Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1
IV. C Evolution of the War (26 Vols.)
Direct Action: The Johnson Commitments, 1964-1968
(16 Vols.)
7. Air War in the North: 1965 — 1968 (2 Vols.)
a. Volume 1
Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 33
NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1
TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE
UNITED STATES - VIETNAM RELATIONS
1945 - 1967
=^=VIETNAM TASK FORCE =
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE -
Fpc Def Cent ! . T-
Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1
TOP SECRET - Sensitive
IV. C. 7. (a)
N
Volume I
THE AIR WAR Iti NORTH VIETKAM
029 &
Sec Def Coat
TOP SECRET - Sensitive
Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 201 1
ROLLING THUNDER DIGEST
D'EH e fN PHU
iKlJJJ
HANOI & HAIPHONG
RESTRICTED AREA
CINCPACAE
CINCPACFLT
COHUSMACV
'ARMED.
TOP SECRET'
Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Dale: 201 1
TOP SECRET - Sensitive
CHRONOLOGY
1 Jul 65 Under SecState George Ball Ball argues for "cutting our
memo to the President losses" in Vietnam and nego-
tiating an end to the war. A
massive U3 intervention would
likely require complete achieve
meat of our objectives or
humiliation, both at terrible
costs .
Rusk memo to the President
McNamara DPM (revised
20 Jul)
2 Jul 65 JCSM 515-65
13 Jul 65 McNaughton draft memo
14-21 Jul 65 McNamara trip to Vietnam
US had to defend South Vietnam
from aggression even with US
troops to validate the reli-
ability of the US commitment.
The gravity of the military
situation required raising 3 rd
country troops in SVH from 16
to 44 battalions and intensify-
ing the air war through the
mining of Haiphong and other
ports, destruction of rail and
road bridges from Chins., and
destruction of MIG airfields
and SAM sites.
The JCS advocate virtually the
same air war program as the
DM adding only attacks on
"war -making" supplies and facil
ities. Sorties should increase
from 2,000 to 5 , 000 .
Negotiations are unlikely, but
even 200,000-400,000 men may
only give us a 5^-50 chance of
a win by 1968 ; infiltration
routes should be hit hard to
put a "ceiling" on infiltration
After a week in Vietnam,
McNamara returned with a
softened version of the DM.
1
TOP SECRET - Sensitive
Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1
S
TOP SECRET - Sensitive
20 Jul 65 McNamara memo to the
President
30 Jul 65 McNamara memo for the
President
4-6 Aug 65 McNamara before Senate
Armed Services and Appro-
priation Comte and HASC.
2 Sep 65 JCSM- 67 O -65
15 Sep 65 McNamara memo to CJCS
12 Oct 65 Amb. Thompson memo to
McNamara
3 Nov 65 McNamara memo to the
President
9 Nov 65 State Dept, memo to the
President
. 2
Backing away from his 1 July
views, McNamara recommended
mining the harbors only as a
"severe reprisal." Sorties
should be raised to 4 , 000 .
Political improvement a must
in SVN; low-key diplomacy to
lay the groundwork for a
settlement.
Future bombing policy should
emphasize the threat, minimize
DRV loss of face, optimize
interdiction over political
costs, be coordinated with
other pressures on the DRV, and
avoid undue risks of escalation.
McNamara justifies the Adminis-
tration's bombing restraint,
pointing to the risk of escala-
tion in attacks on POL, air-
fields or Hanoi -Haiphong areas.
The JCS recommend air strikes
against "lucrative" NVN targets
-- POL, power plants, etc.
JCSM 67 O is rejected as a
dangerous escalatory step.
Thompson, discussing the possi-
bility of a pause, notes need
to tell Hanoi we'd resume if
the effort failed.
McNamara urges the approval
of the bombing "pause" he had
first suggested in his 20 Jul
memo to test NVN's intentions.
A State memo to the President,
written by U. Alexis Johnson
with Rusk's endorsement, opposes
a pause at a time when Hanoi has
given no sign of willingness to
talk. It would waste an impor-
tant card and give them a chance
to blackmail us about resumption.
TOP SECRET - Sensitive
Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1
6
TOP SECRET - Sensitive
10 Nov 65
JCSM-810-65
The Chiefs propose a systematic
air attack on the NVN POL
storage and distribution net-
work.
17 Nov 65
DIA memo to McNamara
General Carroll (Dir. DIA)
gives an appraisal of the
bombing with few bright spots.
28-29 Nov 65
Me Namar a -Wheeler trip to
Vietnam
McNamara and General Wheeler
make a hurried trip to Vietnam
to consider force increases.
30 Nov 65
McNamara report to the
President
Among other parts of the
report, McNamara urges a pause
in the bombing to prepare the
American public for future
escalations and to give Hanoi
a last chance to save face.
1 Dec 65
W. Bundy draft memo to
the President
Bundy summarizes the pros and
cons with respect to a pause
and concludes against it.
3 Dec 65
McNaughton memo
McNaughton favors a "hard-line"
pause with resumption unless
the DRV stopped infiltration
and direction of the war, with-
drew infiltrators, made the VC
stop attacks and stopped inter-
fering with the GVN's exercise
of its functions.
6 Dec 65
,
State Dept, memo to the
President
Rusk having apparently been
convinced, this new draft by
Bundy and Johnson recommends
a pause.
r
8 Dec 65
McNamara memo to the
President
McNamara states that he is
giving consideration to the
JCS proposal for attacking the
NVN POL system.
24 Dec 65
State msg 1786 to Lodge
The bombing pause begins. It
lasts for 37 days until the
31st of January.
4
TOP SECRET - Sensitive
. 3
■■
Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1
TOP SECRET - Sensitive
26 Dec 65
27 Dec 65
28 Dec 65
12 Jan 66
15 Jan 66
18 Jan 66
24 Jan 66
CINCPAC msg 262159Z Dec 65
MA.CV msg 45265
Helms memo to DepSecDef
Vance
CINCPAC msg 120205Z Jan 66
Bundy "Scenario for
Possible Resumption"
JCSM-41-66
McNaughton draft, "Some
Observations about
Bombing. .
McNamara memo to the
president
CINCPAC, dissenting from the
pause from the outset, argues
for the resumption of the
bombing promptly.
Westmoreland argues that
"immediate resumption is
essential."
Estimates that neither the
Soviets nor Chinese will actively
intervene in the war if the POL
system is attacked.
Admiral Sharp urges that the
bombing be resumed at sub-
stantially higher levels
immediately.
Bundy urges that the resumption
be at a low level building up
again gradually before major
new targets like POL are struck.
"... offensive air operations
against NVN should be resumed
now with a sharp blow and there-
after maintained with uninter-
rupted, increasing pressure."
Specifically, the Chiefs called
for immediate mining of the ports
Purposes of the bombing are
(1) to interdict infiltration;
(2) to bring about negotiation;
(3) to provide a bargaining
counter; and (4) to sustain
GVN morale.
*
McNamara, drawing on the
language of McNaughton' s
earlier memo, recommends
resumption with sorties to
rise gradually to 4,000 per
month and stabilize. Promises
are all cautious.
4
TOP SECRET - Sensitive
Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1
25 Jan 66
31 Jan 66
4 Feb 66
19 Feb 66
1 Mar 66
10 Mar 66
late Mar 66
28 Mar 66
TOP SECRET - Sensitive
Ball memo to the President
Bombing resumes
3NIE 10-1-66
JCSM 113-66
JCSM 130-66
JCSM 153-66
McNamara memo to the
President
White House Tuesday Lunch
Ball warns that resumption
will pose a grave danger of
starting a war with China.
He points to the self -generating
pressure of the bombing for
escalation, shows its ineffec-
tiveness and warns of specific
potential targets such as
mining the harbors.
After 37 days the bombing is
resumed but with no spectacu-
lar targets.
This special estimate states
that increasing the scope and
intensity of bombing, including
attacks on POL, would not prevent
DRV support of higher levels of
operations in 1966 .
The Chiefs urge a sharp escala-
tion of the air war with maxi-
mum shock effect.
Focusing their recommendations
on POL, the Chiefs call it
"highest priority action not
yet approved . " It would have
a direct effect in cutting
infiltration.
Again attacks on POL are urged.
This memo to the President con-
tained McNamara's bombing
recommendations for April which
included hitting 7 of 9 JCS
recommended POL storage sites.
McNamara's POL recommendation
is deferred by the President
because of political turmoil
in SVN.
5
TOP SECRET - Sensitive
Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 2011
9 Apr 66
lit Apr 66
16 Apr 66
26 Apr 66
27 Apr 66
4 May 66
6 May 66
TOP SECRET - Sensitive
White House Review A general policy review at
the White House includes most
of the second-level members
of the Administration. Meet-
■ ings and paper drafting con-
tinued until the political
crisis in SVN abated in mid-
April.
JCSM 238-66 The JCS forwarded a voluminous
study of the bombing that
recommends a much ejqpanded
campaign to hit the Haiphong
POL, mine the harbors, hit
the airfields.
Policy debate continues The high-level policy review
continues. Bundy, McNaughton,
Carver & Unger draft position
papers on the alternatives if
the GW collapses.
JCS msg 9326 CINCPAC is informed that RT5O
will not include the POL.
General Taylor in a major memo
to the President discusses the
problem of negotiations des-
cribing the bombing and other
US military actions as "blue
chips" to be bargained away at
the negotiation table not given
away as a precondition before-
hand.
W. Bundy memo to Rusk Bundy, commenting on Taylor's
"blue chip" memo takes a harder
position on what we should get
for a bombing halt — i.e. both
an end of infiltration and a
cessation of VC/NVA military
activity in the South.
W. W. Rostow memo to Rostow urges the attack on POL
Rusk and McNamara based on the results such
attacks produced against Germany
in W.W. II.
Taylor memo to the
President
6
TOP SECRET - Sensitive
Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number. NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
10 May 66
22 May 66
3 Jun 66
7 Jun 66
8 Jun 66
l4 Jun 66
14-18 Jun 66
22 Jun 66
24 Jun 66
25 Jun 66
TOP SECRET - Sensitive
CINCPAC msg 100730 Z May 66
MA.CV msg 17603
UK Bi Wilson opposes POL
State Dept msg 48 to Oslo.
Brussels msg 87
CIA SC No. 08440/66
CINCPAC msg 140659Z Jun 66
Bonning Mission
JCS msg 5 OO 3
POL deferred
JCS msg 5311
7
Admiral Sharp again urges the
authorization of POL attacks.
General Westmoreland supports
CINCPAC 's request for strikes
on the POL system.
The President, having decided
sometime at the end of May to
approve the POL attacks, informs
UK R-l Wilson. Wilson urges
the President to reconsider.
Rusk, travelling in Europe,
urges the President to defer
the POL decision because of the
forthcoming visit of Canadian
Ambassador Bonning to Hanoi and
the possibility of some peace
feeler.
"it is estimated that the
neutralization of the bulk
petroleum storage facilities
in- NVN will not in itself pre-
clude Hanoi's continued support
of essential war activities."
Having been informed of high
level consideration of the POL
strikes by McNamara, CINCPAC
assures they will cause under
50 civilian casualties.
Canadian Ambassador Ronning
goes to Hanoi and confers with
top DRV leaders. He returns
with no message or indication
of DRV interest in talks.
CINCPAC is ordered to strike the
POL at first light on 24 June.
Bad weather forces rescheduling
of the strikes for 25 June.
The POL execute order is res-
cinded because of a press leak.
TOP SECRET - Sensitive
Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1
28 Jun 66
29 Jun 66
8 Jul 66
24 Jul 66
1 Aug 66
4 Aug 66
13-14 Aug
20 Aug 66
29 Aug 66
TOP SECRET - Sensitive
JCS msg 54l4
POL attacks
ROLLING THUNDER Conference
in Honolulu
CINCPAC msg O 8073 OZ Jul 66
CINCPAC msg 242069Z Jul 66
DIA Special intelligence
SNIE 13-66
66 Westmoreland sees LBJ
CINCPAC msg 202226 Z Aug 66
JASON studies
The POL order is reinstated
for 29 June.
At long last the POL facilities
are struck with initially
highly positive damage reports.
After having been briefed by
CINCPAC on the effects of the
POL strikes to date, McNamara
informs Admiral Sharp that the
President wants first priority
given to strangulation of the
NVN POL system.
RT 51 specifies a program for
intensive attacks on POL as
1st priority.
As a part of a comprehensive
attack on POL storage, Sharp
recommends attacks on Kep and
Phuc Yen airfields.
70 % of NVN's large bulk POL
storage capacity has been
destroyed along with 7$ of its
dispersed storage.
NVN was using the POL attacks
as a lever to extract more aid
from the Chinese and the Soviets.
General Westmoreland spends two
days at the ranch conferring with
the President on the progress of
the war and new troop requirement
CINCPAC emphatically opposes
any standdown, pause or reduc-
tion in the air war.
IDA's JASON Division submits
four reports on the war done by
a special study group of top
scientists who stress the inef-
fectiveness of the bombing,
including POL, and recommend the
construction of an anti -infiltra-
tion barrier across northern
South Vietnam and Laos.
TOP SECRET - Sensitive
Declassified per Execulive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1
IZ
TOP SECRET - Sensitive
3 Sep 66
McNamara memo to CJCS
McNamara requests the views
of the Chiefs on the proposed
barrier.
4 Sep 66
CINCPAC msg 042059Z Sep 66
RT is redirected from a
primary POL emphasis to "attri-
tion of men, supplies, equip-
ment . . . . "
8 Sep 66
CM-1732-66
General Wheeler agrees to the
creation of a special project
for the barrier under General
Starbird, but expresses con-
cern that funding of the program
not be at the expense of other
activities .
.*
12 Sep 66
Joint CIA/DIA Assessment
of POL Bombing
The intelligence community turns
in an overwhelmingly negative
appraisal of the effect of POL
attacks. No POL shortages are
evident, and in general the
bombing has not created insur-
mountable transportation diffi-
culties, economic dislocations,
or weakening of popular morale.
13 Sep 66
CINCPAC msg 13O705Z Sep 66
CINCPAC ridicules the idea of
a barrier.
15 Sep 66
McNamara memo to Lt Gen
Starbird
Starbird is designated as the
head of a Joint Task Force for 1
the barrier.
7 Oct 66
JCSM 646-66
In a report on the US world-
wide force posture the Chiefs
express grave concern at the
thinness with which manpower is
stretched. They recommend
mobilization of the reserves.
IO -13 Oct 66
McNamara trip to Vietnam
McNamara, Katzenbach, Wheeler,
Komer, McNaughton and others
spend three days in Vietnam on
a Presidential fact-finder.
9
TOP SECRET - Sensitive
Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1
TOP SECRET - Sensitive
l4 Oct 66 McNamara memo to the With Katzeribach's concurrence.
President McNamara recommended only 40,000
more troops and the stabilisa-
tion of the air war. Noting the
inability of the bombing to
interdict infiltration, he
recommended the barrier to the
President. To improve the
negotiating climate he proposed
either a bombing pause or shifting
it away from the northern cities.
JCSM 672-66
15 Oct 66 George Carver memo for
Dir . , CIA
23-25 Oct 66 Manila Conference
4 Nov 66 JCSM 702-66
8 Nov 66 Off-Year Election
The Chiefs disagree with vir-
tually every McNamara recommenda-
tion. In addition they urge an
escalatory "sharp knock" against
NVN.
Carver concurs in McNamara's
assessment of the bombing and
agrees with its stabilization
at about 12,000 sorties per
month but urges the closing
of Haiphong port.
The President meets with the
heads of government of all the
troop contributing nations and
agreed positions on the war and
the framework of its settlement
are worked out. In a private
conference, Westmoreland opposes
any curtailment of the bombing
and urges its expansion. He
seemed to have reluctantly
accepted the barrier concept.
The Chiefs in forwarding the
CINCPAC force proposals add a
rationale of their own for the
bombing: to "make it as diffi-
cult and costly as possible" for
NVN to continue the war, thereby
giving it an incentive to end it.
In an off-year election, the
peace candidates in both parties
are all resoundingly defeated.
10
TOP SECRET - Sensitive
Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NNE) Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date; 201 1
TOP SECRET - Sensitive
11 Nov 66 McNamara memo to CJCS
17 Nov 66 McNamara DIM on Supple-
mental Appropriations
The President approved only
the modest McNamara force
increases and ordered a stabil-
ization of the air war.
McNamara describes for the
President the failure of the
bombing to reduce infiltration
below the essential minimum
to sustain current levels of
combat in SVN. He argues for
the barrier as an alternative.
22 Nov 66 JCSM-727 -66
13_l4 Dec 66 Hanoi attacks hit civilian
areas
£3 Dec 66 10 -mile Hanoi prohibited
area established
The Chiefs once again oppose
holiday standdowns for Christ-
mas, New Year's and Tet citing
the massive advantage of them
taken by the DRV during the
37 -day pause.
A series of air attacks on
targets in Hanoi in early Dec.
culminated in heavy strikes
on Dec. 13-14. In the immedi-
ate aftermath, the DRV and
other communist countries claimed
extensive damage in civilian
areas. The attacks came at a
time when contacts with the DRV
through the Poles apparently had
appeared promising.
In response to the worldwide
criticism for the attacks on
civilian areas, a 10 -n.m. pro-
hibited area around Hanoi was
established with a similar zone
for Haiphong. Henceforth attacks
within it could only be by speci-
fic Presidential authorization.
24 Dec 66 48-hour truce
31 Dec 66 New Year's truce
A 48 -hour truce and bombing pause
is observed.
A second 48 -hour truce is
observed. Heavy communist
resupply efforts are observed
during the standdown.
11
TOP SECRET - Sensitive
Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1
TOP SECRET - Sensitive
2 Jan 67 MACV msg OOI 63
4 Jan 67 CINCPAC msg 040403Z Jan 67
4 Jan 67 JCSM-6-67
18 Jan 67 JCSM-25-67
CINCPAC msg 182210Z Jan 67
25 Jan 67 CINCPAC msg 252126Z Jan 67
28 Jan 67 RT 53
1 Feb 67 CINCPAC msg 012005Z Feb 67
2 Feb 67 Marks (Dir., USIA.) memo to
Rusk
JCSM 59-67
3 Feb 67 McI'Iaughton "Scenario"
Westmoreland opposes the Tet
truce based on VC violations of
the two truces just completed.
CINCPAC endorses Westmoreland's
opposition to the Tet truce.
The Chiefs note the heavy DRV
resupply during the two truces
and oppose the proposed 96 -hour
Tet truce.
The Chiefs renew their opposi-
tion to the Tet truce.
Admiral Sharp recommends six
priority targets for RT in 1967:
(l) electric power, (2) the
industrial plant, ( 3 ) the trans-
portation system in depth, (4)
military complexes, ( 5 ) POL,
(6) Haiphong and the other ports.
Sharp again urges the attack
of Haiphong and an intensified
overall campaign.
No new target categories are
approved.
Keeping up his barrage of
cables. Sharp urges the closing
of the NVN ports by aerial mining
Marks proposes extending the
Tet truce for 12 to 24 hours in
an effort to get negotiations
started.
*
The Chiefs propose the mining of
selected inland waterways and
selected coastal areas to inhibit
internal sea transportation in
NVN.
A handwritten "Scenario" for the
pause by McNaughton which notes
McNamara 1 s approval calls for
extension of the Tet truce to
7 days to get negotiations startec
. 12
TOP SECRET - Sensitive
Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316, By: NWD Date: 2011
8 Feb 67
8-l4 Feb 67
15 Feb 67
19 Feb 67
21 Feb 67
21 Feb 67
TOP SECRET - Sensitive
President's letter to Ho
Chi Mi nil
Tet truce
Ho Chi Mirth letter to
President
Moscow msg 3568
Vance memo to Katzenbach
W. Bundy memo
Maxwell Taylor memo to the
President
The President invites Ho to
indicate what reciprocity he
might expect from a bombing
halt. The letter is trans-
mitted in Moscow Feb. 8.
While this truce was in effect
frantic efforts were undertaken
by UK PM Wilson and Premier
Kosygin in London to get peace
talks started. In the end
these failed because the enor-
mous DRV resupply effort forces
the President to resume the
bombing after having first
extended the pause.
Replying to the President's
letter. Ho rejects the US
conditions and reiterates that
unconditional cessation of the
bombing must precede any talks.
Amb. Thompson indicates the
Soviets would react extremely
adversely to the mining of
Haiphong .
Vance sends Katzenbach a package
of proposals for the President's
night reading. Eight categories
of new targets are analyzed;
none can seriously undercut the
flow of supplies South.
Bundy notes that mining of the
waterways and coastal areas of
the DRV panhandle could be
approved without the mining of
Haiphong.
Taylor again considers the
question of ceasefire, polit-
ical settlement and sequencing
of agreements . Ho direct
bearing on the situation.
13
TOP SECRET - Sensitive
Declassified per Execuiive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 i
22 Feb 67
27 Feb 67
10 Mar 67
20-21 Mar 67
8 Apr 67
20 Apr 67
24 Apr 67
TOP SECRET - Sensitive
Mining waterways approved The President approved the
aerial mining of the water-
ways and the attack on the
Thai Nguyen Iron and Steel
works .
1st aerial mining
Thai Nguyen plant struck
Bundy gives Thieu
assurances
Guam Conference
RT 55
JCSM 218-67
Haiphong power plants
struck
The first aerial mining of
the waterways begins.
The Thai Nguyen Iron and
Steel complex is hit for the
first time.
Bundy in Saigon sees Thieu
with Lodge and assures him
the President believes that
more pressure must be applied
in the North before Ho will-
change his position.
The President leads a full
delegation to a conference
with Thieu and Ky. Questions
of constitutional progress and
war progress in the South
dominate the discussions.
During the conference Ho
releases the exchange of letters
during Tet. A decision to base
B-52s in Thailand is also taken.
RT 55 includes the Kep airfield,
Hanoi power transformer and
other industrial sites.
The Chiefs endorse Westmor eland's
request for 100,000 more troops
and 3 more tactical fighter
squadrons to keep up the pressure
on the North.
After numerous weather aborts,
the two Haiphong power plants
are struck for the 1st time.
Airfields attacked Two MIG fields come under
first -time attack shortly after
their authorization.
14 '
TOP SECRET - Sensitive
Declassified per Executive Order 13526. Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1
24 Apr 67
27 Apr 67
X May 67
4 May 67
5 May 67
TOP SECRET - Sensitive
R. W. Komer memo
Moscow msg 4566
Westmoreland sees the
President
W. Bundy memo to Katzeribach
SNIE 11-11-67
McGeorge Bundy letter to
the President
CM-3218-67
Komer leaves behind some views
on the war as he leaves for
Vietnam. Negotiations are now
unlikely, but bombing won't make
Hanoi give in, hence the "crit-
ical variable is in the South."
Amb. Thompson reports the bad
effect of the recent Haiphong
attacks on Soviet attitudes.
Back in the US to speak to BBT
about his troop request and
address Congress, We sty tells
Johnson, "l am frankly dis-
mayed at even the thought of
stopping the bombing. ..."
As a part of the policy review
in progress since 24 April,
Bundy writes a strategy paper
opposing more bombing (among
other things) because of the
likely adverse international
effects.
Soviets will 3.ikely increase
aid to the DRV but not help
get the conflict to the nego-
tiating table.
Bundy argues for a ceiling on
the US effort in Vietnam and
no further escalation of the
air war, particularly the mining
of Haiphong harbor.
General Wheeler takes sharp
exception to Bundy's views.
Haiphong is the single most
valuable and vulnerable NVN
target yet unstruck. Also
explains the rationale for the
attack on the NVN power grid.
15
TOP SECRET - Sensitive
Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3
NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 201 1
5 May 67
6 May 67
8 May 67
12 May 67
16 May 67
19 May 67
TOP SECRET - Sensitive
McNaughton DIM
W. W. Rostov memo
W. Bundy memo
CIA Memo Nos. 0642/67
and 0643/67
Hanoi power plant
authorized
Hanoi power plant bombed
McNamara DIM (given to the
President)
16
As a part of the policy review,
McNaughton drafts a prop'osal
for cutting the bombing back
to 20°, The action was to
enhance military effectiveness
not improve negotiation pros-
pects, which were dim.
After considering three options:
closing Haiphong, heavier
attacks in the Hanoi -Haiphong
area and restriction of bombing
to the panhandle only, Rostow
recommended concentrating on the
panhandle while holding open
the option to up the ante farther
north if ye desired later.
Bundy considers five different
bombing packages and finally
favors levelling off at current
levels with no new targets and
more concentration on the pan-
handle ,
The bombing has not eroded
NVN morale, materially degraded
NVN ability to support the war,
nor significantly eroded the
industrial-military base.
As the debate continues, the
President approves the Hanoi
power plant.
The power plant, 1 mile from
the center of Hanoi, is hit
for "the first time.
McNamara considered two courses:
approval of the military recom-
mendations for escalation in
both North and South; de-escala-
tion in the North (20°) and only
30,000 troops in the South. In
spite of unfavorable negotiations
climate, the second course is
recommended because costs and
risks of the 1st course were too
great .
*
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20 May 67
20 May 67
23 May 67
26 May 67
1 Jun 67
2 Jun 67
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JCSM 286-67
McNamara memo
CIA memo 0649/67
CIA memo
JCSM 307-67
Helms letter to McNamara
W. Bundy memo
The Chiefs rebut -the DPM and
call for expansion of the air
■war "...to include attacks on
all airfields, all port com-
plexes, all land and sea lines
of communication in the Hanoi-
Haiphong area, and mining of
coastal harbors and coastal
waters . "
McNamara asks CJCS, Dir, CIA,
SecNav, and SecAF to analyze
(a) cutting back bombing to 20°;
and (b) intensifying attacks on
LOCs in route packages 6 a and 6 b
but terminating them against
industrial targets.
CIA opposes the mining of the
harbors as too provocative for
the Soviets.
With the recent attacks on NVN’s
power grid 87$ of national
capacity had been destroyed.
The Chiefs take strong exception
to the DPM noting its inconsis-
tency with NSAM 288 and the
jeopardy into which it would
place national objectives in SKA
because of the radical and con-
ceptually unsound military
methods it proposed, including
any curtailment of the bombing.
Responding to McNamara's May 20
request for analysis of two
bombing options, Helms states
neither will cut down the flow
of men and supplies enough "to
decrease Hanoi's determination
to persist in the war."
Bundy, like the Chiefs, rejected
the reformulation of objectives
in the May 19 DPM. He leaves
aside the question of the courses
of action to be followed.
17
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u
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2 Jun 67
JCSM- 312-67
The Chiefs, replying to
McNamara's May 20 request,
again rej ect all suggestions
for a cutback in the bombing.
.
SecNav memo to McNamara
The Secretary of the Navy con-
cluded, in reply to the May 20
request, that the cutback to
the panhandle would be marginally
more productive than the current
campaign.
3 Jun 67
SecAF memo to McNamara
Harold Brown favored the
expanded campaign against LOCs
in northern NVN in his reply
to McNamara's May 20 request.
8 Jun 67
Katzenbach memo to McNamara
Katzenbach favors concentrating
the bombing against LOCs through-
out the country and abandoning
attacks on "strategic" targets.
11 Jun 67
- — - '
Kep Airfield struck
The Kep airfield comes under
attack for the 1st time and
ten KIGs are destroyed.
12 Jun 67
McNamara DM
Three bombing programs are
offered: (a) intensified
attack on Hanoi-Haiphong logis-
tical base; (b) emphasis south
of 20°; (c) extension of the
current program. McNamara,
Vance & SecNav favor B; JCS
favor A; SecAF favors C.
15 jun 67
INR memo to Rusk
Hanoi was possibly reconsidering
the desirability of negotiations.
17 Jun 67
Saigon msg 28293
Bunker doubts the effectiveness
of bombing at interdiction and
therefore urges the rapid com-
pletion of the barrier.
•21 Jun 67
CINCPAC msg 210430Z Jun 67
Sharp argues that results of the
bombing in recent months demon-
strate its effectiveness and are
a powerful argument for its
expansion.
*
18
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23-25 Jun 67
Glassboro Conference
President Johnson meets Soviet
Premier Kosygin at Glassboro,
N.J. No breakthrough on the
war.
3 Jul 67
SecAF memo to McNamara
In a lengthy analytical memo
Brown argues for option C,
a general expansion of the
bombing.
5 Jul 67
JCSM 382-67
The Chiefs reject a Canadian
proposal to exchange a bombing
halt for re -demilitarization
of the DMZ.
7-11 Jul 67
McNamara trip to Vietnam
During McNamara's five day
trip, CINCPAC argues against
any further limitation of the
bombing,
18 Jul 67
JCS msg I 859
RT 57 will be only a limited
extension of previous targets.
No cutback is planned.
9 Aug 67
Addendum to RT 57
Sixteen JCS fixed targets are
added to RT 57 including six
within the 10-mile Hanoi zone.
9-25 Aug 67
Stennis Hearings
The Senate Preparedness Sub-
committee hears two weeks of
testimony on the air war from
Wheeler, Sharp, McConnell and
finally McNamara. The commit-
tee's report condemns the
Administration's failure to
follow military advice.
11-12 Aug 67
Hanoi struck
Several of the newly author-
ized Hanoi targets, including
the Paul Doumer Bridge are struck
19 Aug 67
Attacks on Hanoi suspended
CINCPAC is ordered to suspend
attacks on Hanoi’s 10-mile
zone from 2b Aug to 4 Sep.
20 Aug 67
Largest attack of the war
209 sorties are flown, the
highest number in the war to
date.
19
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21 Aug 67
1 Sep 67
7 Sep 67
10 Sep 67
20 Sep 67
21 Sep 67
22 Sep 67
29 Sep 67
6 Oct 67
8 Oct 67
17 Oct 67
US aircraft lost over China
President's press conference
Hanoi prohibition extended
Campha port struck
CINCPAC msg 202352Z Sep 6?
CINCPAC msg 210028Z Sep 67
CM-2660-67
San Antonio Formula
CM-2679-67
CINCPAC msg 080762Z Oct 67
JCSM 555-67
Two US planes are shot down
over China after having strayed
off course.
The President denies any policy
rift within the Administration
on the bombing.
The prohibition of attack in
the 10 -mile Hanoi zone is
extended indefinitely.
For the first time the port
of Campha is struck including
its docks.
CINCPAC recommends hitting the
MIGs at Phuc Yen air field and
air defense controls at Bac Mai.
Sharp urges lifting the 10-
mile prohibition around Hanoi.
General Johnson (Acting CJCS)
agrees with CINCPAC: hit Phuc
Yen and Bac Mai and lift the
10-mile restriction.
The President offers a new
basis for stopping the bombing
in a San Antonio speech:
assurance of productive dis-
cussions and that no advantage
will be taken of the cessation.
Specific authority to hit the
Hanoi power plant is requested.
Sharp again requests authority
to strike Phuc Yen.
Reviewing the objectives and
limitations of the bombing
policy for the President , the
Chiefs recommended ten new
measures against NVN including
mining the ports and removal
of all current restrictions on
the bombing.
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20 Oct 6?
21 Oct 67
23 Oct 67
23 Oct 67
25 Oct 67
27 Oct 67
9 Nov 67
16 Nov 67
San Antonio Formula rejected
Pentagon anti-war demon-
stration
JCSM 567-67
JCS msg 967^
Fhuc Yen struck
CM- 2707-67
Reduction of Hanoi -Haiphong
zones refused.
Haiphong bombed
In an interview with a western
communist journalist, NVN’s
Foreign Minister rejects the
San Antonio formula.
A massive demonstration in
Washington against the war
ends with a 50,000 -man march
on the Pentagon.
The Chiefs oppose any holiday
standdowns or pauses at year's
end.
Phuc Yen authorized for attack.
Phuc Yen is hit for the 1st
time.
Wheeler proposes reducing the
Hanoi -Haiphong prohibited areas •
to 3 and 1.5 n.m. respectively.
The White House lunch rejects
the proposal to reduce the
Hanoi -Haiphong prohibited zones.
Haiphong’s #2 shipyard is hit
for the 1st time.
17 Nov 67 Bac Mai hit Bac Mai airfield near the
center of Hanoi is struck for
the 1st time.
22 Nov 67 SEACABIN Study A joint ISA/jS study of the
likely DRV reaction to a
bombing halt lays stress on
the risks to the US.
27 Nov 67 • JCSM-663-67 The Chiefs present a plan for
the next four months that calls
for mining the harbors and
lifting all restrictions on
Hanoi -Haiphong, except in a
3 and 1,5 n.m. zone respectively.
In all, 2h new targets are
recommended .
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28 Nov 67
14-15 Dec 67
16 Dec 67
22 Dec 67
24 Dec 67
31 Dec 67
1 Jan 67
2 Jan 68
3 Jan 68
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McNamara ' s re signation
Hanoi RR Bridge struck
Rusk-McN&mara agreement on
new targets
IDA JASON Study
JCSM 698-67
Pope asks bombing halt
Christmas truce
New Year's truce
CINCFAC msg OIOI 56 Z Jan 68
COMUSMACV msg 02891
JCS msg 6402
McNamara's resignation leaks
to the press .
The Paul Doumer island highway
bridge in Hanoi is struck again
The two secretaries reach agree
ment on ten of the 24 new
targets proposed by the Chiefs
in late Nov.
IDA's JASON Division again
produces a study of the bomb-
ing that emphatically rejects
it as a tool of policy.
Noting that the SEACABIN study
did not necessarily reflect
JCS views, the Chiefs advise
against any bombing halt.
The Pope calls on both sides
to show restraint and on the
US to halt the bombing in an
effort to start negotiations.
The President visits him the
next day tc reject the idea.
A 24-hcur Christmas truce is
observed.
Another 24-hour truce.
CINCPAC's year end wrapup
asserts RT was successful
because of materiel destroyed,
and manpower diverted to mili-
tary tasks,
Westmor eland describes the
bombing as "indispensable" in
cutting the flow of supplies
and sustaining his men's morale
Bombing is completely pro-
hibited again within 5 n.m. of
Hanoi and Haiphong, apparently
related to a diplomatic effort.
22
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16 Jan 68
25 Jan 68
29 Jan 68
31 Jan 68
3 Feb 68
5 Feb 68
10 Feb 68
23-25 Feb
27 Feb 68
28 Feb 68
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White House meeting
Clifford testimony
Tet truce begins
Tet offensive
JCSM 78-68
Warnke memo to McNamara
Haiphong struck
68 Wheeler visits Vietnam
Wheeler Report
• CIA. memo
Clifford Group
#
.23
Two new targets are author-
ized but the 5 n.m. zones are
reaffirmed .
Clark Clifford in his con-
firmation hearings states that
"no advantage" means normal
resupply may continue.
The Tet truce begins but is
broken almost immediately by
communist attacks.
The VC/nVA attack all major
towns and cities, invade the
US Embassy and the Presidential
Palace. Hue is occupied and
held well into Feb.
Citing the Tet offensive, the
Chiefs ask for reduction of
the restricted zones to 3 and
1.5 n.m.
Warnke opposes the reduction
of the sanctuary because of
the danger of civilian casu-
alties. Reduction not approved.
After a month of restriction,
Haiphong is again struck.
Gen. Wheeler at the President's
direction goes to Vietnam and
confers with Westmoreland on
required reinforcements .
Wheeler endorses Westmoreland's
request for 200,000 more men.
Hanoi unlikely to seek nego-
tiations but rather will press
the military campaign.
The President asks Clifford to
conduct a high-level "A to Z"
review of US policy in Vietnam.
The Group meets at the Pentagon
and work begins. It continues
until a DBi is finally agreed
on Mar . . 4 .
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29 Feb 68
29 Feb 68
1 Mar 68
3 Mar 68
4 Mar 68
W. Bundy memo to Warnke, Bundy considers several
et. al. alternative courses including
mining the harbors and all-out
bombing. Without indicating
a preference he indicates no
unacceptably adverse Soviet
or Chinese reaction to any
course except invasion.
Taylor memo to the President Taylor proposes three possible
packages of responses to Tet
and Westmoreland’s request.
AH three called for removal of
the San Antonio formula and no
new negotiating initiative.
Moscow msg 2983 Thompson gives his assessment
of Soviet reactions to various
US actions, "...any serious
escalation except in South
Vietnam would trigger strong
Soviet response . . . . "
DIM The 3 Mar. draft memo rejects any*
bombing escalation, particularly
mining the harbors or reducing
the Hanoi -Haiphong restriction
circles. It also rejects West-
moreland's troop requests.
Clifford Group meeting The Clifford Group rejects the
DIM's "demographic frontier"
tactical concept for SVW and is
divided about the bombing.
Wheeler is adamant for an
escalation.
DIM A new draft is completed and
Clifford sends it to the Presi-
dent. It proposes no new peace
initiative and includes both the
JCS proposal for escalation of
the bombing, and the ISA posi-
tion that it should be stabilized.
In transmitting the DIM, Clifford
apparently also suggested to the
President the idea of halting
the bombing north of 20° , an idea
discussed in the Clifford Group.
24
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4 Mar 68
SeeAF memo to Nitze
Brown presents three alter-
native air war escalations
that might produce better
results .
*
5 Mar 68
Rusk "Draft Statement"
A note to Wheeler for informa-
tion from Clifford transmits a
"draft statement" by Rusk
announcing a bombing halt north
of 20°. An attached rationale
does not foresee negotiations
resulting but indicates the time
is opportune because of forth-
coming bad weather over much of
NVN.
11 Mar 68
New Hampshire Primary
President Johnson only narrowly
defeats Eugene McCarthy in a
great moral victory for anti-
Administration doves.
16 Mar 68
Kennedy announces
Robert Kennedy, spurred by the
New Hampshire results, announces
for the Presidency.
ISA DEM
An ISA draft memo that never
gets SecDef signature proposes
the concentration of the bomb-
ing south of 20° on the infil-
tration routes, with only enough
sorties northward to prevent
relocation of DRV air defenses
to the south.
•
18-19 Mar 68
f
"Senior Informal Advisory
Group"
Nine prestigious former Presi-
dential advisors gather at the
White House for briefings on
the Vietnam situation. After
hearing a report from State,
DoD and CIA, they recommended
against further escalation In
favor of greater efforts to
get peace talks started.
22 Mar 68
Westmoreland reassigned
The President announced that
We s-tmor eland would return to
become CofS Army in the summer.
25
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25-26 Mar 68 Abrams confers with the
president
30 Mar 68 State msg 139*81
31 Mar 68 The President withdraws
General Abrams, DepCOMUSMACV,
returns unexpectedly to
Washington and confers with
the President. He is presum-
ably told of his new assignment
to replace Westmoreland and of
the President's decision for
a partial bombing halt.
US Ambassadors to the allied
countries are informed of the
forthcoming announcement of a
partial bombing halt. The
likelihood of a DRV response
is discounted.
The President announces the
partial bombing halt on nation-
wide TV and ends his speech with
the surprise announcement of his
own withdrawal as a candidate
for re-election.
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VOLUME I
THE AIR WAR IN NORTH VIETNAM
TABLE OF CONTENTS AND OUTLINE
Page
j. JULY 1965 TO THE YEAR-END BOMBING PAUSE 1
A. Introduction - Where We Stood at Mid-Summer. ........ 1
B. The July Escalation Debate 5
C. Incremental Escalation. 16
D. The "Pause" — 24 December 19^5 to 31 January 1966 . . 20
1. The Pre-Pause Debate 20
2. Resumption — When and At What Level? 26
E. Accomplishments by Years -End 50
FOOTNOTES 58
II. THE POL DERATE — NOVEMBER 1965 “ JUNE 1966 63
A. Background 63
1. JCS Recommendations 63
2. The Intelligence Community Demurs 68
B. The Issue Focuses 73
1. POL and the Pause 73
2. February Debate 76
3 . The CIA Recommends Escalation 80
4. McNamara Endorses POL, the President Defers It.. 84
C. April and May — Delay and Deliberation.. 90
1. Reasons to Wait 90
2. The April Policy Review 92
3 . Exogenous Factors 108
D. The Decision to Strike ...120
FOOTNOTES .128
HI. McNAMARA 1 S DISENCHANTMENT — JULY-DECEMBER 1966 138
A. Results of the POL Attacks .138
1. Initial Success 138
2 . ROLLING THUNDER 51 ; 140
3 . POL - Strategic Failure 142
B. Alternatives — The Barrier Concept 145
1. Genesis 145
2. The JASON Summer Study Reports 149
3 . A Visit to Vietnam and a Memorandum for the
President. 162
C. The Year End View 170
1. Presidential Decisions 170
2. Stabilization of .the Air War 174
3 . 1966 Summary 177
FOOTNOTES * 1 1
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THE AIR MR IB "NORTH VIETNAM
I. .TOLY 1965 TO THE YEAR-END BOMBING- PAUSE
A. Introduction -- Where We Stood At Mid -Summer
By the stumer of 1965 j a U.S. campaign of sustained, almost
daily air strikes against NVH was well underway, with token GVN partici-
pation. Most of the important bombing policy issues had been settled,
and the general outlines of the campaign had become clear. Military
proposals to seek a quick and decisive solution to the Vietnam War
through bombing NVH — proposals which called for an intensive campaign
to apply maximum practicable military pressure in a short time -- had
been entertained and rejected. Instead, what was undertaken was a
graduated program, nicknamed ROLLING THUNDER , definitely ascending in
tempo and posing a potential threat of heavy bombing pressure, but
starting low and stretching out over a prolonged period.
U.S. decision-makers apparently accepted the military view
that a limited, gradual program would exert less pressure upon NVTJ than
a program of heavy bombing from the outset, and they apparently granted
that less pressure was less likely to get NVN to scale down or call off
the insurgency, or enter into reasonable negotiations. They felt, how-
ever, that all-out bombing would pose far greater risks of widening the
war, would transmit a signal strength out of all proportion to the limited
objectives and intentions of the U.S. in Southeast Asia, would carry
unacceptable political penalties, and would perhaps foreclose the promise
of achieving U.S. goals at a relatively low level of violence.
The decision-makers accordingly elected to proceed with the
bombing in a slow, steady, deliberate manner, beginning with a few
infiltration-associated, tar gets in southern NVU and gradually moving
northward with progressively more severe attacks on a wider variety of
targets. The pattern adopted was designed to preserve the options to
proceed or not, escalate or not, or quicken the pace or not, depending
on NVN's reactions. The carrot of stopping the bombing was deemed as
important as the stick of continuing it, and bombing pauses were provided
for. It was hoped that this track of major military escalation of the
war* could be accompanied by a parallel diplomatic track to bring the
war an end, and that both tracks could be coordinated.
By the summer of 1965s bombing NVF had also been relegated
to a secondary role in U.S. military strategy for dealing with the war.
Earlier expectations that bombing and other pressures on NVTT would
1
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constitute the primary means for the U.S. to turn the tide of the war
had been overtaken by the President's decision to send in substantial
U.S. ground forces for combat in SVN. With this decision the main
hope had shifted from inflicting pain in the Worth to proving, in the
South, that NVN could not win a military victory there. ROLLING
THUNDER was counted as useful and necessary, but in the prevailing
view it was a supplement and not a substitute for efforts within SVN.
From the first, strike requirements in SVN had first call on U.S. air
assets in Southeast Asia.
Nonetheless, ROLLING THUNDER was a comparatively risky and
politically sensitive component of U.S. strategy, and national author-
ities kept it under strict and careful policy control. The strikes
were carried out only by fighter -bombers, in low -altitude precision-
bombing modes, and populated areas were scrupulously avoided. Final
target determinations were made in Washington, with due attention to
the nature of the target, its geographical location, the weight of
attack, the risk of collateral damage, and the like. Armed reconnais-
sance was authorized against targets of opportunity not individually
picked in Washington, but Washington did define the types of targets
which could be hit, set a sortie ceiling on the number of such missions,
and prescribed the areas within which they could be flown.
National authorities also closely regulated the rate of
escalation by discouraging the preparation of extended campaign plans
which might permit any great latitude in the field. They accepted
bombing proposals only in weekly target packages. Each target package,
moreover, had to pass through a chain of approvals which included senior
levels of OSD, the Department of State, and the White House, up to and
including the principals themselves.
Within this framework of action the ROLLING THUNDER program
had been permitted to grow in intensity. By mid-1965 the number of
strikes against targets in the JCS master list of major targets had
increased from one or two per week to ten or twelve per week. The geo-
graphic coverage of the strikes had been extended in stages, first across
the” 19th parallel, from there to the 20th, and then up to 20°30' North.
The assortment of targets had been widened, from military barracks,
ammunition depots, and radar sites at first, to bridges, airfields,
naval bases, radio facilities, railroad yards, oil storage sites, and
oven power plants. The targets authorized for strike by armed recon-
naissance aircraft were also expanded from vehicles, locomotives, and
railroad cars to ferries, lighters, barges, road repair equipment, and
.bivouac and maintenance areas; and aircraft on these missions were
authorized to interdict LOCs by cratering, restriking, and seeding
chokepoints as necessary. The number of attack sorties — strike and
flak suppression — had risen to more than 500 per week, and the total
sorties flown to about 900 per week, four or five times what they had
been at the outset.
2
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This early ROLLING THUNDER program had already scored* some
immediate political and psychological gains. Prior to the bombing,
U.S. authorities were coping with what Presidential Assistant McGeorge
Bundy called a "widespread belief" that the U.S. lacked the will and
determination to do what was necessary in Southeast Asia. The initi-
ation of ROLLING THUNDER, followed by a series of military actions
which in effect made the U.S. a full co -belligerent in the war, did
much to correct that belief. The South Vietnamese were given an
important boost in morale, both by the show of greater U.S. support
and by the inauguration of joint retaliation against their enemy in
the North. Thailand and other countries in Southeast Asia, which had
been watching SVN slide rapidly downhill while the U.S. seemed to be
debating what to do, no doubt received the same kind of lift as well.
The bombing had also served several unilateral U.S. inter-
ests. It gave a clear signal to NVN — and indirectly to China —
that the U.S. did not intend to suffer the takeover of SVN without a
fight. It served notice that if pressed the U.S. would not necessarily
recognize privileged sanctuaries. And it provided the U.S. with a
new bargaining chip, something which it could offer to give up in
return for a reduction or cessation of NVN's effort in the South.
Despite such gains, the overall effect of initiating
ROLLING THUNDER was somewhat disappointing. The hopes in some quar-
ters that merely posing a credible threat of substantial damage to
come might be sufficient "pressure" to bring Hanoi around had been
frustrated. U.S. negotiation overtures had been rejected, and Hanoi's
position had if anything hardened. Infiltration South had continued
and intensified. The signs indicated that Hanoi was determined to
ride out the bombing, at least at the levels sustained up to mid-1965,
while continuing to prosecute the war vigorously in the South. It was
evident that the U.S. faced a long-haul effort of uncertain duration.
Although the real target of the early ROLLING THUNDER
program was the will of NVN to continue the aggression in the South,
the public rationale for the bombing had been expressed in terms of
NVN*s capability to continue that aggression. The public was told
that NVN was being bombed because it was infiltrating men and supplies
into SVN; the targets of the bombing were directly or indirectly related
to that infiltration; and the purpose of attacking them was to reduce
the flow and/or to increase the costs of that infiltration. Such a
rationale v/as consistent with the overall position which morally justi-
fied U.S. intervention in the war in terms of NVN's own intervention;
'and it * specif ically put the bombing in a politically acceptable military
idiom of interdiction.
. 3
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This public rationale for the bombing had increasingly
become the most acceptable internal rationale as well, as decision-
makers sought to prevent runaway escalation and to hold down the
bombing in what they thought should be a secondary role in the war.
As a venture in "strategic persuasion" the bombing had not worked.
The most obvious reason was that it was too light, gave too subdued
and uncertain a signal, and exerted too little pain. Hardly any of
the targets most valued by Hanoi — the "lucrative" targets of the
JCS master list — had been hit. If the main purpose of ROLLING
THUNDER was to impose strong pressure on Hanoi's will, the "lucrative"
targets in the Hanoi/Haiphong area, not those in the barren southern
Panhandle, were the ones to go after, and to hit hard. Aerial bombard-
ment could then perform in its proven strategic role, and even if the
risks of such a course were greater it was precisely because the
potential payoff was greater.
If, however, the emphasis could be shifted toward inter-
diction, it would be easier to confine targets to those of direct
military relevance to the VC/NVA campaign in the South, and it would
be easier to contain the pressures to escalate the bombing rapidly
into the northern heart of NVN's population and industry. A con-
tinuing emphasis on the Panhandle LOCs could be defended more easily,
if the main purpose was to actually handicap NVN's efforts to support
and strengthen VC/NVA forces in the South, and it was less likely to
generate adverse political repercussions.
The interdiction rationale had come to the fore by mid-1965,
both within the government and before the public. There were still
internal and external pressures to proceed faster and farther, of
course, because interdiction effects had not been impressive either.
Official spokesmen conceded that complete interdiction was impossible:
the flow of men and supplies from the North, however vital to the
enemy effort in the South, was quite small and could hardly be cut
off by bombing alone. They explained that the bombing had "disrupted"
the flow , "slowed" it down, and made it "more difficult" and "costly."
They showed dramatic aerial photos of bridges destroyed, and implied
that the enemy was being forced "off the rails onto the highways and
off the highways onto their feet." They could not, however, point to
any specific evidence that bombing the North had as yet had any impact
on the war in the South. Almost inevitably, therefore, even within
the interdiction rationale, the conclusion was that the bombing had
been too restrained. It was argued that the predictably gradual pace
had allowed NVN to easily adjust to, circumvent, or otherwise over-
•cone the effects of the -disruptions and other difficulties caused
by the bombing, and that only an expanded bombing program could produce
significant material results .
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Thus, the outlook in mid-1965 was for some further escalation
of the bombing, with a certain amount of tension between pressures
to speed it up and counter-pressures to keep it in check. With the
debate increasingly forced into the interdiction context, the prospect
was for gradual rather than sudden escalation, and strong resistance
to going all the way if necessary to break Hanoi's win could be pre-
dicted. There was still a gap between those who thought of the bombing
as a primarily political instrument and those who sought genuine mili-
tary objectives, and this would continue to confuse the debate about
how fast and far to go, but the main lines of the debate were set.
Still unresolved in mid-1965 was the problem of the diplo-
matic track. Could the U.S. continue to escalate the bombing, main-
taining a credible threat of further action, while at the same time
seeking to negotiate? Could the U.S. orchestrate communications with
Hanoi with an intensifying bombing campaign? As of mid-1965 this was
an open question.
B. The July Escalation Debate
The full U.S. entry into the Vietnam War in the spring of
1965 — with the launching of air strikes against NVN, the release of
U.S. jet aircraft for close support of ARVM troops in SVN, and the
deployment to SVN of major U.S. ground forces for combat — did not
bring an immediate turnabout in the security situation in SVN. The
VC/NVA may have been surprised and stunned at first by the U.S. actions,
but by the summer of 1965 they had again seized the initiative they
held in late 1964 and early 1965 and were again mounting large-scale
attacks, hurting ARVN forces badly. In mid-July Assistant Secretary
McNaughton described the situation in ominous terms:
The situation is worse than a year ago (when it
was worse than a year before that) ... .A hard VC push is
on.... The US air strikes against the North and US combat-
troop deployments have erased any South Vietnamese fears
that the US will forsake them; but the government is able
to provide security to fewer and fewer people in less and
less territory, fewer roads and railroads are usable, the
economy is deteriorating, and the government in Saigon
continues’ to turn over. Pacification even in the Hop Tac
area is making no progress. The government-tc-VC ratio
overall is now only 3 ~to-l, and in combat battalions only
1 -to-l; government desertions are at a high rate, and the
Vietnamese force build-up. is stalled; the VC reportedly
are trying to double their combat strength. There are no
signs that the VC have been throttled by US/GVN inter-
diction efforts; indeed, there is evidence of further
PAVN build-up in the I arid II Corps areas. The DRV/VC
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seem to believe that SVN is near collapse and show no
signs of being interested in settling for less than a
complete cake -over. 1 /
Faced with this gloomy situation, the leading question on
the U.S. agenda for Vietnam was a further major escalation of troop
commitments, together with a call-up of reserves, extension of mili-
tary tours, and a general expansion of the armed forces.
