtern auf Servern ist Unsinn, weil auf dem Server nicht nur das Passwort, sondern auch der SchlŸssel liegt. Wer das Passwort bekommt, bekommt auch den SchlŸssel.


Deshalb wird in der Regel das Passwort in einen sogenannten Hash-Wert umgewandelt, den man auch als Einweg-Wert bezeichnet. Das ist eine kryptografische Summe. Mit einem Passwort lŠsst sich der auf dem Server hinterlegte Hash-Wert berechnen, aber nicht aus einem Hash-Wert das Passwort. Deshalb ist er fŸr sich betrachtet wertlos. Auch kann sich niemand mit dem Hash-Wert anstelle des Passwortes irgendwo einloggen.



Wenn sie tatsŠchlich ein Passwort erhalten oder wiederherstellen kšnnen, haben sie einen langfristig unbemerkten, dauerhaften Zugriff auf das Konto der Zielperson. Das ist vergleichbar mit einem Trojaner-Einsatz auf dem PC der Person.


Haben sie [die Behšrden] das Passwort nicht wiederherstellen kšnnen, gewinnen sie nichts. Allerdings habe ich da politische Bedenken, denn der nŠchste Schritt, Kryptografie und IT-Sicherheit zu regulieren ist wieder greifbarer geworden. Ein Erfolg in einem nŠchsten Anlauf somit viel wahrscheinlicher.


... Technisch mŸssten Provider und Diensteanbieter internationale Standards ignorieren und die aus dritter Quelle stammenden Werkzeuge modifizieren. Dies erschwert langfristig die Administration der Server, beispielsweise beim Einspielen wichtiger Sicherheitsupdates.


Eine Regulierung der Passwort-Speicherungspraxis kann eine unkalkulierbare Kettenreaktion mit sich bringen, unter der Datenschutz und Datensicherheit des Providers und letztlich des Users zu leiden hŠtten.


netzpolitik.org: Es gibt viele gute RatschlŠge, um sichere Passwšrter zu erstellen. Bringt es noch was, sich an sie zu halten, wenn Lambrechts Vorschlag beschlossen wird?


Thorsten Schršder: So lange wir noch an diesem mittlerweile Ÿberholten Konzept des Passwortes festhalten: Na klar! 

  1. Man kann sich auch Anbieter im Ausland suchen, und 
  2. Šndert das nichts an den Ÿbrigen Bedrohungsszenarien, die sich durch zu schlechte oder mehrfach,verwendete Passwšrter ergeben. 
  3. Wer auch heute schon Angst vor dem Diebstahl des eigenen Passwortes hat, sollte sich mal mit 


ErgŠnzung von Johannes


Grundrechte-Report

Zur Lage der BŸrger- und Menschenrechte in Deutschland

Herausgeber, 

PrŠsentation

2019 - 2018 - 2017 - ..... - 1997


Vorratsdaten: einseitige Studie der EU-Kommission

DigitalCourage, 18.3.2020 - Vortrag auf dem 36C3


Im November 2019 hat die EU-Kommission eine Studie zur Vorratsdatenspeicherung von Telefon- und Internetdaten in Auftrag gegeben. Die belgische Consulting-Firma Milieu erhielt den Auftrag und soll die Studie bis Mitte 2020 fertigstellen. Milieu soll dabei eine ãretrospective fact finding support studyÒ erarbeiten, um die Kommission im Rahmen des seit 2017 laufenden Reflexionsprozesses mit Fakten zu versorgen. Diesen Reflexionsprozess haben wir bereits mehrfach kritisiert, weil lediglich Optionen fŸr MassenŸberwachung sondiert werden, ohne dass grundrechtsfreundliche Alternativen geprŸft werden.

Vertrag Ÿber Studie teilweise zugŠnglich gemacht


Der EU-Abgeordnete Patrick Breyer hat Anfang 2020 durch eine Transparenzanfrage via AsktheEU.org den Vertrag šffentlich gemacht (PDF auf digitalcourage.de). Allerdings hat die Kommission das Dokument lediglich teilgeschwŠrzt mit insgesamt 32 komplett geschwŠrzten Seiten šffentlich zugŠnglich gemacht. Wir kritisieren, dass die Kommission mit den SchwŠrzungen die GeschŠftsinteressen von Milieu als gewichtiger bewertet als das Interesse der …ffentlichkeit an politischen Prozessen in der EU. Das ist aus unserer Sicht nicht nachvollziehbar.


