Volume 1, Issue 4
June-July 2005

Nuclear Cheating: A well-worn path

by Valerie Lincy and Kelly Motz

In a news conference following his victory in June, Iranian president-elect Mahmoud Ahmadinejad promised to continue Iran's nuclear program, saying that the country needs "peaceful nuclear technology for energy, medical and agricultural purposes." This statement echoes comments by his reformist predecessor Mohammad Khatami, who often claimed that Iran was using its nuclear technology only for peaceful purposes.

However, Iran's actual nuclear conduct suggests that it wants to generate more than just kilowatts. The best evidence of this is the similarity between what Iran did secretly for nearly twenty years and what Iraq did before the 1991 Gulf War. Both countries conducted secret nuclear experiments, and both relied on clandestine imports and on cover-ups.

Iraq's pre-1991 efforts to build a bomb under the nose of nuclear inspectors are well known. The striking parallel between these efforts and Iran's secret nuclear work should leave little doubt as to the weapon intentions of the Iranian regime. In the table that follows, we compare what Iran and Iraq have done in common, and the nuclear weapon implications of their actions.

Consider first that both Iran and Iraq secretly produced small amounts of plutonium and enriched uranium, the two materials that fuel atomic bombs. To make plutonium, Iranian and Iraqi scientists used small reactors that their countries had imported under the guise of peaceful nuclear research. They each exposed natural uranium to the reactor's neutrons, which created plutonium, and then used a shielded laboratory to extract the plutonium in weapon-useable form. To make enriched uranium, both countries ran high-speed gas centrifuges and also experimented with lasers.

Consider too how both Iran and Iraq obtained their nuclear wherewithal. They relied on clandestine imports of material and equipment, which allowed them to hone their nuclear expertise in secret experiments beyond the gaze of international inspectors. In 1991, Iran imported uranium compounds from China, including over a ton of uranium hexafluoride gas. The gas was then secretly enriched in centrifuges--the designs and parts for which were also imported surreptitiously. Just before the first Gulf War, Iraq too succeeded in testing its own centrifuges--based on designs and components illicitly procured from Germany--using material secretly imported from Niger and Brazil.

Finally, consider the lengths to which both Iran and Iraq were willing to go in order to conceal their activities, once the scope of their programs came to light. In May 2003, Iran dismantled and moved laser enrichment equipment from its secret pilot plant at Lashkar Ab'ad to an undeclared storage facility. Iran also made considerable modifications to the Kalaye Electric Company workshop, its previously unknown centrifuge enrichment facility in Tehran, sometime between March and August 2003, before allowing inspectors to take environmental samples. And it razed a site known as Lavisan-Shian in northeastern Tehran that was allegedly involved in undeclared nuclear activities--before international inspectors could visit the site and take environmental samples. Iraq's post-Gulf War deception and concealment techniques were similar. They included demolishing whole buildings and digging up floors at the Tuwaitha nuclear complex, where secret uranium enrichment had taken place, and hiding equipment.

After considering the pattern established by Iraq and followed--almost to the letter--by Iran, it is hard to miss where Iran's program is headed. Europe is trying to prevent Iran from getting there by offering economic and security incentives in exchange for Tehran's promise to abandon uranium enrichment. The chance that Iran will agree, given statements by Ahmadinejad and others, seems slim. An understanding of the parallel between Iraq's actions and Iran's should help determine how the world reacts if Iran rejects Europe's proposal and resumes enriching uranium.