The question of intensifying the air war against the North
was a subsidiary issue, but it was related to the troop question in
several ways. The military view, as reflected in JCS proposals and
proposals from the field, was that the war should be intensified on
all fronts, in the North no less than in the South. There was polit-
ical merit in this view as well, since it was difficult to publicly
justify sending in masses of troops to slug it out on the ground
without at least trying to see whether stronger pressures against
NVN would help. On the other hand, there was continued high-level
interest in preventing a crisis atmosphere from developing, and in
avoiding any over-reaction by NVN and its allies, so that a simul-
taneous escalation in both the North and the South needed to be
handled with care. The bombing of the North, coupled with the deploy-
ment of substantial forces should not look like an effort to soften
up NVN for an invasion.
During the last days of June with U.S. air operations
against North Vietnam well into their fifth month, with U.S. forces
in South Vietnam embarking for the first time upon major ground
combat operations, and with the President near a decision that would
increase American troop strength in Vietnam from 70,000 to over
200,000, Under-Secretary of State George Ball sent to his colleagues
among the small group of Vietnam "principals" in Washington a memoran-
dum warning that the United States was poised on the brink of a military
and political disaster. 2 / Neither through expanded bombing of the
North nor through a substantial increase in U.S. forces in the South
would the United States be likely to achieve its objectives, Ball
argued. Instead of escalation, he urged, "we should undertake either
to extricate ourselves or to reduce our defense perimeters in South
Viet -Nam to accord \*ith the capabilities of a limited US deployment."
"T his is our last clear chance to make this decision ," the
Under-Secretaiy asserted. And in a separate memorandum to the President,
he explained why:
The decision you face now, therefore, is crucial.
Once large numbers of US troops are committed to direct
combat they will begin to take heavy casualties in a
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war they are ill-equipped to fight in a non-cooperative
if not downright hostile countryside.
Once we suffer large casualties we will have started
a well-nigh irreversible process. Our involvement will be
so great that we cannot -- without national humiliation —
stop short of achieving our complete objectives. Of the
two possibilities I think humiliation would be more likely
than the achievement of our objectives -- even after we
have paid terrible" costs. 3/
"Humiliation" was much on the minds of those involved in
the making of American policy for Vietnam during the spring and sum-
mer of 19§5. The word, or phrases meaning the same thing, appears
in countless memoranda. No one put it as starkly as Assistant Secre-
tary of Defense John McNaughton, who in late March assigned relative
weights to various American objectives in Vietnam. In McNaughton’ s
view the principal U.S. aim was "to avoid a humiliating US defeat (to
our reputation as a guarantor)." To this he assigned the weight of
70$. Second, but far less important at only 20$ was "to keep SVN
(and then adjacent) territory from Chinese hands." And a minor third,
at but 10$, was "to permit the people of SVN to enjoy a better, freer
way of life." 4/
Where Ball differed from all the others was in his willing-
ness to incur "humiliation" that was certain -- but also limited and
short-term — by' withdrawing American forces in order to avoid the
uncertain but not unlikely prospect of a military defeat at a higher
level of involvement. Tims he entitled his memorandum "Cutting Our
Dosses in South Viet -Nam." In it and in his companion memorandum to
the President ("A Compromise Solution for South Viet -Nam") he went on
to outline a program, first, of placing a ceiling on U.S. deployments
at present authorized levels (72,000 men) and sharply restricting their
combat roles, and, second, of beginning negotiations with Hanoi for a
cessation of hostilities and the formation in Saigon of a "government
of National Union" that would include representatives of the National
Liberation Front. Ball's argument was based upon his sense of relative
priorities. As he told his colleagues:
The position taken in this memorandum does not
suggest that the United States should abdicate leader-
ship in the cold war. But any prudent military com-
mander carefully selects the terrain on which to stand
and fight, and no great captain has ever been blamed for
a successful tactical withdrawal. *
From our point of view, the terrain in South Viet-
Nam could not be worse. Jungles and rice paddies are
not designed for modern arms and, from a military point
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of view, this is clearly what General de Gaulle described
to me as a "rotten country."
Politically, South Viet -Nam is a lost cause. The
country is bled white from twenty years of war and the
people are sick of it. The Viet Cong — as is shown by
the Rand Corporation Motivation and Morale Study — are
deeply committed.
Hanoi has a Government and a purpose and a discipline.
The "government"- in Saigon is a travesty. In a very real
sense, South Viet-Nam is a country with an army and no
government .
In my view, a deep commitment of United States forces
in a land war in South Viet-Nam would be a catastrophic
error. If ever there was an occasion for a tactical with-
drawal, this is it. 5 /
Ball's argument was perhaps most antithetic to one being put
forward at the same time by Secretary of State Rusk. In a memorandum
he wrote on 1 July, Rusk stated bluntly: "The central objective of
the United States in South Viet-Nam must be to insure that North Viet-
Nam not succeed in taking over or determining the future of South
Viet-Nam by force. We must accomplish this objective without a general
war jf possible ." 6/ Here was a statement that the American commit-
ment to the Vietnam war was , in effect, absolute, even to the point
of risking general war. The Secretary went on to explain why he felt
that an absolute commitment was necessary:
The integrity of the U.S. commitment is the principal
pillar of peace throughout the world. If that commitment
becomes unreliable, the communist world would draw conclusions
that would lead to our ruin and almost certainly to a catas-
trophic war. So long as the South Vietnamese are prepared to
fight for themselves, we cannot abandon them without disaster
to peace and to our interests throughout the world.
In short, if "the U.S. commitment" were once seen to be unreli-
able the risk of the outbreak of general war would vastly increase.
Therefore, prudence would dictate risking general war, if necessary,
In order to demonstrate that the United States would meet its commit -
ments. In either case, some risk would be involved, but in the latter
case the risk would be lower. The task of the statesman is to choose
a^iono- unpalatable alternatives. For the Under-Secretary of State,
this^meant an early withdrawal from Vietnam. For the Secretary, it
meant an open-ended commitment.
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Ball was, of course, alone among the Vietnam principals in
arguing for de-escalation and political "compromise." At the same
time that he and Rusk wrote these papers, Assistant Secretary of State
William Bundy and Secretary of Defense McNamara also went on record
with recommendations for the conduct of the war. Bundy's paper, "A
'Middle Way' Course of Action in South Vietnam," argued for a delay
in further U.S. troop commitments and in escalation of the bombing
campaign against Worth Vietnam, but a delay only in order to allow
the American public time to digest the fact that the United States
was engaged in a land war on the Asian mainland, and for U.S. com-
manders to make certain that their men were, in fact, capable of
fighting effectively in conditions of counter-insurgency warfare with-
out either arousing the hostility of the local population or causing
the Vietnamese government and army simply to ease up and allow the
Americans to "take over" their war. 7/
For McNamara, however, the military situation in South
Vietnam was too serious to allow the luxury of delay. In a memoran-
dum to the President drafted on 1 July and then revised on £0 July,
immediately following his return from a week-long visit to Vietnam,
he recommended an immediate decision to increase the U.S. -Third
Country presence from the current 16 maneuver battalions (ifj U.S.,
one Australian) to 44 (34 U.S,, nine Korean, one Australian), and a
change in the mission of these forces from one of providing support
and reinforcement for the ARVW to one which soon became known as
"search and destroy" — as McNamara put it, they were "by aggressive
exploitation of superior military forces... to gain and hold the
initiative. . .pressing the fight against VC/DRV main force units in
South Vietnam to run them to ground and destroy them," 8/
At the same time, McNamara argued for a substantial intensi-
fication of the air war. The 1 July version of his memorandum recom-
mended a total quarantine of the movement of war supplies into North
Vietnam, by sea, rail, and road, through the mining of Haiphong and
other harbors and the destruction of rail and road bridges leading
from China to Hanoi J the Secretary also urged the destruction of
fighter airfields and SAM sites "as necessary" to accomplish these
objectives. 9f
On 2 July the JCS, supporting the views in the DPM, reiterated
a recommendation for immediate implementation of an intensified bombing
urogram against NVN, to accompany the additional deployments which were
mid^r consideration. 10 / The recommendation was for a sharp escalation
of the bombing, with the emphasis on interdiction of supplies into as
well out of NVN. Like the DPM, it called for interdicting the move-
ment of "war supplies" into NVN by mining the major ports and cutting
the -rail and highway bridges on the LOCs from China to Hanoi; mounting
intensive armed reconnaissance against all LOCs and LOC facilities
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within NVN; destroying the "war -making" supplies and facilities of
EVE, especially POL; and destroying airfields and SAM sites as
necessary to accomplish the other tasks. The JCS estimated that an
increase from ohe then 2000 to about 5000 attack sorties per month
would be required to carry out the program.
The elements of greater risk in the JCS proposals were
obvious. The recommendation to mine ports and to strike airfields
and SAM sites had already been rejected as having special Soviet or
Chinese escalatory implications, and even air strikes against LOCs
from China were considered dangerous. U.S. intelligence agencies
believed that if such strikes occurred the Chinese might deliberately
engage U.S. aircraft over NVN from bases in China. CIA thought the
chances were "about even" that this would occur; DIA and the Service
intelligence agencies thought the chances of this would increase but
considered it still unlikely; and State thought the chances "better
than even." 11 /
Apart from this element of greater risk, however, intelli-
gence agencies held out some hope that an intensified bombing program
like that proposed by the JCS (less mining the ports, which they were
not asked to consider) would badly hurt the NVN economy, damage M's
ability to support the effort in SVN, and even lead Hanoi to consider
negotiations. An SNIE of 23 July est im ated that the extension of air
attacks only to military targets in the Hanoi/llaiphong area was not
likely to "significantly injure the Viet Cong ability to persevere"
or to "persuade the Hanoi government that the price of persisting was
unacceptably high." Sustained interdiction of the LOCs from China,
in addition, would make the delivery of Soviet and Chinese aid more
difficult and costly and would have a serious impact on the NVH economy,
but it would still not have a "critical impact" on "the Communist deter-
mination to persevere" and would not seriously impair Viet Cong capabili-
ties in SVN, "at least for the short term." However:
If, in addition, POL targets in the Hanoi -Haiphong
area were destroyed by air attacks, the DRV's capability
to provide transportation for the general economy would
be severely reduced. It would also complicate their mili-
tary logistics. If additional PAVN forces were employed
in South Vietnam on a scale sufficient to counter increased
US troop strength -^yhich the SNIE said was "almost certain"
to happen/ this would substantially increase the amount of
supplies needed- in the South. The Viet Cong also depend
on sutrolies from the North to maintain their present
level" of large-scale operations. The accumulated strains
of a prolonged curtailment of supplies received from North
Vietnam would obviously have an impact on the Communist
effort in the South. They would certainly inhibit and
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might even prevent an increase in large-scale Viet
Cong military activity, though they would probably not
force any significant reduction in Viet Cong terrorist
tactics of harassment and sabotage. These strains,
particularly if they produced a serious cheek in the
development of Viet Cong capabilities for large-scale
(multi -battalion) operations might lead the Viet Cong
to consider negotiations. 11a/
There were certain reservations with respect to the above
estimate. The State and Army intelligence representatives on USIB
registered a dissent, stating that even under heavier attack the LOG
capacities in NVN and Laos were sufficient to support the war in SVN
at the scale envisaged in the estimate. They also pointed out that
it was impossible to do irreparable damage to the LOCs, that the Com-
munists had demonstrated considerable logistic resourcefulness and
considerable ability to move large amounts of war material long dis-
tances over difficult terrain by primitive means, and that in addition
it was difficult to detect, let alone stop, sea infiltration. On
balance, however, the SNIE came close to predicting that intensified
interdiction attacks would have a beneficial effect on the war in the
South .
Facing a decision with these kinds of implications, the
President wanted more information and asked McNamara to go on another
fact -gathering trip to Vietnam before submitting his final recommenda-
tions on a course of action. In anticipation of the trip, McNaughton
prepared a memo summarizing his assessment of the problem. McNaughton
wrote that "meaningful negotiations" were unlikely until the situation
began to look gloomier for the VC, and that even with 200, 000 -hOO, 000
U.S. troops in SVN the chances of a "win" by 1968 (i.e., in the next
2|- years) were only 5O-5O. But he recommended that the infiltration
routes be hit hard, "at least to put a 'ceiling' on what can be infil-
trated/ 1 and he recommended that the limit on targets he "just short"
of population targets, the China border, and special targets like SAM
sites which might trigger Soviet or Chinese reactions. 12/
McNamara left for Vietnam on July l4 and returned a week
later with a revised version of his July 1st DM ready to he sent to
the President as a final recommendation. The impact of the visit was
to soften considerably the position he had apparently earlier taken.
His 20 July memorandum backed off from the 1 July recommendations —
perhaps although it is impossible to tell from the available materials --
because of intimations that such drastic escalation would he unacceptable
to the President. Instead of mining North Vietnam's harbors as a guaran-
tee measure, the Secretary recommended it as a possible "severe reprisal
should the VC or DRV commit a particularly damaging or horrendous act"
^-uch as "interdiction of the Saigon river." But he recommended a gradual
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increase in the number of strike sorties against North Vietnam from
the existing 2,500 per month to 4,000 "or more," still "avoiding
striking population and industrial targets not closely related to
the DRV's supply of war material to the VC."
The urgency which infused McNamara's recommendations stemmed
from his estimate that "the situation in South Vietnam is worse than
a year ago (when it was worse than a year before that)." The VC had
launched a drive "to dismember the nation and maul the army"; since
1 June the GVN had been forced to abandon six district capitals and
had only retaken one. Transport and communications lines throughout
the country were being cut, isolating the towns and cities and causing
sharp deterioration of the already shaky domestic economy. Air Marshal
Ky presided over a government of generals which had little prospect of
being able to unite or energize the country. In such a situation, U.S.
air and ground actions thus far had put to rest Vietnamese fears that
they might be abandoned, but they had not decisively affected the course
of the war. Therefore, McNamara recommended escalation. His specific
recommendations, he noted, were concurred in by General Wheeler and
Ambassador-designate Lodge, who accompanied him on his trip to Vietnam,
and by Ambassador Taylor, Ambassador Johnson, Admiral Sharp, and
General Westmoreland, with whom he conferred there. The rationale for
his decisions was supplied by the CIA, whose assessment he quoted with
approval in concluding the 1 July version of his memorandum. It stated:
Over the longer term we doubt if the Communists are
likely to change their basic strategy in Vietnam (i.e.,
aggressive and steadily mounting insurgency) unless and
until two conditions prevail: (l) they are forced to accept
a situation in the war in the South which offers them no
prospect of an early victory and no grounds for hope that
they can simply outlast the US and (2) North Vietnam itself
is under continuing and increasingly damaging punitive
attack. So long as the Communists think they scent the
possibility of an early victory (which is probably now the
case), we believe that they will persevere and accept
extremely severe damage to the North. Conversely, if North
Vietnam itself is not hurting, Hanoi's doctrinaire leaders
will probably be ready to carry on the Southern struggle
almost indefinitely. If, however, both of the conditions
outlined .above should be brought to pass, we believe Hanoi
probably would, at least for a period of time, alter its
basic strategy and course of action in South Vietnam.
McNamara's memorandum of 20 July did not include this quota-
tion although many of these points were made elsewhere in the paper.
Instead, it concluded with an optimistic forecast:
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The overall evaluation is that the course of action
recommended in this memorandum — if the military and
political moves are properly integrated and executed with
continuing vigor and visible determination — stands a
good chance of achieving an acceptable outcome within a
reasonable time in Vietnam.
Never again while he was Secretary of Defense would McNamara make so
optimistic a statement about Vietnam — except in public.
This concluding paragraph of McNamara's memorandum spoke of
political, as well as military, "vigor" and "determination." Earlier
in the paper, under the heading "Expanded political moves," he had
elaborated on this point, writing:
Together with the above military moves, we should
take political initiatives in order to lay a groundwork
for a favorable political settlement by clarifying our
objectives and establishing channels of communications.
At the same time as we are taking steps to turn the tide
in South Vietnam, we would make quiet moves through diplo-
matic channels (a) to open a dialogue with Moscow and
Hanoi, and perhaps the VC, looking first toward disabusing
them of any misconceptions as to our goals and second toward
laying the groundwork for a settlement when the time is ripe;
(b) to keep the Soviet Union from deepening its military in
the world until the time when settlement can be achieved;
and (c) to cement support for US policy by the US public,
allies and friends, and to keep international opposition
at a manageable level. Our efforts may be unproductive
until the tide begins to turn, but nevertheless they should
be made.
Here was scarcely a program for drastic political action.
McNamara's essentially procedural (as opposed to substantive) recom-
mendations amounted to little more than saying that the United States
should provide channels for the enemy's discrete and relatively face-
saving surrender when he decided that the game had grown too costly.
This" was, in fact, what official Washington (again with the exception
of Ball) meant' in mid-1965 when it spoke of a "political settlement."
(As McNamara noted in a footnote, even this went too far for Ambassador-
designate Lodge, whose view was that "'any further initiative by us
now /before we are strong/ would simply harden the Communist resolve not
to stop fighting."' In this view Ambassadors Taylor and Johnson con-
curred" except that they would maintain "discreet contacts with the
Soviets.") 13 /
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McNamara's concluding paragraph spoke of "an acceptable
outcome." Previously in his paper he had 1 j sted "nine fundamental
elements" of a favorable outcome. These were:
(a) VC stop attacks and drastically reduce inci-
dents of terror and sabotage.
(b) DRV reduces infiltration to a trickle, with
some reasonably reliable method of our obtaining con-
firmation of this fact.
(c) US/GVIJ stop bombing of North Vietnam.
(d) GVN stays independent (hopefully pro-US, but
possibly genuinely neutral).
(e) GVN exercises governmental functions over sub-
stantially all of South Vietnam.
(f) Communists remain quiescent in Laos and Thailand.
(g) DRV withdraws PAVN forces and other North Viet-
namese infiltrators (not regroupees) from South Vietnam.
(h) VC/nIF transform from a military to a purely
political organization.
(i) US combat forces (not advisors or AID) withdraw.
These "fundamental elements," McNamara said, could evolve with
or without express agreement and, indeed, except for what might be nego-
tiated incidental to a cease-fire they were more likely to evolve without
an explicit agreement than with one. So far as the difference between a
"favorable" a nd an "acceptable" outcome was concerned, he continued,
there was no need for the present to address the question of whether the
United States should "ultimately settle for something less than the nine
fundamentals," because the force deployments recommended in the memoran-
dum. would be prerequisite to the achievement of any acceptable settle-
ment' "a decision can be made later, when bargaining becomes a reality,
whether to compromise in any particular."
In summary, then, McNamara's program consisted of first sub-
stantially increasing the pressure on the enemy by every means short of
those such as the bombing of population centers in the North, that would
run" 5 sizeable risks of precipitating Soviet or Chinese direct intervention
in the war, and then seeking a de facto political settlement essentially
on US/GVN terms .
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The July 20 memo to the President was followed up by two
others on specific aspects of the problem before the end of July.
On July 28, he replied to a series of eighteen points made by
Senator Mansfield with respect to the Vietnam war. In so doing.
Secretary McNamara informed the President of his doubts that even
a "greatly expanded program" could be expected to produce signifi-
cant NVN interest in a negotiated settlement "until they have been
disappointed in their hopes for a quick military success in the
South." Meanwhile he favored "strikes at infiltration routes" to
impose a ceiling on what NVN could pour' into SVN, "thereby putting
a ceiling on the size of war that the enemy can wage there." He
warned that a greatly increased program would create even more seri-
ous risks of "confrontations" with the Soviet Union and China. 1 4/
McNamara stated that the current bombing program was on the
way to accomplishing its purposes and should he continued. The future
program, he said, should:
a. Emphasize the threat . It should be structured
to capitalize on fear of future attacks. At any time,
'pressure' on the DRV depends not upon the current level
of bombing but rather upon the credible threat of future
destruction which can be avoided by agreeing to negotiate
or agreeing to some settlement in negotiations.
b. Minimize the loss of DRV 'face. 1 The program
should be designed to make it politically easy for the
DRV to enter negotiations and to make concessions during
negotiations. It may be politically easier for North
Vietnam to accept negotiations and/or to make concessions
at a time when bombing of their territory is not currently
taking place.
c. Optimize interdiction vs. political costs . Inter-
diction should be carried out so as to maximize effective-
ness and to minimize the political repercussions from the
methods used. Fnysically, it makes no difference whether
a rifle is interdicted on its way into North Vietnam, on
its way out of North Vietnam, in Laos or in South Vietnam.
But different amounts of effort and different political
prices may be paid depending on how and where it is done.
The critical variables in this regard are (l) the type of
targets struck, (e.g., port facilities involving civilian
casualties vs. isolated bridges), (2) types of aircraft
(e.g., B- 52s vs. F-105 s), (3) kinds of weapons (e.g.,
napalm vs. ordinary bombs), (4) location of target (e.g.,
in Hanoi vs. Laotian border area), and (5) the accompanying
declaratory policy (e.g./ unlimited vs. a defined inter-
diction zone) .
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d. Coordinate with other influences on the DRV . So '
long as full victory in the South appears likely, the effect
of the bombing program in promoting negotiations or a settle-
ment will probably be small. The bombing program now and
later should be designed for its influence on the DRV at
that unknown time when the DRV becomes more optimistic about
what they can achieve in a settlement acceptable to us than
about what they can achieve by continuation of the war.
e. Avoid undue risks and costs . The program should
avoid bombing which runs a high risk of escalation into war
with the Soviets or China and which is likely to appall allies
and friends. 1 g/
C. Incremental Escalation
Secretary McNamara's 5 principles prevailed. The bombing
continued to expand and intensify, but there was no abrupt switch in
bombing policy and no sudden escalation. The high-value targets in
the Hanoi/Haiphong area were kept off limits, so as not to "kill the
hostage." Interdiction remained the chief criterion for target selec-
tion, and caution continued to be exercised with respect to sensitive
targets. The idea of a possible bombing pause, longer than the last,
was kept alive. 16/ The Secretary refused to approve an overall JCS
concept for fighting the Vietnam War which included much heavier
ROLLING THUNDER strikes against key military and economic targets
coordinated with a blockade and mining attack on NVN ports, 17 / and
he also continued to veto JCS proposals for dramatic attacks on major
POL depots, power plants, airfields, and other "lucrative" targets. 18/
The expansion of ROLLING THUNDER during the rest of 1965
followed the previous pattern of step-by-step progression. The approval
cycle shifted from one-week to two-week target packages. New fixed
targets from the JCS list of major targets, which grew from 94 to 236
by the end of the year, continued to be selected in Washington. The
number of these new targets was kept down to a few per week, most of
them LOC -related. Few strikes were authorized in the vital northeast
quadrant, north of 21° N. and east of 106° E., which contained the
Hanoi/Haiphong urban complexes, the major port facilities, and the
main LOCs to China. In addition, de facto sanctuaries were maintained
in the areas within 30 nautical miles from tne center of Hanoi, 10 from
the center of Haiphong, 3° from the Chinese border in the northwest (to
'l06° E-), and 25 from the Chinese border in the northeast. 19/
The scope of armed reconnaissance missions was also enlarged
but kept within limits. The boundary for such missions was shifted to
tbe roT’th and west of Hanoi up to the Chinese buffer zone, but it was
kept back from the northeast quadrant,- where only individually approved
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fixed target strikes were authorized. The operational latitude for
armed reconnaissance missions was also widened. They were authorized
to strike small pre-briefed fixed military targets not on the JCS
list (e.g., minor troop staging areas, warehouses, or depots) in the
course of executing their LOG attacks, and to restrike previously
authorized JCS targets in order to make and keep them inoperable.
An armed reconnaissance sortie ceiling continued in effect. It was
lifted to 600 per week by October, but then held there until the end
of the year. SO /
By the end of 1965 total ROLLING THUNDER attack sorties had
levelled off to about 750 per week and total sorties to a little over
1500 per week. All told, some 55)000 sorties had been flown during
the year, nearly half of them on attack (strike and flak suppression)
missions, and three -fourths of them as armed reconnaissance rather
than JCS-directed fixed target strikes. Altogether, ROLLING THUNDER
represented only 30 percent of the U.S. air effort in Southeast Asia
during the year, in keeping with the rough priorities set by decision-
makers at the outset. Si/
Although bombing HVN had done much to generate, as Secretary
McNamara put it, "a new school of criticism among liberals and 'peace'
groups," whose activities were reflected in a wave of teach-ins and
other demonstrations during 1965s 22 / the bombing also drew abundant
criticism from more hawkish elements because of its limited nature.
As a result, the Secretary and other officials were frequently obliged
to defend the bombing restrictions before Congress and the press.
Most of the hawkish criticism of the bombing stemmed from
basic disagreement with an air campaign centered upon a tactical inter-
diction rationale rather than a punitive rationale more in keeping with
strategic uses of air power, a campaign in which the apparent target
was the infiltration system rather than the economy as a whole, and in
which, as one CIA report put it,
... almost 80 percent of North Vietnam’s limited modern
industrial economy, 75 percent of the nation's population,
and the most lucrative military supply and LOG targets
have been effectively insulated from air attack. 23 /
This kind of criticism of the bombing concentrated on the most conspic-
uous aspect of the program, the strikes against fixed targets, and it
faulted the program for failing to focus on the kinds of targets which
strategic bombing had made familiar in World War II -- power plants, oil
depots^ harbor facilities, and factories.
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Such "strategic" targets had not been entirely exempted
from attack, of course, hut they had been exempted from attack where
they counted most, in the sanctuary areas. This occasioned some
embarrassment in the Administration because any attack on such
targets seemed inconsistent with a purely interdiction rationale,
while failure to attack the most important of them did not satisfy
a strategic bombing rationale. Secretary McNamara was pressed hard
on these points when he appeared before the Congressional armed
services and appropriations committees in August 1965 with a major
supplemental budget request for the Vietnam War. Senator Cannon
asked :
I know that our policy was to not attack power sta-
tions and certain oil depots and so on earlier. But
within the past two weeks we have noticed that you have
attacked at least one or more power stations. I am
wondering if your policy has actually changed now in
regard to the targets. In other words, are we stepping
up the desirability of certain targets?
Secretary McNamara replied:
I would say we are holding primarily to these
targets I have outlined. This week's program, for
example, includes primarily, I would say, 95 percent
of the sorties against fixed targets are against supply
depots, ammo depots, barracks .but only one or two
percent of the sorties directed against /one power plant J .
I don't want to mislead you. We are not bombing
in the Hanoi... or the Haiphong area. There is a very
good reason for that. In Haiphong there is a substantial
petroleum dump /for example/- First, there is question
whether destruction of that dump would influence the
level of supply into South Vietnam. Secondly, General
Westmoreland believes that an attack on that would lead
to an attack on the petroleum dumps outside of Saigon
that contain eighty percent of the petroleum storage
for SVN. Thirdly, there is the real possibility that
an attack on the Haiphong petroleum would substantially
increase the risk of Chinese participation. . . .for all
those reasons it seems unwise at this time. . .to attack
that petroleum dump. . . .
In defending the policy of not attacking the power plants and POL sites
concentrated in the Hanoi/Haiphong area, the Secretary did not stress
the interdiction purposes of the bombing but rather the risks of widening
tvio war. He explained that an attack on the powerplants and POL sites
would require also attacking Fhuc Yen airfield and the surrounding SAM
sites:
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I had better not describe how we would handle it
but it would be one whale of a big attack. .. .this might
well trigger, in the view of some, would trigger Chinese
intervention on the ground. .. .This is what we wish to
avoid. 24 /
Before the House Committee on Armed Services two days later,
Secretary McNamara stressed both the irrelevance of targets like the
POL facilities at Haiphong to infiltration into the South and the risks
of Chinese intervention:
At present our bombing program against the North is
directed primarily against the military targets that are
associated with the infiltration of men and equipment into
the South, ammo depots, supply depots, barracks areas, the
particular lines of communication over which these move
into the South. For that reason, we have not struck in
the Hanoi area because the targets are not as directly
related to the infiltration of men and equipment as those
outside the area.... As to the Haiphong POL.... if we
strike that there will be greater pressure on Communist
China to undertake military action in support of the
North Vietnamese We want to avoid that if we possibly
can. 2 5 /
On other occasions the Secretary put such stress on the limited
interdiction purposes of the bombing that it seemed to virtually rule out
altogether industrial and other "strategic" targets:
. . .we are seeking by our bombing in North Vietnam
to reduce and make more costly the movement of men and
supplies from North Vietnam into South Vietnam for the
support of the Viet Cong operations in South Vietnam.
That's our primary military objective, and that requires
that we bomb the lines of communication primarily and
secondarily, the ammunition and supply depots. .. .The great
bulk of our bombing... is directed against traffic moving on
roads and railroads, and the other portion... is directed
against specific targets associated with the lines of com-
munication, primarily supply depots and. . .bridges. . . .We
think our. bombing policy is quite properly associated with
the effort to stop the insurgency in Scuth Vietnam. We've
said time after time: It is not our objective to destroy
the Government of North Vietnam. We're not seeking to
widen the war. We do have a limited objective, and that's
why our targeting is limited as it is.
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When ashed whether the U.S. refrained from bombing NVN's more vital
installations because it would escalate the war, the Secretary added:
Well, I'm saying that the other installations you're
speaking of are not directly related to insurgency in the
South, and that's what we're fighting. And that our tar-
geting should be associated with that insurgency. .. .our
objective is to show them they can't win in the South.
Until we do show that to them it's unlikely the insurgency
in the South will stop, 26/
The Secretary's arguments had difficult sledding, however.
As 1965 ended, the bombing restrictions were still under attack. The
U.S. was heavily engaged in the ground war in the South, and a limited
bombing campaign in the North did not make much sense to those who
wanted to win it. The hawks were very much alive, and there was mounting
pressure to put more lightning and thunder into the air war. At that
point, in not very propitious circumstances, the Administration halted
the bombing entirely, and for 37 days, from 24 December 1965 to 31 Janu-
ary 1966, pursued a vigorous diplomatic offensive to get negotiations
started to end the war.
D. The "Pause" — 24 December 1965 to 34 January 1966
1. The Pre -Pause Debate
An important element of the program developed by McNamara
and his Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs, John
McNaughton in July 1965 was a pause in the bombing of North Vietnam.
There had been a five-day pause in May, from the 13th through the 18th,
apparently inspired by the President himself in an effort to see if the
North Vietnamese government — which had previously indicated that any
progress towards a settlement would be impossible so long as its terri-
tory was being bombed — would respond with de-escalatory measures of
its own. Yet the President also saw a pause as a means of clearing the
way for an increase in the tempo of the air war in the absence of a
satisfactory response from Hanoi. The May pause had been hastily
arranged -- almost, so the record makes it seem, as if on the spur of
the moment -- and advance knowledge of it was so closely held, not only
within the international community but also within the U.S. government,
that no adequate diplomatic preparation could be made. Its most seri-
ous shortcoming as an effective instrument of policy, however, lay in
its very brief duration. To have expected a meaningful response in so
short a time, given the complexity of the political relationships not
only within the North Vietnamese government and party, but also between
Hanoi and the NLP in the South, and between Hanoi and its separate (and
quarrelling) supporters within the Communist world, was to expect the
impossible. 27/ Therefore, in his 20 July memorandum to the President,
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Secretary McNamara wrote: "After the 44 US/third- country battalions
have been deployed and after some strong action has been taken in the
program of bombing the North (e.g., after the key railroad bridges
north of Hanoi have been dropped), we could, as part of a diplomatic
initiative, consider introducing a 6-8 week pause in the program of
bombing the North."
The pause which eventually occurred — for 37 days, from
December 1965 until 31 January 1966 — was somewhat shorter than the
six-to-eight weeks McNamara suggested, but it was clearly long enough
to allow the North Vietnamese fully to assess the options before them.
They were not very attractive options, at least in the way they were
seen in Washington. McNamara summarized them in a memorandum to the
President on 30 November:
It is my belief that there should be a three- or
four-week pause /note that McNamara himself no longer
held to the six-to-eight week duration/ in the program
of bombing the North before we either greatly increase
our troop deployments to Vietnam or intensify our strikes
against the North. The reasons for this belief are,
first, that we must lay a foundation in the mind of the
American public and in world opinion for such an enlarged
phase of the war and, second, we should give North Viet-
nam a face-saving chance to stop the aggression. 28/
In other words, Hanoi should be given the implicit
(although, naturally, not explicitly stated) choice of either giving
up "its side of the war," as Secretary Rusk often put it, or facing
a greater level of punishment from the United States. In an earlier
memorandum, dated 3 November, and given to the President on the 7 th,
McNamara had remarked that "a serious effort would be made to avoid
advertising /a pause/ as an ultimatum to the DRV," 2 9/ yet Hanoi
could scarcely have seen it as anything else. John McNaughton had per-
fectly encapsulated the Washington establishment's view of a bombing
pause the previous July, when he had noted in pencil in the margin of
a draft memorandum the words "RT /i . e. , ROLLING THUNDER/ (incl. Pause),
ratchet." 30/ The image of a ratchet, such as the device which raises
the net on a tennis court, backing off tension between each phase of
increasing it, was precisely what McNaughton and McNamara, William
Bundy and Alexis Johnson at State, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had
in mind when they thought of a pause. The only danger was, as McNamara
• put it in his memorandum of 3 November, "being trapped in a status-
quo cease-fire or in negotiations which, though unaccompanied by real
concessions by the VC, made it politically costly for us to terminate
the Pause . "
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McNamara and MeNaughton were optimistic that, by skill-
ful diplomacy, this pitfall could be avoided. Rusk, Bundy and Johnson,
who had to perform the required diplomatic task, and the Chiefs, who
were professionally distrustful of the diplomatic art and of the ability
of the political decision-makers in Washington to resist the pressures
from the "peace movement" in the United States, were not so sure. The
Chiefs (echoing General Westmoreland and Admiral Sharp) were also opposed
to any measures which would, even momentarily, reduce the pressure on
North Vietnam. The arguments for and against a pause were summarized
in a State Department memorandum to the President on 9 November:
The purposes of — and Secretary McNamara's arguments
for — such a pause are four:
(a) It would offer Hanoi and the Viet Cong a chance
to move toward a solution if they should be so inclined,
removing the psychological barrier of continued bombing
and permitting the Soviets and others to bring moderating
arguments to bear;
(b) It would demonstrate to domestic and inter-
national critics that vie had indeed made every effort for
a peaceful settlement before proceeding to intensified
actions, notably the latter stages of the extrapolated
Rolling Thunder program;
(c) It would probably tend to reduce the dangers of
escalation after we had resumed the bombing, at least inso-
far as the Soviets were concerned;
(d) It would set the stage for another pause, per-
haps in late 1966, which might produce a settlement.
Against these propositions, there are the following
considerations arguing against a pause:
(a) In the absence of any indication from Hanoi as
to what reciprocal action it might take, we could well
find ourselves in the position of having played this very
important card without receiving anything substantial in
return. There are no indications that Hanoi is yet in a
mood to agree to a settlement acceptable to us. The chance
is, therefore, very slight that a pause at this time could
lead to an acceptable settlement.
(b) A unilateral pause at this time would offer an
excellent opportunity for Hanoi to interpose obstacles to
our resumption of bombing and to demoralize South Vietnam
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by indefinitely dangling before us (and the world) the
prospect of negotiations with no intent of reaching an
acceptable settlement. It might also tempt the Soviet
Union to make threats that would render very difficult a
decision to resume bombing.
(c) In Saigon, obtaining South Vietnamese acquies-
cence to a pause would be difficult . It could adversely
affect the Government's solidity. Any major falling out
between the Government and the United States or any over-
turn in the Government's political structure could set us
back very severly (sic ).
(d) An additional factor is that undertaking the
second course of action following a pause /i._e. , "extrapo-
lation" of ROLLING THUNDER/ would give this course a much
more dramatic character, both internationally and domes-
tically, and would, in particular, present the Soviets with
those difficult choices that we have heretofore been suc-
cessful in avoiding.
After this summary of the competing arguments, the State paper —
speaking for Secretary Rusk -- came down against a bombing pause.
The paper continued:
On balance, the arguments against the pause are con-
vincing to the Secretary of State, who recommends that it
not be undertaken at the present time . The Secretary of
State believes that a pause should be undertaken only when
and if the chances were significantly greater than they
now appear that Hanoi would respond by reciprocal actions
leading in the direction of a peaceful settlement. He
further believes that, from the standpoint of international
and domestic opinion, a pause might become an overriding
requirement only if we were about to reach the advanced
stages of an extrapolated Rolling Thunder program Involving
extensive air operations in the Hanoi/Haiphong area. Since
the Secretary of State believes that such advanced stages
are not in themselves desirable until the tide in the South
is more favorable, he does not feel that, even accepting
the point of view of the Secretary of Defense, there is
now any international requirement to consider a "Pause." 31 /
Basic to Rusk's position, as John McNaughton pointed out
in a memorandum to Secretary McNamara the same day, was the assumption
that a bombing pause was a "card" which could be "played" only once.
In fact McNaughton wrote, "it is more reasonable to think that it
coiDd be played any number of times, with the arguments against it,
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tut not those for it, becoming less valid each time." 32/ It was
this argument of McNaughton's which lay behind the Defense position
that one of the chief reasons for a pause was that even if it were to
produce no response from Hanoi, it might set vhe stage for another
pause, perhaps late in 1966, which might be "productive."
The available materials do not reveal the President’s
response to these arguments, but it is clear from the continuing flow
of papers that he delayed positively committing himself either for or
against a pause until very shortly before the actual pause began. Most
of these papers retraced old ground, repeating the arguments which we
have already examined. A State memorandum by William Bundy on 1 Decem-
ber, however, added some new ones. 33 / In summary, they were:
FOR a bombing pause (in addition to those we have already
seen):
— Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin had "recently urged a 'pause'
on McGeorge Bundy and had pretty clearly indicated the
Soviets would make a real effort if we undertook onej
however, he was equally plain in stating that he could
give no assurance of any clear result,"
"American casualties are mounting and further involve-
ment appears likely. A pause can demonstrate that the
President has taken every possible means to find a peace-
ful solution and obtain domestic support for the further
actions that we will have to take."
"There are already signs of dissension between Moscow,
Peking, Hanoi and the Viet Cong. The pause is certain
to stimulate further dissension on the other side and
add to the strains in the Communist camp as they argue
about how to deal with it." Moreover, it would decrease
the ability of Hanoi or Peking to bring pressure on
Moscow to escalate Soviet support.
"judging by experience during the last war, the resump-
tion of bombing after a pause would be even more painful
to the population of North Vietnam than a fairly steady
rate of bomb ing .
"<jhe resumption of bombing after a pause, combined with
increased United States deployments in the South, would
remove any doubts the other side may have about U.S.
determination to stay the course and finish the job."
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AC-AINST a bombing pause , fewer new arguments were
adduced. Those which we have seen, however, were restated with
greater force. Thus it was noted that while Hanoi had said it
could never "negotiate" so long as the bombing continued, it had
given no sign whatsoever that even with a complete cessation (this,
the paper pointed out, and not a "pause," was what the DRV really-
insisted upon) it would be led to "meaningful" negotiations or to
de-escalatory actions. It might, for example, offer to enter into
negotiations on condition that the bombing not be resumed and/or
that the HLF be seated at the conference on a basis of full equality
with the GW. Both of these conditions would be clearly unaccept-
able to the U.S., which would run the danger of having to resume
bombing in the face of what major sectors of domestic and international
opinion would regard as a "reasonable" Hanoi offer: "In other words,
instead of improving our present peace-seeking posture, we could actu-
ally end up by damaging it severely." And in doing so, the U.S. would
"lose the one card that we have which offers any hope of a settlement
that does more than reflect the balance of forces on the ground in
the South." (Here, it may be noted, was the ultimate claim that
could he made for the bombing program in the face of criticism that
it had failed to achieve its objective of interdicting the flow of
men and materials to the South. )
To these arguments, essentially restatements of ones
we have previously seen, were added:
— "There is a danger that, in spite of any steps we may
take to offset it, Hanoi may misread a pause at this
time as indicating that we are giving way to inter-
national pressures to stop the bombing of North Vietnam
and that our resolve with respect to South Vietnam is
thus weakening." This danger had recently increased,
the paper noted, because of peace demonstrations in the
United States and the first heavy American casualties
in South Vietnam.
--Just as a pause would make it more difficult to cope
with the domestic "doves," so it would the "hawks"
as well: "Pressure from the Rivers/Nixon sector to
hit Hanoi and Haiphong hard might also increase very
sharply . . . ■ "
--"If a 'pause' were in fact to lead to negotiations
(with or without resumed bombing), we would then have
continuing serious problems in maintaining South Viet-
namese stability. We must also recognize that, although
we ourselves have some fairly good initial ideas of the
positions we would take, we have not been able to go over
the ground with the GVN or to get beyond general proposi-
tions on some of which we and they might well disagree . "
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These statements amounted, then, to the contention
that just as the United States could not afford to initiate a bombing
pause that might fail to produce negotiations and a de-escalation,
neither could it afford to initiate one that succeeded.
Bundy's memorandum of 1 December contained no recom-
mendations. It was a draft, sent out for comment to Under-Secretary
Ball, Ambassadors Thompson and Johnson, John McNaughton, and McGeorge
Bundy. Presumably, although there is no indication of it, copies also
went to Secretaries Rusk and McNamara. By 6 December, William Bundy
and Alexis Johnson were able to prepare another version, repeating
the same arguments in briefer compass, and this time making an agreed
recommendation. It stated: "After balancing these opposing considera-
tions, we unanimously recommend that you [ ~ i .e. , the President/ approve
a pause as soon as possible this month. The decision would, of course,
be subject to consultation and joint action with the GVN." 3 4/ Thus,
at some point between 9 November and 6 December (the available documents
do not reveal when), Secretary Rusk evidently dropped his objection to
a pause.
Getting the agreement of the Ky government to a pause
was no easy task. Ambassador Lodge reported that he himself opposed
the notion of a pause because of the unsettling effects it would have
on the South Vietnam political situation. Only by making very firm
commitments for large increases in American force levels during the
coming year, Lodge warned, could Washington obtain even Saigon's grudging
acquiescence in a pause. This is not the place to describe the process
by which the GVN's consent was obtained; it is sufficient to note that
nowhere in Saigon, neither within the government nor within the American
Embassy and Military Assistance Command, was the prospect of any relaxa-
tion of pressure on the North — for any reason — greeted with any
enthusiasm.
2. Be sumption — When and At What Level?
Implicit in the very notion of "pause," of course, is
the eventual resumption of the activity being discontinued. Among the
principals in Washington concerned with Vietnam, consideration of the
circumstances and conditions in which the bombing of North Vietnam would
be resumed went hand-in-hand with consideration of its interruption.
Relatively early in this process, in his Presidential memorandum of
3 November, Secretary McNamara distinguished between what he termed a
"hp'rd-line” and a "soft-line" pause. "Under a 'hard-line' Pause," he
wrote "we would be firmly resolved to resume bombing unless the Com-
munists were clearly moving toward meeting our declared terms ... .Under
a 1 ooft-line ' Pause, we would be willing to feel our way with respect
to termination of the Pause, with less insistence on concrete conces-
sions by the Communists. _> jf
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McNamara himself came down on the side of a "hard-line"
pause — a "soft-line" pause would make sente, he noted, only if the
U.S. sought a "compromise" outcome. The words "hard-line" and "soft-
line" became terms of art, employed by all of the principals in their
papers dealing with the question of a pause. Throughout this discussion,
it was taken for granted that bombing would be resumed. The only point
at issue was how. On 3 December, John McNaughton wrote an "eyes only"
memorandum (whose eyes was not specified, but presumably they included
those of the Secretary of Defense) entitled, "Hard-Line Pause Packaged
to Minimize Political Cost of Resuming Bombing." He specified four
conditions, all of which would have to be met by the enemy in order to
forestall the resumption of bombing:
"a. The DRV stops infiltration and direction of the
war .
b. The DRV moves convincingly toward withdrawal
of infiltrators.
c. The VC stop attacks, terror and sabotage.
d. The VC stop significant interference with the
GVN’s exercise of governmental functions over substantially
all of South Vietnam." 36 /
Clearly it was unlikely that the enemy would even begin
to meet any of these conditions, but Hanoi, at least (if not the NLF),
might move towards some sort of negotiations. In that event, the resump-
tion of bombing when "peace moves" were afoot would incur a heavy polit-
ical price for the United States. In order to maintain the political
freedom to resume bombing without substantial costs, the U.S. govern-
ment would have to make clear from the outset that it intended only a
pause, certainly not a permanent cessation of the bombing, and that
its continuation would depend upon definite actions by the enemy. Yet
there was a problem, as McNaughton saw it, as to which definite actions
to specify. He recognized that the United States could not easily list
the conditions he had put forward earlier in his memorandum. McNaughton
expressed his dilemma in the following terms:
Inconsistent objectives . A Pause has two objectives —
To influence the DRV to back out 0“ the war and (b) to
create a public impression of US willingness "to try every-
thing" before further increases in military action. To maxi-
mize the chance that the DRV would decide to back out would
require presenting them with an explicit proposal, in a form
where some clearly defined conduct on their part would assure
them of no more bombings. The truth of the matter, however,
is that the hard-line objective is, in effect, capitulation
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by a Communist force which is far from beaten, has un-
limited (if unattractive) reserves available in China,
and is confident that it is fighting for a just principle.
To spell out such "capitulation” in explicit terms is
more likely to subject us to ridicule than to produce a
favorable public reaction. It follows that the hard-line
objectives should be blurred somewhat in order to maximize
favorable public reaction, even though such blurring would
reduce the chances of DRV acceptance of the terms .
If McNaughton was reluctant to spell out U.S. "hard-line"
objectives, he was nevertheless anxious not to allow a situation to
develop where the enemy could make its mere participation in negotia-
tions a sufficient quid pro quo for a continuation of the pause . Regard-
ing negotiations, McNaughton suggested, the American position should be :
"We are willing to negotiate no matter what military actions are going
on." Moreover, when bombing was resumed, the ending of the pause should
be tied to Hanoi's failure to take de-escalatory actions. "People might
criticize our Pause for not having been generous," McNaughton wrote, "but
they will be unlikely to attack the US for having failed to live up to the
deal we offered with the Pause . " 37/
McNaughton recommended that the first strikes after a
resumption should be "identified as militarily required interdiction, "
in order to minimize political criticism. "Later strikes could then be
escalated to other kinds of targets and to present or higher levels."
(At the time McNaughton wrote, the pause had not yet gone into effect.)
Similar advice came from William Bundy, writing on 15 January during the
pause :
Resumed bombing should not begin with a dramatic
strike that was even at the margin of past practice (such
as the power plant in December). For a period of two-
three weeks at least, while the woria is digesting and
assessing the pause, we should do as little as possible
to lend fuel to the charge -- which will doubtless be
the main theme of Communist propaganda -- that the pause
was intended all along merely as a prelude to more dras-
tic action.
Moieover, from a military standpeint alone, the
most immediate need would surely be to deal with the
communications lines and barracks areas south of the
20th parallel. A week or two of this would perhaps
makf 3 sense from both military and political stand-
points. After that we could move against the northeast
rail and road lines again, but the very act of gradual-
ness should reduce any eliance that the Chicoms /the
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Chinese Communists^ will react to some new or dramatic
way when we do so. Extensions of past practice, such
as Haiphong POL ^petroleum, oil, and lubricants/, should
he a third stage. 38/
MeNaughton and Bundy were in essential agreement: the
bombing should he resumed; it should he resumed on a low key at first;
hut after a decent interval it should be escalated at least to the
extent of striking at the Haiphong POL storage facilities, and perhaps
other high-priority targets as well. In their own eyes the two Assistant
Secretaries were cautious, prudent men. Their recommendations were in
marked contrast to those of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who (as this paper
shows in greater detail later) pressed throughout the autumn and winter
of 1965-66 for permission to expand the bombing virtually into a program
of strategic bombing aimed at all industrial and economic resources as
well as at all interdiction targets. The Chiefs did so, it may be added,
despite the steady stream of memoranda from the intelligence community
consistently expressing skepticism that bombing of any conceivable sort
(that is, any except bombing aimed primarily at the destruction of North
Vietnam’s population) could either persuade Hanoi to negotiate a settle-
ment on US/GVN terms or effectively limit Hanoi's ability to infiltrate
men and supplies into the South.
These arguments of the Chiefs were essentially an exten-
sion and amplification of arguments for large-scale resumption received
from the field throughout the pause. Apparently, neither Lodge, Westmore-
land, nor Sharp received advance intimation that the suspension might
continue not for a few days, as in the preceding May, but for several weeks.
When notified that full-scale ground operations could recommence, following
the Christmas cease-fire, as soon as there was "confirmed evidence of
significant renewed Viet Cong violence," they were simply told that air
operations against North Vietnam would not immediately resume , They were
assured, however.
We will stand ready to order immediate renewal of
ROLLING THUNDER... at any time based on your reports and
recommendations. 39 /
None of the three hesitated long relaying- such recommenda-
tions . "Although I am not aware of all the considerations leading to the
continuation of the standdown in ROLLING THUNDER," General Westmoreland
cabled on December 27 , "I consider that their immediate resumption is
essential." He continued,
"...our only hope of a major impact on the ability of
the DRV to support the war in Vietnam is continuous air
attack over the entire length of their LOC's from the
Chinese border to South Vietnam. .. .Notwithstanding the
heavy pressure on their transportation system in the
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past 9 months , they have demonstrated an ability to
deploy forces into South Vietnam at a greater rate than
ve are deploying U.S. forces. .. .Considering the course
of the -war in South Vietnam and the capability which has
been built up here by the PAVN/VC forces — the full
impact of which we have not yet felt — the curtailment
of operations in Worth Vietnam is unsound from a military
standpoint. Indeed , we should no/w_7 step up our effort
to higher levels. 46/
Ambassador Lodge seconded this recommendation, and Admiral Sharp filed
his own pleas not only that ROLLING THUNDER be resumed "at once" but
that his previous recommendations for enlarging it be adopted. The aim
should be to "drastically reduce the flow of military supplies reaching
the DRV and hence the VC," he argued, adding "the armed forces of the
United States should not be required to fight this war with one arm tied
behind their backs . " 4l /
One reason for ignorance in Saigon and Honolulu of the
bombing suspension's possible continuation was that the President had
apparently never fully committed himself to the timetable proposed by
McNamara. Replying to Lodge on December 28, Rusk cabled a summary of the
President's thinking. As of that moment, said the Secretary of State,
the President contemplated extending the pause only "for several more
days, possibly into middle of next week," i.e., until January 5 or 6.
His aim in stretching out the pause was only in small part to seek nego-
tiations .
We do not, quite frankly, anticipate that Hanoi will
respond in any significant way.... There is only the slimmest
of chances that suspension of bombing will be occasion for
basic change of objective by other side but communist propa-
ganda on this subject should be tested and exposed.
The key reasons for extending the pause. Lodge was told, were diplomatic
and domestic. Some hope existed of using the interval to "drive fp.J
rift between Communist powers and between Hanoi and NLF." Even more
hopeful were indications that the government's act of self-abnegation
would draw support at home. The latest Harris poll. Lodge was informed,
showed 73^ favoring a new effort for a cease-fire, 59 fo in favor of a
bombing pause, and 6l$ in favor of stepping up bombing if the pause pro-
duced no result .