†berwachung im Blick Ð Grundrechte nicht

Unserer EinschŠtzung nach, ist der Vertrag Ÿber die EU-Vorratsdaten-Studie Ð soweit einsehbar Ð einseitig zu Lasten der Freiheits- und Grundrechteperspektive formuliert. Entsprechend erwarten wir ein Ergebnis, das Grund- und Freiheitsrechte nicht ausreichend berŸcksichtigt.

 

Die Studie mit dem Namen ãStudy on the retention of electronic communications non-content data for law enforcement purposesÓ soll Daten aus 10 LŠndern (AT, EE, FR, DE, IR, IT, PL, PT, SI und ES) von Anfang 2019 bis August 2019 erfassen, wobei pro Land mindestens sechs Akteure konsultiert werden sollen. Die Ziele der Studie (S. 5) sind: 

  1. ein †berblick Ÿber existierende Gesetze und Praktiken zur Vorratsdatenspeicherung, 
  2. eine Identifizierung von betrieblichen Speicherpraktiken bei Telekommunikationsanbietern, 
  3. Identifizierung spezieller Bedarfe von Strafermittlungsbehšrden und 
  4. Identifizierung von Herausforderungen durch technische Entwicklung (u.a. 5G, dynamische IP-Adressen und VerschlŸsselung) 


Im MŠrz soll die Kommission einen Zwischenbericht erhalten, der Abschluss der Studie ist fŸr Mai bis Mitte Juni 2020 geplant.


control ©: Urheberrecht und Kommunikationsfreiheit

13. April 2020 by Daniela Tur§, Julia Reda / Christopher Clay

Mit unserem Projekt control © wollen wir grundrechtliche Fragen im Spannungsfeld zwischen Kommunikationsfreiheit und Urheberrecht gerichtlich klŠren.


Kulturelles Erbe befreien


Die EU-Urheberrechtsreform birgt viele neue Chancen, kulturelle SchŠtze zu heben und online zugŠnglich zu machen. Weil das Urheberrecht fŸr 70 Jahre nach dem Tod des Urhebers bzw. der Urheberin gilt, die kommerzielle Verwertung neuer Werke aber meist nach wenigen Jahren endet, ist ein Gro§teil unseres kulturellen Erbes heute Ÿberhaupt nicht online zugŠnglich Ð weder kostenfrei noch gegen Bezahlung. Eine flŠchendeckende VerfŸgbarkeit ist nur fŸr die Werke gegeben, die entweder sehr neu sind und sich deshalb noch im kommerziellen Umlauf befinden, oder sehr alt sind und deshalb als gemeinfreie Werke von Kultureinrichtungen šffentlich verfŸgbar gemacht werden kšnnen.


Dazwischen klafft das ãSchwarze Loch des 20. JahrhundertsÒ, ein riesiger Schatz an Bildern, Musik, Gedichten, Filmen und alten Zeitungen, die in Archiven verstauben und damit kulturelle Vielfalt und Zugang zu Wissen beschrŠnken. Dieses Problem sollen die neuen Regeln der EU zur Digitalisierung und VerfŸgbarmachung vergriffener Werke lšsen. Wir wollen Bibliotheken, Museen und Archive  unterstŸtzen, von den neuen Mšglichkeiten Gebrauch zu machen und damit die Kultur-, Wissenschafts- und Informationsfreiheit stŠrken. 


control ©: #saveyourinternet geht weiter (YouTube-Video von Julia Reda)

lia Reda

17.7K subscribers

Mit der Gesellschaft fŸr Freiheitsrechte werde ich gegen Uploadfilter und fŸr mehr Kommunikationsfreiheit klagen. DafŸr brauche ich deine UnterstŸtzung! Fšrdermitglied werden: https://freiheitsrechte.org/mitmachen Mehr Infos: https://freiheitsrechte.org/urheberrecht


