Iraq's Arsenal of Weapons of Mass Destruction


Scott Ritter: Endgame

(Ritter was chief weapon inspector for UNSCOM until 1998)
Rockefeller Center
1230 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10020

Copyright @ 1999 by Scott Ritter


The Iraqis maintain, at a minimum, the capability to conduct active research and development in the field of gaseous centrifuge enrichment and the weaponization of a nuclear device.


Iraq has retained a considerable nuclear weapon manufacturing production base, much being done under monitoring, some on a small scale (in and around Baghdad): (for more details see David Kay, "Iraqi Inspections: Lessons Learned", Eye on Supply: Feb. 10, 1993, Monterey Institute of International Studies, 1997)


With the exception of the secret machine tool centers, storage requirements for the retained infrastructure are negligible.


Iraq has capability to produce, weaponize (into artillery, aerial bombs, 150 - 600 km range missiles), store, and employ chemical weapons.


Information indicates only smallscale ongoing production. To produce ten tons of agent, the Iraqis would need 200 to 300 tons of precursors.


Iraq has


The equipment for the two chemical agent production lines that remain unaccounted for could be The Polish pesticide production plant may have been carried in at least two dozen vehicles.

The filling plant could be carried in 1 - 4 standard metallic shipping (ISO) containers.


see also Gabriele Kraatz-Wadsack, ehemalige UN-Chefinspekteurin, ''Die Waffen-Inspekteure können abschrecken'', 6.Sept.2002 7:50 Uhr:

Das Land habe damals unter anderem

The Iraqis have at least the capability to produce, weaponize, store, and employ biological weapons. This activity appears to revolve around the maintenance of the capability to produce agent using civilian biological laboratories, as well as making use of retained equipment that is outside UNSCOM's control.


Biological agent for military use is relatively simple to produce.




The biggest problem in assessing Iraq's remaining biological weapons capability lies in its refusal to discuss this matter fully with UNSCOM, significantly hindering any understanding of Iraq's past and present capabilities. Real concern exists that Iraq desires to retain a large-scale biological agent production capability. After the Hussein Kamal defection revealed the existence of such a capability, at the Al Hakam facility, it was destroyed by UNSCOM.

Because of the dual-use nature of biology, innocent sounding civilian projects can be readily converted into BW production (for details see the following two papers by J. Tucker "Monitoring and Verification in a Noncooperative Environment: Lessons from the U.N. Experience in Iraq" and "Verification Provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention and Their Relevance to the Biological Weapons Convention").

Of related interest: Gabriele Kraatz-Waedsack: Das  biologische Waffenarsenal des Irak, Deutschlandfunk, Forschung Aktuell, 31.7.2002


Iraq retains a limited operational capability for using long-range (i.e. over 150 kilometers) ballistic missiles.



An Update On Inspection

The Security Council, 27 January 2003:
Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC, Dr. Hans Blix

Version: January 31, 2003
Address of this page
Joachim Gruber