The prospect of large-scale reinforcement in men and
defense budget increases of some twenty billions for the
next eighteen month period requires solid preparation of
the American public. A crucial element will be clear
demonstration that we have explored fully every alterna-
tive hut that aggressor has left us no choice. 42 /
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This message went to Lodge as "EYES ONLY" for himself
and Ambassador Porter. To what extent its contents were shared with
General Westmoreland or other military or naval personnel, available
documents do not indicate. In any case, the Embassy in Saigon had
received from the very highest authority the same kind of intimation
that opponents of the pause had been given in Washington. If the
period of inaction would prepare American and world opinion for more
severe measures, it followed that the next stage would see such measures
put into effect.
As the pause continued beyond the deadline mentioned to
Lodge, military planners in Saigon, Honolulu, and Washington worked
at defining what these severe measures ought to be. On January 12,
Admiral Sharp sent the Joint Chiefs a long cable, summarizing the
conclusions of intensive planning by his staff and that of COMUSMACV.
We began R^olling/ T/hunder/ with very limited
objectives, at a time when PAVN infiltration was of less
significance than it is now,
CINCFAC commented,
. . . .When RT began, there was considerable hope of
causing Hanoi to cease aggression through an increasing
pressure brought to bear through carefully timed destruc-
tion of selected resources, accompanied by threat of
greater losses. . .But. . .the nature of the war has changed
since the air campaign began. RT has not forced Hanoi
to the decision which we sought. There is now every indi-
cation that Ho Chi Minh intends to continue support of the
VC until he is denied the capability to do so.... We must
do all that we can to make it as difficult and costly as
possible for Hanoi to continue direction and support of
aggression. In good conscience, we should not long delay
resumption of a RT program designed to meet the changed
nature of the war.
Specifically, Admiral Sharp recommended:
1. "....interdiction of land LOC's from China and closing
of the ports. .. ./the/ northeast quadrant ... .must be
opened up for armed recce with authority to attack
LOC targets as necessary."
2. "Destruction of resources within NVN should begin
with POL. Every known POL facility and distribution
activity should be destroyed and harassed until the
war is concluded. Denial of electric power facilities
should begin at an early date and continue until all
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plants are out of action. . . .All large military
facilities should be destroyed in Northern NVN
3 . Vie should mount an intensified armed reconnsaissance
program without sortie restriction, to harass, dis-
rupt and attrit/e_7 the dispersed and hidden military
facilities and activities south of 20 deg/rees7
These three tasks well done will bring the enemy to
the conference table or cause the insurgency to wither
from lack of support. The alternative appears to be a
long and costly counterinsurgency — costly in U.S. and
GVN lives and material resources. 43/
Writing the Secretary of Defense on January 18, the
Joint Chiefs offered an equally bold definition of a post -pause
bombing campaign. The Chiefs argued that the piecemeal nature of
previous attacks had permitted the DRV to adapt itself to the bomb-
•ing, replenish and disperse its stocks, diversify its transportation
system and improve its defenses. Complaining about the geographic
and numerical restrictions on the bombing, the Chiefs recommended
that "offensive air operations against NVN should be resumed now with
a sharp blow and thereafter maintained with uninterrupted, increasing
pressure. 44/ The Chiefs further argued that.
These operations should be conducted in such a
manner and be of sufficient magnitude to: deny the
DRV large-scale external assistance; destroy those
resources already in NVN which contribute most to the
support of aggression; destroy or deny use of military
facilities; and harass, disrupt and impede the movement
of men and materials into SVN. 45 /
The shutting off of external assistance would require,
...closing of the ports as well as sustained inter-
diction of land LOCs from China. . . .Military considera-
tions would dictate that mining be conducted now ; however,
the Joint Chiefs. . .appreciate the sensitivity of such a
measure and recognize that precise timing must take into
account political factors. 46/
* In addition to endorsing the full-scale attacks on POL,
electric power plants, large military facilities in northern NVN, and
LOC centers and choke points with intensified armed reconnaissance.
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unhampered by the existing restrictions on sortie number, that CINCPAC
has recommended, the Chiefs urged the reduction of the size of the
sanctuaries around Hanoi, Haiphong and the China border. More impor-
tantly, the Chiefs requested authorization to eliminate the airfields
if required and permission for operational commanders "to deal with the
SAM threat, as required to prevent interference with planned air opera-
tions." 47 /
The Chiefs acknowledged the likely adverse response to
this sharp escalation in the international community, but urged the
necessity of the proposed actions. In dealing with the anxieties about
Chinese communist entry into the war, they neatly turned the usual argu-
ment that China would enter the war in response to escalatory provocation
on its head by arguing that a greater likelihood was Chinese entry through
mi s calculat i on .
The Joint Chiefs. . .believe that continued US restraint
may serve to increase rather than decrease the likelihood
of such intervention ^Chinese/ by encouraging gradual
responses on the part of the Chinese Communists. This is
in addition to the probable interpretation of such restraint
as US vacillation by both the Communist and Free World
leadership. 48 /
The Chiefs spelled out their specific proposals in their concluding recom-
mendations :
a. The authorized area for offensive air operations
be expanded to include all of NVN less the area encompassed
by a ten-mile radius around Hanoi/Phuc Yen Airfield, a
four-mile radius around Haiphong, and a twenty-mile China
buffer zone. Exceptions to permit selected strikes within
these restricted areas, in accordance with the air campaign
described herein, will be conducted only as authorized by
the Joint Chiefs. . . .
h, Numerical sortie limitations on armed reconnais-
sance in NVN be removed.
c. No tactical restrictions or limitations be imposed
upon the execution of the specific air strikes.
d. The Joint Chiefs... be authorized to direct CINCPAC
to conduct the air campaign against the DRV as described
herein. 49 /
On the same day as the Chiefs' Memorandum, and perhaps in
. . x Q John Me Naught on set down what he termed "Some Observa-
tions about Bombing North Vietnam." 50 / It is not clear to whom the
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paper was addressed, or who saw it. But it comprises perhaps the most
effective political case that could have been made for the bombing
program in early 19 66, by a writer who was intimately involved with
every detail of the program and who was fully aware of all its limita-
tions. As such its most important sections are worth extensive quota-
tion here. They were the following:
3, Purposes of the program of bombing the Forth . The
purposes of the bombing are mainly:
a. To interdict infiltration.
b. To bring about negotiations (by indirect third-
party pressure flowing from fear of escalation
and by direct pressure on Hanoi).
c. To provide a bargaining counter in negotiations
(or in a tacit "minuet").
d. To sustain GVN and US morale.
Short of drastic action against the North Vietnamese popula-
tion (and query even then), the program probably cannot be
expected directly or indirectly to persuade Hanoi to come to
the table or to settle either (1) while Le Duan and other
militants are in ascendance in the politburo or (2) while
the North thinks it can win in the South. The only ques-
tions are two: ( 3 ) Can the program be expected to reduce
(not Just increase the cost of) DRV aid to the South below
what it would otherwise be -- and hopefully to put a ceiling
on it — so that we can achieve a military victory or, short
of that, so that their failure in the South will cause them
to lose confidence in victory there? (Our World War II
experience indicates that only at that time can the squeeze
on the North be expected to be a bargaining counter) . And
(4) is the political situation (vis a vis the "hard-liners"
at home, in the GVN and elsewhere) such that the bombing
must be carried on for morale reasons? (The negative morale
effect of now stopping bombing North Vietnam could be substan-
tial, but it need not be considered unless the interdiction
reason fails . )
4 . Analysis of past interdiction efforts. The program
so far has not successfully interdicted infiltration of men
1 and materiel into South Vietnam (although it may have caused
the North to concentrate its logistic resources on the trail,
to the advantage of our efforts in support of Souvanna) .
Despite our armed reconnaissance efforts and 'strikes on rail-
roads, bridges, storage centers, training bases and other key
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links in their lines of communications, it is estimated
that they are capable of generating in the North and
infiltrating to the South 4500 men a month and between
50 and 300 (an average of 200) tons a day depending on
the season. The insufficiency of the interdiction effort
is obvious when one realizes that the 110 battalions of
PAVN (27) and VC ( 83 ) forces in Vietnam need only 20 or
so tons a day from North Vietnam to sustain "1964 " levels
of activity and only approximately 80 tons a day to sustain
"light combat" (l/ 5 th of the force in contact once every
7 days using l/3d of their basic load). The expansion of
enemy forces is expected to involve the infiltration of
9 new PAVN and the generation of 7 new VC combat battalions
a month, resulting (after attrition) in a leveled-off force
of 155 battalions at end-1 966 . The requirements from the
North at that time — assuming that the enemy refuses, as it
can, to permit the level of combat to exceed "light" --
should approximate 140 tons a day, less than half the dry-
season infiltration capability and less than three-quarters
the average infiltration capability.
5 . The effective interdiction program . The flow
of propaganda and military communications cannot be
physically interdicted. But it is possible that the flow
of men and materiel to the crucial areas of South Vietnam
can be. The interdiction can be en route into North Vietnam
from the outside world, inside North Vietnam, en route from
the North by sea or through Laos or Cambodia to South Viet-
nam, and inside South Vietnam, It can be by destruction or
by slow down. The effectiveness can be prolonged by ex-
hausting the North's repair capability, and can be enhanced
by complicating their communications and control machinery.
The ingredients of an effective interdiction program in
North Vietnam must be these:
a. Intensive around-the-clock armed recon-
naissance throughout NVN.
b. Destruction of the L0C targets heretofore tar
targeted.
e. Destruction of POL.
d. Destruction of thermal power plants.
e. Closing of the ports.
. .It has been estimated (without convincing back-up) that an
intensive program could reduce Hanoi's capability to supply
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forces in the South to 50 tons a day — too little for
flexibility and for frequent offensive actions, perhaps
too little to defend themselves against aggressive US/GVN
forces, and too little to permit Hanoi to continue to
deploy forces with confidence that they could be supplied.
6 . Possible further efforts against the North .
Not included in the above interdiction program are these
actions against the North:
f. Destruction of industrial targets.
g. Destruction of locks and dams.
h. Attacks on population targets (per se).
The judgment is that, because North Vietnam's economy and
organization is pre dominantly rural and not highly inter-
dependent, attacks on industrial targets are not likely to
contribute either to interdiction or to persuasion of the
regime. Strikes at population targets (per se) are likely
not only to create a counterproductive wave of revulsion
abroad and at home, but greatly to increase the risk of
enlarging the war with China and the Soviet Union. Destruc-
tion of locks and dams, however — if handled right — might
(perhaps after the next Pause) offer promise. It should be
studied. Such destruction does not kill or drown people.
By shallow -flooding the rice, it leads after time to wide-
spread starvation (more than a million?) unless food is
provided — which we could offer to do "at the conference
table . "
7 . Nature of resumed program against the North . The
new ROLLING THUNDER program could be:
a. None, on grounds that net contribution to
success. is negative.
b. Resume where we left off, with a "flat -line"
, ext r apolat ion .
c. Resume where we left off, but with slow
continued escalation.
d. Resume where we left off, but with fast
escalation.
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On the judgment that it will not "flash" the Soviet Union
or China — we should follow Course d (fast escalation).
Failure to resume would serve none of our purposes and
make us appear irresolute. A "flat line" program would
reduce infiltration (but not below PAVN/VC needs) and
would placate GVN and domestic pressures. But this is
not good enough, A fast (as compared with a slow) escala-
tion serves a double purpose -- (l) it promises quickly
to interdict effectively, i.e., to cut the DRV level of
infiltration to a point below the VC/PAVN requirements,
and (2) it promises to move events fast enough so that
the Chinese "take-over" of North Vietnam resulting from
our program will be a visible phenomenon, one which the
DRV may choose to reject. There is some indication that
China is "smothering North Vietnam with a loving embrace."
North Vietnam probably does not like this but, since it is
being done by "salami slices" in reaction to our "salami-
slice" bombing program, North Vietnam is not inspired to
do anything about it. This condition, if no other, argues
for escalating the war against North Vietnam more rapidly —
so that the issue of Chinese encroachment will have to be
faced by Hanoi in bigger bites, and so that the DRV may
elect for a settlement rather than for greater Chinese .
infringement of North Vietnam's independence. The objec-
tions to the "fast" escalation are (l) that it runs serious
risks of "flashing" the Chinese and Soviets and (2) that
it gets the bombing program against the North "out of phase"
with progress in the South. With respect to the first objec-
tion, there are disagreements as to the likelihood of such
a " flash" j as for the second one, there is no reason why the
two programs should be "in phase" if, as is the case, the
main objective is to interdict infiltration, not to "persuade
the unpersuadable."
9. Criticisms of the program . There are a number of
criticisms of the program of bombing North Vietnam:
a. Cost in men and materiel . The program of
bombing the North through 1965 cost 10 C(? ) airmen (killed
and missing or prisoner) and 178 US or South Vietnamese
aircraft (costing about $250 (?) million) in addition to
the ammunition and other operating costs. The losses and
costs in 1 966 are expected to be 200(? ) airmen and 300(? )
aircraft .
/'“N !■
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b. Damage to peaceful image of the US . A price
paid for because of our program of tombing the North
has been damage to our image as a country which eschews
armed attacks on other nations. The hue and cry corre-
lates with the kind of weapons (e.g. , bombs vs. napalm),
the kind of targets (e.g., bridges vs. people), the loca-
tion of targets (e.g., south vs. north), and not least the
extent to which the critic feels threatened by Asian com-
munism (e.g., Thailand vs. the UK). Furthermore, for a
given level of bombing, the hue and cry is less now than
it was earlier, perhaps to some extent helped by Communist
intransigence toward discussions. The objection to our
"warlike" image and the approval of our fulfilling our
commitments competes in the minds of many nations (and
individuals) in the world, producing a schizophrenia....
c. Impact on US-Soviet detente . The bombing
program — because it appears to reject the policy of
"peaceful co-existence," because it involves an attack
on a "fellow socialist country," because the Soviet
people have vivid horrible memories of air bombing, be-
cause it challenges the USSR as she competes with China
for leadership of the Communist world, and because US
and Soviet arms are now striking each other in North
Vietnam — has seriously strained the US-Soviet detente,
making constructive arms -control and other cooperative
programs more difficult ... .At the same time, the bombing
program offers the Soviet Union an opportunity to play a
role in bringirg peace to Vietnam, by gaining credit for
persuading us to terminate the program. There is a chance
that the scenario could spin out this way; if so, the
effect of the entire experience on the US-Soviet detente
could be a net plus.
d. Impact on Chi com role in DRV . So long as the
program continues, the role of China in North Vietnam
will increase. Increased Chinese aid will be required
to protect against and to repair destruction. Also, the
strikes against North Vietnamese "sovereign territories,"
by involving their "honor" more than would otherwise be the
case, increases the risk that the DRV would accept a sub-
stantially increased Chinese role, however unattractive
that may be, in order to avoid a "national defeat" (failure
of the war of liberation in the South) .
&r Ri sk of escalation . The bombing program —
especi all y as" strikes move toward Hanoi and toward China
and as encounters with Soviet/Chinese SAMs/MIGs/vessels-
at-sea occur — increases the risk of escalation into a
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broader war. The most risky actions are mining of the
ports, bombing of cities (or possibly dams), and landings
in North Vietnam.
10. Requirements of a program designed to "persuade"
(not interdict) . A bombing program focused on the objective
of "persuasion" would have these characteristics:
a. Emphasize the threat . The program should be
structured to capitalize on fear of the future. At a given
time, "pressure" on the DRV depends not upon the current
level of bombing but rather upon the credible threat of
future destruction (or other painful consequence, such as an
unwanted increased Chinese role) which can be avoided by
agreeing to negotiate or agreeing to some settlement in
negotiations. Further, it is likely that North Vietnam would
be more influenced by a threatened resumption of a given level
of destruction — the "hot -cold" treatment — than by a threat
to maintain the same level of de struct i on ; getting " irregu-
lar it^Tnto our pattern is important.
b. Minimize the loss of DRV "face." The program
should be designed to make it politically easy for the DRV
to enter negotiations and to make concessions during negoti-
ations. It is politically easier for North Vietnam to accept
negotiations and/or to make concessions at a time when bombing
of their territory is not currently taking place. Thus we
shall have to contemplate a succession of Pauses.
e. Maintain a "military" cover . To avoid the
allegation that we are practicing "pure blackmail," the
targets should be military targets and the declaratory policy
should not be that our objective is to squeeze the DRV to
the talking table, but should be that our objective is only
to destroy military targets.
Thus, for purposes of the objective or promoting a settle-
ment, three guidelines emerge: (1) Do not practice "strategic"
bombing; (2) do not abandon the program; and (3) carry out
strikes o ily as frequently as is requii ed to keep alive fear
of the future. Because DRV "face" plays a role and because
we can never tell at what time in the future the DRV might
be willing to talk settlement, a program with fairly long
gaps between truly painful strikes at "military" targets
would be optimum; it would balance the need to maintain the
threat with the need to be in an extended pause when the
DRV mood changed. Unfortunately, so long as full VC victory
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in the South appears likely, the effect of the bombing
program in promoting negotiations or a settlement will
probably be small.. Thus, because of the present balance
in the South, the date of such a favorable DRV change of
mood is not likely to be in the near future....
11. Elements of a compromise program . There is a
conflict between the objective of "persuading Hanoi,"
which would dictate a program of painful surgical strikes
separated by fairly long gaps, and the objective of inter-
diction, which would benefit from continuous heavy bombings.
No program can be designed which optimizes the chances of
achieving both objectives at the same time. The kind of
program which should be carried out in the future therefore
depends on the relative importance and relative likelihood
of success of the objectives at any given time. In this
connection, the following questions are critical:
a. How likely is it that the Communists will-
start talking? The more likely this is, the more emphasis
should be put on the "pressure/bargaining counter" program
(para 10 above). The judgment is that the Communists are
not likely to be interested in talking at least for the
next few months.
b. How important to the military campaign is
infiltration and hoy; efficiently can we frustrate the
flow ? The more important that preventable infiltration
is, the more emphasis should be put on the interdiction
program (para 5 above). Unfortunately, the data are not
clear on these points ....
12 . Reconciliation . The actions which these con-
siderations seem now to imply are these, bearing in mind
that our principal objective is to promote an acceptable
outcome :
a. Spare non -interdict ion targets . Do not
bomb any non-interdiction targets in North Vietnam, since
such strikes are not consistent with either of the two
objectives. Such painful non-interdiction raids should
be carried out only occasionally, pursuant to the rationale
explained in para 10 above.
b. Interdict . Continue an interdiction program
in the immediate future, as described in para 5 above, since
the Communists are not likely to be willing to talk very
soon and since it is possible that the interdiction program
will he critical in keeping the Communist effort in South
Vietnam within manageable proportions .
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c. Study politically cheaper methods. Conduct a
study to see whether most of the benefits of the inter-
diction campaign can be achieved by a Laos-SVN barrier or
by a bombing program which is limited to the Laos-SVN
border areas of North Vietnam, to Laos and/or to South
Vietnam (and, if so, transition the interdiction program
in that direction). The objective here is to find a way
to maintain a ceiling on potential communist military
activity in the South with the least political cost and
with the least interference with North Vietnam willingness
to negotiate.
McNaughton prepared a second memorandum complementing and
partially modifying the one on bombing. It concerned the context for
the decision. Opening with a paragraph which warned, "We . . . have in
Vietnam the ingredients of an enormous miscalculation," it sketched the
dark outlines of the Vietnamese scene:
...the ARVN is tired, passive and accommodation-
prone.... The PAVN/vC are effectively matching our deploy-
ments.... The bombing of the North... may or may not be
able effectively to interdict infiltration (partly
because the FAVN/VC can simply refuse to do battle if
supplies are short).. . .Pacification is stalled despite
efforts and hopes. The GVN political infrastructure
is moribund and weaker than the VC infrastructure among
most of the rural population. .. .South Vietnam is near
the edge of serious inflation and economic chaos . 51/
The situation might alter for the better, McNaughton con-
ceded. "Attrition — save Chinese intervention -- may push the DRV
'against the stops' by the end of 1 966." Recent RAND motivation and
morale studies showed VC spirit flagging and their grip on the peasantry
growing looser. "The Ky government is coming along, not delivering its
promised 'revolution' but making progress slowly and gaining experience
and stature each week." Though McNaughton termed it "doubtful that
a meaningful ceiling can be put on infiltration," he said "there is
no doubt that the cost of infiltration can. . .be made very high and
that the flow of supplies can be reduced substantially below what it
would otherwise be." Possibly bombing, combined with other pressures,
could bring the DRV to consider terras after "a period of months, not
of days or even weeks."
The central point of McNaughton 's memorandum, following
from its opening warning, was that the United States, too, should consider
coming to terms. He wrote:
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c. The present US objective in Vietnam is to avoid
humiliation. The reasons why we went into Vietnam to the
present depth are varied; but they are now largely academic.
Why we have not withdrawn from Vietnam is, by all odds,
one reason: (1) To preserve our reputation as a guarantor,
and thus to preserve our effectiveness in the rest of the
world. We have not hung on (2) to save a friend, or (3) to
deny the Communists the added acres and heads (because the
dominoes don't fall for that reason in this case), or even
(4) to prove that "wars of national liberation" won't work
(except as our reputation is involved) . At each decision
point we have gambled; at each point, to avoid the damage
to our effectiveness of defaulting on our commitment, we
have upped the ante. We have not defaulted, and the ante
(and commitment) is now very high. It is important that
we behave so as to protect our reputation. At the same
time, since it is our reputation that is at stake, it is
important that we not construe our obligation to be more
than do the countries whose opinions of us are our repu-
tation.
d. We are in an escalating military stalemate .
There is an honest difference of judgment as to the suc-
cess of the present military efforts in the South. There
is no question that the US deployments thwarted the VC
hope to achieve a quick victory in 1965- But there is a
serious question whether we are now defeating the VC/PAVN
main forces and whether planned US deployments will more
than hold our position in the country. Population and
area control has not changed significantly in the past
year; and the best judgment is that, even with the Phase
IIA deployments, we will probably be faced in early 1967
with a continued stalemate at a higher level of forces
and casualties.
2. US commitment to SVN . Some will say that we have
defaulted if we end up, at any point in the relevant
future, with anything less than a Western-oriented, non-
Communist, independent government, exercising effective
sovereignty over all of South Vietnam. This is not so.
As statec above, the US end is solely 10 preserve our
reputation as a guarantor. It follows that the "softest"
credible formulation of the US commitment is the following:
a. DRV does not take over South Vietnam by force.
This does not necessarily rule out:
b. A coalition government including Communists.
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c. A free decision by the South to succumb to the
VC or to the North.
d. A neutral (or even anti-US) government in SVN.
e. A live -and -let-live "reversion to 1959."
Furthermore, we must recognize that even if we fail in
achieving this "soft" formulation, we could over time
come out with minimum damage:
f . If the reason was GVN gross wrongheadedness or
apathy.
g. If victorious North Vietnam "went Titoist."
h. If the Communist take-over was fuzzy and very slow.
Current decisions, McNaughton argued, should reflect aware-
ness that the U.S. co mmi tment could be fulfilled with something consider-
ably short of victory, " it takes time to make hare decisions, " he wrote,
"It took us a lm ost a year to take the decision to bomb North Vietnam;
it took us weeks to decide on a pause; it could take us months (and
could involve lopping some white as well as brown heads) to get us in
position to go for a compromise. We should not expect the enemy's
molasses to pour any faster than ours. And we should ‘tip the pitchers'
now if we want them to 'pour' a year from now."
But the strategy following from this analysis more or
less corresponded over the short term to that recommended by the Saigon
mission and the military commands: More effort for pacification, more
push behind the Ky government, more battalions for MACV, and intensive
interdiction bombing roughly as proposed by CINCPAC. The one change
introduced in this memorandum, prepared only one day after the other,
concerned North Vietnamese ports. Now McNaughton advised that the ports
not be closed. Why he did so is not apparent. The intelligence com-
munity had concurred a month earlier that such action would create "a
particularly unwelcome dilemma" for the USSR, but would provoke nothing
more than vigorous protest. 52/ Perhaps, however, someone had given
McNaughton a warning sometime on January 18 or 19 that graver consequences
couldbe involved. In any case, McNaughton introduced this one modifica-
tion.
The argument which coupled McNaughton 's political analysis
* with his strategic recommendations appeared at the end of the second
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The dilemma . We are in a dilemma. It is that the
situation may be "polar." That is, it may be that while
going for victory we have the strength for compromise,
but if we go for compromise we have the strength only for
defeat — this because a revealed lowering of sights
from victory to compromise (a) will unhinge the GVN and
(b) will give the DRV the "smell of blood." The situation
therefore requires a thoroughly loyal and disciplined US
team in Washington and Saigon and great care in what is
said and done. It also requires a willingness to escalate
the war if the enemy miscalculates, misinterpreting our
willingness to compromise as implying we are on the run.
The risk is that it may be that the "coin must come up
heads or tails, not on edge." 53 /
Much of McNaughton's cautious language about the lack of
success -- past or predicted - — of the interdiction efforts appeared
six days later, 24 January, in a memorandum from McNamara for the
President. 54/ The memorandum recommended (and its tone makes clear
that approval was taken for granted) an increase in the number of
attack sorties against North Vietnam from a level of roughly 3,000
per month — the rate for the last half of 1965 — to a level of at
least 4,000 per month to be reached gradually and then maintained
throughout 1966. The sortie rate against targets in Laos, which had
risen from 511 per month in June 1965 to 3)047 in December, would rise
to a steady 4,500, and those against targets in South Vietnam, having
risen from 7*234 in June to 13,3-14 in December, would drop back to
12,000 in June 1966, but then climb to 15,000 in December. By any
standards, this was a large bombing program, yet McNamara could promise
the President only that "the increased program probably will not put
a tight ceiling on the enemy's activities in South Vietnam," but might
cause him to hurt at the margins, with perhaps enough pressure to
"condition /him/ toward negotiations and an acceptable /to the US/GVN,
that is J end to the war — and will maintain the morale of our South
Vietnamese allies . "
Most of McNamara's memorandum dealt with the planned
expansion of American ground forces, however. Here it indicated that
the President had decided in favor of recommendations the Secretary
had brought back from his trip to Vietnam on 28 and 29 November, and
had incorporated in memoranda for the President on 3^ November and
7 December. 55/ These were to increase the number of US combat batta-
'lions from 3Tat the end of 1965 to 74 a year later, instead of to 62
as previously planned, with comparable increases for the Korean and
Australian contingents (from nine battalions to 21, and from one to
two respectively) . Such an increase in US combat strength would raise
total US personnel in Vietnam from 220,000 to over 400,000. At the
e time, McNamara noted in his memorandum of 7 December, the Depart-
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supplemental appropriation of $11 billion of new obligational authority
to cover increased Vietnam costs.
The Secretary recommended these measures, he said, because
of "dramatic recent changes in the situation. . .on the military side."
Infiltration from the North, mainly on greatly improved routes through
Laos, had increased from three battalion equivalents per month in late
1964 to a recent high of a dozen per month. With his augmented forces,
the enemy was showing an increased willingness to stand and fight in
large scale engagements, such as the la Drang River campaign in November.
To meet this growing challenge the previously planned US force levels
would be insufficient. Identical descriptions of the increased enemy
capability appeared in both McNamara's 30 November and 7 December memorand
In the former, but not the latter, the following paragraph also appeared:
We have but two options, it seems to me. One is to go
now for a compromise solution (something substantially less
than the "favorable outcome" I described in my memorandum of
November 3), and hold further deployments to a minimum. The
other is to stick with our stated objectives and with the war,
and provide what it takes in men and materiel. If it is
decided not to move now toward a compromise, I recommend that
the United States both send a substantial number of addi-
tional troops and very gradually intensify the bombing of
North Vietnam. Ambassador Lodge, General Wheeler, Admiral
Sharp and General Westmoreland concur in this two-pronged
course of action, although General Wheeler and Admiral Sharp
would intensify the bombing of the North more quickly.
McNamara did not commit himself -- in any of these papers,
at least — on the question of whether or not the President should now
opt instead for a "compromise" outcome. The President, of course,
decided against it. He did so, it should be noted, in the face of a
"prognosis" from McNamara that was scarcely optimistic. There were
changes in this prognosis as it went through the Secretary's successive
Presidential memoranda on 30 November, 7 December and 24 January. The
first of these stated simply:
We should be aware that deployments of the kind I
have recommended will not guarantee success. US killed-
in- act ion can be expected to reach 1000 a month, and the
odds are even that we will be faced in early 1967 with a
"no decision" at an even higher level. My overall evalu-
ation, nevertheless, is that the best chance of achieving
our stated objectives lies in a pause followed, if it fails,
by the deployments mentioned above.
In the latter two memoranda, McNamara elaborated on this prognosis, and
made it even less optimistic. The versions of 7 December and 24 January
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were similar, Taut there were important differences. They are set
forward here with deletions from the 7 December version in brackets,
and additions in the 24 January version underlined:
/Deployments of the kind we have recommended will
not guarantee success^/ Our intelligence estimate is
that the present Communist policy is to continue to
prosecute the war vigorously in the South. They continue
to believe that the war will be a long one, that time is
their ally, and that their own staying power is superior
to ours. They recognize that the US reinforcements of 1 965
signify a determination to avoid defeat, and that more US
troops can be expected. Even though the Communists will
continue to suffer heavily from GVN and US ground and air
action, we expect them, upon learning of any US intentions
to augment its forces, to boost their own commitment and
to test US capabilities' and will to persevere at a higher
level of conflict and casualties (US killed -in-action with
the recommended deployments can be expected to reach 1000
a month).
If the US were willing to commit enough forces —
perhaps 600,000 men or more — we could probably ultimately
prevent the DRV/VC from sustaining the conflict at a
significant level. When this point was reached, however,
the question of Chinese intervention would become critical.
(We are generally agreed that the Chinese Communists will
intervene with combat forces to prevent destruction of the
Communist regime in North Vietnam; it is less clear that they
would intervene to prevent a DRV/VC defeat in the South. ) 56 /
The intelligence estimate is that the chances are a little
better than even that, at this stage, Hanoi and Peiping
would choose to reduce their effort in the South and try to
salvage their resources for another day^ /J but there is an
almost equal chance that they would enlarge the war and bring
in large numbers of Chinese forces (they have made certain
preparations which could point in this direction)^
It follows , therefore, that the odds are about even
that, even with the recommended deployments, we will be
faced in early 1967 with a military stand-off at a much
higher level, with pacification /still stalled, and with
any prospect of military success marred by the chances of
an active Chinese intervention/ hardly underway and with
the -requirement for the deployment of still more US forces. 57 /
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On 25 January 1966, before the bombing had yet been
resumed, George Ball sent to the President a long memorandum on the
matter. Its first page warned:
I recognize the difficulty and complexity of the
problem and I do not wish to add to your burdens. But
before a final decision is made on this critical issue,
I feel an obligation to amplify and document my strong
convi ct ion : that sustained bombing of North Viet -Nam
wi~n more than likely lead us into war with Red China —
probably in six to nine months . And it may well involve
at least a limited war with the Soviet Union. 58/
There were, Ball said, "forces at work on both sides of the conflict that
will operate in combination to bring about this result.
The Under-Secretary dealt with the U.S. side of the conflict
first. The bombing, he wrote, would inevitably escalate; the passage of
time, he contended, had demonstrated " that a sustained bombing program
acquires a life and dynamism of its own." For this there were several
reasons ! First was _ that "the U.S. " philosophy of bombing requires gradual
e scalation ." Ball explained:
Admittedly, we have never had a generally agreed
rationale for bombing North Viet -Nam. But the inarticulate
major premise has always been that bombing will somehow,
so me day, and in some manner, create pressure on Hanoi to
stop the war. This is accepted as an article of faith, not
only by the military who have planning and operational
responsibilities but by most civilian advocates of bombing
in the Administration.
Yet it is also widely accepted that for bombing to
have this desired political effect, we must gradually
extend our attack to increasingly vital targets. In this
wa y — it is contended — we will constantly threaten
Hanoi that if it continues its aggression it will face
mounting costs — with the destruction of its economic life
at the end of the road.
On an attached chart, Ball demonstrated that in the eleven months of
bombing target selection had gradually spread northward to a point where
it was°nearing the Chinese border and closing in on the Hanoi -Haiphong
areEL " "steadily constricting the geographical scope of immunity."
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Just as the geographical extent of the bombing would
inexorably increase. Ball argued, so would the value of the targets
struck. “Unless we achieve dramatic successes in the South -- which
no one expects /Ball wrote/ — we will be led by frustration to hit
increasingly more sensitive targets . " He listed four categories of
likely operations: (l) the mining of Haiphong harbor, and the destruc-
tion of (£) Worth Vietnam's POL supplies, ( 3 ) its system of power
stations, and (4) its airfields. Each of these targets had already
been recommended to the President by one of his principal military or
civilian advisors in Washington or Saigon, Ball noted, and each had
"a special significance for the major Communist capitals." The mining
of Haiphong harbor would "impose a major decision" on the Soviet Union.
"Could it again submit to a blockade, as at the time of the Cuban missile
crisis," Ball asked, "or should it retaliate by sending increased aid or
even volunteers to Worth Viet-Nam or by squeezing the United States at
some other vital point, such as Berlin?" Would Hanoi feel compelled
to launch some kind of attack on crowded Saigon harbor or on U.S. fleet
units — perhaps using surface-to-surface missiles provided by the
Soviet Union? Similarly, the bombing of Worth Vietnam's POL supplies
might bring in response an attack on the exposed POL in Saigon harbor.
Then there were the airfields. Ball wrote :
The "bombing of the airfields would very likely lead
the DRV to request the use of Chinese air bases north of
the border for the basing of Worth Vietnamese planes, or
even to request the intervention of Chinese air. This
would pose the most agonizing dilemma for us. Consistent
with our decision to tomb the Worth, we could hardly per-
mit the creation of a sanctuary from which our own planes
could be harassed. Yet there is general agreement that
for us to bomb China would very likely lead to a direct
war with Peiping and would — in principle at least —
trigger the Sino-Soviet Defense Pact, which has been in
force for fifteen years.
The same process of action-reaction, Ball noted, would
also apply to surface-to-air missile sites (SAMs) within Worth Vietnam.
The wider the bombing the greater the number of SAM sites — manned sub-
stantially by Soviet and Chinese technicians -- the Worth Vietnamese
would install.' "As more SAMs are installed, we will be compelled to
take them out in order to safeguard our aircraft. This will mean
killing more Russians and Chinese and putting greater pressure on those
two nations for increased effort.” Ball summarized this process in
general terms: "Each extension of our bombing to more sensitive areas
will increase the risk to our aircraft and compel a further extension
of bombing to protect the expanded bombing activities we have staked
out."
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These risks would be run, Ball observed, for the sake
of a bombing program, that would nevertheless be ineffective in pro-
ducing the political results being asked of it. Ten days before sending
his memorandum to the President, Ball had asked the CIA's Office of
National Estimates to prepare an estimate of likely reactions to various
extensions of the bombing, and also an assessment of the effects they
would be likely to have on North Vietnam's military effort in the south. 59 j
He cited the estimate's conclusions in his Presidential memorandum. None
of the types of attacks he had specified -- on Haiphong harbor, on the
POL, or on power stations — "would in itself, have a critical impact on
the combat activity of the Communist forces in South Viet -Ham. " This
was, of course, scarcely a new conclusion. In various formulations it
had figured in intelligence estimates for the preceding six months. From
it Ball was led to the premises which motivated him to write his vigor-
ously dissenting paper: "if the war is to be won -- it must be won in
the South," and "the bombing of the North cannot win the war, only enlarge
it."
Ball's paper was at its most general (and perhaps least
persuasive) in its discussion of "enlargement" of the war. He started
from a historical example — the catastrophic misreading of Chinese
intentions by the United States during the Korean war -- and a logical
premise:
Quite clearly there is a threshold which we cannot
pass over without precipitating a major Chinese involve-
ment. We do not know -- even within wide margins of error —
where that threshold is. Unhappily we will not find out
until after the catastrophe.
In positing his own notions of possible thresholds, Ball could only reiter-
ate points he had already made: that forcing the North Vietnamese air
force to use Chinese bases, by bombing their own airfields, would be likely
to escalate into armed conflict between the U.S. and China, and that the
destruction of North Vietnam's industry would call in increased Chinese
assistance to a point "sooner or later, we will almost certainly collide
with Chinese interests in such a way as to bring about a Chinese involve-
ment . "
There were, strikingly enough, no recommendations in Ball's
memorandum. Given his assumption that "sustained bombing" would acquire
"a life of its own," and invariably escalate, the only consistent recom-
mendation would have been that the U.S. should not resume bombing the
North but should instead confine the war to the South, There were no
compromise positions. To a President who placed the avoidance of war
with China (not to mention with the U.S.S.R.) very high on his list of
objectives, and yet who felt — for military and political reasons --
that he was unable not to resume bombing North Vietnam, but that, once
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resumed, the bombing must be carefully controlled, Ball offered dis-
turbing analysis but little in the way of helpful practical advice.
The week including the Tet holidays (January 23-29)
saw some final debate at the White House on the question of whether
to resume at all in which Ball's memo surely figured. The outcome
was a Presidential decision that ROLLING THUNDER should recommence
on January 31. The President declined for the time being, however,
to approve any extension of air operations, despite the strong recom-
mendations of the military and the milder proposals of the Secretary
of Defense for such action.
E. Accomplishments by Years -End
After 10 months, of ROLLING THUNDER, months longer than U,S. officials
had hoped it would require to bring NVN to terms, it was clear that NVN
had neither called off the insurgency in the South nor been obliged to
slow it down. Still, decision-makers did not consider bombing the North
a failure. While willing to entertain the idea of a temporary pause
to focus the spotlight on the diplomatic track they were pursuing, they
were far from ready to give up the bombing out of hand. Why not? What
did they think the bombing was accomplishing, and what did they think
these accomplishments were worth? What did they hope to achieve by
continuing it?
As already noted, certain political gains from the bombing were
evident from the start. Morale in SVN was lifted, and a certain degree
of stability had emerged in the GVN. NVN and other countries were shown
that the U.S. was willing to back up strong words with hard deeds. These
were transient gains, however. After the bombing of the North was begun,
other U.S. actions — unleashing U.S. jet aircraft for air strikes in
the South, and sending U.S. ground troops into battle there — had as
great or even greater claim as manifestations of U.S. will and determina-
tion. Similarly, breaking through the sanctuary barrier had been accom-
plished, and once the message was clear to all concerned it did not
require daily and hourly reinforcement. The acquisition of an important
bargaining chip was a gain of uncertain value as yet, since it might
have to be weighed against the role of the bombing as an obstacle to
getting negotiations underway in the first place. As one high-level
group stated in the fall of 1965:
...it would be difficult for any government, but
especially an oriental one, to agree to negotiate while
under sustained bombing attacks. 60 j
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If this particular chip had to he given up in order to establish what
the group called "the political and psychological framework for initi-
ating negotiations,” the gain in leverage might be small.
Public opinion about the bombing was mixed. On the hawk side,
as Secretary McNamara summed it up for the President:
Some critics, who advocated bombing, were silenced;
others are now as vocal or more vocal because the program
has been too limited for their taste. 61 /
People who believed that the U.S. was justified in intervening in the
war and who identified Hanoi as the real enemy naturally tended to
approve of the bombing. People who questioned the depth of U.S. involve
ment in Southeast Asia and who feared that the U.S. was on a collision
course with China seemed to be more appalled by the bombing than by any
other aspect of the war . The peace fringe attacked it as utterly reck-
less and immoral. Abroad, in many countries, the U.S. was portrayed as
a bully and HVN as a victim. Even U.S. allies who had no illusions
about Hanoi's complicity in the South were unhappy with the bombing.
As McNamara viewed it:
The price paid for improving our image as a guarantor
has been damage to our image as a country which eschews
armed attacks on other nations The objection to our
'warlike ' image and the approval of our fulfilling our
commitments competes in the minds of many nations (and
individuals) in the world, producing a schizophrenia.
Within such allied countries as UK and Japan, popular
antagonism to the bombings per se, fear of escalation,
and belief that the bombings are the main obstacle to
negotiation, have created political problems for the
governments in support of US policy. 62/
Bombing NVN, the Secretary added, had also complicated US-Soviet
relations, mostly for the worse though conceivably — barely so — for
the better:
The bombing program — because it appears to
reject the policy of ’peaceful coexistence, ’ because
the Soviet people have vivid horrible memories of air
bombing, because it challenges the USSR as she competes
with China for leadership of the Communist world, and
because US and Soviet arms are now striking each other
in North Vietnam — has strained the US -Soviet detente,
making constructive arms control and other cooperative
programs difficult. How _ serious this effect will be and
whether the detente can be revived depend on how far we
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carry our military actions against the North and how
long the campaign continues. At the saae time, the
bombing program offers the Soviet Union an opportunity
to play a role in bringing peace to Vietnam, by gaining
credit for persuading us to terminate the program.
There is a chance that the scenario could spin out this
way: if so, the effect of the entire experience on the
US-Soviet detente could be a net plus. 63 /
In addition, the Secretary continued, more countries than before
were "more interested in taking steps to bring the war to an end." The
net effect of this, however, was generally to increase the international
pressures on the U.S. to seek an accommodation, not Hanoi, so that it
was hardly an unmixed blessing.
Immediate gains and losses in the domestic and international polit-
ical arenas were less important, however, than the overall influence of
the bombing on the course of the war itself. Short-term political
penalties were not hard to bear, at home or abroad, if the bombing could
materially improve the prospects for a favorable outcome. This did not
necessarily mean that the bombing had to contribute to a military victory.
ROLLING THUNDER was begun at a time when the war was being lost and even
the minimum task of preventing an outright defeat was far from assured.
Almost any military contribution from the bombing could be viewed as a
boon.
It was not easy to assess the contribution of ROLLING THUNDER to
the war as a whole . Decision-makers like Secretary McNamara received
regular monthly reports of measurable physical damage inflicted by the
strikes, together with a verbal description of less readily quantifi-
able economic, military and political effects within NVN, but it was
difficult to assess the significance of the results as reported or to
relate them to the progress of the war in the South. Reports of this
kind left it largely to the judgment or the imagination to decide what
the bombing was contributing to the achievement of overall U.S. objec-
tives .
CIA and DIA, in a joint monthly "Appraisal of the Bombing of North
Vietnam" which had been requested by the SecDef in August, attempted
to keep a running tabulation of the theoretical cost of repairing or
reconstructing damaged or destroyed facilities and equipment in NVN.
According to this, the first year of ROLLING THUNDER inflicted $63 million
worth of° measurable damage, $36 million to "economic" targets like
bridges and transport equipment, and $27 million to "military" targets
like barracks and ammunition depots. 64/ In addition to this measurable
damage the bombing was reported to have "disrupted" the production and
distribution of goods; created "severe" problems and "reduced capacity"
in all forms of transportation; created more "severe problems" in man-
. the economy; reduced production'; caused "shortages" and "hardships";
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forced the diversion of "skilled manpower and scarce resources" from
productive uses to the restoration of damaged facilities and/or their
dispersal and relocation; and so on.
In terms of specific target categories, the appraisals reported
results like the following:
Power plants. 6 small plants struck, only 2 of them
in the main power grid. Loss resulted in local power
shortages and reduction in power available for irri-
gation but did not reduce the power supply for the
Hanoi/Haiphong area.
POL storage. 4 installations destroyed, about 17 per-
cent of NVU's total bulk storage capacity. Economic
effect not significant, since neither industry nor
agriculture is large user and makeshift storage and
distribution procedures will do.
Manufacturing. 2 facilities hit, 1 explosive plant
and 1 textile plant, the latter by mistake. Loss of
explosives plant of little consequence since China
furnished virtually all the explosives required. Damage
to textile plant not extensive.
Bridges. 30 highway and 6 railroad bridges on JCS list
destroyed or damaged, plus several hundred lesser bridges
hit on armed reconnaissance missions. NVTI has generally
not made a major reconstruction effort, usually putting
fords, ferries, and pontoon bridges into service instead.
Damage has neither stopped nor curtailed movement of
military supplies.
Railroad yards. 3 hit, containing about 10 percent of
HVN's total railroad cargo -handling capacity. Has not
significantly hampered the operations of the major
portions of the rail network.
Ports. 2 small maritime ports hit, at v'inh and Thanh Hoa
in the south, with only 5 percent of the country's mari-
time cargo -handling capacity. Impact on economy minor.
Locks. Of 91 known locks and dams in NVN, only 8 targeted
as significant to inland waterways, flood control, or
irrigation. Only 1 hit, heavily damaged. .
Transport equipment. Destroyed or damaged 12 locomo-
tives", 819 freight cars, 805 trucks, 109 ferries, 75 O
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forced the diversion of "skilled manpower and scarce resources" from
productive uses to the restoration of damaged facilities and/or their
dispersal and relocation; and so on.
In terms of specific target categories, the appraisals reported
results like the following:
Power plants. 6 small plants struck, only 2 of them
in the main power grid. Loss resulted in local power
shortages and reduction in power available for irri-
gation but did not reduce the power supply for the
Hanoi/Haiphong area.
POL storage. 4 installations destroyed, about 17 per-
cent of FVTT's total bulk storage capacity. Economic
effect not significant, since neither industry nor
agriculture is large user and makeshift storage and
distribution procedures will do.
Manufacturing. 2 facilities hit, 1 explosive plant
and 1 textile plant, the latter by mistake. Loss of
explosives plant of little consequence since China
furnished virtually all the explosives required. Damage
to textile plant not extensive.
Bridges. 30 highv/ay and 6 railroad bridges on JCS list
destroyed or damaged, plus several hundred lesser bridges
hit on armed reconnaissance missions. NVTT has generally
not made a major reconstruction effort, usually putting
fords, ferries, and pontoon bridges into service instead.
Damage has neither stopped nor curtailed movement of
military supplies.
Railroad yards. 3 hit, containing about 10 percent of
IJVF's total railroad cargo-handling capacity. Has not
significantly hampered the operations of the major
portions of the rail network.
Ports. 2 small maritime ports hit, at Vinh and Thanh Hoa
in the south, with only 5 percent of the country's mari-
time cargo-handling capacity. Impact on economy minor.
Locks. Of 91 known locks and dams in KVTf, only 8 targeted
as significant to inland waterways, flood control, or
irrigation. Only 1 hit, heavily damaged.
Transport equipment. Destroyed or damaged 12 locomo-
tives, 819 freight cars, 805 trucks, 109 ferries, 750
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targes, and 35^ other water craft. No evidence of seri-
our problems due to shortages of equipment. 6 5 /
What did all of this amount to? The direct losses, in the language
of one of the monthly appraisals,
...still remain small compared to total economic
activity, because the country is predominantly agricul-
tural and the major industrial facilities have not been
attacked. 66/
The "cumulative strains" resulting from the bombing had "reduced indus-
trial performance," but "the primarily rural nature of the area pennits
continued functioning of the subsistence economy." The "economic deter-
ioration so far has not affected the capabilities of North Vietnam 1 s
armed forces, which place little direct reliance on the domestic economy
for material." The bombing had "still" not reduced NVN capabilities
to defend itself from attack and to support existing NVA/VC forces in
Laos and SVN, but it had "limited" "freedom of movement" in the southern
provinces, and it had "substantially curtailed" NVA capabilities to
mount "a major offensive action" in Southeast Asia. Altogether, how-
ever, "the air strikes do not appear to have altered Hanoi's deter-
mination to continue supporting the war in South Vietnam." 67 /
An evaluation which had to be couched in such inexact and impres-
sionistic language was of little help in coming to grips with the most
important questions about the bombing: (l) How much "pressure" was
being applied to NVN to scale down or give up the insurgency, and how
well was it working? (2) In what ways and to what degree was the bombing
affecting NVN's capacity to wage war in the South? Whether the bombing
program was viewed primarily as a strategic -punitive campaign against
Hanoi's will or a tactical- interdict ion campaign against NVN's military
capabilities in the South — or, as some would have it, both — these
were the questions to address, not the quantity of the damage and the
quality of the dislocations.
In dealing with the above questions, it had to be recognized that
WVN was an extremely poor target for air attack. The theory of either
strategic or interdiction bombing assumed highly developed industrial
nations producing large quantities of military goods to sustain mass
armies engaged in intensive warfare. NVN, as U.S. intelligence agencies
knew was an agricultural country with a rudimentary transportation
system and little industry of any kind. Nearly all of the people were
rice farmers who worked the land with water buffaloes and hand tools,
and whose well-being at a subsistence level was almost entirely dependent
on what they grew or made themselves. What intelligence agencies liked
to call the "modern industrial sector" of the economy was tiny even by
Asian standards, producing only about 12 percent of a GNP of $1.6 billion
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in 1965. There were only a handful of "major industrial facilities."
When HVTt was first targeted the JCS found only 8 industrial installa-
tions worth listing on a par with airfields, military supply dumps,
■barracks complexes, port facilities, bridges, and oil tanks. Even by
the end of 1965* after the JCS had lowered the standards and more than
doubled the number of important targets, the list included only 24
industrial installations, 18 of them power plants which v/ere as impor-
tant for such humble uses as lighting streets and pumping water as for
operating any real factories. 68/
Apart from one explosives plant (which had already been demolished),
KW's limited industry made little contribution to its military capabil-
ities. NVN forces, in intelligence terminology, placed "little direct
reliance on the domestic economy for material." NVR in fact produced
only limited quantities of simple military items, such as mortars,
grenades, mines, small arms, and bullets, and those were produced in
small workshops rather than .large arsenals. The great bulk of its
military equipment, and all of the heavier and more sophisticated items,
had to be imported. This was no particular problem, since both the
USSR and China were apparently more than glad to help.
The NVM transportation system was austere and superficially looked
very vulnerable to air attack, but it was inherently flexible and its
capacity greatly exceeded the demands placed upon it. The rail system,
with single-track lines radiating from Hanoi, provided the main link-up
to China and, via the port of Haiphong, to the rest of the world; it
was more important for relatively long-haul international shipments than
for domestic freight. The latter was carried mostly over crude roads
and simple waterways, on which the most common vehicles were oxcarts
and sampans, not trucks or steamers. The system was quite primitive,
but immensely durable.
Supporting the war in the South was hardly a great strain on NVN's
economy. The JSVA/vC forces there did not constitute a large army. They
did not fight as conventional divisions or field armies, with tanks and
airplanes and heavy artillery; they did not need to be supplied by huge
convoys of trucks, trains, or ships. They fought and moved on foot,
supplying themselves locally, in the main, and simply avoiding combat
when supplies were low. What they received from HVH was undoubtedly
critical to their military operations, but it amounted to only a few
tons per day for the entire force — sn amount that could be carried by
a handful of trucks or sampans, or several hundred coolies. This small
, amount did not have to be carried conspicuously over exposed routes,
' and it was extremely difficult to interdict, by bombing or any other
means.
In sum, then, NVR did not seem to be a very rewarding target for
air attack. Its industry was limited, meaningful targets were few, and
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they did not appear critical to either the viability of the economy,
the defense of the nation, or the prosecution of the war in the South.
The idea that destroying, or threatening to destroy, NVN's industry
would pressure Hanoi into calling it quits seems, in retrospect, a
colossal rais judgment. The idea was based, however, on a plausible
assumption about the rationality of NVN's leaders, which the U.S. intel-
ligence community as a whole seemed to share. 69 / This was that the
value of what little industrial plant NVN possessed was disproportionately
great. That plant was purchased by an extremely poor nation at the
price of considerable sacrifice over many years. Even though it did
not amount to much, it no doubt symbolized the regime's hopes and desires
for national status, power, and wealth, and was probably a source of
considerable pride. It did not seem unreasonable to believe that NVN
leaders would not wish to risk the destruction of such assets, especially
when that risk seemed (to us) easily avoidable by cutting down the
insurgency and deferring the takeover of SVN until another day and per-
haps in another manner — which Ho Chi Minh had apparently decided to
do once before, in 195 1 *- After all, an ample supply of oriental patience
is precisely what an old oriental revolutionary like Ho Chi Minh was
supposed to have.