Die neue EU-Urheberrechtsrichtlinie birgt Gefahren fŸr die Grundrechte, insbesondere die drohende EinfŸhrung verpflichtender Uploadfilter. Diese halten wir fŸr unvereinbar mit der EU-Grundrechtecharta. In der Vergangenheit hat der Gerichtshof der EuropŠischen Union festgestellt, dass eine Durchleuchtung aller Uploads von Nutzerinnen einer Plattform auf etwaige Urheberrechtsverletzungen die Meinungs- und Informationsfreiheit der Nutzer*innen sowie die unternehmerische Freiheit des Plattformanbieters ungebŸhrlich einschrŠnken wŸrde. Je nach Funktionsweise eines solchen Filters kšnnte auch die damit einhergehende Datenverarbeitung die Grundrechte auf Datenschutz und Vertraulichkeit der Kommunikation einschrŠnken. Kein automatischer Uploadfilter ist in der Lage, zuverlŠssig zwischen Urheberrechtsverletzungen und legalen Nutzungen im Rahmen von Urheberrechtsschranken zu unterscheiden, Eingriffe in die Meinungs- und Informationsfreiheit sind bei verpflichtenden Uploadfiltern also vorprogrammiert. Deshalb haben unter anderem der UN-Sonderberichterstatter fŸr Meinungsfreiheit und dutzende europŠische Urheberrechtsprofessor*innen die Vereinbarkeit des Artikel 17 der neuen Urheberrechtsrichtlinie mit den Grundrechten angezweifelt.


†ber 5 Millionen Menschen haben eine Petition gegen Uploadfilter unterzeichnet und Ÿber hunderttausend sind gegen sie auf die Stra§e gegangen. Bereits heute fŸhren freiwillig eingesetzte Uploadfilter auf Plattformen zur Sperrung legaler Zitate. In einigen FŠllen gibt es sogar Hinweise darauf, dass das auf dem amerikanischen Urheberrecht basierende Notice-and-Takedown-System zur UnterdrŸckung politischer Berichterstattung genutzt wird. Nach diesem System kšnnen Rechteinhaber*innen Urheberrechtsverletzungen an Plattformen melden, die diese dann unverzŸglich entfernen mŸssen. Auch europŠische Firmen machen von diesem System Gebrauch. FŸr die Plattformen ist es dabei oft schwer festzustellen, ob die Hinweise von den echten Rechteinhaber*innen kommen, oder ob jemand aus anderen GrŸnden erreichen will, dass Inhalte aus dem Netz verschwinden.

Mit der Umsetzung der EU-Urheberrechtsrichtlinie drohen sich diese Gefahren fŸr die Kommunikationsfreiheit zu verschŠrfen.ÊBis zur Umsetzung des umstrittenen Artikel 17 in deutsches Recht hat der Gesetzgeber noch bis zum Juni 2021 Zeit, aber wir stellen schonÊjetzt die Weichen, um die Meinungs- und Informationsfreiheit gerichtlich zu verteidigen. Ab sofort kšnnen sich Nutzer*innen oder Urheber*innen unter info@freiheitsrechte.org mit grundrechtlich relevanten Urheberrechtsproblemen an uns wenden.

Wissenschaftsfreiheit garantieren

Wissen vermehrt sich, wenn man es teilt. Leider treffen Wissenschaftler*innen aber immer wieder auf Barrieren beim Zugang zu Forschungsergebnissen. Die Open Access-Bewegung hat sich zum Ziel gesetzt, unsere meist ohnehin šffentlich finanzierten wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnisse allen frei zugŠnglich zu machen. Das ist auch im Interesse der Autor*innen, die bislang oft gezwungen waren, die Rechte an ihren Studien an kommerzielle Wissenschaftsverlage abzutreten, ohne selbst am lukrativen GeschŠft mit diesen Inhalten zu verdienen. Paywalls behindern den wissenschaftlichen Fortschritt, das hat inzwischen auch der Gesetzgeber erkannt. Die Regelungen, die Wissenschaftler*innen eine schnellere Open Access-Publikation ihrer Ergebnisse ermšglichen sollen, sind aber oft so kompliziert gestaltet, dass sie in der Praxis noch zu wenig genutzt werden. Auch wenn urheberrechtlich geschŸtzte Werke Gegenstand wissenschaftlicher Forschung sind, gibt es oft Probleme. Hier wollen wir durch strategische Klagen Rechtssicherheit im Sinne der Wissenschaftsfreiheit schaffen.


Ausland-Ausland-FernmeldeaufklŠrung nach dem BND-Gesetz verstš§t in derzeitiger Form gegen Grundrechte des Grundgesetzes


Pressemitteilung Nr. 37/2020 vom 19. Mai 2020

Urteil vom 19. Mai 2020
1 BvR 2835/17

Mit heute verkŸndetem Urteil hat der Erste Senat des Bundesverfassungsgerichts entschieden, dass 

Eine verfassungsmŠ§ige Ausgestaltung der gesetzlichen Grundlagen der Ausland-Ausland-FernmeldeaufklŠrung (auch: ãAusland-Ausland-TelekommunikationsŸberwachungÒ) ist jedoch mšglich.