For 1965, at least, these assumptions about Hanoi's leaders were
not borne out. The regime’s public stance remained one of strong defi-
ance, determined to endure the worst and still see the U.S. defeated.
The leadership directed a shift of strategy in the South, from an attempt
at a decisive military victory to a strategy of protracted conflict
designed to wear out the opposition and prepare the ground for an eventual
political settlement, but this decision was undoubtedly forced upon it
by U.S. intervention in the South. There was no sign that bombing the
North, either alone or in combination with other U.S. actions, had brought
about any greater readiness to settle except on their terms.
In the North, the regime battened down and prepared to ride out
the storm. With Soviet and Chinese help, it greatly strengthened its
air defenses, multiplying the number of AAA guns and radars, expanding
the number of jet fighter airfields and the jet fighter force, and intro-
ducing an extensive SAM system. Economic development plans were laid
aside. Imports were increased to offset production losses. Bombed
facilities were in most cases simply abandoned. The large and vulnerable
barracks and storage depots were replaced by dispersed and concealed ones.
Several hundred thousand workers were mobilized to keep the transportation
system operating. Miles of by-pass roads wtre built around choke-points
to make the system redundant. Knocked-out bridges were replaced by fords,
ferries, or alternate structures, and methods were adopted to protect
them from attack. Traffic shifted to night time, poor weather, and
camouflage. Shuttling and transhipment practices were instituted. Con-
struction material, equipment, and workers were prepositioned along key
. 56
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routes in order to effect quick repairs. Imports of railroad cars
and trucks were increased to offset equipment losses.
In short, NVU leaders mounted a major effort to withstand the
bombing pressure. They had to change their plans and go on a war
footing. The5 r had to take drastic measures to shelter the population
and cope with the bomb damage. They had to force the people to work
harder and find new ways to keep the economy operating. They had to
greatly increase imports and their dependence on the USSR and China.
There were undoubtedly many difficulties and hardships involved. Yet,
NYU had survived. Its economy had continued to function. The regime
had not collapsed, and it had not given in. And it still sent men
and supplies into SVB.
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1. Draft memorandum, "Analysis and Options for South Vietnam,"
7/13/65, TOP SECRET, filed with compilation of data assembled
by Secretary McNamara for his 14-21 July 1965 trip to Vietnam.
2. Memorandum for Rusk, McNamara, McG. Bundy, W. Bundy, McNaughton,
Unger, "Cutting Our Losses in South Viet-Nam," TOP SECRET. Ball
distributed this paper in two parts, a summary on 28 June 1965
and the paper itself on the 29th.
3. Memorandum for the President, "A Compromise Solution for South
Viet-Nam," 1 July 1965, TOP SECRET. (Underlining in original.)
4. Draft, "Plan of Action for South Vietnam," 24 March 1965, TOP SECRET.
5. From Ball's summary, 28 June 1965, of his memorandum of the 29th,
cited above, n. 2.
6. Memorandum, "Viet-Nam," 1 July 1965, TOP SECRET. (Emphasis added.)
Rusk's name is typed as drafter at the foot of the memorandum.
7. Bundy's memorandum, 1 July 1965 (TOP SECRET), summarized points
Bundy made in a longer paper, "Holding on in South Vietnam,"
30 June 1965 (TOP SECRET).
8 . Memorandum for the President, "Recommendations of additional deploy-
ments to Vietnam," 20 July I9S5, TOP SECRET.
9. Memorandum for the President, "Program of expanded military and
political moves with respect to Vietnam," first draft 26 June 1965,
revised 1 July, TOP SECRET. The copy used here is the typed draft
of 26 June with extensive pencilled revisions in McNamara's own
hand and his signature,
10. JCSM 515-65, 2 July 1965, "Deployments to South Vietnam," TS;
Fact Sheet, "Military Pressures Against NVN," in Cable File 3^>
SecDef Saigon Trip, 14-21 July 1965.
11, SNIE IO-9-65, 23 July 19S5, "Communist and Free World Reactions
to a Possible US Course of Action," TOP SECRET.
Ha. Ibid .
12 Draft Memorandum, "Analysis and Options for South Vietnam," 7/13/65, TS.
13 Footnote on p. 4 of McNamara's memorandum of 20 July 1965, cited
above , n . 8 ,
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14. Memorandum for the President, 28 July 1965} UNCLASSIFIED, com-
menting cn 18 points made by Senator Mansfield to the President
on the Vietnam situation.
15. Memorandum for the President, "Evaluation of the Program of
Bombing North Vietnam," 30 July 1965, TOP SECRET.
16. Even as early as 7 July the SecDef apparently planned to take up
the idea of a 6-8 week bombing pause with Ambassador Taylor and
General Westmoreland. See OSD 5319 to Saigon, O7/2352 Z July 1965,
TS, NODIS.
17. JCSM 652-65} 27 Aug 1965} "Concept for Vietnam," TS; Memorandum
for the SecDef from ASD/lSA, I~36l4/ 65 , "Concept for Vietnam,"
9/8/65, TS; and Memorandum for the CJCS from the SecDef, "Concept
for Vietnam," 9/ll/65} TS.
18. JCSM 67 O- 63 , 9/2/65; JCSM 686-65, 9/H/65; SecDef Memorandum for
CJCS, "Air Strikes on North Vietnam," 9/15/65, TS. JCS recommenda-
tions along these lines continued to be submitted throughout 1965.
See JCSM 8IO-65, H/lO/65, and JCSM 811-65, H/ll/65, both TS.
19. The Hanoi and Haiphong circles and the Chinese buffer zones
developed into sanctuaries during 1965 from a decision in August
to exclude them from an authorization to strike SAM sites at will,
provided photography had shown them to be occupied. See JCSM 238-66,
14 April 1966, "ROLLING THUNDER Study Group Report — Air Operations
Against North Vietnam," Annex B to Appendix A to Section II, "Chronology,"
TS.
20. JCSM 238-66, 14 April 1966, og. cit., contains a chronological
account of ROLLING THUNDER missions to March 1966. See also CINCPAC
Command History, 1965, Vol. II, pp. 324-389, TS.
21. The statistics are taken from CIA SC No. 04442/67, Jan. 1967,
"The ROLLING THUNDER Program."
22. Memorandum for the President, 30 July 1965, og. cit .
23. CIA SC No. 0828/66, "The Role of Air Strikes in Attaining Objec-
tives in North Vietnam."
24. Testimony before Senate committees on Armed Services and Appropri-
ations, 4 August 1965} SECRET.
25. Testimony, House Committee on Armed Services, 6 August 1965, SECRET.
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26. SecDef Background briefing for the press, 21 October 1965, 0U0.
27. The circumstances and the diplomacy of the May pause are treated
in detail in another paper in this project.
28. Memorandum for the President, 30 November 1965, TOP SECRET. This
paper, written immediately following a visit to Vietnam by McNamara
and General Wheeler on 28 and 29 November, was intended as a supple-
ment to the Secretary's memorandum of 3 November, cited below.
29. Memorandum for the President, "Courses of Action in Vietnam,"
3 November 1965, TOP SECRET. This paper is headed "1st Rough
Draft," but a note in McNamara's handwriting states: "A copy
of this was sent to the Pres, by courier thru Mac's office on
ll/7 & discussed with him by me, George, 8s Mac on ll/7. RMcN."
30. McNaughton draft, "Analysis and Options for South Vietnam," 13 July
1965, TOP SECRET.
31. Memorandum, "Courses of Action in Viet-Nam," 9 November 1965, TOP
SECRET. A pencilled note by McNaughton on the copy used here indi-
cates that Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson was the author of the paper.
32. Memorandum for Secretary McNamara, "State's Memo to the President
(Courses of Action in Viet-Nam)," 9 November 1965, TOP SECRET -
EYES ONLY.
33. Draft Memorandum for the President, "A Pause," 1 December 1965,
TOP SECRET. A cover note indicates that this is an up-dating of
a paper originally circulated on 16 November.
34. Memorandum, "Possible Political Actions, Specifically a 'Pause',"
TOP SECRET. A pencilled note indicates the paper was by Johnson and
Bundy, on 6 December 1965-
35. McNamara's memorandum of 3 November 1965, op- cit.
36. McNamara's memorandum, 3 December I965, TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY.
37* l bid *
38 Bundy draft, "Scenario for Possible Resumption of Bombing," 15 January
- ’ 1966, SECRET.
39. State 1786 to Lodge, MACV, and CINCPAC, 24 Dec 1965, CF 44.
40. MACV 45265, 27 Dec 65, Tbld r
41. CINCPAC 262159Z Dec 1965, CF 44; CINCPAC 271955Z Dec 1965,
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42. State 1805 to Lodge and Porter, 28 Dee I 965 , Ibid . (This cable
is misfiled under 23 Dec 1965 * )
43 . CINCPAC 120205Z Jan 19 66 , Ibid .
44. JCSM 41-66, 18 Jan 1966 .
45 . Ibid .
46. Ibid . (emphasis added)
47. Ibid .
48. Ibid .
49. Ibid .
50. McNaughton 2nd Draft, "Some Observations about Bombing North
Vietnam," 18 January 1966 . (TS-SENSITIVE) in McNaughton Book II,
Tab DD.
51. McNaughton 3rd Draft, "Some Paragraphs on Vietnam," 19 Jan 1966
(TS-Sensitive), in McNaughton Book, Tab BB.
52. SNIE 10-12-65, 10 Dec 1965 , p. 9 (TS) .
53 . McNaughton Draft "Some Paragraphs.,.," oj). cit .
54. Memorandum for the President, "The Military Outlook in South Vietnam,"
24 January 1966, TOP SECRET.
55 . These were: Memorandum for the President (no title), 30 November
1965 ? TOP SECRET, and Memorandum for the President, "Military and
Political Actions Recommended for South Vietnam," 7 December 1965 9
TOP SECRET.
56 . In the 7 December version, this parenthetical sentence was a footnote.
57 . The following footnote, expressing the reservations of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, was appended to the 24 January 1966 version of McNamara's
memorandum:
"The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe 'that the evaluation set forth
in paragraph 7 is on the pessimistic side in view of the constant and
heavy military pressure which our forces in Southeast Asia will be
capable of apploying. While admittedly the following factors are to
a degree imponderables, they believe that greater weight should be
given to the following:
"a. The cumulative effect of our air campaign against the
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DRV on morale and DRV capabilities to provide and move men and
material from, the DRV to South Vietnam.
"h. The effects of constant attack and harassment on
the ground and from the air upon the growth of Viet Cong forces
and on the morale and combat effectiveness of Viet Cong/PAVN forces.
"c. The effect of destruction of Viet Cong base areas on
the capabilities of VC/PA VN forces to sustain combat operations over
an expended period of time.
"d. The constancy of will of the Hanoi leaders to continue
a struggle which they realise they cannot win in the face of progres-
sively greater destruction of their country."
58. Memorandum for the President, "The Resumption of Bombing Poses Grave
Danger of Precipitating a War with China," 25 January 1966, SECRET-
NODIS. Ball noted in a covering letter that he sent copies only to
the President and to Secretaries Rusk and McNamara.
59. Letter, Ball to Raborn, 16 January 1966, SECRET.
60. Memorandum for the SecDef from Ambassador-at -Large Llewellyn E. Thompson,
12 October 1965, SECRET, forwarding a study of ROLLING THUNDER options.
The study, Thompson wrote, "was largely prepared in State and was reviewed
by General Taylor, Mr. McNaughton, Mr. William Bundy, Mr. Unger, and myself."
61. Memorandum for the President, 30 July 1965 3 op. cit.
62. Ibid .
63. Ibid . Although this was written at the end of July, the basic situation
continued essentially as Secretary McNamara described it and there is no
reason to believe his comments would have been different at the end of
the year.
64. CIA/DIA, "An Appraisal of the Effects of the First Year of Bombing in North
Vietnam," SC No. 08437/66, 1 June 1966. A 1967 CIA publication, "The
Rolling Thunder Program -- Present and Potential Target Systems," SC No.
04442/67, January 1967 3 upped the value of military damage in 1965 to $33-6
million and the total to $69.8 million.
65. CIA/DIA, "An Appraisal of the Effects of the First Year of Bombing in
North Vietnam," op. cit.
66. Memorandum for the SecDef from Gen. J. F. Carroll, DIA, "An Appraisal
of the Bombing of North Vietnam," 17 November 1965.
67. Ibid.
68. JCSM 16-66, 10 Jan i960 (TS).
69. CIA/DIA, "An Appraisal. op. cit.
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II. THE POL DEBATE — NOVEMBER 1965 ~ JUKE 1966
A. Background
When the 37 -day bombing pause was terminated at the end of
January 1966, the principal issue before decision-makers was not whether
to intensify the bombing but whether the intensification should be
gradual as before or be sharply accelerated.
Some kind of escalation if the bombing pause failed, i.e.,
if the Worth Vietnamese did not give "concrete evidence of a willingness
to come to terms," was foreshadowed by the October paper from State
recommending the pause:
We would have to convey our intent to reinstitute
the bombing if the Worth Vietnamese refused to negoti-
ate or if their willingness to negotiate is not accom-
panied by a manifest reduction of VC aggression in the
South. If it is necessary to reinstitute bombing, we
should be prepared to consider increasing the pressure,
e.g. through striking industrial targets, to make clear
our continuing, firm resolve. 1 /
According to this thinking, failure of the pause would indicate that
the bombing had not exerted enough pressure; greater effort was needed
to convince Hanoi that the U.S. intended not only to continue the bombing
but to do so on an increasing scale. Moreover, the pause had improved
the political atmosphere for escalation. U.S. willingness to negotiate
and NVN’s unreasonableness had been amply and dramatically displayed
for all the world to see. If the U.S, now decided to intensify the
bombing, the decision could at least be presented as one that was made
reluctantly after trying to find a more peaceful alternative.
The debate over the form of escalation in early 1966 was a
continuation of the debate over bombing policy which had surfaced again
in the fall of 196 5, and which had mixed into the debate over the long
pause. Regardless of any pause, it was clear by Wovember that even the
gradual rate of escalation of 1965 was approaching a point at which any
further increase would be possible only by attacking the sensitive targets
in the Hanoi/Haiphorvg sanctuaries and the China buffer zone. As of the
end of October j 126 of the 2k0 existing JCS targets had been struck; and
of the remaining 114, two thirds (75) were in. the off-limits areas, and
29 of the other 39 remaining were in the touchy northeast quadrant. 2 /
As the debate gathered momentum in the winter of 1965 without a clear
decision to begin attacking "the hostage," the bombing actually levelled
off During Wovember and December only 8 more JCS targets were struck
and* armed reconnaissance missions were held to a sortie ceiling of 1200
per two -week period.
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Apart from general cautiousness about the next obvious
escalatory step, one of the reasons for the Administration's hesi-
tancy was apparently the fear that the timing might not be right.
As the bombing drew closer to Hanoi and Haiphong, some officials felt
forcing the pace might oblige HVF to confront the issue of negotiations
versus greater Chinese and/or Soviet involvement prematurely, i.e.
before WVW was sufficiently convinced that it could not outlast the
U.S. and win in the South. The theory was that so long as Hanoi was
hopeful there was a greater risk that it would opt for escalation rather
than a compromise settlement. As the October paper from State put it:
We may be able to recognize the optimum time for
exerting further pressure by increasing the level of our
bombing, but an increase in our bombing of the Worth at
the present time may bring matters to a head too soon, kj
In addition, of course, there was good reason to hold off
any escalation until a substantial bombing pause was undertaken, both
to test Hanoi's intentions and to disarm critics on the dovish side who
felt that the Administration had not gone far enough to meet Hanoi half-
way.
1. JCS Recommendations
Dissatisfied with the measured pace of the bombing program
from the start, they again began advocating a sharp intensification of
the bombing in early November . Diplomatic and political considerations
were secondary. Their position was that ROLLING THUNDER had succeeded
in making it "substantially" more costly and difficult for NVN to support
the insurgents in Laos and SVN, and had "substantially" degraded WVN's
capability to conduct a conventional invasion of the South, but they
agreed that the campaign had not materially reduced NVN's other military
capabilities, damaged its economy, deterred it from supporting the war
in the South, or brought it closer to the conference table. It was not
because of any difficulty in applying pressure on Hanoi by bombing or in
interdicting support South that the program had not been more successful,
however; it was because numerous "self-imposed restraints" had limited
the potential effectiveness of the program:
...we shall . continue to achieve only limited success
in air operations in DRV/Laos if required to operate within
the constraints presently imposed. The establishment and
observance of de facto sanctuaries within the DRV, coupled
with a denial of operations against the most important mili-
tary and war supporting targets, precludes attainment of the
objectives of the air campaign. .. .Thus far, the DRV has been
able and willing to absorb damage and destruction at the slow
rate. Wow required is an immediate and sharply accelerated
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program which will leave no doubt that the US intends to win
and' achieve a level of destruction which they will not be
able to overcome. Following such a sudden attack, a follow-on
program of increasing pressures is necessary, but at a rate of
increase significantly higher than the present rate. 5 /
The JCS accordingly recommended an immediate acceleration
in the scale, scope, and intensity of the bombing, beginning with heavy
strikes against POL targets and power plants in the Hanoi/Haiphong area
and continuing with aerial mining of NVN ports and air strikes against
the remaining "military and war- supporting" targets. Specifically, the
JCS proposed an immediate sharp blow against the remaining 9 of the
original 13 major POL tank farms, most of them in the Hanoi/Haiphong
area, and against 5 key power plants, 2 in Hanoi and others at Uong Bi,
Thai Nguyen, and Hon Gai, in order to "materially reduce enemy military
capabilities." These strikes would be followed by an accelerated program
of fixed target and armed reconnaissance strikes to cut down NVN's
ability to direct and support the war in the South. The follow-on program
would attack first the major airfields in the Hanoi/Haiphong area; then
the rail, road, and waterway LOCs throughout NVN, including the major LOC
targets in the Hanoi/Haiphong area, "at a rate of destruction that would
exceed the recuperability rate"; then the ports at Haiphong, Hon Gai,
and Cam Pha; and finally military installations and other targets of
military significance, such as the Ministry of Defense, the Radio Transmitter
Station, and the Machine Tool Plant in Hanoi; the Ammunition Depot at
Haiphong; and the Iron -St eel Combine and Army Supply Depot at Thai Nugyen.
SAM installations and other antiaircraft defenses w r ould be attacked in
order to keep friendly losses down. According to the proposal, most
of the significant fixed targets in NVN would be destroyed within three
or four' months . Thereafter, the effort would concentrate on keeping the
targets inoperative and maintaining the pressure on LOCs. 6/
The JCS proposal to escalate all aspects of the bombing
was largely oriented toward greatly increasing the pressure on Hanoi's
will. On the same day, however, in a separate memorandum, the JCS made
a strong pitch for an immediate attack on the NVN POL system as an inter-
diction measure:
Attack of this system would be more damaging to the
DRV capability to move war-supporting resources within
country and along the infiltration routes to SVN than an
attack against any other single target system, if
It is not surprising that the JCS singled out the POL target
'system for special attention. NVN had no oil fields or refineries, and
he a to import all of its petroleum products, in refined form. During 1965 ,
it imported about 170,000 metric tons, valued at about $4.8 million. Nearly
all of it came from the Black Sea area of the USSR and arrived by sea at
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Haiphong, the only port capable of conveniently receiving and handling
bulk POL brought in by large tankers. From large tank farms at Haiphong
with a capacity of about one-fourth of the annual imports, the POL was
transported by road, rail, and water to other large storage sites at
Hanoi and elsewhere in the country. Ninety-seven percent of the NVN POL
storage capacity was concentrated in 13 sites, ^ of which had already
been hit. The other 9 were still off limits. They were, of course,
highly vulnerable to air attack. 8 /
In making the recommendation, the JCS emphasized the
interdiction effects. They pointed out that the strikes would not hurt
the industrial base or the civilian economy very much. They would directly
affect the military establishment, which consumed some 60 percent of all
POL, and the "government transportation system," which consumed nearly
ai 1 the rest. Supplying the armed forces in NVN as well as in Laos and
SVN depended heavily on FOL-powered vehicles, and this dependence had if
anything increased as a result of air attacks on the railroads:
The flow of supplies to all communist military forces,
both in and through the country to SVN and Laos, would be
greatly impeded since POL-fueled carriers are the principal
vehicles for this transport. Further, the interdiction of
rail lines and destruction of railroad rolling stock has
resulted in the need to move increased tonnages by alternate
means, primarily trucks and motor driven water craft. Thus,
the most effective way to compound the current interdiction
of DRV LOCsj and to offset the introduction and use of sub-
stitute modes and routes, is to reduce drastically the
available supply of POL. sf
The JCS also suggested that POL in NVN was becoming increas-
ingly important to the effort in the South. There were now 5 confirmed
and 2 suspected NVA regiments in SVN, increasing the load on the supply
lines through Laos, and the roads there were being improved, indicating
that NVN planned to rely more heavily on trucks to handle the load.
Significantly, the importation of trucks was increasing, and despite
losses inflicted by ROLLING THUNDER strikes, the size of the truck fleet
was growing.
The JCS recommended hitting the most important target,
Haiphong POL storage, first, followed closely by attack on the remaining
8 targets. The weight of effort required was 336 strike and 80 flak
suppression aircraft, with not more than 10 losses predicted. All POL
targets could be destroyed with only light damage to surrounding areas
and few civilian casualties (less than 50 ) •
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According to the JCS, the destruction of the Haiphong
target "would drastically reduce the capability to receive and dis-
tribute the major portions of DRV bulk POL imports." Destruction of
the others would "force reliance upon dispersed POL storages and
imnrovised distribution methods." Recovery would be difficult and
time-consuming. As stated in an annex to the JCSM:
Re cuper ability of the DRV POL system from the
effects of an attack is very poor. Loss of the receiving and
and distribution point at Haiphong would present many
problems. It would probably require several months for
the DRV, with foreign assistance, to establish an alternate
method for importing bulk POL, in the quantities required.
An alternative to bulk importation would be the packaging
of POL at some point for shipment into NVN and subsequent
handling and distribution by cumbersome and costly methods
over interdicted LOCs. Loss of bulk storage facilities
would necessitate the use of small drums and dispersed
storage areas and further compound the POL distribution
problem. 10/
Any further delay in carrying out the strikes, on the
other hand, "will permit further strengthening of DRV active defenses
of the POL, as well as the improvement of countermeasures, such as dis-
persed and underground storages." On the latter point, the appendix
to the JCSM added detailed intelligence information that boded ill for
any procrastination:
Current evidence shows that the DRV has in progress
an extensive program of installing groups of small POL
tanks in somewhat isolated locations and throughout the
Hanoi area. Photographs reveal groups of tanks ranging
in number of 16 to 120 tanks per group. The facilities are
generally set into shallow excavations and are then earth -
covered leaving only the vents and filling apparatus exposed.
This construction was observed at several places in the Hanoi
area in August and appeared to be an around-the-clock activity....
In addition, considerable drum storage has been identified. 11 /
It appeared that NVN had already begun a crash program to drastically
reduce the vulnerability of its POL storage and handling system. As
in other instances, HVH expected further escalation of the bombing,
and was preparing for it.
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2. The Intelligence Community Demurs
There was no immediate action on the November 196 5 JCS
recommendations , but they were taken under study. Secretary McNamara
asked for intelligence evaluations, and on 27 November and 3 December,
respectively, he received special reports from the Board of National
Estimates on (a) U.S, air attacks on NVN petroleum storage facilities,
and (b) a generally stepped-up effort involving doubling or tripling
U.S. troop commitments, bombing military and industrial targets in the
Hanoi/Haiphong area, and mining NVN harbors. 12/
The Board reported that strikes against POL targets in
the Hanoi/Haiphong area would represent "a conspicuous change in the
ground rules” which the U.S. had hitherto observed, but would not
appreciably change the course of the war:
the Communists .would unquestionably regard the
proposed US attacks as opening a new stage in the war, and
as a signal of US intention to escalate the scale of con-
flict.... We do not believe, however, that the attacks in
themselves would lead to a major change of policy on the
Communist side, either toward negotiations or toward enlarging
the war . — 13/
The strikes would cause strains and embarrassment but would not have a
major military or economic impact:
Hanoi would not be greatly surprised by the attacks.
Indeed... it has already taken steps to reduce their impact.
It has developed some underground storage facilities, and
some capacity for dispersed storage in drums.... We believe
that the DRV is prepared to accept for some time at least
the strains and difficulties which loss of the major POL
facilities would mean for its military and economic activity.
It is unlikely that this loss would cripple the Communist
military operations in the South, though it would certainly
embarrass them. 14/
NVN might possibly ask the Chinese to intervene with fighter aircraft
to help defend the targets but would probably not ask for ground troops.
The Chinese would probably decline to intervene in the air and would not
volunteer ground forces, though they would urge NVN to continue the war.
-The Soviets would be "concerned" at the prospect of a further escalation
of the bombing:
The Soviets would find their difficulties and frustra-
tions increased. .. .They are committed to provide defense
for North Vietnam, and... their inability to do so effectively
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would be dramatized. .. ,We believe that they would not change
their basic policy of avoiding overt involvement in combat
.while giving extensive military equipment and economic
assistance to NVN. But their relations with the US would
almost certainly deteriorate, for it is the bombing of
North Vietnam which is, for Moscow, the most nearly intoler-
able aspect of /the War£7 iS/
In its estimate of the likely reactions to the wider
course of substantially expanding the U.S. effort in the South, together
with the bombing and aerial mining of the North, the Board similarly
offered little hope that the escalation would produce any marked improve-
ment in the situation. They characterized NVN's will to resist in the
North and to persevere in the South as virtually unshakeable in the short
run and extremely tough even in the long run:
Present Communist policy is to continue to prosecute
the war vigorously in the South. The Communists recognize
that the US reinforcements of 1965 signify a determination
to avoid defeat. They expect more US troops and probably
anticipate that targets in the Hanoi -Haiphong area will come
under air attack. Nevertheless, they remain unwilling to
damp down the conflict or move toward negotiation. They
expect a long war, but they continue to believe that time
is their ally and that their own staying power is superior. 16/
Heavier air attacks by themselves would not budge them:
The DRV would not decide to quit; PAVN infiltration
southward would continue. Damage from the strikes would
make it considerably more difficult to support the war in
the South, but these difficulties would neither be immedi-
ate nor insurmountable . 17/
Aerial mining would create serious problems, but NVN would keep supplies
moving by resorting to shallow- draft coastal shipping and intensive
efforts to keep the rail lines open. As for the South, NVN would accept
the challenge :
Rather than conclude in advance that the tide of battle
would turn permanently against them, the Communists would
choose tc boost their own commitment ard to test US capa-
bilities and will to persevere at a higher level of conflict
and casualties. Thus the DRV reaction would probably be a
larger program of PAVN infiltration. 18/
The Board's picture of Hanoi was one of almost unbelievably
strong commitment and dogged determination, by contrast with previous
estimates. Thus, if the U.S. .committed enough forces in the South to
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prevent NVA/VC forces from sustaining the conflict at a significant
level — and the Board would not estimate how many U.S, forces were
"enough" —
...they might believe it necessary to make a more
fundamental choice between resorting to political tactics
or enlarging the war. /But/ We believe that it would take a
prolonged period of military discouragement to convince the
DRV and the VC, persuaded as they are of their inherent
advantages, that they had reached such a pass. 1 9 /
Even if It found itself in such straits, however, the chances were close
to 5 O- 5 O that NVN would bring in Chinese forces rather than quit:
If this point were reached. .. .Prudence would seem to
dictate that Hanoi ... should choose... to reduce the effort
in the South, perhaps negotiate, and salvage their resources
for another day. We think that the chances are a little
better than even that this is what they would do. But their
ideological and emotional commitment, and the high political
stakes involved, persuade us that there is an almost equal
chance that they would do the opposite, that is, enlarge the
war and bring in large numbers of Chinese forces. SO /
The two CIA intelligence estimates of the probable con-
sequences of the proposed escalatory measures were apparently closely
held, but the available documentary evidence does not reveal how influ-
ential they may have been. Secretary McNamara's response to the JCS
was merely that he was considering their recommendations "carefully" in
connection with "decisions that must be taken on other related aspects
of the conflict in Vietnam." 21/ He was apparently not satisfied with
the estimate of reactions to the POL strikes, however, which was largely
confined to an estimate of political reactions, and asked CIA for another
estimate, this time related to two options: (a) attack on the storage and
handling facilities at Haiphong, and (b) attack on the facilities at
Haiphong together with the other bulk storage sites .
The new estimate was submitted by Richard Helms, then
Acting Director of CIA, on 28 December (with the comment that it had
been drafted without reference to any pause in the bombing "such as is
now the subject of various speculative press articles." 22/ The esti-
mate snelled out with greater force than before what "strains" the POL
strikes might create in the North and how they might "embarrass" NVA/vc
military operations in the South, and its tone was much more favorable
to carrying out the strikes.
The estimate made little distinction between the two
options. Haiphong was by far the most important and most sensitive of
the targets and the closest to a major city; the attacks on the others were
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of secondary importance. Neither option was likely to bring about a
change in NVN policy, either toward negotiations or toward sharply
enlarging the war, but either option would substantially increase NVN's
economic difficulties in the North and logistics problems in the South.
First, the estimate said, NVN would have to resort to
much less efficient methods of receiving, storing and handling POL:
Destruction of the storage tanks and bulk unloading
equipment at Haiphong would substantially increase the
Communists' logistic problems and force them to improvise
alternate POL import and distribution channels. These
could include, subject to the hazards of interdiction, the
use of rail or highway tankers and the transport of POL
in drums by road, rail, or coastal shipping. The DRV is
already increasing its use of drums because this facili-
tates dispersal and concealment. However, handling POL
this way also requires greater expenditures of time and
effort, and very large numbers of drums. Resort to these
methods would necessitate transhipping through Chinese ports
or transport directly across China by rail, which would in
turn not only involve physical delays and difficulties but
also increase the DRV's political problems in arranging for the
the passage of Soviet supplies through China. 23 /
This in turn would interfere with the production and distribution of
goods in NVN:
The economy would suffer appreciably from the resultant
disruption of transportation. This... would somewhat curtail
the output of the DRV's modest industrial establishment and
complicate the problems of internal distribution. 2hJ
And make it more difficult to support the war in the South (although it
would not force a reduction in such support):
The loss of stored POL and the dislocation of the
distribution system would add appreciably to the DRV's
difficulties in supplying the Communist forces in the South.
However, we have estimated that the Communist effort in
South Vietnam, at present levels of combat, does not depend
on imports of POL into the South and requires only relatively
small tonnages of other supplies (say 12 tons per day, on an
annual basis). Accordingly, we believe that adequate quan-
tities of supplies would continue to move by one means or
another to the Communist forces in South Vietnam, though the
supplies would not move as fast and it would hence require
more to keep the pipeline filled 25 /
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But was not likely to break Hanoi's will:
Although there presumably is a point at which one more
turn of the screw would crack the enemy resistance to
negotiations, past experience indicates that we are unlikely
to have clear evidence when that point has been reached....
Though granting that each increase of pressure on the DRV
bears with it the possibility that it may be decisive, we
do not believe the bombing of the Haiphong facility is likely
to have such an effect. 26 /
With the exception of State's I NR, other intelligence
agencies appeared to look with favor upon escalating the bombing. In
a SNIE issued on 10 December, they agreed that intensified air attacks,
beginning with POL facilities and key power plants and extending to
other targets in the Hanoi /Haiphong area and mining the harbors, would
not bring about any basic change in NVN policy hut would in time hamper
NVN's operations and set a lid on the war in the South:
We believe that Hanoi's leaders would not decide to
quit and that PAVN infiltration southward would continue.
Though damage from the strikes would make it considerably
more difficult to support the war in South Vietnam, these
difficulties would not be immediate. Over the long run,
the sustained damage inflicted upon North Vietnam might
impose significant limitations on the numbers of PAVN and
VC main force units which could be actively supported in
South Vietnam from North Vietnam. 27 /
Mining the ports, despite the dilemma created for the Soviets, would
probably succeed in blocking all deep-water shipping:
The difficulty of clearing such mine fields and the
ease of resowing would virtually rule out efforts to reopen
the ports. The Soviets would protest vigorously and might
try for some kind of action in the UN. We do not believe,
however, that the Soviets would risk their ships in mined
Vietnamese harbors. Peking and Hanoi would try to compensate
by keeping supplies moving in shallow- draft coastal shipping
and overland. 28 /
DIA, NSA, and the 3 Service intelligence agencies even
recorded a judgment that the intensified air strikes, combined with the
projected build-up of U.S. ground forces .in SVN to about 350,000 troops
by the fall of 1966 , might . ultimately result in a change of heart in
Hanoi. In a footnote to the SNIE they said they believed:
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...that as time goes on and as the impact of sustained
bombing in NVN merges with the adverse effects of the other
courses of action as they begin to unfold, the DRV would
become clearly aware of the extent of US determination and
thus might reconsider its position and seek a means to
achieve a cessation of the hostilities. 2 9/
I NR dissented. Its Director, Thomas L. Hughes, wrote that
the escalation would evoke stronger reactions than indicated in the
SNIE, "because it would be widely assumed that we were initiating an
effort to destroy the DRV’s modest industrial establishment":
The distinction between such operations and all-out
war would appear increasingly tenuous. As. these attacks
expanded, Hanoi would be less and less likely to soften its
opposition to negotiations and at some point it would come
to feel that it had little left to lose by continuing the
fighting.... 30/
B. The Issue Focuses
1. POL and the Pause
Meanwhile, the flow of JCS papers urging POL strikes as
the next step continued. Secretary McNamara sent the Chairman, General
Wheeler, the 27 November CIA estimate which had suggested that the
strikes would not have great impact on the war (they would only "embar-
rass" operations in the South). General Wheeler commented that the loss
of POL storage would do much more:
It would, in fact, have a substantial impact not only
on their military operations but also would significantly
impede their efforts to support the anticipated build-up of
VC/PAVN forces in South Vietnam during the coining months. 31/
General Wheeler also forwarded a Joint Staff -DIA study
of the POL target system, with the comment that destruction of the system
would force NVN to curtail all but the most vital POL-powered activities
and resort to "more extensive use of porters, animal transport, and non-
powered water craft." The net result would be to considerably reduce
EVN's capability to move large units cr quartities of equipment, an
important consideration in view of the fact that motorable segments of
. the Ho Chi Minh trail were being extended. 32/
The Joint Staff -DIA study 33/ showed that NVN's bulk POL
storage capacity was greatly in excess of what NVN required to sustain
current consumption levels — 179,000 metric tons available as compared
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with 32,000 metric tons needed — indicating that the strikes would
have to be very damaging in order to cause NVN any major difficulties.
The study also hinted that an adequate substitute system could be
improvised, with lighterage from ocean tankers and dispersed storage,
but it nonetheless concluded that the strikes would result in "a reduc-
tion of essential transport capabilities for military logistic and
infiltration support opeations," i.e., as a result of a deprivation of
necessary POL. 3V
As already noted, during the 37-day Pause, the JCS con-
tinued to recommend not only the resumption of the bombing but resumption
with a dramatic sharp blow on major targets, including FOL, followed by
uninterrupted, increasing "pressure" bombing. They wished, in short,
to turn the limited bombing program into a major strategic assault on NVN.
In mid-January 1 966 they sent Secretary McNamara a memo reiterating old
arguments that the current ROLLING THUNDER program would not cause NVN
to stop supporting the war in the South, and that the piecemeal nature
of the attacks left NVN free to replenish and disperse its supplies and
contend with interdictions. The way to achieve U.S. objectives, the JCS
said, was to implement the bombing program they had recommended long ago,
in JCSM 982-64 of 23 November 1964, which called for the rapid destruction
of the entire NVN target system. In order to get the program started, the
JCS recommended extending armed reconnaissance to all areas of NVN except
the sanctuaries, which they would shrink (to a 10-mile radius around
Hanoi and Fnuc Yen airfield, a 4-mile radius around Haiphong, and a strip
20 miles along the Chinese border); lifting the sortie ceiling on armed
reconnaissance; and removing "tactical restrictions" on the execution of
specific strikes. The strikes would be heavy enough to deny NVN external
assistance, destroy in-country resources contributing to the war, destroy
in-country resources contributing to the war, destroy all military facili-
ties, and harass, disrupt, and impede movement into SVN. 35 /
The idea of resuming the bombing with a large and dramatic
bang did not appeal much to decision-makers. Apart from the old problem
of triggering an unwanted Chinese reaction, the Administration was inter-
ested in giving the lie to NVN and Chinese claims that the Pause was a
cynical prelude to escalation. Although it was possible that resuming
merely where the bombing left off (following as it would an extended pause
and a display of great eagerness for peace) might signal too much irreso-
lution and uncertainty, there was good reason to put off any escalatory
acts for a while. As Assistant Secretary of State William Bundy wrote:
For a period of two-three weeks at least, while the
world is digesting and assessing the Pause, we should do as
little as possible to lend fuel to the charge -- which will
doubtless be the main theme of Communist propaganda -- that
the Pause was intended all along merely as a prelude to more
drastic action. 3 6/
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Bundy in fact suggested resuming at a lesser level, opening with strikes
below the 20th parallel, and only after a few weeks again moving north-
ward. McNaughton wrote:
No consideration argues for a ’noisy* resumption....
The program at first should be at the level and against
the kinds of targets involved prior to the Pause (only
two weeks later should the program begin... to escalate ). 37/
He also suggested that criticism would be less if the first strikes were
clearly identified with the effort to stop the southward flow of men
and supplies, which had been greatly increased during the Pause.
The decisions went against ending the Pause with a bang.
When the bombing was resumed on 3h January (Saigon time) it was limited
"until further notice" to armed reconnaissance. No new major targets
were authorized. The former sanctuary restrictions and the sortie
ceilings were maintained. 38 /
It was also decided to postpone any serious escalation for
the time being. Secretary McNamara informed the JCS that their proposals
for rapid escalation were being considered, and on 24 January he sent
the President a memorandum on the overall Vietnam program which side-
stepped the issue. For 1966, the memorandum said, the bombing program
against NVN should include 4000 attack sorties per month "at a minimum."
It should consist of day and night armed reconnaissance against rail and
road targets and POL storage sites. The present sanctuaries should be
preserved. There should be more intense bombing of targets in Laos,
along the Bassac and Mekong Rivers running into SVN from Cambodia, and
better surveillance of the sea approaches. 39/
The use of interdiction rather than pressure terms in the
Presidential memorandum, and the emphasis on bombing infiltration routes
into SVN, rather than the flow of supplies into or within NVN, indicates
that the Secretary was still interested in keeping the objectives of the
bombing limited and any escalation in check. The memorandum said that
the bombing had already achieved the objective of raising the cost of
infiltration, and was reducing the amount of enemy supplies reaching the
South. In NVN it had also diverted manpower to air defense and repair
work interfered with mobility, and forced the decentralization of many
activities- It could further reduce the flow of supplies to NVA./VC forces
in the South, and limit their "flexibility" to defend themselves adequately
or undertake frequent offensive action, but it was doubtful that even
heavier bombing would put a "tight ceiling" on the NVN effort in the
South. 4o/
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Despite the application of the brake on ROLLING THUNDER
operations, the debate over escalation wore on. Further proposals were
made and further studies and reviews were requested. DIA was asked
to conduct a special analysis of the NVN POL system. The study said
that the exceptionally high ratio of storage capacity to consumption
all owed the system to "absorb a high degree of degradation," and noted
that the dispersed sites in the system were "relatively invulnerable,"
but concluded nonetheless that (a) the loss of storage at Haiphong would
be "critical to the entire bulk distribution system" and would require
either a "modification" in the handling of marine imports or a switch
to importation by rail or truck through China, and (b) the loss of the
other facilities would produce local POL shortages and transportation
bottlenecks until substitutes and alternatives could be devised. 4l/
2. The February Debate
In February a SNIE was published, estimating how NVN's
physical capabilities (not its will) to support the war in the South
would be affected by increasing the scope and intensity of ROLLING
THUNDER. The enlarged program which the estimate considered included
attacks to destroy all known POL facilities, destroy all large military
facilities except airfields and SAM sites (unless they seriously inter-
fered with our operations), interdict the land LOCs from China, (a) with
or (b) without closing the ports, put and keep electric power plants out
of action, and restrict the use of LOCs throughout NVN but especially
south of Hanoi. 42/
The SNIE concluded that although the increased bombing
might set a limit somewhere on the expansion of NVA/VC forces and their
operations in SVN, it would not prevent their support at substantially
higher levels than in 1965- The destruction of electric power facilities
would practically "paralyze" NVN's industry, but
, . .because so little of what Is sent south is pro-
duced in the DRV, an industrial shutdown would not very
seriously reduce the regime's capability to support the
insurgency. 43/
Destruction of POL storage facilities would force NVN to almost complete
dependence on current Imports, but NVN could manage. Destruction of
military facilities would mean the loss of some stockpiled munitions,
"although most such storage is now well dispersed and concealed." Closing
the norts and interdicting the LOCs from China would reduce the level of
imports leaving the ports open would not — but NVN could continue to
b r ^ n g enough supplies that were critical to the survival of the regime
and essential military tasks, including the "small quantities" necessary
for transshipment to SVN.
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Importation of POL would be a key problem, but would
be surmountable in a comparatively short time, probably a
few weeks, since quantities involved would not be large,
even if increased somewhat over previous levels. Soviet
POL could be unloaded from tankers at Chan- chi ang in South
China, moved thence by rail to the DRV border and from there
to the Hanoi area by truck. It could also move from the USSR
by rail directly across China, or down the coast from Chan-
chiang in shallow- draft shipping. 44 /
Restricting the LOCs south of the Hanoi region would create logistical
problems for NVN military forces in Military Region IV south of the 20th
parallel, but would not stop the relatively small amounts of material
forwarded to SVN.
The cumulative effect of the proposed bombing program
would make life difficult for NVN, therefore, but it would not force it
to curtail the war in the South:
The combined impact of destroying in -country stock-
piles, restricting import capabilities, and attacking the
southward LOCs would greatly complicate the DRV war effort.
The cumulative drain on material resources and human energy
would be severe. The postulated bombing and interdiction
campaign would harass, disrupt, and impede the movement
of men and material into South Vietnam and impose great
overall difficulty on the DRV. However, we believe that,
with a determined effort, the DRV could still move sub-
stantially greater amounts than in 1965* 4 5 /
The bombing program would not prevent NVN from further expanding NVA/VC
forces in the South at the projected reinforcement rate of 4500 men per
month and from further providing them with heavier weapons, but it might
set some limit on their size and their operations:
. . .an attempt by the Communists to increase their
strength. . .to intensify hostilities. . .or. . .to meet
expanded US/GVN offensive operations .. .will use up
supplies at a higher rate. . ./ThisJ might raise supply
requirements to a level beyond the practical ceiling
imposed on their logistic capabilities by the bombing
campaign. .. .There are, however, too many uncertainties
to permit estimating at just what level the limit on
expansion would be. 46 /
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Also in February, Secretary McNamara asked the JCS to
develop an optimum air interdiction program "to reduce to the maxi-
mum extent the support in men and materiel being provided by North
Vietnam to the Viet Cong and PAVN forces in South Vietnam." 47/ The
study, forwarded to the Secretary on 14 April, managed to frame an
interdiction program which embraced virtually everything the JCS had
been recommending. It pointed out that less than half of the JCS
targets, "the most critical to North Vietnam's support of the insurgency,
military capabilities, and industrial output," had been hit, "due to
self-imposed restraints":
These restraints have caused a piecemealing of air
operations which has allowed the enemy a latitude of freedom
to select and use methods that significantly increase his
combat effectiveness. It has permitted him to receive war
supporting materiel from external sources through routes of
ingress which for the most part have been immune from attack
and then to disperse and store this materiel in politically
assured sanctuaries. From these sanctuaries the enemy then
infiltrates this materiel to SVN/Laos . . . . Throughout the
entire movement, maximum use is made of villages and towns
as sanctuaries. These and the Hanoi, Haiphong, and China
border buffer areas cloak and protect his forces and mater-
iel, provide him a military training and staging area free
from attack, and permit him to mass his air defense weapons.
....The less than optimum air campaign, and the rela-
tively unmolested receipt of supplies from Russia, China,
satellite countries, and certain elements of the Free World
have undoubtedly contributed to Hanoi's belief in ultimate
victory. Therefore, it is essential that an intensified air
campaign be promptly initiated against specific target sys-
tems critical to North Vietnam's capability for continued
aggression and support of insurgency. 48/
The study went on to outline an intensified bombing
campaign to cause NVN to stop supporting the insurgency in the South
by making, it difficult and costly for North Vietnam to
continue effective support of the NVN/VC forces in South
Vietnam and to impose progressively increasing penalties
on NVN for continuing to support insurgency in Southeast
Asia. 49/
Its language left no doubt that while the strikes were intended "to
restrict' NVN capability to support and conduct armed aggression in
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SEAsia," the ultimate purpose was to apply pressure against Hanoi's
will:
The strategy of this plan requires initial application
of air attacks over a widespread area against the NVN mili-
tary base structure and war supporting resources. The
intensity of air operations and the number of targets to
be attacked gradually increase. Under such pressure of
attack, NVN must further disperse or face destruction in
depth of its military base and resources. The dispersal
will increase the stresses on command, control, and logistic
support and should cause some concern in the Military Com-
mand of the wisdom of further aggression. .. .The combined
effects of reducing and restricting external assistance to
NVN, the progressive attacks against NVN military and war
supporting resources, the interdiction of infiltration
routes in NVN and Laos, and the destruction of NVN/vC forces
and bases in SVN and Laos should cause a reappraisal in
Hanoi as to NVN's military capability to continue aggression. 50 /
The plan, which was merely "noted" and not red-striped
by the JCS, called for the "controlled and phased intensification of
air strikes" and a "modest adjustment" in the sanctuaries (to 10 miles
around Hanoi, 4 around Haiphong, and 20 from the Chinese border, as
previously recommended by the JCS). A first phase extended armed recon-
naissance to the northeast, and struck 11 more JCS-listed bridges, the
Thai Nguyen railroad yards and shops, 14 headquarters/barracks, 4 ammuni-
tion and 2 supply depots, 5 POL storage areas, 1 airfield, 2 naval bases,
and 1 radar site, all outside the (reduced) sanctuaries. The second
phase attacked 12 "military and war supporting installations" within
the Hanoi and Haiphong sanctuaries: 2 bridges, 3 POL storage areas, 2
railroad shops and yards, 3 supply depots, 1 machine tool plant, and
1 airfield. The third phase attacked the 43 remaining JCS targets,
including 6 bridges, 7 ports and naval bases, 6 industrial plants, 7 locks
10 power plants, the NVN ministries of national and air defense, and
assorted railroad, supply, radio, and transformer stations.
The plan also provided for three special attack options
for execution during any of the phases "as a counter to enemy moves or
when strong political and military action is desired." The options were:
attack on the K)L center at Haiphong; aerial mining of the channel
approaches to Haiphong, Hon Gai, and Cam Pha, the three principal mari-
time ports; and strikes against the major jet airfields at Hanoi, Haiphong
and Phuc Yen. 51 /
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The JCS were apparently not in complete sympathy with
the gradual phasing of stronger attacks ovei several months, as pro-
posed in the study. In their formal memoranda to the SecDef they
continued to restate their mid-January recommendations for the sharp
blows with maximum shock effect as "the soundest program from a mili-
tary standpoint" which offered "the greatest return for the air effort
expended." 52/ Apparently sensing that this was more than the traffic
would hear, however, they began to push for early strikes against POL
as "one of the highest priority actions not yet approved." They pointed
out that NVN was busily expanding and improving its LOCs, and its
"offensive and defensive" air capabilities; it was expediting its
import of trucks. POL was becoming increasingly significant to WVN's
war effort, and its destruction would have an "immediate effect on the
military movement of war supporting materials." 53 /
3 . The CIA Recommends Escalation
While the JCS kept up its barrage of recommendations during
March, CIA broke into the debate with an apparently very influential
report on the past accomplishments and future prospects of the bombing.
The report virtually wrote off the bombing results to date as insignifi-
cant, in terms of either interdiction or pressure; blamed "the highly
restrictive ground rules" under which the program operated; and took
the bold step, for an intelligence document, of explicitly recommending
a preferred bombing program of greater intensity, redirected largely
against "the will of the regime as a target system." $4/
The report held that the economic and military damage sus-
tained by NVN had been moderate and the cost had been passed along to
the USSR and China. The major effect of the bombing had been to disrupt
normal activity, particularly in transportation and distribution, but
with considerable external help the regime had been singularly successful
in overcoming any serious problems. It had been able to strengthen its
defenses, keep its economy going, and increase the flow of men and sup-
plies South. Most of the direct damage so far had been to facilities
which NVN did not need to sustain the military effort, and which the
regime merely did without. It had been able to maintain the overall
performance of the transport at ion system at the levels of 1964 or better.
It had increased the capacity of the LOCs to the South and made them less
vulnerable to air attack by increasing the number of routes and bypasses.
Despite the bombing, truck movement through Laos, with larger vehicles
and heavier loads, had doubled.
The program had not been able to accomplish more because
it bad been handicapped by severe operational restrictions:
Self-imposed restrictions have limited both the choice
of targets and the areas to be bombed. Consequently, almost
80 percent of North Vietnam's limited modern, industrial
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economy, 75 percent of the nation's population and the
most lucrative military supply and LOC targets have been
effectively insulated from air attack. Moreover, the
authorizations for each of the ROLLING THUNDER programs
often have imposed additional restrictions, such as limiting
the number of strikes against approved fixed targets. The
policy decision to avoid suburban casualties to the extent
possible has proved to be a major constraint.
The overall effect of those area and operational
restrictions has been to grant a large measure of
•immu nity to the military, political, and economic assets
used in Hanoi's support of the war in the South and to
insure an ample flow of military supplies from North
Vietnam's allies. Among North Vietnam's target systems,
not one has been attacked either intensively or extensively
enough to provide a critical reduction in national capacity.
No target system can be reduced to its critical point under
existing rules. 55 /
Moreover, the bombing had been too light, fragmented, and slowly paced:
The ROLLING THUNDER program has spread bomb tonnage
over a great variety of military and economic targets
systems, but the unattacked targets of any one system have
consistently left more than adequate capacity to meet all
essential requirements. Furthermore, the attacks on major
targets have often been phased over such long periods of
time that adequate readjustment to meet the disruption could
be accomplished. jj6/
What was required was a basic reorientation of the
program;
Fundamental changes must be made if the effective-
ness of the campaign is to be raised significantly.
First, the constraints upon the air attack must be
reduced. Secondly, target selection must be placed on
a more rational basis militarily. 57/
Putting the program on a "more rational" military basis
apparently involved abandoning interdiction as a primary goal. The
report held out little promise that any acceptable bombing program
* cou ia physically interfere with the flow of supplies to the South.
The NVN economy, it stated, was not "an indigenous economic base heavily
committed to the support of military operations in the South," but rather
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a "logistic funnel" through which supplies from the USSR and China
flowed. As such, it was a hard target, easy to maintain in operation
and quite large for the load. This was particularly the case in the
lower half of the "funnel", where the bombing had been concentrated:
...the rudimentary nature of the logistic targets
in the southern part of North Vietnam, the small volume
of traffic moving over them in relation to route capaci-
ties, the relative ease and speed with which they are
repaired, the extremely high frequency with which they
would have to be restruck — once every three days —
all combine to make the logistic network in this region
a relatively unattractive target system, except as a
supplement to a larger program. A significant lesson from
the ROLLING THUNDER program to date is that the goals of
sustained interdictions of the rudimentary road and trail
networks in southern North Vietnam and Laos will be
extremely difficult and probably impossible to obtain in
1966 , given the conventional ordnance and strike capabili-
ties likely to exist. 58 /
The upper half of the "funnel" was a much more lucrative
target — not, however, because attacking it would choke the volume
of supplies flowing into the South, but because it would inflict more
pain on the regime in the North.
The flow of military logistics supplies from the USSR
and China cannot be cut off, but the movement could be
made considerably more expensive and unreliable if authoriza-
tion is granted to attack intensively the rail connections to
Communist China and if the three major ports are effectively
mined. About 2/3 of North Vietnam's imports are carried by
sea transport and the remainder move principally over the
rail connections from Communist China. Mining the entrances
to the three major ports would effectively transfer all
imports to rail transport, including the flow of imports needed
to" maintain economic activity. The rail connections to Com-
munist China would then become a more lucrative target and
the disruptive effect of interdiction would then be more
immediately felt. Sustained interdiction would then force
Hanoi to allocate considerable amounts of manpower and
materials to maintain the line. 59/
Bombing the supplies and supply facilities at the top of
the "funnel" was therefore a "preferred LOC target system." It was
not advanced as an interdiction measure, however, but as a means of
increasing the penalty to Hanoi (and its allies), in terms of economic.
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social, and political consequences, of supporting the war in the South,
and thus presumably to reduce the desire to continue it. Other targets
which might be attacked in order to similarly influence the will of the
regime were: 2 6 military barracks and/or supply facilities on the JCS
list, the neutralization of which would "impede the flow of military
supplies and disrupt the military training programs of NVN" ; 8 major POL
storage facilities, which had a "direct bearing" on the regime's ability
to support the war in the South, but which had to be hit almost simul-
taneously in order to reduce NVN to the critical point in meeting essential
requirements; the Haiphong cement plant, the loss of which would "create
a major impediment to reconstruction and repair programs" until cement
could be imported; 3 major and 11 minor industrial plants which, though
they made "no direct or significant contribution to the war effort" and
"only a limited contribution" to the economy, were "highly prized and
nominally lucrative" targets; or, as an alternative method of knocking
out industrial production, the main electric power facilities. 6 0/
As for other potential targets in NVN — the command and
control system, agriculture, and manpower —
Attacks on these targets are not recommended at this
time. In each case the effects are debatable and are
likely to provoke hostile reactions in world capitals. 6l/
The March CIA report, with its obvious bid to turn ROLLING
THUNDER into a punitive bombing campaign and its nearly obvious promise
of real payoff, strengthened JCS proposals to intensify the bombing. In
particular, however, the report gave a substantial boost to the proposal
to hit the POL targets. The POL system appeared to be the one target system
in NVN to which, what the report called, "the principle of concentration"
might be applied; that is, in which enough of the system could be brought
under simultaneous attack to cut through any cushion of excess capacity,
and in which a concentrated attack might be able to overwhelm the other
side's ability to reconstruct, repair, or disperse its capacity. 62/
The POL targets had other qualities to commend them as the
next escalatory step in ROLLING THUNDER. They really were pressure tar-
gets, but they could be plausibly sold as interdiction targets. The
main ones were in the Hanoi /Haiphong sanctuaries, so that over and above
any economic or military impact, strikes against them would signal that
the last sanctuaries were going and the industrial and other targets there
were now at risk. They fit the image of "war -supporting” facilities which
strategic bombing doctrine and ample military precedent had decreed to be
' fair game in bringing a war machine to a standstill. They had, in fact,
been struck before in other parts of NVN without any unusual political
repercussions. They were situated in the arbitrarily-defined urban/
industrial centers, but somewhat set apart from the densest civilian
housing areas, and thus might not entail as many civilian casualties
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as other targets in those areas.
Moreover, ever, if the impact of POL strikes would be
within NVTI itself — because NVN supplied no POL at all to NVA/VC forces
in the South and used next to none in transporting other goods there —
POL was at least relevant as an interdiction target. It did power trucks
and boats which were involved in carrying men and supplies South. If
any truck in the NVN fleet was an acceptable interdiction target, wherever
it was and whatever its cargo, why not any POL?
4. McNamara Endorses POL, The President Defers It
Resumption of ROLLING THUNDER , as initiation of the pause,
did not, of course, constitute a final decision on escalation. The views
of CINCFAC and the JCS remained unaltered, and Secretary McNamara stood
committed, unless he reversed himself, to enlarging the area and intensity
of interdiction bombing and to destroying North Vietnamese POL. Neither
in OSD nor the White House had anyone opposed these measures on other than
prudential grounds — the risk of alienating allies or provoking Chinese
or Russian intervention or uncertainty that results would justify either
the risks or the costs. Everyone seemed agreed that, were it not for these
factors, intensified bombing of the North would help to accomplish American
objectives. Nevertheless, the position of the decision-makers can best be
characterized as hesitant.
The services naturally undertook to tip the balance toward
the rapid and extensive escalation they had ail along advocated. To
McNamara's memorandum to the President, the JCS had attached a dissent.
They felt that the Secretary underrated the "cumulative effect of our
air campaign against the DRV on morale and DRV capabilities" and over-
estimated the "constancy of will of the Hanoi leaders to continue a
struggle which they realize they cannot win in the face of progressively
greater destruction of their country." 63 /
When McNamara reported to the Chairman the President 1 s ruling
on ROLLING THUNDER, he apparently spoke of the difficulty of making out a
convincing case that air operations against North Vietnam could seriously
affect PAVN/vC operations in the South. In any event, following a conver-
sation with the Secretary, General Wheeler ordered formation of a special
study group to devise a bombing effort "redirected for optimum military
effect." He explained, "the primary objective should be to reduce to the
maximum extent the support in men and materiel being provided by North
Viet-Nam to the Viet Cong and PAVN forces in South Viet-Nam." 64/ Headed
' by a Brigadier General from SAC, composed of five Air Force, three Navy,
two Army, and one Marine Corps officers, and making extensive use of
CINCPAC assistance, this study group went to work in early February, with
an assignment to produce at least an interim report by 1 March and a final
report no later than 1 August,, o 5/
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Meanwhile, routine continued, with CINCPAC recommending
programs thirteen days prior to the beginning of a month and the JCS
acting on these recommendations two days later. 66/ In consequence,
McNamara received from the Chiefs on 19 February the same advice that
had been given during the pause. 67 / He and the President responded
much as before, though now permitting armed reconnaissance within the
geographical limits fixed just before the pause and authorizing a sig-
nificant increase — to above 5,000 — in numbers of sorties. 68/
On 1 March, when this slightly enlarged campaign opened,
the Chiefs filed a memorandum stressing the special importance of an
early attack on North Vietnamese POL. 69 / They had singled out POL
somewhat earlier, writing McNamara in November, 1965 , that attack on
this target "would be more damaging to the DRV capability to move war-
supporting resources within country and along infiltration routes to
SVN than an attack against any other single target system." While causing
relatively little damage to the civilian economy, it would, they reasoned
force a sharp reduction in truck and other road traffic carrying men and
supplies southward. They held also that the attack should be made soon,
before North Vietnam succeeded in improving air defenses and in dispersing
POL storage. 70/
McNamara had rejected this recommendation, not only because
of the planned pause, but also because CIA sources questioned some of
the Chiefs' reasoning and stressed counterarguments which they tended to
minimize. Assessing the probable results of not only taking out North
Vietnamese POL, but also mining harbors and bombing military and indus-
trial targets in the northeast quadrant, the Board of National Estimates
said, "Damage from the strikes would make it considerably more difficult
to support the war in the South, hut these difficulties would neither he
immediate nor insurmountable." 71 / With regard to the POL system alone,
the Board observed "it is unlikely that this loss would cripple the Com-
munist military operations in the South, though it would certainly
embarrass them." Pointing out that the bulk of storage facilities stood
near Haiphong and Hanoi, the Board went on to say that "the Communists
would unquestionably regard the proposed U.S. attacks as opening a new
stage in the war, and as a signal of U.S. intention to escalate the
scale of conflict." 72/ This appraisal did not encourage adoption of
the JCS recommendation.
The Chiefs continued nevertheless to press for a favorable
decision. Before and during the pause, they presented fresh memoranda
to McNamara. 73 / A more detailed CIA study, obtained just after Christ-
mas provided somewhat more hacking for their view. It conceded that the
' Communists were dispersing POL facilities and that an early attack on
those at Hanoi and Haiphong "would add appreciably to the DRV's difficulties
in supplying the Communist forces in the South." Nevertheless, it fore-
cast that "adequate quantities of supplies would continue to move by one
me^-ns or another to the Communist forces in South Vietnam." 74/
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In mid-January, the DIA prepared an estimate considerably
more favorable to the scheme. 75/ But in early February appeared a
SNIE estimating effects on "DRV physical capabilities to support the
insurgency in the South" of the various measures, including attacks on
POL, previously recommended by CINCPAC and the JCS. Its conclusion, sub-
scribed to by all intelligence services except that of the Air Force,
was that, even with a campaign extended to port facilities, power plants,
and land LOG'S from China, "with a determined effort, the DRV could still
move substantially greater amounts than in 1965 ." 76 /
In renewing their recommendation on 1 March, and again on
10 March, the JCS once more disputed such assessments. In an appendix
to their long March 1 memorandum to the Secretary, the Chiefs outlined a
concept of operations upon which they proposed to base future deployments.
With respect to the air war, they urged that it be expanded to include POL
and the aerial mining of ports and attacks on Hanoi and Haiphong. Their
rationale was as follows :
To cause. . .NVN to cease its control, direction, and
support of the communist insurgency in SVN and Laos, air
strikes are conducted against military and war-sustaining
targets in all areas, including the Hanoi/Haiphong complex
and areas to the north and northeast. Armed reconnaissance
within NVN and its coastal waters Is conducted to interdict
LOCs, harass, destroy and disrupt military operations and
the movement of men and materials from NVN into Laos and SVN.
Aerial mining of ports and interdiction of inland waterways
and coastal waters, harbors and water LOCs are conducted to
reduce the flow of war resources. Air reconnaissance and
special air operations are conducted in support of the over-
all effort." 77/
Ten days later the Chiefs again requested attacks on the POL together with
authorization to mine the approaches to Haiphong. This time they noted
that Ambassador Lodge and Admiral Sharp had each recently endorsed such
measures (no documents so indicating are available to the writer). Sup-
porting their request they cited recent intelligence reports of North
Vietnamese orders for expedited delivery of additional trucks. With the
arrival of more trueks, POL would become even more critical to the North
Vietnamese logistical effort. Once POL reserves were initially destroyed,
however, the mining of Haiphong harbor would be the next immediate priority
to prevent resupply by North Vietnam's allies, 78 / The Chiefs argued that
the elimination as a package of these high value targets would signifi-
cantly damage the DRV'.s war-sustaining capability.
This time, moreover, the Chiefs possessed support in the
intelligence community. A study by CIA addressed the question which had
been deliberately omitted from the terms of reference for the 4 February
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SMIE, i.e. , what effect bombing might produce on the will of the
North Vietnamese regime. Judging from a summary with some extracts,
preserved in Task Force files, it made a stiong case for almost
unlimited bombing such as CINCPAC and the JCS had steadily advocated.
It accepted previous judgments that "the goals of sustained interdictions
of the rudimentary road and trail networks in southern North Vietnam and
Laos will be extremely difficult and probably impossible to obtain in
1966, given the conventional ordnance and strike capabilities likely
to exist." Though arguing that more payoff could result from regarding
North Vietnam as a "logistic funnel" and attempting to stop what went
into it rather than what came out, it conceded that the "flow of military
logistics supplies from the USSR and China cannot be cut off." But the
report contended that such measures as mining harbors, maintaining steady
pressure on LOC’s with China, and destroying militarily insignificant
but "highly prized" industrial plants would not only reduce North Vietnam's
capacity to support the insurgency in the South but would influence her
leaders’ willingness to continue doing so. "Fundamental changes must be
made if the effectiveness of the campaign is to be raised significantly,"
said the report, "First, the constraints upon the air attack must be
reduced. Secondly, target selection must be placed on a more rational
basis militarily." One point stressed was the importance of taking out
nl 1 remaining POL storage facilities simultaneously and at an early date. 79 /
With memoranda from the JCS now reinforced by this CIA
report, Secretary McNamara had to reconsider the POL issue. Conferring
with Wheeler on 23 March, he put several specific questions, among them
whether destruction of POL storage facilities would produce significant
results if not coupled with raining of North Vietnamese ports, what exact
targets were to be hit, and with how many sorties. 80/ Responding with
the requested details, the Chiefs said that they attached the highest
importance to the operation, even if enemy harbors remained open. They
strongly recommended, in addition, attacks on adjoining industrial targets
and LOC’s, in order to enhance the effect of destroying POL facilities. 8l/
In a memorandum for the President on bombing operations for
April, McNamara endorsed most of these JCS recommendations. He proposed
authorizing attacks on seven of the nine POL storage facilities in the
Hanoi -Haiphong area. Of the two he omitted, one lay near the center of
Hanoi. In addition, McNamara recommended attacks on the Haiphong cement
plant and on roads, bridges, and railroads connecting Haiphong and Hanoi
and leading from the two cities to the Chinese border, and asked that the
military coraim nders be permitted to run up to 900 sorties into the north-
east quadrant , at their discretion.
For this marked stepping-up of the air war, McNamara put
on paper a much more forceful presentation than that in his January
memorandum. Using as a point of departure the general estimate that
bombing could neither interdict supply of the South nor halt flow from
China and Russia into the North, he argued that:
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. . . .The movement can be made considerably more
expansive and unreliable (a) by taking action to over-
load the roads and railroads (e.g., by destroying the
domestic source of cement), (b) by attacking the key
roads, railroads and bridge between Hanoi on the one hand
and Haiphong and China on the other, and (c) by pinching
the supply of POL, which is critical to ground movement
and air operations.
Amplifying one of these recommendations, McNamara commented that destruc-
tion of the plant, which produced 50$ of North Vietnam's cement, would
make bridge and road rebuilding difficult. As -for P0L > he observed that
the facilities targeted represented 70-80$ of those in the country.
Though the North Vietnamese possessed reserves and had probably already
built up some in the South, their transportation system depended on a
continuous supply. They were known to have recently doubled their orders
for imported Soviet POL. Eventually, though not necessarily in the short
run, he said, they were bound to suffer a shortage.
While McNamara conceded that he did not expect the proposed
program to yield quick results in South Vietnam, he predicted that it
would ultimately have some effect. Addressing some political issues that
had influenced the previous hesitancy, he asserted that the South would
probably do nothing more than adopt "a somewhat harsher diplomatic and
propaganda line" and that the Chinese "would not react to these attacks
by active entry — by ground or air," unless the United States took
further steps, the decisions on which "at each point would be largely
within our own control." And offsetting such risks stood the possibility
of favorable political effects. McNamara ventured no promises. He said,
"We would not expect Hanoi to change its basic policy until and unless it
concluded that its chances of winning the fight in the South had become
so slim that they could no longer justify the damage being inflicted upon
the North." Nevertheless, he commented that destruction of POL facilities
"should cause concern in Hanoi about their ability to support troops in
South Vietnam" and concluded his memorandum by writing:
In the longer term, the recommended bombing program
can be expected to create a substantial added burden on North
Vietnam's manpower supply for defense and logistics tasks and
to engender popular alienation from the regions should shortages
become widespread. While we do not predict that the regime's
control would be appreciably weakened, there might eventually
he an aggravation of any differences which may exist within the
regime as £~tcj the policies to be followed.
Reading this memorandum, one might conclude that the
Secretary, after passing through a season of uncertainty, had finally
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made up his mind — that he now felt the right action to be sharp
escalation such as CINCPAC, the JCS, and McKaughton had advocated during
the pause. But even now, despite the comparatively vigorous language of
the memorandum, one cannot he sure that McNamara expected or wanted the
President to approve his recommendations.
The memorandum was probably brought up at the White House
Tuesday luncheon on 28 March. Just sixteen days earlier, in response to
Marshal Ky's removal of General Nguyen Chanh Thi from Command of the
I Corps Area, Buddhist monks had initiated anti-Ky demonstrations in DaNang
and Hue. Soon, with other groups joining in, dissidents dominated the
northern and central part of the country. Many not only attacked the Ky
regime but denounced the American presence in Vietnam and called for negoti-
ation with the NLF. Controlling the Hue radio and having easy access to
foreign newsmen , these dissidents won wide publicity in the United States.
As a result, Americans previously counted as supporters of administration
policy began to ask why the United States should expend its resources on
people who apparently did not want or appreciate help. Such questioning
was heard from both Democrats and Republicans in Congress. Quite probably,
the political situation in Vietnam and its repercussions in America stood
uppermost in the President's mind. Equally probably, McNamara recognized
this fact. If so, it should not have surprised him to find the President
taking much the same position as that which they had both taken, and
recorded in NSAM 288 in March, 1964, when the Khanh government trembled --
that it was imprudent to mount new offensives "from an extremely weak base
which might at any moment collapse and leave the posture of political
confrontation worsened rather than improved." 83 /
In any event, the principal outcome of White House meetings
at the end of March was a string of urgent cables from Rusk to Lodge,
suggesting steps which might be urged on the Ky government and saying,
among other things,
....We are deeply distressed by the seeming unwilling-
ness or inability of the South Vietnamese to put aside their
lesser quarrels in the interest of meeting the threat from
the Viet Cong. Unless that succeeds, they will have no
country to quarrel about. .. .We face the fact that we our-
selves cannot succeed except in support of the South Viet-
namese. Unless they are able to mobilize reasonable solidarity,
the prospects are very grim." 84/
As for McNamara's proposals, the President approved only giving commanders
discretion to launch 900 sorties into the northeast quadrant during April
and permission to strike roads, railroads, and bridges outside or just on
the fringe of the prohibited circles around Hanoi and Haiphong. He did
not consent to measures involving more visible escalation of the air war.
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McNamara returned to the Pentagon to inform the Chiefs that, while
these operations had not been vetoed, they were not yet authorized. 85/
The President had authorized the extension of armed
reconnaissance into the northeast quadrant and strikes on h of the 5
bridges recommended by McNamara but deferred any decision on the crucial
portion, the strikes against the 5th bridge, the cement plant, the radar,
and above all the 7 POL targets. The JCS execution message for ROLLING
THUNDER 50 , which was sent out on 1 April, directed implementation of what
had been approved. In addition, it ordered CINCPAC to "plan for and be
prepared to execute when directed attacks during April" against the 5th
bridge, the cement plant, the radar, and the 7 POL sites. 86/ A pen-
cilled notation by Secretary McNamara with reference to these targets also
mentions April: "Defer. . .until specifically authorized but develop specific
plans to carry out in April." 87/
C. April and May — Delay and Deliberation
1 . Reasons to Wait
Although the President's reasons for postponing the POL
decision are not known, and although the initial postponement seemed
short, a matter of weeks, it is evident from the indirect evidence avail-
able that the proposal to strike the POL targets ran into stiffening
opposition within the Administration, presumably at State but perhaps in
other quarters as well. Before the question was settled it had assumed
the proportions of a strategic issue, fraught with military danger and
political risk, requiring thorough examination and careful appraisal,
difficult to come to grips with and hotly contended. The question remained
on the agenda of senior officials for close to three months, repeatedly
brought up for discussion and repeatedly set aside inconclusively. Before
it was resolved a crisis atmosphere was generated, requiring the continuing
personal attention of all the principals.
There can he little doubt that the POL proposal instigated
a major policy dispute. The explanation seems to be two-fold. One,
those who saw the bombing program, whatever its merits, as seriously
risking war with China or the USSR, decided to seize the occasion as
perhaps the last occasion to establish a firebreak against expanding the
bombing to the "flash points." Two, those who saw the bombing program
as incurring severe political penalties saw this as the last position
up to which those penalties were acceptable and beyond which they were
* not. Both points no doubt merged into a single position. Both turned
the POL question into an argument over breaching the Hanoi/Haiphong
sanctuaries in any major way.
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McNamara's Memorandum for the President, which had treated
the POL strikes as a logical extension of the previous interdiction
program into an area in which it might be more remunerative, did not
address these questions of sanctuaries. No other single document has
been located in the available files which does. Pieced together and
deduced from the fragmentary evidence, however, it appears that the
view that POL strikes ran too great a risk of counter-escalation involved
several propositions. One was that the strikes might trigger a tit-for-
tat reprisal (presumably by the VC) against the vulnerable POL stores
near Saigon. The Secretary of Defense had himself made this point as
early as raid-1965 in holding off Congressional and other proponents of
Hanoi /Haiphong area FOL strikes, citing the endorsement of General
Westmoreland. 88/ The JCS had recognized the possibility in their
November 1965 paper on POL strikes, although they considered it "of
relatively small potential consequence, minor in comparison to the value
of destruction of the DRV POL system." 8 9/ General Wheeler had also
gone out of his way to allude to it. 90/ Under Secretary of State Ball, in
a January 196 6 memorandum, saw the possibility of an enemy reprisal in
SVN as only the first act of a measure -countermeasure scenario which could
go spiralling out of control: a VC reprisal against POL in SVN would put
unbearable pressure on the U.S. to counter -retaliate against the North in
some dangerous manner, which in turn would force the other side to react
to that, and so on. 91 f
More important than the fear of a VC reprisal, one assumes,
was the belief that the POL sites were the first of the "vital" targets,
high-value per se but also generally co -located with and fronting for
NVN's other high-value targets. NVN, with its "vital" targets attacked
and its economic life at stake, would at a minimum defend itself strenu-
ously (again, provoking us to attack its airfields in our defense, which
in turn might set off an escalatory sequence); or, at the other extreme,
NVN might throw caution to the winds and call on its allies to intervene.
This might be only a limited intervention at first, e.g. use of Chinese
fighters from Chinese bases to protect NVN targets, but even this could
go escalating upward into a full-scale collision with China. On the
other hand, the strikes at the "vital" targets might be the Southeast
Asian equivalent of the march to the Yalu, convince the other side that
the U.S. was embarked on a course intolerable to its own interests, such
as the obliteration of the NVN regime, and cause it to intervene directly. 9£ /
These arguments were not new, of course; they were arguments
which could be, and no doubt were, used against any bombing at all. They
gained force, however, as the bombing became more intense and the more
the bombing was thought to really hurt Hanoi, (it was an irony of the
original concept of the air war North that the more pressure it really
applied and hence the more successful it was, the more difficult it was
t o pros e cute . )
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The belief that POL strikes would overload the negative
side of the scale on political grounds had to do with the possibility
that, since the targets were situated in relatively populated "urban"
areas (even though outside of the center cities), the strikes would be
construed as no less than the beginning of an attack on civilian targets
and/or population centers. This possibility, too, could widen the war
if it were taken by NVTT and its allies as indicating a U.S. decision to
commence "all-out" bombing aimed at an "unlimited" objective. But even
if it did not widen the war, it could cause a storm of protest world-wide
and turn even our friends against us. The world had been told repeatedly
that the U.S. sought a peaceful settlement, not a total military victory;
that the U.S. objectives were limited to safeguarding SVN; that bombing
NVN was confined to legitimate military targets related to the aggression
against SVN; and that great care was taken to avoid civilian casualties.
Any or all of this could be called into question by the POL strikes,
according to the argument, and the U.S. could be portrayed as embarking
on a course of ruthless brutality against a poor defenseless population.
The argument about the escalatory implications of the pro-
posed POL strikes was difficult to deal with. Official intelligence
estimates were available which said, on balance, that Chinese or Soviet
intervention in the war was unlikely, but no estimate could say that such
intervention was positively out of the question, and of course intelli-
gence estimates could misjudge the threshold of intervention, it was said,
as they had in Korea. 93/
The argument about the political repercussions made some
headway, however. Progress became possible because of the development of
military plans to execute the strikes with "surgical" precision, thus
minimizing the risk of civilian casualties, and because of the develop-
ment of a "scenario" for the strikes in which military, diplomatic, and
public affairs factors were coordinated in an effort to contain adverse
reactions. There slowly unfolded a remarkable exercise in "crisis manage-
ment . "
2. The April Policy Review
Though McNamara's memorandum, and the President's indica-
tion that he might later approve POL, brought the Administration somewhat
nearer to a decision for escalation, there was as yet no new consensus on
how the air war against the North might be tailored to serve American
objectives or, indeed, on what those objectives were or ought to be. The
study group in the Joint Staff, completing its work early in April, offered
a straightforward answer: "The overall objective is to cause NVN to cease
supporting, directing, and controlling the insurgencies in South Vietnam
and Laos." With his understanding, they could recommend a three phase
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campaign leading to destruction of between 90 and 100$ of all POL
storage, bridges, airfields, rail facilities, power plants, communica-
tions, port structures, and industry in North Vietnam. Whether the
Chiefs reasoned similarly is not apparent from the papers available.
Although they came out with comparable recommendations, they merely
"noted" this study. 94/
Certainly, in spite of McNamara's memorandum recommending
escalation, no clear view prevailed within OSD or among civilians
elsewhere in the government occupied with Vietnam policy. Among the
papers left behind by McNaughton are some fragments relating to an attempt
early in April, 1966, to rethink the question of what the United States
sought in Vietnam. These fragments suggest an evolution between winter,
1965-66, and spring, 1966, from hesitancy to perplexity.
The political situation in South Vietnam became increas-
ingly exp3.osive. On March 31> 10,000 Buddhists had demonstrated in
Saigon against the government and the demonstrations had spread to other
cities in the next several days. On April 5, Premier Ky flew to Danang
to quell the rebellion and threatened to use troops if necessary. 95/
In this context, a meeting was convened at the White House on Friday,
9 April. Vance and McNaughton represented Defense; Ball, Bundy, and
Leonard Unger the State Department; and George Carver the CIA. Walt Rostow,
who had just replaced McGeorge Bundy, took part. So did Robert Komer
and Bill Moyers. 96/
In. preparation for this meeting, McNaughton, Ball, Unger,
and Carver undertook to prepare memoranda outlining the broad alternatives
open. Carver would make the case for continuing as is, Unger and McNaughton
for continuing but pressing for a compromise settlement — Unger to take
an optimistic and McNaughton a pessimistic view and Ball to argue for
disengagement. Then four options were labelled respectively, A, B-0, B-P,
and C.
Carver, advocating Option A, wrote:
OPTION A
I. Description of the Course of Action
1. Option A involves essentially persevering in our
present policies and programs, adhering to the objectives of
a. Preventing a North Vietnamese takeover of
South Vietnam by insurrectionary warfare, thus
(l) Checking Communist expansion in
Southeast Asia
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(2) Demonstrating U.S. ability to provide
support which will enable indigenous non-Communist elements
to cope with "wars of national liberation" and, hence,
(3) Demonstrating the sterile futility of
the militant and aggressive expansionist policy advocated by
the present rulers of Communist China.
b. Aiding the development of a non-Communist
political structure within South Vietnam capable of extending
its writ over most of the country and acquiring sufficient
internal strength and self-generated momentum to be able to
survive without the support of U.S. combat forces whenever North
Vietnam ceases its present campaign of intensive military
pressure.
To adopt this option, Carver reasoned, required, on the
political side, work with all non-Communist Vietnamese factions "to
insure that the transition to civilian rule is as orderly as possible
and effected with a minimum disruption of current programs." The United
States would have to make plain in Saigon that continued support was
"contingent upon some modicum of responsible political behavior" and
would have to "initiate the Vietnamese in the techniques of developing
political institutions such as constitutions and parties." An "intensive
endeavor at provincial and district levels" would have to complement
efforts in the capital.
On the military side, Carver judged the demands of Option A
to be as follows:
a. Current U.S. force deployments in Vietnam will have
to be maintained and additional deployments already authorized
should be made.
b. Efforts to hamper Communist use of Laos as a corridor
for infiltrating troops and supplies into South Vietnam should
be continued and in some respects intensified. There should be
further employment of B-52's against selected choke points
vulnerable to this type of attack. Additional programs should
be developed to make our interdiction attacks more effective.
c. The aerial pressure campaign on North Vietnam should
be sustained for both military and psychological purposes.
Attacks should not be mounted against population centers such
as Hanoi or Haiphong, but major POL storage depots should be
destroyed and, probably, Haiphong harbor should be mined.
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d. Within South Vietnam we must recognize that the
period ol’ political transition now in urain — even if it
evolves in the most favorable fashion possible — will pro-
duce some diminution in the effectiveness of central authority
and some disruption in current programs. At best, we will be
in for a situation like that of late 1963- It is essential
that the Communists be prevented from making major military
gains during this time of transition or scoring military
successes which would generate an aura of invincibility or
seriously damage the morale of our South Vietnamese allies.
Therefore, it is essential that during this period, Communist
forces be constantly harried, kept off balance, and not per-
mitted to press their advantage. The bulk of this task will
have to be borne by U.S. and allied forces during the immedi-
ate future and these forces must be aggressively and offensively
employed .
Option B-0, as developed by Unger, assumed a "policy
decision that we will undertake to find a way to bring to an end by
negotiation the military contest in South Viet-Nam." (This paper, dated
"4/14/66," was prepared after the April 9 meeting but was filed with the
other papers of that date.) It was the optimistic version of this option
because Unger assumed the possibility of reaching a settlement "on terms
which preserve South Vietnam intact and in a condition which offers at
least a 60-40 chance of its successfully resisting Communist attempts
at political takeover."
In pursuit of this option the United States would persuade
the GVN to negotiate with the NLF, offering amnesty and a coalition
government, though not one giving the NLF control of the military, the
police, or the treasury. The United States would withdraw troops "in
return for the withdrawal of Worth Vietnamese military forces and political
cadre." Perhaps, agreements between South Vietnam and Worth Vietnam would
provide for economic intercourse and mutual recognition.
It would not be easy to persuade the GVW, Unger conceded.
Doing so might require not only words but withholding of funds or with-
drawal of some American forces. And once the GVW appreciated that the
United States was in earnest, there would be danger of its collapse. Even
if these problems were surmounted, there would remain the difficulty of
pressing the negotiations to conclusion. "There is no assurance," Unger
wrote "that a negotiated settlement can pass successfully between the
uppe>’ millstone of excessively dangerous concessions to the VC/WLF and
the "nether millstone of terms insufficiently attractive to make the
VC/WIiF consider it worthwhile to negotiate."
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Militarily, Unger reasoned, Option B-0 would call for
continuation of current efforts, perhaps with a modest increase in
ground forces but with no step-up in the air war. Total refusal to
talk on the part of the Communists would, however, Unger wrote,
...leave us with a question of what kind of stick we
have to substitute for the prof erred carrot and this might
bring us up against the judgment of whether intensification
and extension of our bombing in North Viet -Nam, coupled with
whatever greater military efforts could be made in the South
would bring the Communists to the table.
McNaughton's papers do not contain his original memorandum
setting forth the pessimistic version of Option B. One can, however,
infer its outlines from various other pieces in the McNaughton collection.
The difference between McNaughton and Unger presumably did
not concern the objective — negotiating out. It lay in McNaughton's
expressing less confidence in an outcome not involving Communist control
of South Vietnam. On the first Monday in April, he had talked with
Michael Deutch, freshly back from Saigon. His notes read:
1. Place (VN) in unholy mess.
2. We control next to no territory.
3 . Fears economic collapse.
4. People would not vote for *our ride. '
5 . Wants to carry out economic warfare in VC.
6 . This is incorruptible and popular. Chieu ^sic J
is best successor for Ky.
7 . Militarily will be same place year from now.
8. Pacification won't get off ground for a year.
If McNaughton himself accepted anything like this estimate, he would
have been pessimistic indeed about prospects for the GVN's survival.
Even if he did not take quite so gloomy a view, he probably felt, as he
had intimated in one of his January memoranda, that the United States
should prepare to accept something less than the conditions which Unger
sketched. What practical consequences followed from this difference in
view, one can only guess.
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Option C, as stated by Ball, rested on the assumption
that "the South Vietnamese people will not be able to put together a
government capable of maintaining an adequate civil and military effort
or — if anything resembling actual independence is ever achieved —
running the country." On this premise, he concluded, much as in earlier
memoranda, "we should concentrate our attention on cutting our losses."
Specifically, he recommended official declarations that United States
support depended on a representative government which desired American
aid and which demonstrated its ability to create "the necessary unity of
action to assure the effective prosecution of the war and the peace."
Seizing upon the next political crisis in South Vietnam, the United States
should, said Ball, "halt the deployment of additional forces, reduce the
level of air attacks on the North, and maintain ground activity at the
minimum level required to prevent the substantial improvement of the
Viet Cong position."
Ball described two alternative outcomes from Option C.
One was that the South Vietnamese might unify and "face reality," the
other, far more likely in Ball's estimation, was that South Vietnam would
fragment still further, "leading to a situation in which a settlement
would be reached that contemplated our departure." He closed:
Let us face the fact that there are no really attrac-
tive options open to us. To continue to fight the war with
the present murky political base is, in my judgment, both
dangerous and futile. It can lead only to increasing com-
mitments, heavier losses, and mounting risks of dangerous
escalation.
In McNaughton's files are pencil notes which may relate
either to his own missing memorandum or to a conversation that took place
among some of the officials concerned. Despite its cryptic nature, it is
worth reproducing in its entirety, in part because it gives a clue to
thoughts passing at this time through McNamara's mind:
Do we press VNese or do they move themselves/”?/
What the point of probes if (w/oul/d be counterpro-
ductive otherwise)
mil
1. No more US forces unless better govt
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2. Reemph/asis/ of conditions/
(a) Rep govt ask/ed/
(b) Performance
3. Fashion govt unified and stable govt. Give time.
Protect selves.
Defend selves.
Effect
(a) Nationalist
(b) VC deal by GVN
If squeeze GVN first, and go to /Sail's position/ later, have
contaminated Course C. Better to claim we want to win and they
rush .out to settle.
Timing critical. 10 days ago. Not today. Will have new
chance when advisors decide how election set up. Unless
elections rigged, Buddhists to streets.
Need Pres, statements re (a) eond/itio/ns and (b) optimism
VNese moving that way.
w/oul/dn't the SVNese just comply and knuckle down and not
do any better /JJ How do we move them toward, compromise [JJ
Maybe second time, we do throw in the towel and they make deal.
Lodge more likely to go for Ball ultimatum than B.
Anti-US govt likely to follow. How handle actual departure JJJ
Do we want to precipitate anti-US fJJ
Must we condition US and world public for 6 mos before
'ultimatum. 1
Pres, to press, ans, qn. giving bases of our help.
BUT, why not get better deal for SVN by RSM approach? Give
them choice now between (l) chaos 6 mos from now (via Ball)
and VC govt, and (2) chance at compromise now with even
chance of something better.
Who can deal -- Don, Thi?
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If ve followed RSM approach, ruin our image (pushing for
deal) and cause demoralization. Tri Quang may even say we
selling out.
We ch-'lled bids earlier.
Could there be an independent Delta? Already accommodation.
As McNaughton* s notes reveal, the group that met at the
White House on April 9 was preoccupied with the immediate political
crisis in South Vietnam. Early that morning, Walt Rostov; had addressed
a memo to Secretaries Rusk and McNamara suggesting a course of action
for "breaking Tri Quang 's momentum." 97/ His .proposal — which was the
form the subsequent solution took -- called for giving substantial
tactical concessions to the Buddhists on the issue of the Constituent
Assembly in order to bring the regime -threatening de onions trat ions to an
end. At the White House meeting later that day several participants
were called on to prepare papers on the crisis.
Leonard Unger of the State Department drafted a paper out-
lining five possible outcomes of the crisis, the last two of which were
a secession of neutralist northern provinces and/or a complete collapse of
Saigon political machinery with the VC moving into the vacuum. 98 / His
paper was probally considered at a meeting on Monday, April 12, as sug-
gested by McNaughton' s handwritten notes. 99/ At the same meeting,
a long memorandum prepared by George Carver of CIA in response to a request
at the Friday meeting, and entitled "Consequences of Buddhist Political
Victory in South Vietnam," was also considered. 100/ Carver argued that
while a Buddhist government would have been difficult for us to deal with
it would not have been impossible and, given the evident political strength
of the Buddhists, might even work to our long range advantage. The three
American options in such a contingency were: (l) trying to throw out the
new government; (2) attempting to work with it; or ( 3 ) withdrawing from
South Vietnam. Clearly, he argued, the second was the best in view of
our commitments . .
That same day. Maxwell Taylor sent the President a detailed
memo with recommendations for dealing with the Buddhist uprising. In
essence he recommended that the U.S. take a tough line in support of Ky
and against the Buddhists. In his words,
. , .we must prevent Tri Quang from overthrowing the
Directorate (with or without Ky who personally is expendable)
and support a conservative, feasible schedule for a transi-
tion to constitutional government. In execution of such a
program, the GVN (Ky, for the present) should be encouraged
to use the necessary force to restore and maintain order, short
of attempting to reimpose government rule by bayonets on
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Danang-Hue which, for the time being, should be merely
contained and isolated. 101 /
These recommendations, however, had been overtaken by events. The GVN
had already found a formula for restoring order and appeasing the Buddhists.
In a three day "National Political Congress" in Saigon from April 12-14,
the GVN adopted a program promising to move rapidly toward constitutional
government which placated the main Buddhist demands. 105/ For a few
weeks the demonstrations ceased and South Vietnam returned to relative
political quiet. "While not unusual as policy problems go, this political
crisis in South Vietnam intervened temporarily to divert official attention
from the broader issues of the war and indirectly contributed to the
deferral of any decision to authorize attacks on the POL in North Vietnam.
Other issues and problems would continue to defer the POL decision, both
directly and indirectly, for another two months.
With some semblance of calm restored momentarily to South
Vietnamese politics, the second-level Washington policy officials could
turn their attention once again to the broader issues of U.S. policy
direction. On April 14, Walt Rostow sent McNaughton a memo entitled
"Headings for Decision and Action: Vietnam, April 3.4, 1966 ," (implying
topics for discussion at a meeting later that day? ) . Item one on Rostow's
agenda was a proposed high-level U.S. statement endorsing the recent evolu-
tion of events in South Vietnam and stipulating that continued U.S. assis-
tance and support would be contingent on South Vietnamese demonstration
of unity, movement toward constitutional government, effective prosecution
of the war, and maintenance of order. His second topic was the bombing of
the North, and subheading "b" re-opened the POL debate with the simple
question, "is this the time for oil?" 103/ Other issues which he listed
for consideration included: accelerating the campaign against main force
units, economic stabilization, revolutionary construction, Vietnamese
politics (including constitution-making), and negotiations between the
GVN and the VC (if only for political warfare purposes).
On the same day, the -JCS forwarded to the Secretary the
previously mentioned " ROLLING THUNDER Study Group Report: Air Operations
Against NVN" with a cover memo noting that its recommendations for a
stepped up bombing campaign were "in consonance with the general concept
recommended in JCSM-41-66 " 104/ The voluminous study itself recom-
mended a general expansion of the bombing with provision for three special
attack options, one against the Haiphong POL center; the second for the
aerial mining of the sea approaches to Haiphong, Hon Gai, and Cam FLa; and
the third for strikes at the major airfields of Hanoi, Haiphong, and Phuc
Yen. 105/ In offering these options, the report stated that, "Military
considerations would require that two of the special attack options, POL
and mining, be conducted now. However, appreciation of the sensitivity of
such attacks is recognized and the precise time of execution must take
into account political factors." 106 / Somewhat optimistically, the report
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estimated that the POL strike would involve only 13 civilian casualties,
and the mining would cause none. 10?/ While there is no specific record
of the Secretary's reaction to this full-blown presentation of the argu-
ments for expanded bombing, he had sent a curt memo to the Chiefs the
previous day in reply to their JCSM 189-66 of March 26, in which they had
again urged attacking the POL. Tersely reflecting the President's failure
to adopt their (and his) recommendation, he stated, "I have received
JCSM-189-66. Your recommendations were considered in connection with
the decision on ROLLING THUNDER 50.” 108/
As the second-echelon policy group returned to its consid-
eration of the four options for U.S. policy (previously known as A, B-0,
B-P, and C), the weight of recent political instability shifted its focus
somewhat. When the group met again on Friday, April 16, at least three
papers were offered for deliberation. William Bundy's draft was titled,
"Basic Choices in Viet-Nam"; George Carver of CIA contributed "How We
Should Move"; and a third paper called "Politics in Vietnam: A 'Worst*
Outcome" was probably written by John McNaughton.
Bundy began with a sober appraisal of the situation:
The political crisis in South Viet-Nam has avoided
outright disaster up to this point, but the temporary
equilibrium appears to be uneasy and the crisis has meant
at the very least a serious setback of the essential non-
military programs. 109 /
But the closeness with which political disaster had been averted in the
South in the preceding week, "forces us to look hard at our basic posi-
tion and policy in South Viet-Nam. We must now recognize that three
contingencies of the utmost gravity are in some degree, more likely than
our previous planning had r e cognized... I' 110/ The three contingencies Bundy
had in mind were: (l) a state of total political chaos and paralysis
resulting from an uprising by the Buddhists countered by the Catholics,
Army, etc.; (2) the emergence of a neutralist government with wide support
that would seek an end to the war on almost any basis and ask for a U.S.
withdrawal; and (3) a continuation of the present GVN but in an enfeebled
condition unable to effectively prosecute the war, especially the vital
non-military aspects of it. Bundy's estimate was that the third contingency
was the most likely at that moment, and that even the most optimistic
scenario for political and constitutional evolution could not foresee a
change within the succeeding three to four months. Nevertheless, he out-
lined the four possible U.S. lines of action much as they had been presented
before :
Option A: To continue roughly along present lines, but to
hope that the setback is temporary.
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Option B : To continue roughly along present lines, but
to move more actively to stimulate a negotiated soluticn, '
specifically through contact between the Saigon government
and elements in the Viet Cong and Liberation Front. This
eptien /lined out in McNaughton/ could be approached on an
"optimistic " /underlined in McNaughton/ or "leaser risk"
/lined out in McNaughton with "harder penciled in above and
question marks in the margin/ basis, or on a " pessimistic ”
/McNaughton underline/ or "greater- risk" /lined out in
McNaughton with "softer" pencilled in/ basis. The opening
moves might be the same in both options, but more drastic
indications of the U.S, position would /” be involved" penned
in by McNaughton/ in the "pessimistic" approach /7 which
shades into option C below." penned by McNaughton/.
Option C : To decide now that the chances of bringing about an
independent (and non-Communist) /parenthesis added by McNaughton/
South Viet -Nam have shrunk to the point where, on an over -all
basis, the US effort is no longer warranted /lined out by
McNaughton and replaced in pencil with "should be directed at a
minimum-cost disengagement." Stet pencilled in the margin//
This would mean setting the stage rapidly /circled by McNaughton/
for US disengagement and withdrawal irrespective of whether any
kind of negotiation would work or not." /question marks in the
margin// 111/
Bundy did not identify in the paper his preferred option.
The tone of his paper, however, suggested a worried preference for "A".
In a concluding section he listed a number of "broader factors" which
"cut, as they always have, in deeply contradictory directions." 11 2/ The
first was the level of support for the Vietnam policy within the U.S.
While it was adequate for the moment, continued GVN weakness and political
unrest could seriously undermine it. With an eye on the 1968 Presidential
elections, Bundy prophetically summed up the problem:
As we look a year or two ahead, with a military program
that would require major further budget costs — with all their
implications for taxes and domestic programs — and with steady
or probably rising casualties, the war could well become an
albatross around the Administration's neck, at least equal to
what Korea was for President Truman in 1952. 113/
Moreover, if the prevailing malaise about the war among our non-SEATO
allies degenerated into open criticism, a far wider range of world issues
on which their cooperation was required might be seriously affected. With
respect to the Soviet Union, no movement on disarmament or other matters
of detente could be expected while the war continued. But since no
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significant change in Chinese or North Vietnamese attitudes had been
expected in any circumstances, continuing the war under more adverse
conditions in South Vietnam would hardly worsen them. Bundy ended his
paper with an analysis of the impact of a U.S. failure in South Vietnam
on the rest of non -communist Asia, even if the failure resulted from a
political collapse in Saigon.
5, Vis-a-vis the threatened nations of Asia , we must
ask ourselves whether failure in Viet-Nam because of clearly
visible political difficulties not under our control would be
any less serious than failure by-ear-ewn-eheiee /lined out in
McNaughton/ without this factor. The question comes down, as
it always has, to whether there is any tenable line of defense
in Southeast Asia if Viet-Nam falls. Here we must recognize
that the anti-Communist regime in Indonesia has been a tremen-
dous "break" for us, both for in /McNaughton/ removing the
possibility of a Communist pincer movement, which appeared
irresistible almost certain ^ScNaughton/ a year ago, and
in /McNaughton/ opening - up the possibility that over a period
of some years Indonesia may become a constructive force. But
for the next year or two any chance of holding the rest of
Southeast Asia hinges on the same factors assessed a year
ago, whether Thailand and Laos in the first instance and
Malaysia, Singapore, and Burma close behind, would — in the
face of a US failure for any reason in Viet-Nam — have any
significant remaining will to resist the Chinese Communist
pressures that would probably then be applied. Taking the
case of Thailand as the next key point, it must be our present
conclusion that — even if sophisticated leaders understood the
Vietnamese /McNaughton/ political weaknesses and our inability
to control them — to the mss of the Thai people the failure
would remain a US failure and a proof that Communism from the
north was the decisive force in the area. Faced with this
reaction, we must still conclude that Thailand simply could
not be held in these circumstances, and that the rest of South-
east Asia would probably follow in due course. In other words,
the strategic stakes in S outh east Asia a re fundamentally
unchanged by the possible politTcal nature of the causes' for
failure in Viet-Nam. The same is almost certainly true of the
shockwaves that would arise against other free nations — Korea,
Taiwan, Japan, and the Philippines— in the wider area of East
Asia. Perhaps these shockwaves can be countered, but they
would not /McNaughton/ be mitigated by the fact that the failure
arose from internal political /sic/ causes rather than any US
major error or omission." 11 V ~
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Once again, the domino theory, albeit in a refined
case by case presentation, was offered by this key member of the
Administration as a fundamental argument for the continuing U.S.
involvement in Vietnam. Bundy rejected even the subtle argument,
offered by some longtime Asian experts, that the uniqueness of the
Vietnamese case, particularly its extraordinary lack of political
structure, invalidated any generalization of our experience there to
the rest of Asia. Thus, he argued the American commitment was both
open-ended and irreversible.
George Carver of CIA argued quite a different point
of view. His paper began, "The nature and basis of the U.S. commit-
ment in Vietnam is widely misunderstood within. the United States,
throughout the world , and in Vietnam itself." 11 5 / Placing himself
squarely in opposition to the kind of analysis presented by Bundy,
Carver argued that we had allowed control over our policy to slip from
our grasp into the "sometimes irresponsible and occasionally unidentifi-
able hands of South Vietnamese over whom we have no effective control.
This is an intolerable position for a great power. 116/ By inferring
that our commitment was irreversible and open-ended, Carver maintained
we permitted the Vietnamese to exercise leverage over us rather than
vice versa. To correct this mistaken view of our commitment and get
our own priorities straight. Carver proposed a reformulation of objec-
tives :
Whatever course of policy on Vietnam we eventually
decide to adopt, it is essential that we first clarify the
nature of our commitment in that country and present it in
a manner which gives us maximum leverage over our Vietnamese
allies and maximum freedom of unilateral action. What we
need to do, in effect, is return to the original 1954
Eisenhower position and make it abundantly clear that our
continued presence in Vietnam in support of the South Viet-
namese struggle against the aggressive incursions of their
northern compatriots is contingent on the fulfillment of
both of two necessary conditions:
(a) A continued desire by the South Vietnamese
for our assistance and physical presence.
(b) Some measure of responsible political
behavior on the part of the South Vietnamese themselves
including, but not limited to, their establishment of a
reasonably effective .government with which we can work. 117/
Carver was careful to state, however, that' two to three
months would be required to prepare the ground for this kind of clarifi-
cation so as not to have it appear we were reversing directions on Vietnam
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or presenting the GVN with an ultimatum. Effectively carried out, such
a clarification would broaden the range of available options for the U.S.
and place us in a much better position to effect desired changes. The
mechanics of his proposal called for a Presidential speech in the near
future along the lines suggested earlier that week by Walt Rostow. The
President should express satisfaction at the evolution of political events
in South Vietnam toward constitutional government and indicate "that our
capacity to assist South Vietnam is dependent on a continued desire for
our assistance and on the demonstration of unity and responsibility in
the widening circle of those who will now engage in politics in South
Vietnam." 118/ Other speeches by the Vice President and members of
Congress in the succeeding weeks might stress the contingency of our
commitment, and press stories conveying the new message could he stimu-
lated. Finally, three or four months in the future, the President would
complete this process by making our position and commitment crystal clear,
possibly in response to a planted press conference question. This public
effort would be supplemented by private diplomatic communication of the
new message to South Vietnamese leaders by the Embassy.
Carver argued that putting the U.S. in a position to
condition its commitment would considerably enhance U.S. flexibility in
an uncertain policy environment.
Once the U.S. position is clear we can then see whether
our word to the Vietnamese stimulates better and more respon-
sible political behavior. If it does, we will have improved
Option A' s chances for success. If it does not, or if South
Vietnam descends into chaos and anarchy, we will have laid
the groundwork essential to the successful adoption of Option C
with minimal political cost. 119 /
Questions which remained to be answered included: (1) whether to continue
with scheduled troop deployments; (2) whether to give the GVN a specific
list of actions on which we expected action and then rate their performance,
or rely on a more general evaluation; (3) whether the U.S. should continue
to probe the DKV/NLF on the possibility of negotiations; (4) whether to
encourage the GVN to make negotiation overtures to the VC.
The third paper. Politics in Vietnam: A "Worst" Outcome ,
(presumably by McNaughton) dealt with the unsavory possibility of a fall
of the current government and its replacement by a "neutralist" successor
that sought negotiations, a ceasefire, and a coalition with the VC. After
considering a variety of possible, although equally unpromising, courses
of action, the paper argued that in such a case the U.S. would have "little
'choice but to get out of Vietnam. .. .Governing objectives should be;
minimizing the inevitable loss of face and protecting U.S. forces, allied
forces, and those South Vietnamese who appeal to us for political refuge." 120/
An intriguing tab to the same paper considered the impact on the U.S. posi-
tion in the Pacific and East Asia in the event of a withdrawal from Vietnam.
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Unlike the Bundy paper this analysis eschewed pure domino theorizing
for a careful country by country examination. The overall evaluation
was that, "Except for its psychological impact, withdrawal from Vietnam
would not affect the present line of containment from its Korean anchor
down the Japan-Ryukyus -Taiwan -Philippine Island chain." 121 / Pour
possible alternate defense lines in Southeast Asia were considered: (l)
the Thai border; (2) the Isthmus of Kra on the Malay peninsula; (3) the
"Water Line" from the Strait of Malacca to the North of Borneo; and (4) an
"Interrupted Line" across the gap between the Philippines and Australia.
Like other analyses of the strategic problem in Southeast Asia, this
paper rejected any in-depth defense of Thailand as militarily untenable.
The best alternatives were either the Isthmus of Kra or the Strait of
Malacca; alternative four was to be considered only as a fall back posi-
tion. The paper stands as a terse and effective refutation of the full-
blown domino theory, offering as it does cool-headed alternatives that
should have evoked more clear thinking than they apparently did about
the irrevocability of our commitment to South Vietnam.