Nach der Entscheidung ist die Bindung der deutschen Staatsgewalt an die Grundrechte nach Art.Ê1 Abs.Ê3 GG nicht auf das deutsche Staatsgebiet begrenzt. Jedenfalls der Schutz des Art.Ê10 Abs.Ê1 und des Art.Ê5 Abs.Ê1 SatzÊ2 GG als Abwehrrechte gegenŸber einer TelekommunikationsŸberwachung erstreckt sich auch auf AuslŠnder im Ausland. Das gilt unabhŠngig davon, ob die †berwachung vom Inland oder vom Ausland aus erfolgt. 

Da der Gesetzgeber demgegenŸber von der Unanwendbarkeit der Grundrechte ausgegangen ist, hat er den hieraus folgenden Anforderungen weder in formeller noch in inhaltlicher Hinsicht Rechnung getragen. 


Bei verhŠltnismŠ§iger Ausgestaltung ist das Instrument der strategischen Ausland-Ausland-TelekommunikationsŸberwachung demgegenŸber mit den Grundrechten des Grundgesetzes im Grundsatz vereinbar. Die beanstandeten Vorschriften gelten daher bis zum Jahresende 2021 fort, um dem Gesetzgeber eine Neuregelung unter BerŸcksichtigung der grundrechtlichen Anforderungen zu ermšglichen.