What the exact outcome of the deliberations on these
papers was is not clear from the available documents. Nor is there any
clear indication of the influence the documents or the ideas contained
in them might have had on the Principals or the President. Judgments
on this score must be by inference. A scenario drafted by Leonard Unger
and included by McNaughton with Carver's paper suggests that some con-
sensus was reached within the group reflecting mostly the Ideas contained
in Carver's draft. Its second point stated:
On U.S. scene and internationally we will develop in
public statements and otherwise the dual theme that the U.S.
has gone into South Viet -Nam to help on the assumption that
(a) the Government is representative of the people who do want
our help (b) the Government is sufficiently competent to hold
the country together, to maintain the necessary programs and
use our help. President will elaborate this at opportune
moment in constructive tone but with monetary overtones if
there is any political turmoil or If Government unwilling to
do what we consider essential in such fields as countering
Inflation, allocating manpower to essential tasks and the like. 122/
In fact, however, while we did attempt to steer the South Vietnamese
toward constitutional government on a democratic model, when the President
spoke out in succeeding weeks it was to reiterate the firmness of our
commitment and the quality of our patience, not to condition them. At a
Medal of Honor ceremony at the White House on April 21, he said:
There are times when Viet -Nam must seem to many a
thousand contradictions, and the pursuit of freedom there
an almost unrealizable dream.
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But there are also times — and for me this is one of
them — when the mist of confusion lifts and the basic
principles emerge:
— that South Viet-Nam, however young and frail, has
the right to develop as a nation, free from the interference
of any other power, no matter how mighty or strong ;
— that the normal processes of political action,
if given time and patience and freedom to work, will some-
day, some way create in South Viet-Nam a society that is
responsive to the people and consistent with their tradi-
tions .... 123/
The third point in the Unger scenario was to encourage
the GVN to establish contacts with the VC in order to promote defections
and/or to explore the possibilities of "negotiated arrangements." This
emphasis on contacts between the GVN and the VC may well have reflected
the flurry of highly public international activity to bring about negoti-
ations between the U.S. and the DRV that was taking place at that time
(considered in more detail below). In any event, this entire effort at
option-generation came to an inconclusive end around April 20.
The last paper to circulate was a much revised redraft
of Course B that reflected the aforementioned ideas about GVM/vC contacts.
It was, moreover, a recapitulation of ideas circulating in the spring
of 1966 at the second-level of the government. That they were considerably
out of touch with reality would shortly be revealed by the renewed I Corps -
Buddhist political problem in May. The paper began with a paragraph dis-
cussing the "Essential element" of the course of action — i.e. " our
decision now to press the GVN to expand and exploit its contacts with
the VC/NLF." 124/ The point of these contacts was to determine what
basis, if any, might exist for bringing the insurgency to an end.
The proposed approach to the GVN was to be made with three
considerations in mind. The first was the dual theme that U.S. assistance
in South Vietnam depended on a representative and effective GVN and the
genuine desire of the people for our help. Continued political turmoil
in South Vietnam would force us to state this policy with increasing
sharpness. The second consideration was the U.S. military effort.
McNaughton specif ically bifurcated this section in his revision to include
two alternatives, as follows :
(b) Continuation of the military program including U.S.
deployments and air sorties.
(l) Alternative A. Forces increased by the end of
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the year to 385,000 men and to attacks on the key military
targets outside heavily populated areas in all of North
Vietnam except the strip near China.
( 2 ) Alternative B . Forces increased in modest
amounts by the end of the year to about 300*000 (with
the possibility of halting even the deployments implicit
in that figure in case of signal failure by the GVN to
perform) and air attacks in the northeast quadrant of
North Vietnam kept to present levels in terms of intensity
and type of target. 125 /
The third consideration was a continuation of U. S. support for GVN revo-
lutionary development and inflation control.
Two alternative GVN tactics for establishing contact with
the NLF were offered. The first alternative would be an overt, highly
publicized GVN appeal to the VC/NLF to meet with representatives of the
GVN to work out arrangements for peace. Alternative two foresaw the
initiation of the first contacts through covert channels with public
negotiations to follow if the covert talks revealed a basis for agreement.
All of this would produce, the paper argued, one of the following out-
comes :
(a) If things were going passably for our side but
the VC/NLF showed no readiness to settle on terns providing
reasonable assurances for the continuation of a npn-Communist
regime in SVN, we might agree to plod on with present programs
(with or without intensified military activity) until the VC/
NLF showed more give.
(b) If things were going badly for our side we might
feel obliged to insist on the GVN's coming to the best
terms it could get with the VC/NLF, with our continuing mili-
tary and other support conditioned on the GVN moving along
those lines.
(c) If things were going well for our side, the VC/NLF
might accede to terms which entailed no serious risks for
a continuing non-Communist orientation of the GVN in the
short term. It would probably have to be assumed that this
would represent no more than a tactical retreat of the VC/NLF. 12 6/
3. Exogeneous Factors
No precise reason can be adduced for the termination of
this interdepartmental effort to refine options for American action. In
a general way, as the preceding paper shows, the effort had lost some
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touch with the situation; the GVN was far too fragile a structure at
that point (and about to be challenged again in May by I Corps ' Com-
mander General Thi and his Buddhist allies) to seriously contemplate
contacts or negotiations with the VC. In Washington, the President
and his key advisors Rusk and McNamara were preoccupied with a host of
additional immediate concerns as well. The President had a newly appointed
Special Assistant, Robert Komer, who had recently returned from a trip
to Vietnam urging greater attention to the non-military, nation-building
aspects of the struggle. In addition, the President was increasingly
aware of the importance of the war, its costs, and its public relations
to the upcoming Congressional elections. McNamara and the JCS were
struggling to reach agreement on force deployment schedules and require-
ments; and Rusk was managing the public U.S. response to a major inter-
national effort to bring about U.S. negotiations with Hanoi. These con-
cerns, as we shall see, served to continue the deferral of any imple-
mentation of strikes against North Vietnamese POL reserves.
On April 19, about the time the option drafting exercise
was ending, Robert Komer addressed a lengthy memo to the President
(plus the Principals and their assistants) reporting on his trip to
Vietnam to review the non-military aspects of the war. Presidential
concern with what was to be called "pacification" had been piqued during
the Honolulu Conference in February. Upon his return to Washington,
President Johnson named Komer to become Special Assistant within the
White House to oversee the Washington coordination of the program. To
emphasize the importance attached to this domain, Komer 1 s appointment
was announced in a National Security Action Memorandum on March 28. 127 /
As a "new hoy" to the Vietnam problem, Komer betook himself to Saigon
in mid-April to have a first-hand look. His eleven page report repre-
sents more a catalogue of the well-known problems than any very startling
suggestion for their resolution. 128/ Nevertheless, it did provide the
President with a detailed review of the specific difficulties in the RD
effort, an effort that the President repeatedly stressed in his public
remarks in this period. 129 /
At Defense, problems of deployment phasing for Vietnam occu-
pied a good portion of McNamara's time during the spring of 1 966 . On
March 1, the JCS had forwarded a recommendation for meeting planned
deployments that envisaged extending tours of service for selected
specialties and calling up some reserve units, 130 / Whatever McNamara's
own views on calling the reserves, the President was clearly unprepared
to contemplate such seemingly drastic measures at that juncture. Like
attacks on North Vietnamese POL, a reserve callup would have been seen
as a complete rejection of the international efforts to get negotiations
started and as a decisive escalation of the war . Moreover, to consider
such an action at a time when South Vietnam was in the throes of a pro-
tracted uolitical crisis would have run counter to the views of even
some of the strongest supporters of the war. So, on March 10, the Secre-
^. ar y a sked the Chiefs to redo their proposal in order to meet the stipulated
deployment schedule, stating that it was imperative that, "...all necessary
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actions.. -be taken to meet these deployment dates without callup of
reserves or extension of terms of service." I3l/ The JCS replied on
April 4 that it would be impossible to meet the deployment deadlines
because of shortages of critical skills. They proposed a stretch-out
of the deployments as the only remedy if reserve callups and extension
of duty tours were ruled out. 13 2/ Not satisfied, the Secretary asked
the Chiefs to explain in detail why they could not meet the require-
ments within the given time schedule. 133 / The Chiefs replied on
April 28 with a listing of the personnel problems that were the source
of their difficulty, but promised to take "extraordinary measures" in
an effort to conform as closely as possible to the desired closure
schedule. 134/ The total troop figure for Vietnam for end CY 66 on
which agreement was then reached was some 276,000 men. This constituted
Program 2-AR.
These modifications and adjustments to the troop deploy-
ment schedules, of course, had implications for the supporting forces
as well. The Chiefs also addressed a series of memos to the Secretary
on required modifications in the deployment plans for tactical aircraft
to support ground forces, and for increases in air munitions requirements. 135 /
These force expansions generated a requirement for additional airfields. 136/
When these matters are added to the problems created for McNamara and his
staff by the French decision that spring to request the withdrawal of all
NATO forces from French soil, it is not hard to understand why escalating
the war was momentarily set aside.
Another possible explanation for delaying the POL strikes
can be added to those already discussed. The spring of 1966 saw one of
the most determined and most public efforts by the international community
to bring the U.S. and North Vietnam to the negotiating table. While at
no time during this peace initiative was there any evidence, public or
private, of give in either sides' uncompromising position and hence real
possibility of talks, the widespread publicity of the effort meant that
the Administration was constrained from any military actions that might
be construed as "worsening the atmosphere" or rebuking the peace efforts .
Air strikes against- DRV POL reserves would obviously have fallen into this
category.
In February, after the resumption of the bombing, Nkrumah
and Nasser unsuccessfully attempted to get negotiations started, the former
touring severe 1 capitals including Moscow to further the effort. DeGaulle
replied to a letter from Ho Chi Minh with an offer to play a role in set-
tling the dispute, but no response was forthcoming. Prime Minister Wilson
met with Premier Kosygin in Moscow* firom Feb. 22-24 and urged reconvening
the Geneva Conference; the Soviets countered by saying the U.S. and DRV
must arrange a conference since the conflict was theirs. Early in March,
Hanoi reportedly rejected a suggestion by Indian President Radharrishnon
for an Asian-African force to replace American troops in South Vietnam.
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Later that month Canadian Ambassador Chester Bonning went to Hanoi
to test for areas in which negotiations might be possible. He -returned
with little hope, other than a vague belief the ICC could eventually
play a role.
Early in April, UN Secretary General U Thant advocated
Security Council involvement in Vietnam if Communist China and North
Vietnam agreed, and he reiterated his three point proposal for getting
the parties together (cessation of bombing; scaling down of all mili-
tary activity; and willingness of both sides to meet). No response was
forthcoming from the DRV, but later that month during meetings of the
"Third National Assembly" Ho and Premier Pham Van Dong reiterated the
unyielding North Vietnamese position that the U.S. must accept the four
points as the basis for solving the war before negotiations could start.
On April 29 , Canadian Prime Minister Pearson proposed a ceasefire and
a gradual withdrawal of troops as steps toward peace. The ceasefire was
seen as the first part of peace negotiations without prior conditions,
Phased withdrawals would begin as the negotiations proceeded. The U.S.
endorsed the Pearson proposal which was probably enough at that stage
to insure its rejection by Hanoi. On the same day, Danish PM Krag urged
the US to accept a transitional coalition government as a realistic step
toward peace.
In May, Netherlands Foreign Minister Luns proposed a mutual
reduction in the hostilities as a step toward a ceasefire and to prevent
any further escalation. Neither side made any direct response. On May
22, Guinea and Algeria called for an end to the bombing and a strict
respect for the Geneva Agreements as the basis of peace in Vietnam. In
a major speech on May 25, U Thant called for a reduction of hostilities,
but rejected the notion that the UN had prime responsibility for finding
a settlement. Early in June press attention was focused on apparent
Romanian efforts to bring Hanoi to the negotiating table. Romanian
intermediaries made soundings in Hanoi and Peking but turned up no new
sentiment for talks. In mid-June Canadian Ambassador Ronning made a
second trip to Hanoi but found no signs of give in the DRV portion (detailed
discussion below). Near the end of June a French official, Jean Sainteny,
reported from Hanoi and Peking through Agence France-Presse that the DRV
had left him with the impression that negotiations might be possible if
the U.S. committed itself in advance to a timetable for the withdrawal of
forces from South Vietnam. With pressure again mounting for additional U.S.
measures against the North and the failure of the Ronning mission, the
State Department closed out this international effort on June 23 (the day
after the original POL execute order), stating that neither oral reports
nor public statements indicated any change in the basic elements of
' Hanoi's position. On June 27, Secretary Rusk told the SSATO Conference
in Camberra, "I see no prospect of peace at the present moment." 137/
The bombing of the POL storage areas in Hanoi and Haiphong began on
June 2 9*
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The seriousness with which these international efforts
were being treated within the U.S. Government is reflected in two memos
from the period of late April and early May. On April 27 , Maxwell Taylor,
in his capacity as military advisor to the President, sent a memo to
the President entitled, "Assessment and Uses of Negotiation Blue Chips."
The heart of his analysis was that bombing was a "blue chip" like cease-
fire, withdrawal of forces, amnesty for VC/NVA, etc., to be given away
at the negotiation table for something concrete in return, not abandoned
beforehand merely to get negotiations started. The path to negotiations
would be filled with pitfalls, he argued,
Any day, Hanoi may indicate a willingness to negotiate
provided we stop permanently our bombing attacks against the
north. In this case, our Government would be under great
pressure at home and abroad to accept this precondition whereas
to do so would seriously prejudice the success of subsequent
negotiations. 138/
To avoid this dilemma, Taylor urged the President to clearly indicate
to our friends as well as the enemy that we were not prepared to end
the bombing except in negotiated exchange for a reciprocal concession
from the North Vietnamese. His analysis proceeded like this:
To avoid such pitfalls, we need to consider what we will
want from the Communist side and what they will want from
us in the course of negotiating a cease-fire or a final
settlement. What are our negotiating assets, what is their
value, and how should they be employed? As I see them, the
following are the blue chips in our pile representing what
Hanoi would or could like from us and what we might consider
giving under certain conditions.
a. Cessation of bombing in North Viet-Nam.
b. Cessation of military operations against Viet Cong units.
c. Cessation of increase of U.S. forces in South Viet-Nam.
d. Withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Viet-Nam.
e. Amnesty and civic rights for Viet Cong.
f. Economic aid to North Viet -Nam.
The Viet Cong/Hanoi have a similar stack of chips representing
actions we would like from them.
a. Cessation of Viet Cong incidents in South Viet-Nam,
b. Cessation of guerrilla .military operations.
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c. Cessation of further infiltration of men and
supplies from North Viet -Nam to South Viet -Nam.
d. Withdrawal of infiltrated North Vietnamese Army
units and cadres.
e. Dissolution or repatriation of Viet Cong. 139 /
Continuing his argument, Taylor outlined his views about which "blue
chips" we should trade in negotiations for concessions from the DRV.
If these are the chips, how should we play ours to
get theirs at minimum cost? Our big chips are a and d,
the cessation of bombing and the withdrawal of U.S. forces j
their big ones are c and _e, the stopping of infiltration
and dissolution of the Viet Cong. We might consider trading
even, our a and d for their £ and e except for the fact that
all will require a certain amount of verification and inspec-
tion except our bombing which is an overt, visible fact.
Even if Hanoi would accept inspection, infiltration is so
elusive that I would doubt the feasibility of an effective
detection system. Troop withdrawals, on the other hand,
are comparatively easy to check. Hence, I would be inclined
to accept as an absolute minimum a cessation of Viet Cong
incidents and military operations (Hanoi a and b) which are
readily verifiable in exchange for the stopping of our
bombing and of offensive military operations against Viet
Cong units (our a and b). If Viet Cong performance under
the agreement were less than perfect, we can resume our
activities on a scale related to the volume of enemy action.
This is not a particularly good deal since we give up one of
our big chips, bombing, and get neither of Hanoi's two big ones.
However, it would achieve a cease-fire under conditions which
are subject to verification and, on the whole, acceptable.
We would not have surrendered the right to use our weapons
in protection of the civil population outside of Viet Cong-
controlled territory. ikO/
^ mimi ng up, Taylor argued against an unconditional bombing halt in these
words :
Such’ a tabulation of negotiating blue chips and their
purchasing power emphasized the folly of giving up any one
in advance as a precondition for negotiations. Thus, if
we gave up bombing in order to start discussions, we would
not have the coins necessary to pay for all the concessions
required for a satisfactory terminal settlement. My estimate
of assets and values may be challenged, but I feel that it is
important for us to go through some such exercise and make up
our collective minds as to the Value of our holdings and how
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to play them. We need such an analysis to guide our own ,
thoughts and actions and possibly for communication to some
of the third parties who, from time to time, try to get
negotiations started. Some day we may be embarrassed if some
country like India should express the view to Hanoi that the
Americans would probably stop their bombing to get discussions
started and then have Hanoi pick up the proposal as a formal
offer. To prepare our own people as well as to guide our
friends, vie need to make public explanation of some of the
points discussed above. 141/
In conclusion he sounded a sharp warning about allowing ourselves to
become embroiled in a repetition of our Korean negotiating experience,
where casualties increased during the actual bargaining phase itself.
It is hard to assess how much influence this memo had on the President's
and the Administration’s attitudes toward negotiations, but in hind-
sight it is clear that thinking of this kind prevailed within the U.S.
Government until the early spring of 1968.
Taylor's memo attracted attention both at State and Defense
at least down to the Assistant Secretary level. William Bundy at State
sent a memo to Secretary Rusk the following week commenting on Taylor's
ideas with his Own. assessment of the bargaining value and timing of a
permanent cessation of the bombing. Since they represent views on the
bombing which were to prevail for nearly two years, Bundy's memo is repro-
duced in substantial portions below. Recapitulating Taylor's analysis
and his own position, Bundy began.
Essentially, the issue has always been whether vie would
trade a cessation of bombing in the North for some degree of
reduction or elimination of Viet Gong and new North Viet-
namese activity in the South, or a cessation of infiltration
from the North, or a combination of both. 142/
Worried that Taylor's willingness to trade a cessation of US/gVN bombing
and offensive operations for a cessation of VC/NVA activity might be
prejudicial to the GVN, Bundy outlined his own concept of what would be
a reciprocal concession from the DRV:
...I have myself been more inclined to an asking price,
at least, that vrould include both a declared cessation of
inf iltration and a sharp reduction in \c/NVA military opera-
tions in the South. Even though vie could not truly verify
the cessation of infiltration, the present volume and routes
are such that we could readily ascertain whether there was
any significant movement, using our own air. Moreover, DRV
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action concerning infiltration would be a tremendous
psychological blow to the VC and would constitute an
admission which they have always declined really to make.
Whichever form of trade might be pursued if the issue
even arose — as it conceivably might through such nibbles
as the present Ronning effort -- I fully agree with General
Taylor that we should do all we can to avoid the pitfalls
of ceasing "bombing in return simply for a willingness to talk. 143/
Concerned that the current spate of international peace moves might entice
the Administration in another bombing pause, Bundy reminded the Secretary
that.
...during our long pause in January, we pretty much
agreed among ourselves that as a practical matter, if Hanoi
started to play negotiating games that even seemed to be
serious, we would have great difficulty in resuming bombing
for some time. This was and is a built-in weakness of the
"pause" approach. It does not apply to informal talks with
the DRV, directly or indirectly, on the conditions under
which we would stop bombing, nor does it apply to possible
third country suggestions. As to the latter, I myself believe
that our past record sufficiently stresses that we could stop
the bombing only if the other side did something in response.
Thus, I would not at this moment favor any additional public
statement by us, which might simply highlight the issue and
bring about the very pressures we seek to avoid. Ih4/
Hence, he concluded.
As you can see, these reactions are tentative as to the
form of the trade, but quite firm that there must in fact be
a trade and that we should not consider another "pause" under
existing circumstances. If we agree merely to these points,
I think we will have made some progress. l4g/
Bombing was thus seen from within the Administration as a counter to be
traded during negotiations, a perception not shared by large segments of
the international community where bombing was always regarded as an
impediment to any such negotiations. Hanoi, however, had always clearly
seen the bombing as the focal point in the test of wills with the U.S.
While Secretary Rusk was fending off this international
'pressure for an end to the bombing and de-escalation of the war as a
means to peace, the President was having increasing trouble with war-
dissenters within his own party. The US had scarcely resumed the bombing
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of the Worth after the extended December -January pause when Senator
Fulbright opened hearings by his Senate Foreign Relations Committee
into the Viet rum war. Witnesses who took varying degrees of exception
to U.S, policy as they testified in early February included former
Ambassador George Kennan and retired General James Gavin. Secretary
Rusk appeared on February 18 and defended U.S. involvement as a fulfill-
ment of our SEATO obligations. In a stormy confrontation with Fulbright
the Secretary repeatedly reminded the Senator of his support for the
1964 Tonkin Gulf Resolution. The next day, Senator Robert Kennedy stated
that the WLF should be included in any postwar South Vietnamese govern-
ment. Three days later, he clarified his position by saying that he had
meant the NLF should not be "automatically excluded" from power in an
interim government pending elections. Speaking no doubt for the Presi-
dent and the Administration, the Vice President pointedly rejected
Kennedy’s suggestion on February 21. On the other side of the political
spectrum. Senator Russell, otherwise a hawk on the war, reacted in April
to the continuing political turmoil in South Vietnam by suggesting a
poll be taken in all large Vietnamese cities to determine whether our
assistance was still desired by the Vietnamese. If the answer was no,
he asserted, the U.S. should pull out of Vietnam.
The President was also regularly reminded by the press of
the possible implications for the November Congressional elections of a
continuing large effort in South Vietnam that did not produce results.
Editorial writers were often even more pointed. On May 17, James Reston
wrote :
President Johnson has been confronted for some time
with a moral question in Vietnam, but he keeps evading it.
The question is this: What justifies more and more killing
in Vietnam when the President's own conditions for an effec-
tive war effort — a government that can govern and fight in
Saigon — are not met?
By his own definition, this struggle cannot succeed
without a regime that commands the respect of the South
Vietnamese people and a Vietnamese army that can pacify the
country. Yet though the fighting qualities of the South
Vietnamese are now being demonstrated more and more against
one another, the President's orders are sending more and more
Americans .into the battle to replace the Vietnamese who are
fighting among themselves. 146/
Public reaction to the simmering political crisis in South Vietnam was
reflected in declining popular approval of the President's performance.
In March 68$ of those polled had approved the President's conduct in
office, but by May, his support had declined sharply to only 54$. 147/
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Some indication of the concern being generated by these adverse
U.S. political effects of the governmental crisis in South Vietnam is
offered by the fact that State, on May 21, sent the Embassy in Saigon
the results of a Gallup Poll on whether the U.S. should continue its
support for the war. These were the questions and the distribution of
the responses:
1. Suppose South Vietnamese start fighting on big scale
among themselves. Do you think we should continue help them,
or should we withdraw our troops? (a) Continue to help 28
percent; (b) Withdraw 54 percent; (c) ho opinion 18 percent.
2. If GVh decides stop fighting (discontinue war), what
should US do — continue war by itself, or should we withdraw?
(A) Continue 16 percent; (b) Withdraw 72 percent; (C) ho
opinion 12 percent. Comparison August 1965 is 19, 63 and 18
percent.
3. Do you think South Vietnamese will be able to estab-
lish stable government or not? (A) Yes 32 percent; (B) ho
48 percent; (c) ho opinion 20 percent. Comparison January
1965 is 25, 42 and 33 percent. 148/
Lodge, struggling with fast moving political events in Hue and DaNang,
replied to these poll results on May 23 in a harsh and unsympathetic tone,
We are in Viet-Nam because it cannot ward off external
aggression by itself, and is, therefore, in trouble. If it
were not in trouble, we would not have to be here. The time
for us to leave is when the trouble is over — not when it is
changing its character. It makes no sense for us here to help
them against military violence and to leave them in the lurch
to be defeated by criminal violence operating under political,
economic and social guise.
It is obviously true that the Vietnamese are not today
ready for self-government, and that the French actively tried
to unfit them for self-government. One of the implications
of the phrase 'internal squabbling' is this unfitness. But
if we are going to adopt the policy of turning every country
that is unfit for self-government over to the communists, there
won't be much of the world left. 149/
Lodge rejected the implications of these opinion polls in the strongest
possible terms, reaffirming his belief in the correctness of the U.S.
course.
The idea that we are here simply because the Vietnamese
want us to be here — which is another implication of the
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phrase 'internal squabbling* -; that we have no national
interest in being here ourselves; and that if some of
them don't want us to stay, we ought to get out is to
me fallacious. In fact, I doubt whether we would have
the moral right to make the commitment we have made here
solely as a matter of charity towards the Vietnamese and
without the existence of a strong United States interest.
For one thing, the U.S. interest in avoiding World War
III is very direct and strong. Some day we may have to
decide how much it is worth to us to deny Viet -Nam to Hanoi
and Peking — regardless of what the Vietnamese may think. 150 /
■ Apparently unable to get the matter off his mind, Lodge brought it up
again in his weekly NODIS to the President on May 25,
I have been mulling over the state of American opin-
ion as I observed it when I was at home. I have also been
reading the recent Gallup polls. As I commented in my
EMBTEL 4880 , I am quite certain that the number of those
who want us to leave Viet -Nam because of current 'internal
squabbling' does not reflect deep conviction but a super-
ficial impulse based on inadequate information.
In fact, I think one television fireside chat by you
personally — with all your intelligence and compassion —
could tip that figure over in one evening. I am thinking of
a speech, the general tenor of which would be; 'we are
involved in a vital struggle of great difficulty and
complexity on which much depends. I need your help.'
I am sure you would get much help from the very
people in the Gallup poll who said we ought to leave
Viet -Nam --as soon as they understood what you want them
to support. 151 /
Lodge's reassurances, however, while welcome bipartisan political support
from a critical member of the team, could not mitigate the legitimate
Presidential concerns about the domestic base for an uncertain policy.
Thus, assailed on many sides, the President attempted to steer what he
must have regarded as a middle course.
The President's unwillingness to proceed with the bombing
of the POL storage facilities in North Vietnam continued in May in spite
of the near consensus among his top advisors on its desirability. As
already noted, the JCS recommendation that POL be included in Program 50
of the ROLLING THUNDER strikes for the month of May had been disapproved. 152/
An effort was made to have the strikes included in the ROLLING THUNDER
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series for the month of May, which ordinarily would have been ROLLING
THUNDER 51, but the decision was to extend ROLLING THUNDER 50 until
further notice, holding the POL question in abeyance. 153 / On May 3,
McNaughton sent Walt Rostow a belated list of questions, "to put into
the 'ask-Lodge' hopper." The first set of proposed queries had to do
with the bombing program and included specific questions about attacking
POL. Whether Rostov; did, in fact, query Lodge on the matter is not clear
from the available cables, but in any case, Rostow took up the matter of
the POL attacks himself in an important memorandum to Rusk and McNamara
on May 6 . Rostow developed his argument for striking the petroleum
reserves on the basis of U.S. experience in the World War II attacks on
German oil supplies and storage facilities. His reasoning was as follows:
From the moment that serious and systematic oil attacks
started, front line single engine fighter strength and tank
mobility were affected. The reason was this: it proved much
more difficult, in the face of general oil shortage, to
allocate from less important to more important uses than the
simple arithmetic of the problem would suggest. Oil moves
in various logistical channels from central sources. When
the central sources began to dry up the effects proved fairly
prompt and widespread. What look like reserves statistically
are rather inflexible commitments to logistical pipelines. 1 5 I 1 /
The same results might be expected from heavy and sustained attacks on
the North Vietnamese oil reserves,
With an understanding that simple analogies are danger-
ous, I nevertheless feel it is quite possible the military
effects of a systematic and sustained bombing of POL in North
Vietnam may be more prompt and direct than conventional intel-
ligence analysis would suggest.
X would underline, however, the adjectives 'systematic
and sustained. ' If we take this step we must cut clean
through the POL system — and hold the cut — if we are looking
for decisive results. 1 55/
On May 9> recalling that the VC had recently attacked three
South Vietnamese textile factories, Westmoreland suggested that to deter
further assaults against South Vietnamese industry, the U.S. should strike
a North Vietnamese industrial target with considerable military signifi-
cance such as the Thai Nguyen iron and steel plant. 1 %J Concurring with
the basic intent of the proposal, CINCPAC recommended that the target be
the North Vietnamese POL system instead. "Initiation of strikes against
NVN POL system and subsequent completed destruction , would be more mean-
ingful and further deny NVN essential war making resources. 157 /
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Lending further support to these military and civilian
recommendations was a study completed on May 4 hy the Air Staff which
suggested that civilian casualties and collateral damage could be mini-
mized in POL strikes if only the most experienced pilots, with thorough
briefing were used; if the raids were executed only under favorable
visual flight conditions with maximum use of sophisticated navigational
aids; and if weapons and tactics were selected for their pinpoint accuracy
rather than area coverage. 158/ On May 22, COMUSMACV sent CINCPAC yet
another recommendation for retaliatory air strikes against North Vietnamese
industrial and military targets. He called for plans that would permit the
U.S. to respond to any VC terror attacks by an air strike against a
similar target in the North. In particular, the Hanoi and Haiphong oil
storage sites were recommended as reprisal targets for VC attacks against
U.S. or South Vietnamese POL. 159 /
Intervening again in mid -May, however, was yet another
round of the continuing South Vietnamese political crisis. It is not
clear whether or not a decision on the strikes against Hanoi/Haiphong
POL was deferred by the President for this reason, but it is plausible to
think that it was a factor. In brief, the Buddhists in Hue and DaNang,
with the active support and later leadership of General Thi, the I Corps
commander, defied the central government. Thi refused to return to Saigon
when ordered and only when Ky flew to DaNang and intervened with troops
and police to recapture control of the two cities was GVN authority
restored to the area. The crisis temporarily put the constitutional
processes off the track and diverted high level American attention from
other issues. 360 / The effect of this dispute on public support for the
U.S. involvement in the war has already been discussed. Concern with
bringing an end to this internal strife in South Vietnam and with pushing
a reluctant GVN steadily along the road to constitutional and democratic
government preoccupied the highest levels of the U.S. Government throughout
May. These concerns momentarily contributed to forcing the military
aspects of the war into the background for harried U.S. leaders whose time
is always insufficient to the range of problems to be dealt with.
D. The Decision to Strike
The POL decision was rapidly coming to a head. On May 31, a
slight relaxation of the restrictions against attacking POL was made when
six minor storage areas in relatively unpopulated areas were approved
for attack. l6l / Apparently sometime in late May, possibly at the time
of the approval of the six minor targets, the President decided that
attacks on the entire North Vietnamese POL network could not be delayed
'much longer. In any case, sometime near the end of the month he informed
British Prime Minister Wilson of his intentions. When Wilson protested,
McNamara arranged a special briefing by an American officer for Wilson
and Foreign Minister Michael Stewart on June 2. The following day, Wilson
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cabled his appreciation to the President for his courtesy, but expressed
his own feeling of obligation to urge the President not to make these
new raids. Thus, he stated:
I was most grateful to you for asking Bob McNamara to
arrange the very full briefing about the two oil targets near
Hanoi and Haiphong that Col. Rogers gave me yesterday. . . .
I know you will not feel that I am either unsympathetic
or uncomprehending of the dilemma that this problem presents
for you. In particular, I wholly understand the deep concern
you must feel at the need to do anything possible to reduce
the losses of young Americans in and over Vietnam; and Col.
Rogers made it clear to us what care has been taken to plan
this operation so as to keep civilian casualties to the
minimum.
However,...! am bound to say that, as seen from here,
the possible military benefits that may result from this
bombing do not appear to outweigh the political disadvantages
that would seem the inevitable consequence. If you and the
South Vietnamese Government were conducting a declared war
on the conventional pattern. . .this operation would clearly
be necessary and right. But since you have made it abundantly
clear — and you know how much we have welcomed and supported
this — that your purpose is to achieve a negotiated settlement,
and that you are not striving for total military victory in
the field, I remain convinced that the bombing of these targets,
without producing decisive military advantage, may only increase
the difficulty of reaching an eventual settlement ....
The last thing I wish is to add to your difficulties, but,
as I warned you in my previous message, if this action is taken
we shall have to dissociate ourselves from it, and in doing so
I should have to say that you had given me advance warning and
that I had made my position clear to you....
Nevertheless I want to repeat .. .that our reservations
about this operation will not affect our continuing support
for your policy over Vietnam, as you and your people have
made it clear from your /April 19 65 / Baltimore speech onwards.
But, while this will remain the Government's position, I know
that the effect on public opinion in this country -- and I
■ believe throughout Western Europe — is likely to be such as
to reinforce the existing disquiet and criticism that we have
to deal with. 162 /
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The failure of the special effort to obtain Wilson's support
must have been disappointing, but it did not stop the onward flow of
events. Available information leaves unclear exactly how firmly the
President had decided to act and gives no specific indication of the
intended date for the strikes. A package of staff papers prepared by
McNaughton suggests that the original date was to have been June 10,
A scenario contained in the package proposes a list of actions for the
period 8-30 June and begins with strike-day minus 2. The suggested
scenario was as follows:
S-/Strike7 day minus 2: Inform UK, Australia, Japan
S-day minus 1: Notify Canada, New Zealand, Thailand, Laos,
Philippines (Marcos only), GRC (Chiang only), Korea
S-hour minus 1: Inform GVN
S-hour: Strike Hanoi, Haiphong
S-hour plus 2: Announce simultaneously in Washington and
Saigon
S-hour plus 3-5: SecDef press backgrounder (depends on
strike timing and completeness of post-strike reports) 16 3 /
The package also included a draft JCS execute message, a draft State
cable to the field on notifying third countries, a draft public announce-
ment, a talking paper for a McNamara press conference, a list of anticipated
press questions, and maps and photographs of the targets.
The circle of those privy to this tentative Presidential decision
probably did not. include more than a half dozen of the key Washington
advisers. Certainly the military commanders in the field had not been
informed. On June 5, Westmoreland urged that strikes be made against POL
at the "earliest possible" moment, noting that ongoing North Vietnamese
dispersal efforts would make later attacks less effective. 164/ Admiral
Sharp took the occasion to reiterate to Washington that the - strikes,
besides underscoring the US resolve to support SVN and increase the pres-
sure against NVN, would make it difficult for Hanoi to disperse POL,
complicate off-loading from tankers, necessitate new methods of trans-
shipment, "temporarily" halt the flow to dispersed areas, and have a
"direct effect" on the movement of trucks and watercarft -- perhaps (if
imports were inadequate) limiting truck use. Sharp called the POL targets
the most lucrative available in terms of impairing NVN's military logis-
tics capabilities. I65 / Two days later, in reporting the results of a
review of the armed recce program, CINCPAC again urged that POL be
attacked. He particularly noted the importance of,
...the effort being made by the NVN to disperse, camou-
flage and package things into ever smaller increments. This
is particularly true of POL. ...This again emphasizes the
importance of souce /sic7 targets such as ports and major
POL installations.
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It is hoped that June will see a modification to
the RT /ROILING THIMDKR/ rules with authorization to
syrike /Tic/ key POL targets, selected targets in the
Ron Gai and Cam Pha compleses /Tic/, and relaxation of
the restrictions against coastal armed recce in the HE.
In addition, reduction in the size of the Hanoi /Haiphong
restricted areas would be helpful. , . , 166/
The CIA, however, remained skeptical of these expectations for strikes
against POL. On June 8, they produced a special assessment of the likely
effects of such an attack, probably in response to a request from the
Principals for a last minute evaluation. The report emphasized that
"neutralization" of POL would not in itself stop North Vietnamese support
of the war, although it would have an adverse general effect on the
economy.
It is estimated that the neutralization of the bulk
petroleum storage facilities in NVN will not In itself
preclude Hanoi's continued support of essential war activi-
ties. The immediate impact in NVN will be felt in the need
to convert to an alternative system of supply and distribu-
tion. The conversion program will be costly and create
additional burdens for the regime. It is estimated, how-
ever, that the infiltration of men and supplies into SVN
can be sustained. The impact on normal economic activity,
however , would be more severe. New strains on an already
burdened economic control structure and managerial talent
would cause reductions in economic activity, compound
existing distribution problems, and further strain man-
power resources. The attacks on petroleum storage facili-
ties in conjunction with continued attacks on transportation
targets and armed reconnaissance against lines of communica-
tions will increase the burden and costs of supporting the
war.
The sequence of events in the POL scenario drawn up by McNaughton
was interrupted on June 7 by yet another international diplomatic effort
to get negotiations started, or at least to test Hanoi's attitudes toward
such a possibility, Canadian Ambassador Chester Ronning had been planning
a second visit to Hanoi for June 14-18 with State Department approval.
Thus, when Rupk, who was travelling in Europe, learned on June 7 of the
possibility of strikes before Ronning* s trip, he urgently cabled the
President to defer them.
. . • Regarding special operation in Vietnam we have had
under consideration, I sincerely hope that timing can be
postponed until my return. A major question in my mind is
Ronning mission to Hanoi occurring June l4 through 18. This
123
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is not merely political question involving a mission with
which we have fully concurred. It also involves impor-
tance of cur knowing whether there is ary change in the
thus far harsh and unyielding attitude of Hanoi. 168/
Much on his mind in making the request, as he revealed in a separate
cable to McNamara the following day, was the likelihood of "...general
international revulsion...." toward an act that might sabatoge Ronning' s
efforts .
...I am deeply disturbed by general international
revulsion, and perhaps a great deal at home, if it becomes
known that we took an action which sabotaged the Ronning
mission to which we had given our agreement. I recognize
the agony of this problem for all concerned. We could
make arrangements to get an immediate report from Ronning.
If has a negative report, as we expect, that provides a
firmer base for the action we contemplate and would make
a difference to people like Wilson and Pearson. If, on
the other hand, he learns that there is any serious break-
through toward peace, the President would surely want to
know of that before an action which would knock such a
possibility off the tracks. I strongly recommend, there-
fore, against ninth or "tenth. I regret this because of my
maximum desire to support you and your colleagues in your
tough job. 169/
The President responded to the Secretary's request and suspended action
until Ronning returned. When Ronning did return, William Bundy flew to
Ottawa and met with him on June 21. Bundy reported that he was "markedly
more sober and subdued" and had found no opening or flexibility in the
North Vietnamese position. 170/
While these diplomatic efforts were under', '/ay, McNamara had
informed CINCPAC of the high level consideration for the POL strikes, but
stated:
Final decision for or against will be influenced by
extent they can be carried out without significant civilian
casualties. What preliminary steps to minimize would you
recommend and if taken what number of casualties do you
believe would result? 171/
CINCPAC replied eagerly listing the conditions and safeguards for the
attack that the Air Staff study had suggested in early May. He would
execute only under favorable weather conditions, with good visibility
and no cloud cover, in order to assure positive identification of the
targets and improved strike accuracy; select the best axis of attack to
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avoid populated areas; select weapons with optimum ballistic character-
istics for precision; make maximum use of ECM support in order to hamper
SA.-2 and AAA radars and reduce "pilot distraction" during the strikes;
and employ the most experienced pilots, thoroughly briefed. He added
that NVN had an excellent alert system, which would provide ample time
for people to take cover. In all, he expected "under 50" civilian
casualties. 1 72/ (This was the Joint Staff estimate, too, but CIA in
its 8 June report estimated that civilian casualties might run to 200-300*)
McNamara cabled his approval of the measures suggested and indi-
cated that they would be included in the execute message. He stressed
that the President's final decision would be greatly influenced by the
ability to minimize civilian casualties and inquired about restrictions
against flak and SAM suppression that might endanger populated areas. 173/
On June 16, CINCFAC offered further assurances that all possible measures
would be taken to avoid striking civilians and that flak and SAM suppression
would be under the rightest of restrictions. 174/
The stage was thus set, and when the feedback from the Ronning
mission revealed no change in Hanoi's position, events moved quickly.
On 22 June the execution message was released. 175 / It auth-
orized strikes on the 7 POL targets plus the Kep radar, beginning with
attacks on the Hanoi and Haiphong sites, effective first light on 24 June
Saigon time.
The execution message is a remarkable document, attesting in
detail to the political sensitivity of the strikes and for some reason
ending in a "never on Sunday" injunction. The gist of the message was
as follows :
Strikes to commence with initial attacks against
Haiphong and Hanoi POL on same day if operationally
feasible. Make maximum effort to attain operational
surprise. Do not conduct initiating attacks under mar-
ginal weather conditions but reschedule when weather
assures success. Follow -on attacks authorized as opera-
tional and weather factors dictate.
At Haiphong, avoid damage to merchant shipping. No
attacks authorized on craft unless US aircraft are first
fired on and then only if clearly North Vietnamese. Piers
servicing target will not be attacked if tanker is berthed
off end of pier.
Decision made after SecDef and CJCS were assured every
feasible step would be taken to minimize civilian casual-
ties would be small. If you do not believe you can accom-
plish objective while destroying targets and protecting
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crews, do not initiate program. Take the following
measures: maximum use of most experienced ROLLING
THUNDER personnel, detailed briefing of pilots stressing
need to avoid civilians, execute only when weather per-
mits visual identification of targets and improved strike
accuracy, select best axis of attack to avoid populated
areas, maximum use of ECM to hamper SAM and AAA fire
control, in order to limit pilot distraction and improve
accuracy, maximum use of weapons of high precision
delivery consistent with mission objectives, and limit
SAM and AAA suppression to sites located outside popu-
lated areas.
Take special precautions to insure security. If
weather or operational considerations delay initiation
of strikes, do not initiate on Sunday, 26 June. 176/
The emphasis on striking Hanoi and Haiphong POL targets on the
same day and trying to achieve operational surprise reflected an acute
concern that these targets were in well-defended areas and U.S. losses
might be high. The concern about merchant shipping, especially tankers
which might be in the act of off-loading into the storage 'tanks, reflected
anxiety over sparking an international incident, especially one with the
USSR.
With the execute message out, high-level interest turned to the
weather in the Hanoi/Haiphong area. The NMCC began to send Secretary
McNamara written forecasts every few hours. These indicated that the
weather was not promising. Twice the strikes were scheduled but had to
be postponed. Then, on 2h June, Philip Geyelin of the Wall Street Journal
got hold of a story that the President had decided to bomb the POL at
Haiphong, and the essential details appeared in a Dow Jones news wire that
evening. This was an extremely serious leak, because of the high risk of
U.S. losses if NVN defenses were fully prepared. The next day an order
was issued cancelling the strikes. 177/
The weather watch continued. However, under special security
precautions. The weather reports, plus other messages relating to the
strikes, continued, handled as Top Secret Special Category (SpeCat)
Exclusive for the SecDef, CJC3, and CINCPAC. (It is not known whether
the diplomatic scenario which involved informing some countries about
the strikes ahead of time was responsible for the press leak; in any case,
the. classification and handling of these messages kept them out of State
■ Department channels. ) The continued activity suggests that the cancella-
tion of the strikes on the' 25th may have been only a cover for security
purposes.
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On the 28th Admiral Sharp cabled General Wheeler that his
forces were ready and the weather was favorable for the strikes; he
requested authority to initiate them on the 29th. 178/ General
Wheeler responded with a message rescinding the previous cancellation,
reinstating the original execution order, and approving the recommenda-
tion to execute on the 29th „ The message informed Admiral Sharp that
preliminary and planning messages should continue as SpeCat Exclusive
for himself and the SecDef. 179/
The strikes were launched on 29 June, reportedly with great
success. The large Hanoi tank farm was apparently completely knocked
out; the Haiphong facility looked about 80 percent destroyed. One U.S.
aircraft was lost to ground fire. Four MIGs were encountered and one
was probably shot down. The Deputy Commander of the 7th Air Force in
Saigon called the operation "the most significant, the most important
strike of the War."
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FOOTNOTES
1. Memorandum for the SecDef from Ambassador-at -Large Llewellyn E.
Thompson, 12 October 1965 , ££• cit .
2. JCSS Armed Reconnaissance Study Group Report, "An Analysis of the
Armed Reconnaissance Program in North Vietnam," 15 November 1965,
Appendix 1 to Annex C.
3. JCSM £38-66, ROLLING THUNDER Study Group Report, "Air Operations
Against North Vietnam," l 4 April 1 966, Tab B to Annex C to
Appendix A to Section II, and Appendix B to Section II.
k. Memorandum for the SecDef from Ambassador-at -Large Llewellyn E.
Thompson, 12 October 1965, op. cit .
5. JCSM 811 - 65 , 10 November 1965, "Future Operations and Force Deploy-
ments with Respect to the War in Vietnam."
6. Memorandum for the DepSecDef from McNaughton, 9 November 1965,
summarizing the JCS position.
7. JCSM 8IO-65, "Air Operations Against the North Vietnam POL System,"
10 November 1965-
8. "Attack on the North Vietnam Petroleum Storage System -- A Study,"
prepared by J-3 in collaboration with DIA, 23 April 1965, revised
22 December 1965-
9. JCSM 8IO-65, 10 November 1965, 0£. cit .
10 . Ibid . , Appendix, Annex D.
11. Ibid .
12. Memorandum for the Director, CIA, from Sherman Kent, for the Board
of National Estimates, "Probable Reactions of the DRV, Communist
China, and the USSR to US Air Attacks on Petroleum Storage Facilities
in North Vietnam," 27 November 1965; and Memorandum for the SecDef
from Admiral W. F. Raborn, 3 December 1965, forwarding Memorandum for
the Director, CIA, from Sherman Kent, for the Board of National
Estimates, "Reactions to a US Course of Action in Vietnam," 2 December
1965 .
13. Memorandum for Director, CIA from Sherman Kent, 27 November 1965,
op . cit .
lU. Ibid .
15. Ibid . #
128
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16. Memorandum for the Director, CIA, from Sherman Kent, 2 December
1965> ££. cit .
17. Ibid .
18. Ibid .
19. Ibid .
20. Ibid .
21. Memorandum for the CJCS from the SecDef, 8 December 1965, "Military
Operations in Worth and South Vietnam."
22. Memorandum for the DepSecDef from the Acting Director, CIA,
28 December 1965 , "Probable Reactions to US Bombing Attacks on
POL Targets in Worth Vietnam."
23. Ibid .
24. Ibid .
25. Ibid .
26. Ibid .
27. SNIE 10-2-65, 10 December 1965* "Probable Communist Reactions to
a US Course of Action."
28. Ibid .
2 9. Ibid .
30. Ibid .
31. CM-IOO6-65, Memorandum for the SecDef, "Probable Reactions of
the DRV, Communist China, and the USSR to US Air Attacks on the
Petroleum Storage Facilities in Worth Vietnam," 2 December 1965.
32. CM 1071-65) Memorandum for ASD/lSA, 28 December 1965 .
33. "Attack on the Worth Vietnam Petroleum Storage System — A Study"
prepared by J-3 in collabroation with DIA, 23 April 1 965, revised
22 December 19^5*
34. Ibid .
35. JCSM 41-66, 18 January 1966.
129
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36 . Draft, W. P. Bundy, 1 / 15 / 66 , "Scenario for Possible Resumption
of Bombing."
37 . Draft, McNaughton, l/l 8 / 66 , "Some Observations About Bombing
North Vietnam."
38 . JCS 283 O, 292126Z January 1966 , directed the resumption. This
was the beginning of ROLLING THUNDER 48.
39 . Memorandum for the President, "The Military Outlook in South
Vietnam," 24 January i 960 .
40. Ibid .
41. DIA Special Report AP-I- 63 O-I-I 5 - 66 , "Relationship Between Petro-
leum Storage and Distribution System and Petroleum Consumption
in North Vietnam," January 1966 .
42. SNIE 10-1-66, "Possible Effects of a Proposed US Course of Action
on DRV Capability to Support the Insurgency in South Vietnam,"
4 February 1966 .
43. Ibid .
44. Ibid .
45. Ibid .
46. Ibid .
47. CM-1147-66, 1 February 1 966 , "Interdiction Operations Against the DRV."
48. JCSM 238-66, 14 April 1966 , "ROLLING THUNDER Study Group Report,"
°p. cit . , Section I, Basic Report.
49. Ibid .
50. Ibid .
51 . Ibid .
52 . JCSM 113-66, 19 February 1966 .
53 . JCSM I 3 O- 66 , 1 March 1966 ; JCSM 153-66, 10 March 1966 .
54. CIA SC No. 0828/66, "The Role of Air Strikes in Attaining Objec-
tives in North Vietnam," March 1966 .
55 . Ibid .
130
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56 . Ibid .
57. Ibid .
58 . Ibid .
59 . Ibid.
60. Ibid .
61. Ibid .
62. Ibid .
63 . Memo, SecDef to President, 24 Jan 1966 , erg. cit.
64. CM 1147-66: Memo, Chairman to Director, Joint Staff, 1 Feb 1966,
JCS Study Group Report, Sect. I, App A, Annex B; JCSM 238 - 66 ; Memo,
Director, Joint Staff to SecDef, l4 Apr 1966, states that the Study
Group was formed "In furtherance of your conversation with the
Chairman. ..."
65 . JCS Study Group Report, Sect. I, App A, Annex B, and App B.
66 . Ibid ., Sect. II, App A, Annex D, pp. 12-13.
67 . JCSM 113-66 (19 Feb 1966).
68 . JCS Study Group Report, Sec. II, App A, Annex B, p. 13.
69 . JCSM 130-66 (1 Mar 1966).
70. JCSM 810-65 (1° Nov 1965)-
71. Memo, Sherman Kent to Director, CIA, 2 Dec 1965 *
72 . Memo, Sherman Kent to Director, CIA, 27 Nov 1965*
73* lhid -
74 . Memo, Acting Director, CIA, to DepSeeDef, 28 Dec 1965 .
75 . DIA Special Report AP-I- 63 O, 15 Jan 1966 .
76 . SNIE 10-1-66 (4 Feb 1 966).
131
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77. JCSM- 130-66, 1 March 1966, Appendix A, p. A-3 (TS), emphasis
added.
78. JCSM-153-66, 10 March 1966 (TS).
79. CIA SC No. 0828/66, "The Role of Air Strikes in Attaining Objectives
in North Vietnam," March 1966.
80. JCSM 189-66, 26 Mar 1966.
81. Ibid.
82. Memo, SecDef to President (no date, but late March 1966), Subject:
April Program of Air Strikes Against North Vietnam and Laos" (in
McNaughton Book II, Tab V.)
83. NSAM No. 288, 17 Mar 1964.
84. State 2884 to Lodge, 30 Mar 1 966, CF 49.
85. Notes on Memo, SecDef to President, "April Program...," copy in
McNaughton Book VII, Tab L.)
86. JCS 7480, 0101122 April 1 966.
87. Memorandum for the President, "April Program. op. cit .
88. Testimony before the Senate Committees on Armed Services and Appro-
priations, 4 August 1965, SECRET.
89. JCSM 810-65, 10 November 1965, op. cit .
90. CM- 1006 -65, 2 December 1965, op- cit .
91. Memorandum for the President from Under SecState Ball, 25 January 1966.
92. Ibid .
93. Ibid .
94. JCS Study Group Report, Section III, Appendix A, pp. 2-3; JCSM 238-66,
14 April 1966.
Background Information Relating to Southeast Asia and Viet-Nam , op .
cit., p-
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96. The papers and notes presented at this meeting for consideration
and described in detail below are all contained in McNaughton
Book XI, Tab W (S-Sensitive) .
97. W. W. Rostov; Memorandum for Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara,
April 9, 1966 — 7:00 a.m.. Subject: Breaking Tri Quang's Momentum (S)
in McNaughton Book II, Tab S.
98. Leonard Unger, State, Far East, Planning for Viet -Nam Contingencies ,
April 11, 1966 (TS), in McNaughton Book II, Tab R.
99. McNaughton* s handwritten notes dated "4/12/66" suggest such a meeting;
they begin withha list of names (of participants?) and contain a
numbered summary of probable discussion points. (McNaughton, Book II,
Tab R.)
100. George A. Carver, CIA, Memorandum for the Honorable John T. McNaughton
(copies to Rostow, Bundy, Moyers, Unger, Ball, Vance, Komer),
12 April 1966, with attached Memorandum entitled "Consequences of
a Buddhist political Victory in South Vietnam," 11 April 1966,
(S-SENSITIVE); McNaughton Book II, Tab Q.
101. Maxwell D. Taylor, Memorandum for the President, Subject: "Current
Situation in South Vietnam," April 12, 1966 (S); in McNaughton Book II,
Tab P.
102. U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Background Information
Relating to Southeast Asia and Vietnam (4th Revised edition) ,
(Washington; GFO, March 1968), p. 28; for a good review of events
at the time see Embassy Saigon msg. 4033, 16 April 1966 (S-LIMDIS).
103. W. W. Rostow, Headings for Decision and Action: Vietnam, April 14,
i960, April 14, 1966 (S), copy for Mr. McNaughton; in McNaughton
Book II, Tab 0.
104. JCSM-238-66, op. cit .
105. JCS ROLLING THUNDER Study Group Report: Air Operations Against
NVN, 6 April 1966 (TS), Section III, Annexes D, E, and F.
106. Ibid . , Section III, Appendix B, p. 6.
107. Ibid .
108. Robert S. McNamara Memorandum for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of
Staff, Subject: Air Operations Against North Vietnam, April 13, J.966.
133
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109- DRAFT, FE: WPBundy;mk, 4/16/66, Basic Choices in Viet-Nam (s);
in McNaughton. Book II, Tab N.
110. Ibid .
111. Ibid .
112. Ibid .
113. Ibid .
114. Ibid . , emphasis added,
11 5 . Plow We Should Move, unsigned, undated paper (TS-SENSITIVE, " By-
Carver, 4/16/66"' pencilled in by McNaughton) in McNaughton Book II,
Tab Me.
116. Ibid .
H7 > Ibid. , emphasis added.
118. Ibid .
lig. Ibid .
120. Politics in Vietnam: A "Worst" Outcome, 16 April 19 66, unsigned
paper in McNaughton Book” II, Tab M (S)7
121. Ibid . , Tab A.
122. Scenario , FE: LUnger ;hjh, 4/l6 in McNaughton Book II, Tab Me,
123 . Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents , vol . 2 , no . 16 ,
. Monday, April 25, 1966, p. 555, emphasis added.
124. Course B, Unger 4/19/66; McNaughton revision 4/20/66; Unger re-
revi sion 4/21/66 (S-SENSITIVE) in McNaughton Book II, Tab J.
125. Ibid .
126. Ibid .
127. NSAM 343) March 28, 1966 (S).
128. R. W. Komer Memorandum for Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, and
Administrators Bell, Marks and Raborn, April 19, i960 (S); with
attached Memorandum for the President, April 19, 1966 (S).
134
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129. See, for instance, his Statementoon Vietnam during a News Conference
at the White House, June 18, 1 966, in Weekly Compilation of Presi-
dential Documents , Monday, June 27, 19^6, pp. 8O5-7-
130. JCSM-130-66, 1 March 1966 (TS).
131. Robert S. McNamara Memorandum to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of
Staff, Subject: "Deployments to Southeast Asia," 10 March 1 966 (TS)
132. JCSM-218-66, 4 April 1966 (TS).
133. Robert S. McNamara Memorandum for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of
Staff, Subject: "Deployment Program for South Vietnam," 12 April
1966 (TS).
134. JCSM-274-66, 28 April 1966 (TS).
135. See JCSM-215-66, 2 April 1966 (TS) ; JCSM-233-66, 15 April 1966 (TS ) ;
and JCSM-375-66, 4 June 1966 (TS) on Tac Air requirements; and
JCSM-317-66, 10 May 1966 (TS) on air munitions requirements.
136. JCSM-264-66, 27 April 1966 (TS),
137* The New York Times , 28 June 1966.
138. Maxwell D. Taylor Memorandum for the President, Subject: "Assess-
ment and Use of Negotiation Blue Chips," April 27, 1966 (s); in
McNaughton Book II, Tab H.
139. Ibid .
140. Ibid .
141. Ibid .
142. William P. Bundy Memorandum' to the Secretary /of State/, Subject:
"General Taylor's Memorandum of April 27 on Negotiation Blue Chips,"
May 4, 1 966 (S-NODIS); in McNaughton Book II, Tab K.
143. Ibid .
144-. Ibid.
( l45. Ibid .
146. James Reston, "Washington: The Evaded Moral Question in Vietnam,"
New York Times, May 18, 1966.
147. Tabular presentation of Presidential popularity showing Truman,
Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson- in SecDef Cable File 52, Tab F.
135
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148. State Department message 3553 3 May 21, 1 966 (c).
149. Embassy Saigon message 4880, May 23, 1966 (C-LIMDIS).
150. Ibid .
151. Embassy Saigon message 4952 for the President from Lodge, May 25,
1966, 7:20 a.m. (S-NODIS).
152. Robert S. McNamara Memorandum for the Chairman, JCS, April 13, 1966,
op . cit .
153. JCS 9326, 261842Z April 1966.
154. W. W. Rostow Memorandum for the Secretary of State /and/ the
Secretary of Defense, May 6, 1966 (TS-SENSITIVE).
155. Ibid .
156. C0MUSMA.CV message to CINCPAC 091226 Z May 1966 (S).
157. CINCPAC message to JCS IOO73OZ May 1966 (s); emphasis in original.
158. Memorandum apparently prepared in the Air Staff, "Safeguards for
Success," May 4, 1966.
159. COMUSMACV message for CINCPAC I76O3, 221145Z May 1966 (S).
160. For a complete review of these political events and the U.S,
reactions and involvement in them, see Task Force Vol. IV. C.,
"Evolution of the War: US-GVN Relations: 1963-1967, part II"
(TS-SENSITIVE) .
161. History of Restrictions on Attack on NVN POL System , briefing paper
prepared by the JCS, 10 August 1967 for Secretary of Defense Backup
Book for appearance before Preparedness Subcommittee of the Senate
Armed Services Committee, 25 Aug 1967, Section IV, Tab A(S).
162. State Department msg. 48 to OSLO (ToSec), 3 Jun 66, For Secretary
and Ambassador Bruce, transmitting "for your eyes only" msg.
received by President from P. M. Wilson (S-NODIS).
163. 1-35728/66 (no date). Memorandum for the SecDef from ASD/lSA.
164. COMUSMACV msg 051201Z June 1966, personal for CINCPAC (TS) .
136
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165. CINCPAC to JCS, 060705Z June 1 966.
166. CINCPAC msg. to JCS O80757Z June 1966 (TS).
167. CIA SC No. 08 440/66, "The Effect of Destruction of NVN Petroleum
Storage Facilities on the War in SVN" 8 June 1966.
168. Brussels msg 79 to State, Literally Eyes Only for the President
from the Secretary, 7 June 1966 (TS-NODIS) ,
169. Brussels msg. 87 to State, Eyes Only for Secretary McNamara
from the Secretary, 8 June 1966 (TS-NODIS).
170. State Department Memorandum of Conversation, "Visit of Ambassador
Ronning to Hanoi, June 14-17, 1966," 21 June 1966.
171. OSD msg. to CINCPAC 3339-66, 132146Z June 19 66, SECDEF to CINCPAC
Eyes Only.
172. CINCPAC msg to SecDef, 140659Z June 1966, Exclusive.
173. OSD msg 3395-66, 152000Z June 1966, SecDef to CINCPAC, Eyes Only.
174. CINCPAC msg to SecDef, 160920Z June 1966, Exclusive.
175. JCS 5003 to CINCPAC, 222055Z June 1966. This execute message was
drafted as an amendment to JCS 9326 of 26 April, which had extended
ROLLING THUNDER 50 until further notice. The amendment simply made
provision for an A, or Alpha, element to ROLLING THUNDER 50 consisting
of these particular JCS fixed targets. The operation thus came to be
identified as ROLLING THUNDER 50-A.
176. Ibid-
177. JCS msg 5311, to CINCPAC, 251859Z dune 1966; New York Times , 1 July
1966.
178. CINCPAC msg 28IOI5Z June 1966, SpeCat Exclusive to SecDef and CJCS.
179- JCS msg 54l4 to CINCPAC, 281340Z, SpeCat Exclusive.
137
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HI. McNAMARA'S DISENCHANTMENT — JULY -DECEMBER 1966
The attack on North Vietnam's POL system was the last major
escalation of the air war recommended by Secretary McNamara. Its
eventual failure to produce a significant decrease in infiltration
or cripple North Vietnamese logistical support of the war in the
South, when added to the cumulative failure of the rest of ROLLING
THUNDER, appears to have tipped the balance In his mind against any
further escalation of air attacks on the DRV. As we shall see, a
major factor in this reversal of position was the report and recommenda-
tion submitted at the end of the summer by an important study group
of America's top scientists. Another consideration weighing in his
mind must have been the growing antagonism, both domestic and inter-
national, to the bombing, which was identified as the principle impedi-
ment to the opening of negotiations. But disillusionment with the
bombing alone might not have been enough to produce a recommendation
for change had an alternative method of irrpeding infiltration not been
proposed at the same time. Thus, in October when McNamara recommended
a stabilization of the air war at prevailing levels, he was also able
to recommend the imposition of a multi -system anti -infiltration barrier
across the DMZ and the Laos panhandle. The story of this momentous
policy shift is the most important element in the evolution of the air
war in the summer and fall of 1966 .
A. Results of the POL Attacks
1. Initial Success
Official Washington reacted with mild jubilation to the
reported success of the POL strikes and took satisfaction in the
relatively mild reaction of the international community to the
escalation. Secretary McNamara described the execution of the raids
as "a superb professional job," and sent a message of personal con-
gratulation to the field commanders involved in the planning and
execution of the attacks shortly after the results were in. 1 /
In a press conference the next day, the Secretary justi-
fied the strikes "to counter a mounting reliance by NVN on the use of
trucks and powered junks to facilitate the infiltration of men and
equipment from North Vietnam to South Vietnam." He explained that
truck movement in the first half of 1966 had doubled, and that daily
supply tonnage and troop infiltration on the Ho Chi Minh trail were
up" 150 and 120 percent, respectively, over 1965 • The enemy had built
new roads and its truck inventory by the end of the year was expected
to be double that of January 1965 * an increase which would require 50-70
percent more POL. 2/
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The Department of State issued instructions to embassies
abroad to explain the strikes to foreign governments in counter-
infiltration terms. The guidance was to the effect that since the
Pause, the bombing of NVN had been carefully restricted to actual
routes of infiltration and supply; there had been no response what-
ever from Hanoi suggesting any willingness to engage in discussions
or move in any way toward peace; on the contrary, during the Pause
and since, NVN had continued to increase the infiltration of regular
NVN forces South, and to develop and enlarge supply routes; it was
relying more heavily on trucking and had sharply increased the importa-
tion and use of POL. The U.S. could no longer afford to overlook this
threat. Major POL storage sites in the vicinity of Hanoi and Haiphong
were military targets that needed to be attacked.
The targets, the guidance continued, were located away
from the centers of both cities. Strike forces had been instructed
to observe every precaution to confine the strikes to military targets
and there had been no change in the policy of not carrying out attacks
against civilian targets or population centers. There was no intention
of widening the war. The U.S. still desired to meet Hanoi for dis-
cussions without conditions or take any other steps which might lead
toward peace. 3/
The strikes made spectacular headlines everywhere. Hanoi
charged that U.S. planes had indiscriminately bombed and strafed resi-
dential and economic areas in the outskirts of Hanoi and Haiphong, and
called this "a new and extremely serious step." The USSR called it a
step toward further escalation. The UK, France, and several other
European countries expressed official disapproval. India expressed
"deep regret and sorrow," and Japan was understanding but warned that
there was a limit to its support of the bombing of NVN. Nevertheless,
according to the State Department's scoreboard, some 26 Free World
nations indicated either full approval or "understanding" of the strikes,
and 12 indicated disapproval. Press reaction to the attacks was short-
lived, however, and within a week or so they were accepted as just
another facet of the war. 4/
Meanwhile in the U.S., following a familiar pattern of the
Vietnam war, in which escalations of the air war served as preludes to
additional increments of combat troops. Secretary McNamara informed the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Service Secretaries and the Assistant Secre-
taries of Defense on July 2 that the latest revision of the troop deploy-
ment schedule had been approved as Program ,^3« 5/ The troop increases
were not major as program changes have gone in the Vietnam war, an increase
in authorized year-end strength from 383 , 500 approved in April to 391,000
and an increase of the final troop ceiling from 425,100 to 431,000. 6 /
But McNamara had personally rewritten the draft memo submitted to him by
Systems Analysis inserting as its title, "Program # 3 ." His handwritten
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changes also included a closing sentence which read, "Requests for
changes in the Program may he submitted by the Service Secretaries
or JCS whenever these appear appropriate." 7 / This language clearly
reflected the following instruction that McNamara had received from
the President on June 28:
As you know, we have been moving our men to Viet Nam
on a schedule determined by General Westmoreland's require-
ments.
As I have stated orally several times this year, I should
like this schedule to be accelerated as much as possible so
that General Westmoreland can feel assured that he has all
the men he needs as soon as possible.
Would you meet with the Joint Chiefs and give me at
your early convenience an indication of what acceleration
is possible for the balance of this year. 8 /
While the Chiefs were unable to promise any further speed-up in the
deployment schedule, the Secretary assured the President on July 15
that all possible steps were being taken. 9 / But as in the air war,
so also in the question of troop deployments a turning point was
being reached. By the fall of 1966 when Program #4 was under considera-
tion, the President would no longer be instructing McNamara to honor
all of General Westmoreland's troop requests as fully and rapidly as
possible.
2. ROLLING THUNDER 51
In the air campaign strikes continued on the other major
POL storage sites, and were soon accepted as a routine part of the
bombing program. On 8 July, at a Honolulu conference. Secretary McNamara
was given a complete briefing on the POL program. He informed CINCPAC
that the President wished that first priority in the air war be given to
the complete "strangulation" of NVN's POL system, and he must not feel
that there were sortie limitations for this purpose. (He also stressed
the need for increased interdiction of the railroad lines to China.) 10 /
As a result, ROLLING THUNDER program No. $ 1 , which went into effect the
next day, specified a "strangulation" program of armed reconnaissance
against the POL system, including dispersed sites. The ceiling for
attack sorties on NVH and Laos was raised ■from 8100 to 10,100 per month. 11 /
McNamara left CINCPAC with instructions to develop a com-
prehensive plan to accomplish the maximum feasible POL destruction while
maintaining a balanced effort against other priority targets. On July 24,
CINCPAC forwarded his concept for the operation to Washington. 12/ In
addition to the fixed and dispersed sites already under attack, he recom-
mended strikes against the storage facilities at Fhuc Yen and Kep airfields;
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against the DRV's importation facilities (i.e,, foreign ships in
Haiphong harbor, destruction of harbor dredges, destruction of doc s,
etc.)j and the expansion of the reconnaissance effort to provide more
and better information on the overall POL system. Also recommended
was a step-up in attacks on rolling stock of all kinds carrying POL,
and strikes on the Xom Trung Hoa lock and dam. In spite of this recom-
mendation and a follow-up on August 8, ROLLING THUNDER 51 was only
authorized to strike previously approved targets plus some new bridges
and a bypass as outlined in the July 8 execute order. 13/
While CINCPAC and his subordinates were making every effort
to hamstring the DRV logistical operation through the POL attacks, the
Secretary of Defense was keeping tabs on results through specially com-
missioned reports from DIA. These continued through July and into
August. By July 20, DIA reported that 59*9$ of North Vietnam's original
POL capacity had been destroyed. l4 / By the end of July, DIA reported
that 70$ of NVN's large bulk (JCS-targeted) POL storage capacity had been
destroyed, together with 7$ of the capacity of known dispersed sites.
The residual POL storage capacity was down from some 185,000 metric tons
to about 75,000 tons, about 2/3 still in relatively vulnerable large
storage centers — two of them, those at the airfields, still off limits -
and l/3 in smaller dispersed sites. 15/ This still provided, however,
a fat cushion over NVN's requirements. What became clearer and clearer
as the summer wore on was that while we had destroyed a major portion
of North. Vietnam' s storage capacity, she retained enough dispersed
capacity, supplemented by continuing imports (increasingly in easily
disper sable drums, not bulk), to meet her on-going requirements. The
greater invulnerability of dispersed POL meant an ever mounting U.S.
cost in munitions, fuel, aircraft losses, and men. By August we were
reaching the point at which these costs were prohibitive. It was simply
impractical and infeasible to attempt any further constriction of North
Vietnam's POL storage capacity.
As the POL campaign continued, the lucrative POL targets
disappeared and the effort was confined more and more to the small
scattered sites. Finally, on September 4, CINCPAC (probably acting
by direction although no instructions appear in the available documents)
directed a shift in the primary emphasis of ROLLING THUNDER strikes.
Henceforth they were to he aimed at, "...attrition of men, supplies,
equipment and. . .POL. . 16/ Stressing the new set of priorities
CINCPAC instructed, "POL will also receive emphasis on a selective
basis." 17 / By mid-October, even PACAF reported that the campaign had
reached the point of diminishing returns. 18/
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3. POL - Strategic Failure
It was clear in retrospect that the POL strikes had been
a failure. Apart from the possibility of inconveniences, interruptions,
and local shortages of a temporary nature, there was no evidence that
NVN had at any time been pinched for POL. NVN's dependence on the
unloading facilities at Haiphong and large storage sites in the rest of
the country had been greatly overestimated. Bulk imports via ocean-
going tanker continued at Haiphong despite the great damage to POL docks
and storage there. Tankers merely stood offshore and unloaded into
barges and other shallow-draft boats, usually at night, and the POL
was transported to hundreds of concealed locations along internal water-
ways. More POL was also brought in already drummed, convenient for dispersed
storage and handling and virtually immune from interdiction. 19 /
The difficulties of switching to a much less vulnerable
but perfectly workable storage and distribution system, not an unbearable
strain when the volume to be handled was not really very great, had also
been overestimated. Typically, also, NVN's adaptability and resourceful-
ness had been greatly underestimated. As early as the summer of 1965*
about six months after the initiation of ROLLING THUNDER, NVN had begun
to import more POL, build additional small, dispersed, underground tank
storage sites, and store more POL in drums along LOCs and at consumption
points. It had anticipated the strikes and taken out insurance against
them; by the time the strikes came, long after the decision had been
telegraphed by open speculation in the public media, NVN was in good
position to ride them. out. Thus, by the end of 1966, after six months
of POL attacks, it was estimated that NVN still had about 26,000 metric
tons storage capacity in the large sites, about 30-40,000 tons capacity
in medium-sized dispersed sites, and about 28,000 tons capacity in smaller
tank and drum sites. 20 /
One of the unanticipated results of the POL strikes, which
further offset their effectiveness, was the skillful way in which Ho Chi
Minh used them in his negotiations with the Soviets and Chinese to extract
larger commitments of economic, military and financial assistance from
them. Thus, on July 17 he made a major appeal to the Chinese based on
the American POL escalation. 21 / Since North Vietnam is essentially a
logistical funnel for supplies originating in the USSR and China, this
increase in their support as a direct result of the POL strikes must
also be discounted against whatever effect they may have had on hampering
North Vietnam's transportation.
The real and immediate failure of the POL strikes was
reflected,- however, in the undiminished flow of men and supplies down ■
the Ho Chi Minh trail to the war in the South. In early July, the
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intelligence community had indicated that POL could become a factor
in constricting the truck traffic to the South. The statement was,
however, qualified,
The POL requirement for trucks involved in the infiltra-
tion movement has not been large enough to present significant
supply problems. But local shortages have occurred from time
to time and may become significant as a result of attacks on
the POL distribution system. 22/
By the end of the month, however, the CIA at least was more pessimistic:
Hanoi appears to believe that its transportation system
will be able to withstand increased air attacks and still
maintain an adequate flow of men and supplies to the South.
...Recent strikes against North Vietnam's POL storage
facilities have destroyed over 50 percent of the nation's
petroleum storage capacity. However, it is estimated that
substantial stocks still survive and that the DRV can con-
tinue to import sufficient fuel to keep at least essential
military and economic traffic moving. 23/
DIA continued to focus its assessments on the narrower effectiveness of
the strikes in destruction of some percentage of North Vietnamese POL
storage capacity without directly relating this to needs and import
potential. 24/ By September, the two intelligence agencies were in
general agreement as to the failure of the POL strikes. In an evaluation
of the entire bombing effort they stated, "There is no evidence yet of
any shortage of POL in North Vietnam and stocks on hand, with recent imports,
have been adequate to sustain necessary operations." 25/ The report
went even further and stated that there was no evidence of insurmountable
transport difficulties from the bombing, no significant economic dislocation
and no weakening of popular morale.
Powerful reinforcement about the ineffectiveness of the
strikes came at the end of August when a special summer study group of
top American scientists submitted a series of reports through the JASON
Division of the Institute for Defense Analyses (treated comprehensively
below). One of their papers dealt in considerable detail with the entire
bombing program, generally concluding that bombing had failed in all its
specified goals. With respect to the recent petroleum attacks to disrupt
North Vietnamese transportation, the scientists offered the following
summary conclusions:
In view of the nature of the North Vietnamese POL system,
the relatively small quantities of POL it requires, and the
options available for overcoming the effects of U.S. air
strikes thus far, it seems doubtful that any critical denial
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of essential POL has resulted, apart from temporary and
local shortages. It also seems doubtful that any such denial
need result if China and/or the USSR are willing to pay
greater costs in delivering it.
Maintaining the flow of POL to consumers within North
Vietnam will be more difficult, costly, and hazardous,
depending primarily on the effectiveness of the U.S. armed
reconnaissance effort against the transportation system.
Temporary interruptions and shortages have probably been
and can no doubt continue to be inflicted, but it does not
seem likely that North Vietnam will have to curtail its
higher priority POL-powered activities as a result.
Since less than 5 percent of North Vietnamese POL
requirements are utilized in supporting truck operations
in Laos, it seems unlikely that infiltration South will
have to be curtailed because of POL shortages; and since
North Vietnamese and VC forces in South Vietnam do not
require POL supplied from the North, their POL-powered
activities need not suffer, either. S 6/
Coming as they did from a highly prestigious and respected group of
policy-supporting but independent -thinking scientists and scholars, and
coming at the end of a long and frustrating summer in the air war , these
views must have exercised a powerful influence on McNamara's thinking.
His prompt adoption of the "infiltration barrier" concept they recommended
as an alternative to the bombing (see below) gives evidence of the overall
weight these reports carried.
McNamara, for his part, made no effort to conceal his dis-
satisfaction and disappointment at the failure of the POL attacks. He
pointed out to the Air Force and the Navy the glaring discrepancy between
the optimistic estimates of results their pre-strike POL studies had
postulated and the actual failure of the raids to significantly decrease
infiltration. 27/ The Secretary was already in the process of rethinking
the role of the entire air campaign in the U.S, effort in Southeast Asia.
He was painfully aware of its inability to pinch off the infiltration to
the South and had seen no evidence of its ability to break Hanoi's will,
demoralize its, population, or bring it to the negotiation table. The full
articulation cf his disillusionment would not come until the following
January, however, when he appeared before a joint session of the Senate
Armed Services and Appropriations Committees to argue against any further
extension of the bombing. To illustrate the ineffectualness of bombing
he cited our experience with the POL strikes:
t \
...
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There is no question but what petroleum in the North
is an essential material for the movement, under present
circumstances, of men and equipment to their borders. But
neither is there any doubt that with, in effect, an unres-
tricted bombing campaign against petroleum, we were not
able to dry up the supply.
The bombing of the POL system was carried out with as
much skill, effort, and attention as we could devote to it,
starting on June 29 , and we haven't been able to dry up
those supplies ....
We in effect took out the Haiphong docks for unloading
of POL and we have had very little effect on the importation
level at the present time. I would think it is about as
high today as it would have been if we had never struck
the Haiphong docks. And I think the same thing would be
true if we took out the cargo docks in Haiphong for dry
cargo ....
I don't believe that the bombing up to the present
has significantly reduced, nor any bombing that I could
contemplate in the future would significantly reduce, actual
flow of men and materiel to the South. 28/
Thus disenthralled with air power's ability to turn the
tide of the war in our favor, McNamara would increasingly in the months
ahead recommend against any further escalation of the bombing and turn
his attention to alternative methods of shutting off the infiltration
and bringing the war to an end.
B. Alternatives — The Barrier Concept
1. Genesis
The fact that bombing had failed to achieve its objectives
did not mean that all those purposes were to be abandoned. For an option-
oriented policy adviser like McNamara the task was to find alternative
ways of accomplishing the job. The idea of constructing an anti -infiltration
barrier across the DMZ and the Laotian panhandle was first proposed in
January 1966 by Roger Fisher of Harvard Law School in one of his periodic
memos to McNaughton. 2 9 / The purpose of Fisher's proposal was to provide
the Administration with an alternative strategic concept for arresting
infiltration, thereby permitting a cessation of the bombing (a supporting
sub-thesis of his memo was the failure of the bombing to break Hanoi's
will)- He had in mind a primarily air-seeded line of barbed wire, mines
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and chemicals since the terrain in question would make actual on -the -
ground physical construction of a barrier difficult and would probably
evoke fierce military opposition. In his memo, Fisher dealt at length
with the pros and cons of such a proposal including a lengthy argument
for its political advantages.
The memo must have struck a responsive cord in McNaughton
because six weeks later he sent McNamara an only slightly revised
version of the Fisher draft. 30/ McN&ughton ' s changes added little to
the Fisher ideas; they served merely to tone down some of his assertions
and hedge the conclusions. The central argument for the barrier concept
proceeded from a negative analysis of the effects of the bombing,
B- Present Military Situation in North Vietnam
1. Physical consequences of bombing
a. The DRV has suffered some physical hardship and
pain, raising the cost to it of supporting the VC.
b. Best intelligence judgment is that:
(1) Bombing may or may not - by destruction
or delay - have resulted in net reduction in the flow of men or
supplies to the forces in the South;
(2) Bombing has failed to reduce the limit on
the capacity of the DRV to aid the VC to a point below VC needs;
(3) Future bombing of North Vietnam cannot be
expected physically to limit the military support given the VC
by the DRV to a point below VC needs .
2. Influence consequences of bombing
a. There is no evidence that bombings have made
it more likely the DRV will decide to back out of the war.
b. Nor is there evidence that bombings have
resulted in an increased DRV resolve to continue the war to
an eventual victory. /Fisher’s draft had read "There is some
evidence that bombings . . . "J
C. The Future of a Bombing Strategy
Although bombings of North Vietnam improve GVN morale
and provide a counter in eventual negotiations (should they
take place) there is no evidence that they meaningfully reduce
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either the capacity or the will for the DRV to support the
VC. The DRV knows that we cannot force them to stop by bombing
and that we cannot, without an unacceptable risk of a major war
with China or Russia or both, force them to stop by conquering
them or "blotting them out." Knowing that if they are not
influenced we cannot stop them, the DRV will remain difficult
to influence. With continuing DRV support, victory in the
South may remain forever beyond our reach.
Having made the case against the bombing, the memo then spelled out the
case for an anti -infiltration barrier:
II. SUBSTANCE OF THE BARRIER PROPOSAL
A. That the US and GVN adopt the concept of physically
cutting off DRV support to the VC by an on-the -ground barrier
across the Ho Chi Minh Trail in the general vicinity of the 17th
Parallel and Route 9* To the extent necessary the barrier would
run from the sea across Vietnam and Laos to the Mekong, a straight-
line distance of about 160 miles.
B. That in Laos an "interdiction and verification zone,"
perhaps 10 miles wide, be established and legitimated by such
measures as leasing, international approval, compensation, etc.
C. That a major military and engineering effort be
directed toward constructing a physical barrier of minefields,
barbed wire, walls, ditches and military strong points flanked
by a defoliated strip on each side.
D. That such bombing in Laos and North Vietnam as
takes place be narrowly identified with interdiction and with
the construction of the barrier by
1. Being within the 10-mile -wide interdiction
zone in Laos, or
2. Being in support of the construction of the
barrier, or
3. Being interdiction bombing pending the completion
of the barrier.
E. That, of course, intensive interdiction continues at
sea and from Cambodia.
(It might be stated that all bombings of North Vietnam will stop
as soon as there is no infiltration and no opposition to the con-
struction of the verification barrier.) 32 /
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Among the McNaughton additions to the Fisher draft were
several suggested action memos including one to the Chiefs asking for
military comment on the proposal. Available documents do not reveal
whether McNamara sent the memo nor indicate what his own reaction to
the proposal was. He did, however, contact the Chiefs in some way
for their reaction to the proposal because on March 24 the Chiefs sent a
message to CINCPAC requesting field comment on the barrier concept. 33 /
After having in turn queried his subordinates, CINCPAC replied on April 7
that construction and defense of such a barrier would require 7-8 U.S.
divisions and might take up to three and one half to four years to become
fully operational. 3^/ It would require a substantial diversion of
available combat and construction resources and would place a heavy strain
on the logistics support system in Southeast Asia, all in a static defense
effort which would deny us the military advantages of flexibility in
employment of forces. Not surprisingly, after this exaggerated catalog
of problems, CINCPAC recommended against such a barrier as an inefficient
use of resources with small likelihood of achieving U.S. objectives in
Vietnam. These not unexpected objections notwithstanding, the Army (pre-
sumably at McNamara's direction) had begun an R&D program in March to
design, develop, test and deliver within six to nine months for opera-
tional evaluation a set of anti-personnel route and trail Interdiction
devices. 35 /
At approximately the same time an apparently unrelated offer
was made by four distinguished scientific advisors to the Government to
form a summer working group to study technical aspects of the war in
Vietnam. It is possible that the idea for such a study really originated
in the Pentagon, although the earliest documents indicate that the four
scholars (Dr. George Kistiakowsky - Harvard; Dr. Karl Kaysen ~ Harvard;
Dr. Jerome Uiesner - MIT; and Dr. Jerrold Zacharias - MIT) made the
first initiative with Adam Yarmolinsky, then working for McNaughton. 3 6 /
In any case, McNamara liked the idea and sent Zacharias a letter on April 16
formally requesting that he and the others arrange the summer study on
"technical possibilities in relation to our military operations in
Vietnam." 37/ On April 26 he advised John McNaughton, who was to oversee
the project, that the scientists' group should examine the feasibility of
"A 'fence' across the infiltration trails, warning systems, reconnaissance
(especially night) methods, night vision devices, defoliation techniques,
and area-denial weapons," 38 / In this way the barrier concept was offi-
cially brought to the attention of the study group.
During the remainder of the spring, while McNamara and the
other Principals were preoccupied with the POL decision, the summer study
group was organized and the administrative mechanics worked out for providing
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its members with briefings and classified material. The contract, it
was determined, would be let to the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA)
for the study to be done through its JASON Division (ad hoc high-level
studies using primarily non-IDA scholars). The group of 47 scientists
(eventually to grow to 67 with the addition of 20 IDA personnel), repre-
senting the cream of the scholarly community in technical fields, finally
met in Wellesley on June 13 for ten days of briefings by high-level
officials from the Pentagon, CIA, State and the White House on all facets
of the war. Thereafter they broke into four sub-groups to study different
aspects of the problem from a technical (not a political) point of view.
Their work proceeded through July and August and coincided with McNamara's
disillusionment over the results of the POL strikes.
2. The JASON Summer Study Reports
At the end of August the Jason Simmer Study, as it had come
to be known, submitted four reports: (l) The Effects of US Bombing in
North Vietnam; (2) VC/nVA Logistics and Manpower ; ( 3 ) An Air Supported
Anti -Infiltration Barrier; and (4) Summary of Results, Conclusions and
Recommendations. The documents were regarded as particularly sensitive and
were extremely closely held with General Wheeler and Mr. Rostow receiving
the only copies outside OSD. The reason is easy to understand. The Jason
Summer Study reached the conclusion that the bombing of North Vietnam was
ineffective and therefore recommended that the barrier concept be imple-
mented as an alternative means of checking infiltration.
Several factors combined to give these conclusions and recom-
mendations a powerful and perhaps decisive influence in McNamara's mind at
the beginning of September 1966. First, they were recommendations from
a group of America's most distinguished scientists, men who had helped the
Government produce many of its most advanced technical weapons systems
since the Second World War, and men who were not identified with the vocal
academic criticism of the Administration's Vietnam policy. Secondly, the
reports arrived at a time when McNamara, having witnessed the failure of
the POL attacks to produce decisive results, was harboring doubts of his
own about the effectiveness of the bombing, and at a time when alternative
approaches were welcome. Third, the Study Group did not mince words or
fudge its conclusions, but stated them bluntly and forcefully. For all
these reasons, then, the reports are significant. Moreover, as we shall
see, they apparently had a dramatic impact on the Secretary of Defense
and provided much of the direction for future policy. For these reasons,
then, the reports are significant. Moreover, as we shall see, they
•apparently had a dramatic impact on the Secretary of Defense and provided
much of the direction for future policy. For these reasons important
sections of them are reproduced at some length below.
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The report evaluating the results of the U.S, air campaign
against North Vietnam began with a forceful statement of conclusions:
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
1. As of July I 966 the U.S. bombing of North Vietnam (NVN)
had had no measurable direct effect on Hanoi's ability to mount
and support military operations in the South at the current
level .
Although the political constraints seem clearly to have
reduced the effectiveness of the bombing program, its limited
effect on Hanoi 1 s ability to provide such support cannot be
explained solely on that basis. The countermeasures intro-
duced by Hanoi effectively reduced the impact of U.S. bombing.
More fundamentally, however , North Vietnam has basically a
subsistence agricultural economy that presents a difficult and
unrewarding target system for air attack.
The economy supports operations in the South mainly by
functioning as a logistic funnel and by providing a source of
manpower. The industrial sector produces little of military
value. Most of the essential military supplies that the VC/
NVN forces in the South require from external sources are provided
by the USSR and Communist China. Furthermore, the volume of
such supplies is so low that only a small fraction of the capacity
of North Vietnam's rather flexible transportation network is
required to maintain the flow. The economy's relatively under-
employed labor force also appears to provide an ample manpower
reserve for internal military and economic needs including
repair and reconstruction and for continued support of military
operations in the South.
2, Since the initiation of the ROLLING THUNDER program
the damage to facilities and equipment in North Vietnam has been
more than offset by the increased flow of military and economic
aid, largely from the USSR and Communist China.
The measurable costs of the damage sustained by North
Vietnam are estimated by intelligence analysts to have reached
approximately $86 million by 15 July 1966 . In 1965 alone,
the value of the military and economic aid that Hanoi received
from the USSR and Communist China is estimated to have been on
the order of $250-400 million, of which about $ 100-150 million
was economic, and they have continued to provide aid, evidently
at an increasing rate, during the current year. Most of it
has been from the USSR, which had virtually cut off aid during
the 1962-64 period. There can be little doubt, therefore, that
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Hanoi's Communist backers have assumed the economic costs
to a degree that has significantly cushioned the impact
of 0.S. bombing.
3 . The aspects of the basic situation that have
enabled Hanoi to continue its support of military opera-
tions in the South and to neutralize the impact of U.S.
bombing by passing the economic costs to other Communist
countries are not likely to be altered by reducing the
present geographic constraints, mining Haiphong and the
principal harbors in North Vietnam, increasing the number
of armed reconnaissance sorties and otherwise expanding the
U.S. air offensive along the lines now contemplated in
military recommendations and planning studies.
An expansion of the bombing program along such lines
would make it more difficult and costly for Hanoi to
move essential military supplies through North Vietnam to the
VC/nVN forces in the South. The low volume of supplies
required, the demonstrated effectiveness of the counter-
measures already undertaken by Hanoi, the alternative options
that the NVN transportation network provides and the level
of aid the USSR and China seem prepared to provide, how-
ever, make it quite unlikely that Hanoi's capability to
function as a logistic funnel would be seriously impaired.
Our past experience also indicates that an intensified air
campaign in NVN probably would not prevent Hanoi from infil-
trating men into the South at the present or a higher rate,
if it chooses. Furthermore, there would appear to be no
basis for assuming that the damage that could be inflicted by
an intensified air offensive would impose such demands on
the North Vietnamese labor force that Hanoi would be unable
to continue and expand its recruitment and training of mili-
tary forces for the insurgency in the South.
4. While conceptually it is reasonable to assume that
some limit may be imposed on the scale of military activity
that Hanoi can maintain in the South by continuing the
ROLLING THUNDER program at the present, or some higher level
of effort, there appears to he no basis for defining that
limit in .concrete terms or, for concluding that the present
scale of VC/NVN activities in the field have approached that
limit .
The available evidence clearly indicates that Hanoi has
been infiltrating military forces and supplies into South
Vietnam at an accelerated rate during the current year.
Intelligence estimates have concluded that North Vietnam is
capable of substantially, increasing its support.
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5 . The indirect effects of the bombing on the will of
the North Vietnamese to continue fighting and on their leaders'
appraisal of the prospective gains and costs of maintaining the
present policy have not shown themselves in any tangible way.
Furthermore, we have not discovered any basis for concluding
that the indirect punitive effects of bombing will prove
decisive in these respects.
It may be argued on a speculative basis that continued or
increased bombing must eventually effect Hanoi's will to con-
tinue, particularly as a component of the total U.S. military
pressures being exerted throughout Southeast Asia. However,
it is not a conclusion that necessarily follows from the avail-
able evidence; given the character of North Vietnam's economy
and society, the present and prospective low levels of casualties
and the amount of aid available to Hanoi. It would appear to
be equally logical to assume that the major influences on
Hanoi's will to continue are most likely to be the course of the
war in the South and the degree to which the USSR and China sup-
port the policy of continuing the war and that the punitive
impact of U.S. bombing may have but a marginal effect in this
broader context. 39/
In the body of the report these summary formulations were
elaborated in more detail. For instance, in assessing the military and
economic effect of the bombing on North Vietnam's capacity to sustain
the war, the report stated:
The economic and military damage sustained by Hanoi in
the first year of the bombing was moderate and the cost could
be (and was) passed along to Moscow and Peiping.
The major effect of the attack on North Vietnam was to
force Hanoi to cope with disruption to normal activity,
particularly in transportation and distribution. The bombing
hurt most in its disruption of the roads and rail nets and
in the very considerable repair effort which became necessary.
The regime, however, was singularly successful in overcoming
the effects of the U.S. interdiction effort.
Much of the damage was to installations that the North
Vietnamese did not need to sustain the military effort.
The regime made no attempt to restore storage facilities
and little to repair damage to power stations, evidently
because of the existence of adequate excess capacity and
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"because the facilities were not of vitcl importance. For
somewhat similar reasons, it made no major effort to restore
military facilities, but merely abandoned barracks and dis-
persed materiel usually stored in depots.
The major essential restoration consisted of measures
to keep traffic moving, to keep the railroad yards opera-
ting, to maintain communications, and to replace transport
equipment and equipment for radar and SAM sites. 40 /
A little further on the report examined the political effects of the
bombing on Hanoi's will to continue the war, the morale of the popu-
lation, and the support of its allies.
The bombing through 1 965 apparently had not had a major
effect in shaping Hanoi's decision on whether or not to
continue the war in Vietnam. The regime probably continued
to base such decisions mainly on the course of the fighting
in the South and appeared willing to suffer even stepped-up
bombing so long as prospects of winning the South appeared
to be reasonably good.
Evidence regarding the effect of the bombing on the
morale of the North Vietnamese people suggests that the
results were mixed. The bombing clearly strengthened
popular support of the regime by engendering patriotic
and nationalistic enthusiasm to resist the attacks. On the
other hand, those more directly involved in the bombing
underwent personal harships and anxieties caused by the
raids. Because the air strikes were directed away from
urban areas, morale was probably damaged less by the direct
bombing than by its indirect effects, such as evacuation
of the urban population and the splitting of families.
Hanoi's political relations with its allies were in
some respects strengthened by the bombing. The attacks had
the effect of encouraging greater material and political
support from the Soviet Union than might otherwise have
been the case. While the Soviet aid complicated Hanoi's
relation:- hip with Peking, it reduced North Vietnam's
dependence on China and thereby gave Hanoi more room for
maneuver on its own behalf. 4l/
This report ' s concluding chapter was entitled
"Observations" and contained some of the most lucid and
penetrating analysis of air war produced to that date, or
this! It began by reviewing the original objectives the
bombing was initiated to achieve:
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...reducing the ability of North Vietnam to support
the Communist insurgencies in South Vietnam and Laos,
and. . .increasing progressively the pressure on NVN to
the point where the regime would decide that it was too
costly to continue directing and supporting the insurgency
in the South. 42/
After rehearsing the now familiar military failure of the bombing to
halt the infiltration, the report crisply and succinctly outlined the
bombing's failure to achieve the critical second objective — the
psychological one:
...initial plans and assessments for the ROLLING
THUNDER program clearly tended to overestimate the
persuasive and disruptive effects of the U.S. air strikes
and, correspondingly, to underestimate the tenacity and
recuperative capabilities of the North Vietnamese. This
tendency, in turn, appears to reflect a general failure
to appreciate the fact, well-documented in the historical
and social scientific literature, that a direct, frontal
attack on a society tends to strengthen the social fabric
of the nation, to increase popular support of the existing
government, to improve the determination of both the
leadership and the populace to fight back, to induce a
variety of protective measures that reduce the society's
vulnerability to future attack, and to develop an increased
capacity for quick repair and restoration of essential
functions. The great variety of physical and social counter-
measures that North Vietnam has taken in response to the
bombing is now well documented in current intelligence
reports, but the potential effectiveness of these counter-
measures was not stressed in the early planning or intelli-
gence studies. 43/
Perhaps the most trenchant analysis of all, however, was reserved for
last as the report attacked the fundamental weakness of the air war
strategy -- our inability to relate operations to objectives:
In general, current official thought about U.S. objec-
tives in bombing NVN implicitly assumes two sets of causal
relationships :
1. That by increasing the damage and destruction of
resources in NVN, the U.S. is exerting pressure to cause
the DRV to stop their support of the military operations
in SVN and Laos; and
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2. That the combined effect of the total military effort
against NVN — including the U.S. air strikes in NVN and
Laos, and the land, sea, and air operations in SVN — will
ultimately cause the DRV to perceive that its probable losses
accruing from the war have become greater than its possible
gains and, on the basis of this net evaluation, the regime
will stop its support of the war in the South.
These two sets of interrelationships are assumed in
military planning, but it is not clear that they are sys-
tematically addressed in current intelligence estimates and
assessments. Instead, the tendency is to encapsulate the
bombing of NVN as one set of operations and the war in the
South as another set of operations, and to evaluate each
separately; and to tabulate and describe data on the physical,
economic, and military effects of the bombing, but not to
address specifically the relationship between such effects and
the data relating to the ability and will of the DRV to continue
its support of the war in the South.
The fragmented nature of current analyses and the lack of
an adequate methodology for assessing the net effects of a
given set of military operations leaves a major gap between the
quantifiable data on bomb damage effects, on the one hand, and
policy judgments about the feasibility of achieving a given set
of objectives, on the other. Bridging this gap still requires
the exercise of broad political -military judgments that cannot
be supported or rejected on the basis of systematic intelli-
gence indicators. It must be concluded, therefore, that there
is currently no adequate basis for predicting the levels of
U.S. military effort that would be required to achieve the
stated objectives — indeed, there is no firm basis for deter-
mining if there is any feasible level of effort that would
achieve these objectives. 44/
The critical impact of this study on the Secretary's thinking is revealed
"by the fact that many of its conclusions and much of its analysis would
find its way into McNamara's October trip report to the President.
Having submitted a stinging condemnation of the bombing,
the Study Group was under some obligation to offer constructive alter-
natives and this they did, siezing, not surprisingly, on the very idea
McNamara had suggested — the anti -infiltration barrier. The product
of their summer's work was a reasonably detailed proposal for a multi-
system barrier across the DMZ and the Laotian panhandle that would make
extensive use of recently innovated mines and sensors. The central
portion of their recommendation follows:
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The harrier would have two somewhat different parts,
one designed against foot traffic and one against vehicles.
The preferred location for the anti-foot-traffic barrier is
in the region along the southern edge of the LMZ to the
Laotian border and then north of Tchepone to the vicinity
of Muong Sen, extending about 100 by 20 kilometers. This
area is virtually unpopulated, and the terrain is (luite
rugged, containing mostly V-shaped valleys in which the
opportunity for alternate trails appears lower than it is
elsewhere in the system. The location of choice for the
anti -vehicle part of the system is the area, about 100 by 40
kilometers, now covered by Operation Cricket. In this area
the road network tends to be more constricted than else-
where, and there appears to be a smaller area available for
new roads. An alternative location for the anti-personnel
system is north of the EMZ to the Laotian border and then
north along the crest of the mountains dividing Laos from
North Vietnam. It is less desirable economically and mili-
tarily because of its greater length, greater distance
from U.S. bases, and greater proximity to potential North
Vi etname s e count er - effort s .
The air- supported barrier would, if necessary, be
supplemented by a manned "fence" connecting the eastern
end of the barrier to the sea.
The construction of the air- supported barrier could be
initiated using currently available or nearly available
components, with some necessary modifications, and could
perhaps he installed by a year or so from go-ahead. How-
ever, we anticipate that the North Vietnamese would learn
to cope with a barrier built this way after some period of
time which we cannot estimate, but which we fear may be
short. Weapons and sensors which can make a much more
effective barrier, only some of which are now under develop-
ment, are not likely to be available in less than 18 months
to 2 years. Even these, it must be expected, will eventu-
ally be overcome by the North Vietnamese, so that further
improvements in weaponry will be necessary. Thus we
envisage a dynamic "battle of the barrier," in which the
barrier is repeatedly improved and strengthened by the
introduction of new components, and which will hopefully
permit us to keep the North Vietnamese off balance by
continually posing new problems for them.
This barrier is in concept not very different from
what has already been suggested elsewhere; the new aspects
are: the very large scale of area denial, especially mine
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fields kilometers deep rather than the conventional
100-200 meters; the very large numbers and persistent
employment of weapons, sensors, and aircraft sorties
in the barrier area; and the emphasis on rapid and
carefully planned incorporation of more effective
weapons and sensors into the system.
The system that could be available in a year or so
would, in our conception, contain /sic J the following
components :
— Gravel mines (both self-sterilizing for harass-
ment and non- sterilizing for area denial).
— Possibly, "button borablets" developed by Picatinny
Arsenal, to augment the range of the sensors against
foot traffic.*
— SADEYE/bHJ-26b clusters,** for attacks on area-
type targets of uncertain locations.
— Acoustic detectors, based on improvements of
the "Acoustic Sonobuoys" currently under test
by the Wavy.
— P-2V patrol aircraft, equipped for acoustic
sensor monitoring. Gravel dispensing, vectoring
strike aircraft, and infrared detection of
campfires in bivouac areas.
— Gravel Dispensing Aircraft (A-l's, or possibly
C-123’s)
— Strike Aircraft
— Photo -reconnaissance Aircraft
— Photo Interpreters
— (possibly) ground teams to plant mines and sensors,
gather information, and selectively harass traffic
on foot trails.
* These .are^ small mines (aspirin-size) presently designed to give
a loud report but not to injure when stepped on by a shod foot.
They would be sown in great density along well-used trails, on
the assumption that they would be much harder to sweep than
Gravel. Their purpose would be to make noise indicating pedes-
trian traffic at a range of approximately 200 feet from the
acoustic sensors.
** CBU-24 in Air Force nomenclature.
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The anti-troop infiltration system (which would also
function against supply porters) would operate as follows .
There would be a constantly renewed mine field of non-
sterilizing Gravel (and possibly button bomblets), dis-
tributed in patterns covering interconnected valleys and
slopes (suitable for alternate trails) over the entire
barrier region. The actual mined area would encompass
the equivalent of a strip about 100 by 5 kilometers.
There would also be a pattern of acoustic detectors to
listen for mine explosions indicating an attempted pene-
tration. The mine field is intended to deny opening of
alternate routes for troop infiltrators and should be
emplaced first. On the trails and bivouacs currently used,
from which mines may — we tentatively assume — be cleared
without great difficulty, a more dense pattern of sensors
would be designed to locate groups of infiltrators. Air
strikes using Gravel and SADEYES would then be called
against these targets. The sensor patterns would be
monitored 24 hours a day by patrol aircraft. The struck
areas would be reseeded with new mines.
The anti-vehicle system would consist of acoustic
detectors distributed every mile or so along all truck-
able roads in the interdicted area, monitored 24 hours
a day by patrol aircraft, with vectored strike aircraft
using SADEYE to respond to signals that trucks or truck
convoys are moving. The patrol aircraft would distribute
self -sterilizing Gravel over parts of the road net at
dusk. The self-sterilization feature is needed so that
road -wat chi ng and mine-planting teams could be used in
this area. Photo-reconnaissance aircraft would cover the
entire area each few days to look for the development
of new truckable roads, to see if the transport of supplies
is being switched to porters, and to identify any other
change in the infiltration system. It may also be desir-
able to use ground teams to plant larger anti-truck mines
along the roads, as an interim measure pending the develop-
ment of effective air-dropped anti-vehicle mines.
The cost of such a system (both parts) has been
estimates to be about ^800 million per year, of which by
far the major fraction is spent for Gravel and SADEYES.
The key requirements would be (all numbers are approxi-
mate because of assumptions which had to be made regarding
degradation of system components in field use, and regarding
the magnitude of infiltration) : 20 million Gravel mines
per month; possibly 25 million button bomblets per month;
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10,000 SAJEYE-BLU-26B clusters* per moni.h; 1600 acoustic
sensors per month (assuming presently employed batteries with
2-week life), plus 68 appropriately equipped P-2V patrol
aircraft; a fleet of about 50 A-l's or 20 C-123's for Gravel
dispensing (1400 A-l sorties or 600 C-123 sorties per month) ;
500 strike sorties per month (F-4C equivalent); and sufficient
photo -reconnaissance sorties, depending on the aircraft, to
cover 2500 square miles each week, with an appropriate team of
photo interpreters. Even to make this system work, there
would he required experimentation and further development
for foliage penetration, moisture resistance, and proper dis-
persion of Gravel; development of a better acoustic sensor
than currently exists (especially in an attempt to eliminate
the need for button bomblets) ; aircraft modifications; possible
modifications in BLU-26B fuzing; and refinement of strike-
navigation tactics.
For the future, rapid development of new mines (such as
tripwire, smaller and more effectively camouflaged Gravel,
and various other kinds of mines), as well as still better
sens or /informat ion processing systems will be essential. 4-5/
Thus, not only had this distinguished array of American
technologists endorsed the barrier idea McNamara had asked them to con-
sider, they had provided the Secretary with an attractive, v;e 11 -thought-
out and highly detailed proposal as a real alternative to further
escalation of the ineffective air war against North Vietnam. But, true
to their scientific orientations, the study group members could not con-
clude their work without examining the kinds of counter-measures the North
Vietnamese might take to circumvent the harrier. Thus, they reasoned:
Assuming that surprise is not thrown away, countermeas-
ures will of course still be found, but they may take some
time to bring into operation. The most effective counter-
measures we can anticipate are mine sweeping; provision of
shelter against SADEYE strikes and Gravel dispersion;
spoofing of sensors to deceive the system or decoy aircraft
into ambushes, and in general a considerable step-up of North
Vietnamese anti-aircraft capability along the road net.