Urteil des Ersten Senats vom 19. Mai 2020 - 1 BvR 2835/17

LeitsŠtze

  1. Die Bindung der deutschen Staatsgewalt an die Grundrechte nach Art. 1 Abs. 3 GG ist nicht auf das deutsche Staatsgebiet begrenzt.
    Der Schutz der einzelnen Grundrechte kann sich im Inland und Ausland unterscheiden.
    Jedenfalls der Schutz des Art. 10 Abs. 1 und des Art. 5 Abs. 1 Satz 2 GG als Abwehrrechte gegenŸber einer TelekommunikationsŸberwachung erstreckt sich auch auf AuslŠnder im Ausland.
  2. Die derzeitigen Regelungen zur Ausland-Ausland-TelekommunikationsŸberwachung, zur †bermittlung der hierdurch gewonnenen Erkenntnisse und zur Zusammenarbeit mit auslŠndischen Nachrichtendiensten verletzen das Zitiergebot des Art. 19 Abs. 1 Satz 2 GG; der Gesetzgeber hat die Grundrechte bewusst als nicht betroffen erachtet, obwohl sie auch hier anwendbar sind. Sie genŸgen auch zentralen materiellen Anforderungen der Grundrechte nicht.
  3. Art. 10 Abs. 1 GG schŸtzt die Vertraulichkeit individueller Kommunikation als solche. Personen, die geltend machen, in ihren eigenen Grundrechten verletzt zu sein, sind nicht deshalb vom Grundrechtsschutz des Grundgesetzes ausgeschlossen, weil sie als FunktionstrŠger einer auslŠndischen juristischen Person handeln.
  4. Die Regelung der AuslandsaufklŠrung fŠllt unter die auswŠrtigen Angelegenheiten im Sinne von Art. 73 Abs. 1 Nr. 1 GG. Dem Bundesnachrichtendienst kann auf dieser Kompetenzgrundlage Ÿber die Aufgabe einer au§en- und sicherheitspolitischen Unterrichtung der Bundesregierung hinaus als eigene, nicht operativ wahrzunehmende Aufgabe die FrŸherkennung von aus dem Ausland drohenden Gefahren von internationaler Dimension Ÿbertragen werden. Es muss sich um Gefahren handeln, die sich ihrer Art und ihrem Gewicht nach auf die Stellung der Bundesrepublik in der Staatengemeinschaft auswirken kšnnen und gerade in diesem Sinne von au§en- und sicherheitspolitischer Bedeutung sind.
  5. Die strategische AuslandstelekommunikationsŸberwachung ist mit Art. 10 Abs. 1 GG nicht grundsŠtzlich unvereinbar. Als anlasslose, im Wesentlichen nur final angeleitete und begrenzte Befugnis ist sie jedoch eine Ausnahmebefugnis, die auf die AuslandsaufklŠrung durch eine Behšrde, welche selbst keine operativen Befugnisse hat, begrenzt bleiben muss und nur durch deren besonderes Aufgabenprofil gerechtfertigt ist.
  6. Erforderlich sind danach insbesondere 
  7. Die †bermittlung personenbezogener Daten aus der strategischen †berwachung ist nur zum Schutz besonders gewichtiger RechtsgŸter zulŠssig und setzt eine konkretisierte Gefahrenlage oder einen hinreichend konkretisierten Tatverdacht voraus. Ausgenommen sind hiervon Berichte an die Bundesregierung, soweit diese ausschlie§lich der politischen Information und Vorbereitung von Regierungsentscheidungen dienen.
  8. Die †bermittlung setzt eine fšrmliche Entscheidung des Bundesnachrichtendienstes voraus und bedarf der Protokollierung unter Nennung der einschlŠgigen Rechtsgrundlage. Vor der †bermittlung an auslŠndische Stellen ist eine Vergewisserung Ÿber den rechtsstaatlichen Umgang mit den Daten geboten; hierbei bedarf es einer auf die betroffene Person bezogenen PrŸfung, wenn es Anhaltspunkte gibt, dass diese durch die DatenŸbermittlung spezifisch gefŠhrdet werden kann.
  9. Regelungen zur Kooperation mit auslŠndischen Nachrichtendiensten genŸgen grundrechtlichen Anforderungen nur, wenn sie sicherstellen, dass die rechtsstaatlichen Grenzen durch den gegenseitigen Austausch nicht Ÿberspielt werden und die Verantwortung des Bundesnachrichtendienstes fŸr die von ihm erhobenen und ausgewerteten Daten im Kern gewahrt bleibt.
  10. Will der Bundesnachrichtendienst von einem Partnerdienst bestimmte Suchbegriffe nutzen, um die Treffer ohne nŠhere inhaltliche Auswertung automatisiert an diesen zu Ÿbermitteln, erfordert dies eine sorgfŠltige Kontrolle dieser Suchbegriffe sowie der hieran anknŸpfenden TrefferfŠlle. Die bei AuslandsŸbermittlungen geltenden Vergewisserungspflichten gelten entsprechend. Die gesamthafte †bermittlung von Verkehrsdaten an Partnerdienste setzt einen qualifizierten AufklŠrungsbedarf im Hinblick auf eine spezifisch konkretisierte Gefahrenlage voraus. FŸr den Umgang der Partnerdienste mit den Ÿbermittelten Daten sind gehaltvolle Zusagen einzuholen.
  11. Die Befugnisse zur strategischen †berwachung, zur †bermittlung der mit ihr gewonnenen Erkenntnisse und zur diesbezŸglichen Zusammenarbeit mit auslŠndischen Diensten sind mit den Anforderungen der VerhŠltnismŠ§igkeit nur vereinbar, wenn sie durch eine unabhŠngige objektivrechtliche Kontrolle flankiert sind. Sie ist als kontinuierliche Rechtskontrolle auszugestalten, die einen umfassenden Kontrollzugriff ermšglicht.
  12. HierfŸr ist einerseits eine mit abschlie§enden Entscheidungsbefugnissen verbundene gerichtsŠhnliche Kontrolle sicherzustellen, der die wesentlichen Verfahrensschritte der strategischen †berwachung unterliegen, sowie anderseits eine administrative Kontrolle, die eigeninitiativ stichprobenmŠ§ig den gesamten Prozess der †berwachung auf seine RechtmŠ§igkeit prŸfen kann.
  13. Zu gewŠhrleisten ist eine Kontrolle in institutioneller EigenstŠndigkeit. 



Urteil


  1. ¤¤ 6, 7, 13 bis 15 des Gesetzes Ÿber den Bundesnachrichtendienst in der Fassung des Gesetzes zur Ausland-Ausland-FernmeldeaufklŠrung des Bundesnachrichtendienstes vom 23. Dezember 2016 (Bundesgesetzblatt I Seite 3346), auch in der Fassung des Gesetzes zur Anpassung des Datenschutzrechts an die Verordnung (EU) 2016/679 und zur Umsetzung der Richtlinie (EU) 2016/680 vom 30. Juni 2017 (Bundesgesetzblatt I Seite 2097), sind mit Artikel 10 AbsatzÊ1 des Grundgesetzes sowie mit Artikel 5 Absatz 1 Satz 2 des Grundgesetzes nicht vereinbar.
  2. ¤ 19 Absatz 1, ¤ 24 Absatz 1 Satz 1, Absatz 2 Satz 1, Absatz 3 des Gesetzes Ÿber den Bundesnachrichtendienst sind mit Artikel 10 Absatz 1 des Grundgesetzes sowie mit Artikel 5 Absatz 1 Satz 2 des Grundgesetzes nicht vereinbar, soweit sie zur Verarbeitung von im Zusammenhang mit der strategischen FernmeldeaufklŠrung nach ¤¤Ê6, 7, 13 bis 15 des Gesetzes Ÿber den Bundesnachrichtendienst erhobenen personenbezogenen Daten ermŠchtigen.
  3. Bis zu einer Neuregelung, lŠngstens jedoch bis zum 31.ÊDezember 2021 gelten die fŸr mit dem Grundgesetz unvereinbar erklŠrten Vorschriften fort.
  4. Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland hat den BeschwerdefŸhrerinnen und BeschwerdefŸhrern ihre notwendigen Auslagen aus dem Verfassungsbeschwerdeverfahren zu erstatten.


BND law

by Nora Markard, GFF, 6. November 2016 

Civil rights and liberties extend beyond borders: GermanyÕs highest Constitutional Court declares that the Federal Intelligence ServiceÕs practice of worldwide mass surveillance is unconstitutional

...the Court declared that the The Federal Intelligence ServiceÕs (BND) practice of monitoring of worldwide internet traffic is unconstitutional. The BNDÕs surveillance practices violate the fundamental rights to privacy of telecommunications, which are protected by the German Constitution (Basic Law). The relevant BND law does not set high enough hurdles for the targeted surveillance of individuals abroad, and lacks special protection for vulnerable groups such as journalists. ...

Legal problem: ÔStrategicÕ surveillance without specific grounds for suspicion

The lawsuit has been prompted by the new comprehensive surveillance powers granted to the BND by the amendment of 23 December 2016 to the BND law (Gesetz zur Ausland-Ausland-FernmeldeaufklŠrung) (Act on Signals Intelligence Gathering in Germany of Foreigners Abroad). The amendment enables the BND to intercept communications without any specific grounds for doing so and to gather and process all content and traffic data. In other words: every e-mail, text message or telephone call sent or made by foreigners living abroad can be intercepted and used by the BND.

...


Destroying trust between journalists and their sources

The new BND law destroys trust between journalists and their sources precisely in places where investigative journalism is particularly difficult. While it cannot be used for strategic surveillance of German or EU Institutions, it can otherwise target any group of people. So in principle anyone communicating in a foreign country can be targeted, including highly sensitive groups such as lawyers or journalists and their sources.

...


Ghost of J. Edgar Haunts Flynn Investigation

By Coleen Rowley, May 18, 2020

Former FBI special agent Coleen Rowley explains Bureau misdeeds in the Flynn case.


New UK Laws Could Criminalize Journalism

Richard Norton-Taylor, ConsortiumNews, May 30, 2020

The British government is pursuing Òespionage legislationÓ that could criminalise the release of public information as part of an Òepidemic of secrecy,Ó

The governmentÕs QueenÕs Speech in December included plans for new Òespionage legislationÓ. It stressed the need to combat Òhostile state activityÓ and make the UK Òa harder environment for adversaries to operate inÓ ...


Whistleblowers and journalists could be convicted for revealing information about defence, international relations or law enforcement, even if it was unlikely to cause harm. They would make it easier to secure convictions by weakening the existing tests for proving an offence.


Neither would someone revealing danger to the public, abuse of power or serious misconduct be able to argue that they acted in the public interest. In addition, maximum prison sentences on conviction, currently two years under the Official Secrets Act, would be increased.


Moreover, it would not be a defence to show that the information had already lawfully been made public Ð unless the information had also been Òwidely disseminatedÓ. How would that be determined?


Maurice Frankel, director of the Campaign for Freedom of Information, has warned that the Law CommissionÕs proposals could criminalise the release of a vast amount of additional information. Instead of applying, as now, to unauthorised disclosures ÒlikelyÓ to damage defence, international relations or law enforcement, he points out that it would be an offence to reveal information that the discloser should have realised was simply ÒcapableÓ of causing such damage. 


ÒA whistleblower revealing information, or a journalist or blogger publishing it, would commit an offence even if there was only the remotest possibility of harmÓ, says Frankel.


Douglas Hurd, the home secretary responsible for the 1989 Official Secrets Act, assured the public that the measure would not apply to Òinformation of a general nature that might conceivably be useful in committing an offence, where the chain of circumstance is too long and too uncertainÓ.  ...



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Meine Emails


31.5.2017


NetzDG

9.6.2018


EU-Copyright Directive, Artikel 13

22.6.2018


call on UK government to not extradite Julian Assange




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