Counter -countermeasures must be an integral part of the
sy s t em de ve lopment •
V These q nan t.it. 5 rs depend on an average number of strikes consistent
with the assumption of 7000 troops/month and l80 tons/day of supplies
by truck on the infiltration routes. This assumption was based on
likely upper limits at the time the barrier is installed. If the
assumption of initial infiltration is too high, or if we assume that
the barrier will be successful, the number of weapons and sorties
will be reduced accordingly.
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Apart from the tactical countermeasures against the
harrier itself, one has to consider strategic alternatives
available to the North Vietnamese in case the barrier is
successful. Among these are: a move into the Mekong Plain;
infiltration from the sea either directly to SVN or through
Cambodia; and movement down the Mekong from Thakhek (held by
the Pathet Lao-North Vietnamese) into Cambodia.
Finally, it will be difficult for us to find out how
effective the barrier is in the absence of clearly visible
North Vietnamese responses, such as end runs through the
Mekong plain. Because of supplies already stored in the
pipeline, and because of the general shakiness of our quan-
titative estimates of either supply or troop infiltration,
it is likely to be some time before the effect of even a
wholly successful barrier becomes noticeable. A greatly
stepped-up intelligence effort is called for, including
continued road-watch activity in the areas of the motorable
roads, and patrol and reconnaissance activity south of the
anti-personnel barrier. 46/
This, then, was the new option introduced into the Vietnam
discussions in Washington at the beginning of September.
Their work completed, the Jason Group met with McNamara
and McNaughton in Washington on August 30 and presented their conclusions
and recommendations. McNamara was apparently strongly and favorably
impressed with the work of the Summer Study because he and McNaughton
flew to Massachusetts on September 6 to meet with members of the Study
again for more detailed discussions. Even before going to Massachusetts,
however, McNamara had asked General Wheeler to bring the proposal up
with the Chiefs and to request field comment. 47/ After having asked
CINCPAC for an evaluation, Wheeler sent McNamara the preliminary reactions
of the Chiefs. 48/ They agreed with the Secretary’s suggestion to estab-
lish a project manager (General Starbird) in DDR&E, but expressed concern
that, "the very substantial funds required for the barrier system would
be obtained from current Service resources thereby affecting adversely
important current programs."
CINCPAC' s evaluation of the barrier proposal on September 13
was little more than a rehash of the overdrawn arguments against such a
system advanced in April. The sharpness of the language of his summary
arguments, however, is extreme even for Admiral Sharp. In no uncertain
terms he stated:
The combat forces required before, during and after con-
struction of the barrier; the initial and follow-on logistic
support; the engineer construction effort and time required;
and the existing logistic posture in Southeast Asia with
respect to ports and land LOCs make construction of such a
barrier impracticable.
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. . . .Military operations against North Vietnam and
operations in South Vietnam are of transcendent importance.
Operation", elsewhere are complementary supporting under-
takings. Priority and emphasis should he accorded in
consideration of the forces and resources available to
implement the strategy dictated by our objectives. 49/
To some extent, the vehemence of CINCPAC's reaction must
have stemmed from the fact that he and General Westmoreland had just
completed a paper exercise in which they had struggled to articulate
a strategic concept for the conduct of the war to achieve TJ.S. objec-
tives as they understood them. This effort had been linked to the
consideration of CY 19^7 force requirements for the war, the definition
of which required some strategic concept to serve as a guide. With
respect to the war in the North, CINCPAC's final "Military Strategy
to Accomplish United States Objectives for Vietnam," stated:
In the North - Take the war to the enemy by unremitting
but selective application of United States air and naval
power. Military installations and those industrial facili-
ties that generate support for the aggression will be
attacked. Movement within, into and out of North Vietnam
will be impeded. The enemy will be denied the great psycho-
logical and material advantage of conducting an aggression
from a sanctuary. This relentless application of force is
designed progressively to curtail North Vietnam's war-
making capacity. It seeks to force upon him major replenish-
ment, repair and construction efforts. North Vietnamese
support and direction of the Pathet Lao and the insurgency
in Thailand will he impaired. The movement of men and material
through Laos and over all land and water lines of communica-
tions into South Vietnam will be disrupted. Hanoi’s capability
to support military operations in South Vietnam and to direct
those operations will be progressively reduced. gO /
With this formulation of intent for the air war, it is not surprising
that the barrier proposal should have been anathema to CINCPAC.
McNamara, however, proceeded to implement the barrier pro-
posal in spite of CINCPAC's condemnation and the Chiefs' cool reaction.
On September 15 he appointed Lt. General Alfred Starbird to head Joint
Task Force 728 within DDR&E as manager for the project. 51 / The Joint
Task Force was eventually given the cover name Defense Communications
Planning Group to protect the sensitivity of the project. Plans for
implementing the barrier were pushed ahead speedily. Early in October,
just prior to the Secretary's trip, General Starbird made a visit to
Vietnam to study the problem on the ground and begin to set the adminis-
trative wheels in motion. In spite of the fact that McNamara was
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vigorously pushing the project forward, there is no indication that
he had officially raised the natter with the President, although it
is hard to imagine that some discussion of the Jason Summer Study recom-
mendations had not taken place between them. In any case, as McNamara
prepared to go to Vietnam again to assess the situation in light of new
requests for troop increases, he made arrangements to have General Starbird
remain for the first day of his visit and placed the anti -infiltration
barrier first on the agenda of discussions. 52/
3. A Visit to Vietnam and a Memorandum for the President
McNamara's trip to Vietnam in October 1966 served a variety
of purposes. It came at a time when CINCPAC was involved in a force
planning exercise to determine desired (required in his view) force levels
for fighting the war through 1967- This was related to DOD's fall DM
process in which the Pentagon reviews its programs and prepares its budget
recommendations for the coming fiscal year. This in turn engenders a
detailed look at requirements in all areas for the five years to come. As
a part of this process, just three days before the Secretary's departure,
the Joint Chiefs of Staff had sent him an important memo reviewing force
posture the world over and recommending a call-up of the reserves to meet
anticipated 1967 requirements. 53/ This recommendation as a part of the
overall examination of force requirements needed his personal assessment
on the spot in Vietnam. Other important reasons for a trip were, no
doubt, the ones to which we have referred in detail: McNamara's dissatis-
faction with the results of the POL attacks; and the reports of the Jason
Summer Study. Furthermore, the off-year Congressional elections were
only a month away and the President had committed himself to go to Manila
for a heads of state meeting later in October. For both these events
the President probably felt the need of McNamara's fresh impressions
and recommendations.
Whatever the combination of reasons, McNamara left Washington
on October 10 and spent four days in Vietnam. Accompanying the Secretary
on the trip were Under Secretary of State Katzenbach, General Wheeler,
Mr. Komer, John McNaughton, John Foster, Director of DDR&E, and Henry
Kissinger. In the course of the visit McNamara worked his way through
a detailed seventeen item agenda of briefings, visited several sections
of the country plus the Fleet, and met with the leaders of the GVN. 5 V
His findings in those three days in South Vietnam must have
confirmed his disquiet about the lack of progress of the war and the
ineffectualness of U.S. actions to date, for when he returned to Washington
he sent the President a gloomy report with recommendations for leveling
, effort and seeking a solution through diplomatic channels. 55/
McNamara recommended an increase in the total authorized final troop
strength In Vietnam of only about 40,000 over Program #3, for an end
strength of 470,000. This was a direct rejection of CINCPAC' s request
for al2/3l/67 strength of 570,000 and marked a significant turning point
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in McNamara's attitude toward the force buildup. 5 6/ The issue would
continue to be debated until the President's decision shortly after
the election in November to approve the McNamara recommended total of
469,300 troops under Program #4.
With respect to the air war he stated that the bombing had
neither significantly reduced infiltration nor diminished Hanoi's will
to continue the fight, and he noted the concurrence of the intelligence
community in these conclusions. Pulling back from his previous positions,
he now recommended that the President level off the bombing at current
levels and seek other means of achieving our objectives. The section of
the memo on bombing follows:
Stabilize the ROLLING THUNDER program against the North .
Attack sorties^ in North Vietnam have risen from about 4,000
per month at the end of last year to 6,000 per month in the
first quarter of this year and 12,000 per month at present.
Most of our 50 percent increase of deployed attack -capable air-
craft has been absorbed in the attacks on North Vietnam. In
North Vietnam, almost 84,000 attack sorties have been flown
(about 25 percent against fixed targets), 45 percent during
the past seven months.
Despite these efforts, it now appears that the North
Vietnamese-Laotian road network will remain adequate to meet
the requirements of the Communist forces in South Vietnam —
this is so even if its capacity could be reduced by one -third
and if combat activities were to be doubled. North Vietnam's
serious need for trucks, spare parts and petroleum probably
can, despite air attacks, be met by imports. The petroleum
requirement for trucks involved in the infiltration movement,
for example, has not been enough to present significant sup-
ply problems, and the effects of the attacks on the petroleum
distribution system, while they have not yet been fully
assessed, are not expected to cripple the flow of essential
supplies. Furthermore, it is clear that, to bomb the North
sufficiently to make a radical impact upon Hanoi's political,
economic and social structure, would require an effort which
we could make but which would not be stomached either by our
own people or by world opinion; and it would involve a seri-
ous risk of drawing us into open war with China.
The North Vietnamese are paying a price. They have been
forced to assign some 300,000 personnel to the lines of com-
munication in order to maintain the critical flow of personnel
and materiel to the South. Now that the lines of communica-
tion have been manned, however, it is doubtful that either a
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large increase or decrease in our interdiction sorties would
substantially change the cost to the enemy of maintaining'
the roads, railroads, and waterways or affect whether they
are operational. It follows that the marginal sorties --
probably the marginal 1,000 or even 5*000 sorties — per
month against the lines of communication no longer have a
significant impact on the war.
When this marginal inutility of added sorties against
North Vietnam and Laos is compared with the crew and air-
craft losses implicit in the activity (four men and aircraft
and $20 million per 1,000 sorties), I recommend, as a minimum,
against increasing the level of bombing of North Vietnam and
against increasing the intensity of operations by changing
the areas or kinds of targets struck.
Under these conditions, the bombing program would continue
the pressure and would remain available as a bargaining counter
to get talks started (or to trade off in talks). But, as in
the case of a stabilized level of US ground forces, the
stabilization of ROLLING THUNDER would remove the prospect of
ever- escalating bombing as a factor complicating our political
posture and distracting from the main job of pacification in
South Vietnam.
At the proper time, as discussed on pages 6-7 below,
I believe we should consider terminating bombing in all of
North Vietnam, or at least in the Northeast zones, for an
indefinite period in connection with covert moves toward
peace. 57/
As an alternative to further escalation of the bombing, McNamara recom-
mended the barrier across the DMZ and Laos:
Install a barrier . A portion of the 470,000 troops --
perhaps 10,000 to 207000 — should be devoted to the construc-
tion and maintenance of an infiltration barrier. Such a
barrier would lie near the 17th parallel — would run from
the sea, across the neck of South Vietnam (choking off the
new infiltration routes through the DMZ) and across the trails
in Laos. This interdiction system (at an approximate cost
of $1 billion) xrould comprise to the east a ground barrier
of fences, wire, sensors, artillery, aircraft and mobile troops;
and to the west — mainly in Laos --an interdiction zone
covered by air-laid mines and bombing attacks pin-pointed
by air -laid acoustic sensors.
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The barrier may not be fully effective at first, but
I believe that it can be made effective in time and that
even the threat of its becoming effective can substantially
change to our advantage the character of the war. It
would hinder enemy efforts, would permit more efficient use
of the limited number of friendly troops, and would be per-
suasive evidence both that our sole aim is to protect the
South from the North and that we intend to see the job
through. 58/
The purpose of these two actions would be to lay the
groundwork for a stronger U.S. effort to get negotiations started. With
the war seemingly stalemated, this appeared to be the only "out" to the
Secretary that offered some prospect of bringing the conflict to an end
in any near future. In analyzing North Vietnamese unwillingness to date
to respond to peace overtures, McNamara noted their acute sensitivity to
the air attacks on their homeland (recalling the arguments of the Jason
Summer Study) and the hostile suspicion of U.S. motives. To improve the
climate for talks, he argued, the U.S. should make some gesture to
indicate our good faith. Foremost of these was a cessation or a limita-
tion of the bombing.
As a way of projective /sic J U.S. bona files, I believe
that we should consider two possibilities with respect to
. our bombing program against the North, to be undertaken, if
at all, at a time very carefully selected with a view to
maximizing the chances of influencing the enemy and world
opinion and to minimizing the chances that failure would
strengthen the hand of the "hawks" at home: First, without
fanfare, conditions, or avowal, whether the stand-down was
permanent or temporary, stop bombing all of North Vietnam.
It is generally thought that Hanoi will not- agree to negoti-
ations until they can claim that the bombing has stopped
unconditionally. We should see what develops, retaining
freedom to resume the bombing if nothing useful was forth-
coming .
Alternatively, we could shift the weight-of-effort away
from "Zones 6A and 6B" — zones including Hanoi and Haiphong
and areas north of those two cities to the Chinese border.
This alternative has some attraction ir that it provides
the North Vietnamese a "face saver" if only problems of
"face" are holding up Hanoi peace gestures; it would narrow
the bombing down directly to the objectionable infiltration
(supporting the logic of a stop-infiltration/full-pause
deal); and it would reduce the international heat on the
US. Here, too, bombing of the Northeast could be resumed at
any time, or "spot" attacks could be made there from time
to time to keep North Vietnam off balance and to require
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her to pay almost the full cost by maintaining her repair *
crews in place. The sorties diverted from Zones 6 A and 6 b
could be concentrated on the infiltration routes in Zones 1
and 2 (the southern end of Worth Vietnam, including the
Mu Gia Pass), in Laos and in South Vietnam. a /
a/ Any limitation on the bombing of North Vietnam will cause
Serious psychological problems among the men who are risking
their lives to help achieve our political objectives; among
their commanders up to and including the JCS; and among those
of our people who cannot understand why we should withhold
punishment from the enemy. General Westmoreland, as do the
JCS, strongly believes in the military value of the bombing
program. Further, Westmoreland reports that the morale of
his Air Force personnel may already be showing signs of
erosion — an erosion resulting from current operational
restrictions. 59/
The Secretary's footnote was judicious. The Chiefs did
indeed oppose any curtailment of the bombing as a means to get negoti-
ations started. They fired off a dissenting memo to the Secretary the
same day as his memo and requested that it be passed to the President.
With respect to the bombing program per se they stated:
The Joint Chiefs of Staff do not concur in your recom-
mendation that there should be no increase in level of
bombing effort and no modification in areas and targets subject
to air attack. They believe our air campaign against NVN to be
an integral and indispensable part of our over all war effort.
To be effective, the air campaign should be conducted with
only those minimum constraints necessary to avoid indiscrim-
inate killing of population. 60 /
As to the Secretary's proposal for a bombing halt:
The Joint Chiefs of Staff do not concur with your pro-
posal that, as a carrot to induce negotiations, we should
suspend or reduce our bombing campaign against NVN. Our
experiences with pauses in bombing and resumption have not
been happy ones. Additionally, the Jo?nt Chiefs of Staff
believe that the likelihood of the war being settled by
negotiation is small, and that, far from inducing negoti-
ations, another bombing pause will be regarded by North
Vietnamese leaders, and our Allies, as renewed evidence
of lack of US determination to press the war. to a successful
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conclusion. The bombing campaign is one of the two trump
cards in the hands of the President (the other being the
presence of US troops in SVN). It shou3.d not be given up
without an end to the NVN aggression in SVN. 6 l/
The Chiefs did more than just dissent from a McNamara
recommendation, however. They closed their memo with a lengthy counter-
proposal with significant political overtones clearly intended for the
President's eyes. In their own words this is what they said:
The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the war has
reached a stage at which decisions taken over the next
sixty days can determine the outcome of the war and, con-
sequently, can affect the over-all security interests of
the United States for years to come. Therefore, they wish
to provide to you and to the President their unequivocal
views on two salient aspects of the war situation: the
search for peace and military pressures on NVN.
a. The frequent, broadly-based public offers
made by the President to settle the war by peaceful means
on a generous basis, which would take from NVN nothing it
now has, have been admirable. Certainly, no one - American
or foreigner - except those who are determined not to be
convinced, can doubt the sincerity, the generosity, the
altruism of . US actions and objectives. In the opinion of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff the time has come when further
overt actions and offers on our part are not only non-
productive, they are counterproductive. A logical case
fsi-cj can be made that the American people, our Allies,
and our enemies alike are increasingly uncertain as to
our resolution to pursue the war to a successful conclusion.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff advocate the following:
(l) A statement by the President during the
Manila Conference of his unswerving determination to carry
on the war until NVN aggression against SVN shall cease;
(£) Continued covert exploration of all avenues
leading to a peaceful settlement of the war; and
( 3 ) Continued alertness to detect and react
appropriately to withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops from
SVN and cessation of support to the VC.
b. In JCSM-955-64, dated l4 November 1964, and in
JCSM-962-64, dated 23 November 1964, the Joint Chiefs of Staff
provided their views as to the military pressures which should be
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brought to bear on NVN. In summary, they recommended a
"sharp knock" on NVN military assets and war -supporting
facilities rather than the campaign of slowly increasing
pressure which was adopted. Whatever the political merits
of the latter course, we deprived ourselves of the mili-
tary effects of early weight of effort and shock, and gave
to the enemy tine to adjust to our slow quantitative and
qualitative increase of pressure. This is not to say that it
is now too late to derive military benefits from more
effective and extensive use of our air and naval superiority.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend:
(1) Approval of their ROILING THUNDER 52
program, which is a step toward meeting the requirement
for improved target systems. This program would decrease
the Hanoi and Haiphong sanctuary areas, authorize attacks
against the steel plant, the Hanoi rail yards, the thermal
power plants, selected areas within Haiphong port and other
ports, selected locks and dams controlling water LOCs, SAM
support facilities within the residual Hanoi and Haiphong
sanctuaries, and POL at Haiphong, Ha Gia (Phuc Yen) and
Can Thon (Kep).
(2) Use of naval surface forces to interdict
North Vietnamese coastal waterborne traffic and appropriate
land LOCs and to attack other coastal military targets such
as radar and AAA sites.
5 . The Joint Chiefs of Staff request that their views
as set forth above be provided to the President.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff
(Sgd) EARLE G. WHEELER 62 /
Such a memo from the Chiefs represents more than a dissent or an alterna-
tive recommendation; it constitutes a statement for the record to
guarantee that in the historical accounts the Chiefs will appear having
discharged their duty. It always comes as a form of political notifica-
tion, not merely a military recommendation.
The available documents do not show what the reaction at
the State Department was (apart from Mr. Katzenbach's apparent endorse-
ment), nor do they indicate the views of the White House staff under
W W. Rostov. McNaughton's 1 files do contain a commentary on the McNamara
recommendations prepared by George Carver of CIA for the Director,
Richard Helms. Carver agreed with the basic McNamara analysis of the
results of the air war but did not think they constituted a conclusive
statement about possible results from an escalation. Carver wrote,
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We concur in Secretary McNamra's analysis of the
effects of the ROLLING THUNDER program, its potential
for reducing the flow of essential supplies, and his
judgment on the marginal inutility of added sorties against
lines of communication. We endorse his argument on
stabilizing the level of sorties. We do not agree, how-
ever, with the implied judgment that changes in the bombing
program could not be effective. We continue to judge that
a bombing program directed both against closing the port
of Haiphong and continuously cutting the rail lines to
China could have a significant impact. 63 /
Carver also opposed any halt or de-escalation of the bombing to start
negotiations, arguing that we could either pursue negotiations or try
to build up the GVN but we could not do both. His preference was to build
in the South. Hence, a bombing halt or pause was not required. As to
a reduction, he argued that,
Shifting the air effort from the northeast quadrant
to the infiltration areas in Laos and southern North Vietnam
would be quite unproductive. Such a course of action would
not induce Hanoi to negotiate (since it would still involve
bombing in the north) and would probably have little effect
in changing present international attitudes. Furthermore,
a concentration of sorties against the low-yield and elusive
targets along the infiltration routes in the southern end of
North Vietnam and in Laos would not appreciably diminish North
Vietnam's ability to maintain the supply of its forces in
South Vietnam. 64/
As for the anti -infiltration barrier, neither the Chiefs
nor Carver had a great deal of comment. The Chiefs reiterated their
reservations with respect to resource diversion but endorsed the barrier
concept in principle. Carver somewhat pessimistically observed that.
In order to achieve the objectives set for the barrier
in our view it must be extended well westward into Laos.
Air interdiction of the routes in Laos unsupplemented by
ground action will not effectively check infiltration. 65 /
To no one's surprise, therefore, McNamara proceeded with the barrier
project in all haste, presumably with the President's blessing.
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C. The Year End View
1 . Presidential Decisions
The President apparently did not react immediately to the
McNamara recommendations, although he must have approved them in general.
He was at the time preparing for the Manila Conference to take place
October 23-25 and major decisions before would have been badly timed.
Thus, formal decisions on the McNamara recommendations, particularly
the troop level question would wait until he had returned and the elec-
tions were over. At Manila, the President worked hard to get the South
Vietnamese to make a greater commitment to the war and pressed them for
specific reforms. He also worked hard to get a generalized formulation
of allied objectives in the war and saw his efforts succeed in the agreed
communique. Its most important feature was an appeal to the North Viet-
namese for peace based on a commitment to withdraw forces within six
months after the end of the war. It contained, however, no direct refer-
ence to the air war.
While in Manila, the President and his advisors also con-
ferred with General Westmoreland. As McKaughton subsequently reported
to McNamara (who did not attend), Westmoreland opposed any curtailment
of the air war in the North, calling it "our only trump card." 66 /
Unlike the Jason Study Group, Westmoreland felt the strikes had definite
military value in slowing the southward movement of supplies, diverting
DRV manpower and .creating great costs to the North. Rather than stabilize
or de-escalate, Westmoreland advocated lifting the restrictions on the
program. Citing the high level of aircraft attrition on low priority
targets, he warned, "you are asking for a very bad political reaction." 6 jJ
He recommended that strikes be carried out against the MIG airfields, the
missile assembly area, the truck maintenance facility, the Haiphong port
facilities, the twelve thermal power plants, and the steel plant. When
McNaughton pressed him on the question of whether the elimination of
these°targets would have much payoff in reduced logistical support for the
Southern war, Westmoreland backed off stating, "I'm not responsible for
the bombing program. Admiral Sharp is. So I haven't spent much time on it.
But I asked a couple of my best officers to look into it, and they came
up with the recommendations I gave you." In any event, he opposed any
■pause in- the bombing, contending that the DRV would just use it to
strengthen its air defenses and repair air fields. McNaughton reported
that Westmoreland had repeated these views to the President in the presence
of Ky and Thieu at Johnson's request; moreover, he planned to forward
them to the President in a memo /pot available/ at the request of Walt
Rostow.
As to the barrier, McNaughton reported that, " We sty seems
. be fighting the barrier less (although he obviously fears that it
is designed mainly to justify stopping RT /ROLLING THUNDER/, at which
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he 'shudders’...." 69/ Apart from that his concerns about the barrier
were minor (although he did propose a NIKE battalion for use in a
surface to surface role in support of the barrier) .
On his way home from Manila, the President made the now
famous dramatic visit to U.S. troops at Cam Ranh Bay. Once home, how-
ever, he deferred any major decisions on the war until after the elections.
Several "peace” candidates were aggressively challenging Administration
supporters in the off-year Congressional contests and the President wished
to do nothing that might boost their chances. As it turned out, they were
overwhelmingly defeated in the November 8 balloting.
Meanwhile, at the Pentagon the dispute over the level of
effort for the air war continued. Even before Manila, the Chiefs had
attempted to head off McNamara's recommendation for stabilizing the
bombing with a request for a 25 percent increase in B-52 sorties per
month. 70/ The Secretary, for his part, was showing considerable con-
cern over the high attrition rates of ROLLING THUNDER aircraft. Among
other things he questioned the utility of committing pilots to repeated
risks when the operational return from many of the missions was so small
and the expectations for achieving significant destruction so minimal. 71/
The force level arguments had continued during the President’s
trip too. On October 20, CINCPAC forwarded his revised Force Planning Program
containing the results of the October 5-14 Honolulu Planning Conference to
the JCS. 72/ In effect, it constituted a reclama to the Secretary's
October it recommendations. CINCPAC requested U.S. ground forces totalling
493,969 by end CY 1967; 519,310 by end CY 1968; and 520,020 by end CY 1969-
But the total by end CY 1969 would really be 555? 262 reflecting an addi-
tional 35,721 troops whose availability was described in the planning
document as "unknown." 73 /
With respect to the air war, CINCPAC stated a requirement
for an additional ten tactical fighter squadrons (TFS) and an additional
aircraft carrier to support both an intensification of the air war in the
North and the additional maneuver battalions requested for the war in the
South. These new squadrons were needed to raise sortie levels in the North
above 12,000/month in CY 1967 . Of these ten TFS, the Air Force indicated
that three were unavailable and the Secretary of Defense had previously
deferred deployment of five. Nonetheless, the requirement was reiterated. 74/
They were needed to implement the strategic concept of the air mission in
SEA that CINCPAC had articulated on September 5 a nd that was included
again here as justification. 75 / Moreover, the objective of attacking
the ports and water LOCs was reiterated as well. 76/
On November 4, the JCS sent the Secretary these CINCPAC
force planning recommendations with their own slight upward revision of
the troop figures to an eventual end strength of 558,432. 77/ In the
body of the memo they endorse the CINCPAC air war recommendations in
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principle but indicated that 3 TFS and the carrier would not b§ available.
They supplemented CINCPAC's rationale with a statement of their own on
the matter in appendix A. The two objectives of the air war were to
"make it as difficult and costly as possible" for NVN to support the war
in the South and to motivate the DRV to "cease controlling and directing
the insurgency in South Vietnam." 78/ Their evaluation of the effective-
ness of the bombing in achieving these objectives was that:
Air operations in NVN have disrupted enemy efforts to
support his forces and have assisted in preventing the success-
ful mounting of any major offensives. The NVN air campaign
takes the war home to NVN by complicating the daily life,
causing multiple and increasing management and logistic problems,
and preventing the enemy from conducting an aggression from
the comfort of a sanctuary. 79/
Failures to date were attributed to the constraints imposed on the
bombing by the political authorities, and the Chiefs again urged that
these be lifted and the target base be widened to apply increasing pres-
sure to the DRV .
These were the standard old arguments. But on October 6,
the Secretary had addressed them a memo with an attached set of 28
"issue papers" drafted in Systems Analysis. One of these took sharp
issue with any increase in the air war on purely force effectiveness
grounds. The Chiefs attempted to rebut all 28 issue papers in one of the
attachments to the November 4 memo. The original Systems Analysis "issue
paper" on air war effectiveness had argued that additional deployments of
air squadrons should not be made because: (l) the bulk of the proposed
new sorties for North Vietnam were in Route Package I (see Map) and could
be attacked much more economically by naval gunfire; (2) although inter-
diction had forced the enemy to make greater repair efforts and thereby
had diverted some resources, had forced more reliance on night operations,
and had inflicted substantial casualties to vehicular traffic, none of
these had created or were likely to create insuperable problems for the
DRV; and (3) CINCPAC's increased sortie requirements would generate 230
aircraft losses in CY 1967 and cost $1.1 billion while only doing negligible
damage to the DRV. 80/ The similarity of much of this analysis to the
conclusions of the Jason Summer Study is striking.
The Chiefs rejected all three of the Systems Analysis argu-
ments. Naval gunfire, in their view, should be regarded as a necessary
supplement for the bombing, not as a substitute since it lacked flexibility
' and* responsiveness. As to the question of comparative costs in the air
war, the Chiefs reasoned as follows:
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The necessity for this type of air campaign is created
by constraints imposed, for other than military reasons,
upon the conduct of the war in NVN. These constraints
result in maximizing exposure of larger numbers of aircraft
for longer periods against increasingly well defended targets
of limited comparative values ./sic/ The measure of the
effectiveness of the interdiction effort is the infiltration
and its consequence which would be taking place if the air
campaign were not being conducted. The cost to the enemy
is not solely to be measured in terms of loss of trucks but
in terms of lost capability to pursue his military objectives
in SW. Similarly, the cost to the US must consider that
damage which the enemy would be capable of inflicting by
infiltrating men and supplies now inhibited by the inter-
diction effort; this includes increased casualties in RVN
for which a dollar cost is not applicable. 8l /
Sensing that the thrust of the OSD analysis was to make a case for the
barrier at the expense of the bombing, the Chiefs at last came down hard
against any diversion of resources to barrier construction. In no uncer-
tain terms they stated:
The Joint Chiefs of Staff agree that improved inter-
diction strategy is needed, but such improvement would not
necessarily include the barrier operation. As mentioned above
and as recommended previously, an effective air campaign
against NVN should include closing the ports, destruction of
high value military targets, attack of their air defense
systems and airfields and the other fixed targets on the
target list that have not been struck. These improvements
have thus far been denied.
Preliminary information developed by Task Force 728 indi-
cates that the forces and cost for the barrier will be sub-
stantial. The concept and equipment for the barrier have
not been subjected to a cost analysis study. Its effectiveness
is open to serious question and its cost could well exceed
the figure of $1.1 billion given for- projected aircraft losses
in this issue paper. 82 /
Ar already indicated, these issues were all decided upon
by the President immediately after the election. On November 11, McNamara
sent the Chiefs a memo with the authorized levels for Program #4. CINCPAC’
uronosed increases in sortie levels were rejected and the McNamara recom-
mendation of October l4 for their stabilization was adopted. 83 / As a
reason for rejecting expansion of the air war, the Secretary simply stated
that such would not be possible since no additional tactical fighter
squadrons had been approved. The one ^upward adjustment of the air war
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that was authorized was the increase of B-52 sorties from 600 to 800
in February 196 7 as proposed by CINCPAC and the JCS. 84/
2. Stabilization of the Air War
With the President's decision not to increase squadrons
or sorties for the air campaign in 1967 added to McNamara's strong
recommendation on stabilizing the level of the bombing, activity for
the remainder of 1 966 was kept at about the current level. Among the
continuing constraints that was just beginning to alleviate itself was
an insufficiency of certain air munitions to sustain higher levels of
air combat. 8 5/ The real constraints, however, as CINCPAC and the
JCS correctly stated were political.
The principle supporters of halting the expansion of the
air war, as we have already seen, were the Secretary of Defense and his
civilian advisors. The arguments they had used during the debate over
Program #4 and its associated air program were reiterated and somewhat
enlarged later in November in the backup justification for the FY 1967
Southeast Asia Supplemental Appropriation. Singled out for particular
criticism was the ineffective air effort to interdict infiltration.
The draft Memorandum for the President began by making the best case
possible, on the basis of results, for the bombing, and then proceeded
to demonstrate that those accomplishments were simply far below what
was required to really interdict. The section of the memo in question
follows :
A substantial air interdiction campaign is clearly
necessary and worthwhile. In addition to putting a ceiling
on the size of the force that can be supported, it yields
three significant military effects. First, it effectively
harasses and delays truck movements down through the
southern panhandles of NVN and Laos, though it has no effect
on troops infiltrating on foot over trails that are virtually
invisible from the air. Our experience shows that daytime
armed reconnaissance above some minimum sortie rate makes
it prohibitively expensive to the enemy to attempt daylight
movement of vehicles, and so forces him to night movement.
Second, destruction of bridges and cratering of roads
forces the enemy to deploy repair crews, equipment, and
porters to repair or bypass the damage. Third, attacks
on vehicles, parks, and rest camps destroy some vehicles
with their cargoes and inflict casualties. Moreover, our
bombing campaign may produce a beneficial effect on U.S.
and SVN morale by making NVN pay a price for its enemy.
But at the scale we are now operating, I believe our bombing
is yielding very small marginal returns, not worth the
cost in pilot lives and aircraft.
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The first effect, that of forcing the enemy into a
system of night movement, occurs at a lower frequency of
armed reconnaissance sorties than the level of the past
several months. The enemy was already moving at night
in 19 o 5 j before the sortie rate had reached half the
current level; further sorties have no further effect on
the enemy's overall operating system. The second effect,
that of forcing the enemy to deploy repair crews, equip-
ment, and porters, is also largely brought about by a
comparatively low interdiction effort. Our interdiction
campaign in 1965 and early this year forced NVN to assign
roughly 300,000 additional personnel to LOCs; there is no
indication that recent sortie increases have caused further
increases in the number of these personnel. Once the
enemy system can repair road cuts and damaged bridges in
a few hours, as it has demonstrated it can, additional
sorties may work this system harder but are unlikely to
cause a significant increase in its costs. Only the third
effect, the destruction of vehicles and their cargoes, con-
tinues to increase in about the same proportion as the number
of armed reconnaissance sorties, but without noticeable
impact on VC/NVA operations. The overall capability of
the NVN transport system to move supplies within NVN
apparently improved in September in spite of 12,200 attack
sorties. 8 6/
In a summary paragraph, the draft memo made the entire case against the
bombing:
The increased damage to targets is not producing notice-
able results. No serious shortage of POL in North Vietnam
is evident, and stocks on hand, with recent imports, have
been adequate to sustain necessary operations. No serious
transport problem in the movement of supplies to or within
North Vietnam is evident; most transportation routes appear
to be open, and there has recently been a major logistical
build-up in the area of the LMZ. The raids have disrupted
the civil populace and caused isolated food shortages, hut
have not significantly weakened popular morale. Air strikes
continue to depress economic growth and have been responsible
for abandonment of some plans for economic development, but
essential economic activities continue. The increasing
amounts of physical damage sustained by North Vietnamese are
in large measure compensated by aid received from other
Communist countries. Thus, in spite of an interdiction
campaign costing at least $250 million per month at current
levels^ no significant impact on the war in South Vietnam
is evident. The monetary value .of damage to NVN since the
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start of bombing in February 196 5 is estimated at about
$140 million through October 10, 1966. 87/
As an alternative method of arresting the infiltration the
memo proposed the now familiar barrier, preparatory work on which was
proceeding rapidly. No new arguments for it were offered, and its
unproven qualities were acknowledged. But it seemed to offer at that
point a better possibility of significantly curtailing infiltration
than an escalation of the ineffective air war. Its costs were estimated,
however, at an astounding $1 billion per year.
While these considerations were dominant at the Pentagon,
the air war in the North continued. The only exceptions to the even
pattern of air strikes at the end of 1966 were strikes authorized in
early December within the 30-Eiile Hanoi sanctuary against the Yen Vien
rail classification yard and the Yan Dien vehicle depot. 88/ The former
was attacked on December 4 and again on the 13th and l4th with extensive
damage to buildings but little destruction of rolling stock. The Yan
Dien vehicle depot was struck six times between December 2 and l4 with
some two thirds of its 184 buildings being either destroyed or damaged. 89/
Hanoi's reaction was prompt and vociferous. The DRV accused the U.S. of
blatantly attacking civilian structures and of having caused substantial
civilian casualties. On December 13, the Soviet Press Agency TA.SS picked
up the theme claiming that U.S. planes had attacked residential areas in
Hanoi. This brought a prompt State Department denial, but on December 15
further attacks on the two targets were suspended. Three days later
there were new charges. This time the Communist Chinese claimed the U.S.
had bombed their embassy in Hanoi. On December 17 the Rumanians made a
similar allegation. The net result of all this public stir was another
round of world opinion pressure on Washington. 90/ In this atmosphere,
on December 23, attacks against all targets within 10 n.m. of Hanoi were
prohibited without specific Presidential authorization.
The most important result of these attacks, however, was to
undercut what appeared to be a peace feeler from Hanoi. In late November,
the DRV had put out a feeler through the Poles for conversations In
Warsaw. The effort was given the code name Marigold , hut when the attacks
were launched inadvertently against Hanoi in December, the attempt to
start talks ran into difficulty. A belated U.S, attempt to mollify
North Vietnam's bruised ego failed and formal talks did not materialize.
Some significant exchanges between Hanoi and Washington on their respec-
tive terms apparently did take place, however. 91/
The controversy over civilian casualties from the bombing
continued through the end of the year and into January 1967* Harrison
Salisbury, a respected senior editor of the New York Times , went to
Hanoi '"at Christmas and dispatched a long series of articles that attracted
much"world-wide attention. He corroborated DRV allegations of civilian
laities and damage to residential areas including attacks on Nam Dinh,
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North Vietnam's third city, and other towns and cities throughout the
country. 92/ The matter reached a level of concern such that the
President felt compelled to make a statement to the press on December 31
to the effect that the bombing was directed against legitimate military
targets and that every effort was being made to avoid civilian casualties. 93 /
At no time in the fall of 1966 is there any evidence that
a second major "pause" like that of the previous year was planned for the
holiday period to pursue a diplomatic initiative on negotiations. But
as the holidays drew near a brief military standdown was expected. The
Chiefs went on record in November opposing any suspension of military
operations. North or South, at Christmas, New Years or the Lunar New
Year the coming February. 94/ The failure of the initiative through
Poland in early December left the U.S. with no good diplomatic reason for
lengthening the holiday suspensions into a pause, so the President ordered
only 48-hour halts in the fighting for Christmas and New Year's. The Pope
had made an appeal on December 8 for both sides to extend the holiday
truces into an armistice and begin negotiations, but this had fallen on
deaf ears in both capitals, 95/ As window-dressing, the U.S. had asked
UN Secretary General U Thant to take whatever steps were necessary to get
talks started. He replied in a press conference on the last day of the
year that the first step toward negotiations must be an "unconditional"
U.S. bombing halt. 9 6/ This evoked little enthusiasm and some annoyance
in the Johnson Administration.
Thus, 1966 drew to a close on a sour note for the President.
He had just two months before resisted pressure from the military for a
major escalation of the war in the North and adopted the restrained
approach of the Secretary of Defense, only to have a few inadvertent
raids within the Hanoi periphery mushroom into a significant loss of
world opinion support. He was in the uncomfortable position of being
able to please neither his hawkish nor his dovish critics with his care-
fully modulated middle course.
3. 1966 Summary
ROLLING THUNDER was a much heavier bombing program in 1966
than in 1965. There were 148,000 total sorties flown in 1966 as compared
with 55,000 in 1965, and 128,000 tons of bombs were dropped as compared
with 33,00° in the 10 months of bombing the year before. The number of
JCS fixed targets struck, which stood at 158 at the end of 1965, increased
to 185, or 27 more, leaving only 57 unstruck out of a list of 242. 97/
Armed reconnaissance, which was still kept out of the northeast quadrant
at the end of 1965, was extended during 1966 throughout NVN except for the
Hanoi/Haiphong sanctuaries and the China buffer zone, and beginning with
ROLLING THUNDER 51 on 6 July was even permitted to penetrate a short way
into the Hanoi circle along small selected route segments. Strikes had
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even been carried out against a few "lucrative" POL targets deep
within the circles.
The program had also become more expensive. 318 ROLLING
THUNDER aircraft were lost during 19 66, as compared with 171 in 1965
(though the loss rate dropped from . 66 $ of attack sorties in 1965 to
. 39 $ in 19 66 ). CIA estimated that the direct operational cost of the
program (i.e., production costs of aircraft lost, plus direct sortie
overhead costs — not including air base or CVA maintenance or logistical
support — plus ordnance costs) came to $1,247 million in 1966 as com-
pared with $460 million in 1965 . 98/
Economic damage to NVN went up from $36 million in 1965
to $94 million in 1966 , and military damage from $34 million to $36 million.
As CIA computed it, however, it cost the U.S. $ 9.6 to inflict $1 worth of
damage in 1966, as compared with $6.6 in 1965 . 99/
Estimated civilian and military casualties in NVN also went
up, from 13,000 to 23-24,000 (about 80 $ civilians), but the numbers
remained small relative to the 18 million popula ion. 100/
The program in 1966 had accomplished little more than in
1965 , however. In January 1967 , an anlaysis by CIA concluded that the
attacks had not eliminated any important sector of the NVN economy or
the military establishment. They had not succeeded in cutting route
capacities south of Hanoi to the point where the flow of supplies required
in SVN was significantly impeded. The POL attacks had eliminated 7 6$ of
JCS-targeted storage capacity, but not until after NVN had implemented a
system of dispersed storage, and the POL flow had been maintained at
adequate levels. 32$ of NVN's power -generating capacity had been put
out of action, but the remaining capacity was adequate to supply most
industrial consumers. Hundreds of bridges were knocked down, but vir-
tually all of them had been quickly repaired, replaced, or bypassed, and
traffic continued. Several thousand freight cars, trucks, barges, and
other vehicles were also destroyed or damaged, but inventories were main-
tained through imports and there was no evidence of a serious transport
problem due to equipment shortages. The railroad and highway networks
were considerably expanded and improved during the year. 10l/
The main losses to the economy, according to the CIA
analysis, had been indirect — due to a reduction in agricultural out-
put and the fish catch, a cut in foreign exchange earnings because of
a decline in exports, disruptions of production because of dispersal
and other passive defense measures, and the diversion of effort to
repair essential transportation facilities. On the military side, damage
had disrupted normal military practices, caused the abandonment of many
facilities, and forced the widespread dispersal of equipment, but overall
military capabilities had continued at a high level. 102 /
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The summary CIA assessment was that ROLLING THUNDER
had not helped either to reduce the flow of supplies South or to shake
the will of the North:
The evidence available does not suggest that ROLLING
THUNDER to date has contributed materially to the achieve-
ment of the two primary objectives of air attack —
reduction of the flow of supplies to VC/nvA forces in the
South or weakening the will of North Vietnam to continue
the insurgency. ROLLING THUNDER no doubt has lessened
the capacity of the transport routes to the South — put a
lower 'cap' on the force levels which North Vietnam can
support in the South -- but the 'cap' is well above present
logistic supply levels. 103/
The bombing had not succeeded in materially lowering morale among the
people, despite scone "war weariness." The leaders continued to repeat
in private as well as public that they were willing to withstand even
heavier bombing rather than accept a settlement on less than their
terms. As to the future:
There may be some degree of escalation which would
force the regime to reexamine its position, but we
believe that as far as .pressure from air attack is con-
cerned the regime would be prepared to continue the
insurgency indefinitely in the face of the current level
and type of bombing program. 104/
A key factor in sustaining the will of the regime, according
to the CIA analysis, was the "massive" economic and military aid provided
by the USSR, China, and Eastern Europe. Economic aid to NVN from these
countries, which ran about $100 million a year on the average prior to
the bombing, increased to $150 million in 196 5 an< ^ $275 million in 1966.
Military aid was $270 million in 1965 and $455 million in 1966. Such
aid provided NVN with the "muscle" to strengthen the insurgency in the
South and to maintain its air defense and other military forces; and it
provided the services and goods with which to overcome NVN's economic
difficulties. So long as the aid continued, CIA said, NVN would be able
and willing to persevere "indefinitely" in the face of the current
ROLLING THUNDER program. IO5/
The military view of why ROLLING THUNDER had failed in its
objectives in 1 966 was most forcefully given by Admiral Sharp, USCINCPAC,
in a briefing for General Wheeler at Honolulu on January 12, 1967.
Admiral Sharp described three tasks of the air campaign in achieving
its objective of inducing Hanoi to "cease supporting, controlling, and
directing" the insurgency in the South: "(l) reduce or deny external
assistance; (2) increase pressures by destroying in depth those resources
that contributed most to support the aggression; and (3) harass, disrupt
and impede movement of men and materials to South Vietnam." 106/ CINCPAC
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had developed and presented to the Secretary of Defense an integrated
plan to perfoim these tasks, but much of it had never been approved.
Therein lay the cause of whatever failure could be attributed to the
bombing in Admiral Sharp’s view.
The rest of the briefing was a long complaint about the
lack of authorization to attack the Haiphong harbor in order to deny
external assistance, and the insignificant number of total sorties
devoted to JCS numbered targets (1^ of some 81,000 sorties). Never-
theless, CINCPAC was convinced the concept of operations he had pro-
posed could bring the DRV to give up the war if "self -generated US
constraints" were lifted in 1967* 107/
Thus, as 1966 drew to a close, the lines were drawn for
a long fifteen month internal Administration struggle over whether to
stop the bombing and start negotiations. McNamara and his civilian
advisers had been disillusioned in 1966 with the results of the bombing
and held no sanguine hopes for the ability of air power, massively
applied, to produce anything but the same inconclusive results at far
higher levels of overall hostility and with significant risk of Chinese
and/or Soviet intervention. The military, particularly CINCPAC, were
ever more adamant that only civilian imposed restraints on targets had
prevented the bombing from bringing the DRV to its knees and its senses
about its aggression in the South. The principle remained sound, they
argued; a removal of limitations would produce dramatic results. And
50 ^ 1967 would be the year in which many of the previous restrictions
were progressively lifted and the vaunting boosters of air power would be
once again proven wrong. It would be the year in which we relearned the
negative lessons of previous wars on the ineffectiveness of strategic
bombing.
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FOOTNOTES
1. DEF 5517, 291238Z, to CINCPAC, COMUSMACV, CINCPACFLT, and CINCPACAF.
2. USAF Historical Division Liaison Office, "USAF Plans and Operations:
The Air Campaign Against North Vietnam, 1 966 ."
3. State Circular 2568 , 2913 OOZ June 1966 .
4. "Current Foreign Relations," 6 July 1 966 .
5 . Robert S. McNamara Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military
Departments, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Assistant Secre-
taries of Defense, Subject: "Southeast Asia Deployment Plan,"
2 July 1966 (s).
6 . Alain Enthoven, ASD/SA, Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense,
Subject: "Southeast Asia Deployment Plan," 30 June 1 966 (TS),
transmitting the recommended changes and a draft memo to the JCS,
Services and ASDs.
7 . McNamara's handwritten and signed changes to the draft memo submitted
by Alain Enthoven, ASD/SA, ibid .
8 . President Lyndon B. Johnson Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense,
Tuesday, June 28, 1966 , 5:05 p.m. (S).
9. David L. McDonald, Acting CJCS, Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense,
JCSM- 450 - 66 , 8 July 1966 (TS ) ; and Robert S. McNamara Memorandum
for the President, Subject: "Schedule of Deployments to South Vietnam,"
15 July 1966 (TS). For a full treatment of the troop deployment issue
see Task Force paper IV. C. 6 , "U.S. Ground Strategy and Force Deploy-
ment, 1965-1967," (TS-Sensitive).
10. USAF Historical Division Liaison Office, "USAF Plans and Operations:
The Air Campaign Against North Vietnam, 1 966 ," o£. cit .
11 . CINCPAC msg. O 8 O 73 OZ July 1966 (TS).
12. CINCPAC msg. to JCS 242069 Z July 1966 (TS).
13 CINCPAC msg. to JCS 081937Z August 1966 (TS)j and CINCPAC msg. O 8 O 73 OZ
July 1966, op. cit.
14 DIA Special Intelligence Summary, ”NVN POL Status Report," 20 July 1966 (TS.
15 DIA Special Intelligence Summary, "NVN POL Status Report," 1 August 1966.
*
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16. CINCPAC msg to CINCPACAF 042059Z September 1966 (TS-LIMDIS).
17. Ibid .
18. USAF Historical Division Liaison Office, "USAF Plans and Operations:
The Air Campaign Against North Vietnam, 1966."
19. CIA SC No. 04442/67, January 1967, "The Rolling Thunder Program,
Present and Potential Target Systems ," Appendix A.
20. Ibid .
21. SNIE 13 -66, "Current Chinese Communist Intentions in the Vietnam
Situation," 4 August 1966 (S).
22. NIE 14.3-66, 7 July 1966, "North Vietnamese Potential for Fighting
in South Vietnam," (TS), p. 12.
23. CIA Intelligence Memorandum No. 1684/66, "North Vietnamese Intentions
and Attitudes Toward the War," 23 July 1966 (s), pp. 3-4.
24. See the daily DIA Special Intelligence Summaries, "NVN POL Status
Report" for July and August 1966.
25. Joint CIA/dIA Report, "An Appraisal of the Bombing of North Vietnam
through 12 September 1966," (TS).
26. Institute for Defense Analysis Study, IDA TS/hQ. 66-49, "The Effects
of US Bombing on North Vietnam's Ability to Support Military Opera-
tions in South Vietnam and Laos: Retrospect and Prospect," 29 August
1 966 (TS), p. 58, emphasis added.
27. USAF Historical Division Liaison Office, "USAF Plans and Operations:
The Air Campaign Against North Vietnam, 1966."
28. Quoted in the Washington Post, 15 February 1967*
29. Roger Fisher, Memorandum, A Barrier Strategy , Draft/l-30-66, in
McNaughton Book II, Tab AA (S-Eyes Only). -
30. Unsigned "Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, Subject: 'A
Barrier Strategy'," dated in pencil in McNaughton 's hand 1/30/66
with additional pencil note, "copy given to RSM 3/22/66" (S-Eyes
Only).
31. Ibid .
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32. Ibid .
33 . JCS msg. 2339/222 to CINCPAC 24 Mar I966 (TS); and JCS msg.
252305Z Mar 1966 to CINCPAC (TS).
34. CINCPAC msg. to JCS O71925Z April 1966 (TS).
35 . Program is referred to in DA msg. to C0MUSMA.CV 774060, 161456Z July-
1966 (S).
36. Adam Yarmolinsky (Principle Deputy ISA) Memorandum for the Secretary
of Defense, 3° March 1966.
37. Robert S. McNamara letter to Jerrold Zacharias, 16 April 1966,
copies to Kistiakowsky, Kaysen and WIesner.
38. Robert S. McNamara Memorandum for the Assistant Secretary of
Defense, International Security Affairs, 26 April 1966 (s).
39 . Institute for Defense Analyses Report, IDA TS/HQ66-49, "The Effects
of US Bombing on North Vietnam's Ability to Support Military Operations
in South Vietnam and Laos: Retrospect and Prospect," 29 August 1 966
(TS),
pp.
v-viii .
4o.
Ibid.,
pp.
10-11.
4i.
Ibid.,
pp.
12 - 13 .
42.
Ibid. ,
pp.
37-38.
43*
Ibid.,
P-
39-
44.
Ibid . ,
pp.
45-46.
45. Institute for Defense Analyses, JASON Division, Study S-255 (TS),
August 19 66, "Air-Supported Anti -Infiltration Barrier," pp. 2-6.
46. Ibid., p. 7*
47. Robert S. McNamara Memorandum for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of
Staff, Subject: "Proposal for Barrier Systems," 3 September 1966 (s).
48. JCS msg. 1975 to CINCPAC, O72155Z September 1966 (TS); JCS msg. 2160
to CINCPAC, 082307Z September 1966 (S); and CM-1732-66, 8 September
1966 (S).
49. CINCPAC msg. to JCS 130705Z September 1966 (TS) .
50 CINCPAC msg. to field commands, O5205O September 1966 (TS).
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51 . Robert S. McNamara Memorandum for Lieutenant General Alfred D.
Starbird, 15 September 1966 (s).
52 . Defense msg. 4244, from SecDef to AmEmbassy Saigon , 021801Z October
1966 (S).
53 . JCSM-646-66, 7 October 1966 (TS).
54 . SecDef' s Saigon Trip, October 1966 , CP- 54, Tab C.
55 . Robert S. McNamara Memorandum for the President, Subject: "Actions
Recommended for Vietnam," l4 October 1966 ( TS ) . A note at the end of
the memo states, "Mr. Katzenbac’n and I have discussed many of its
(the memo's) main conclusions and recommendations — in general, but
not in particulars, it expresses his views as well as my own."
56 . See Task Force paper IV. C *8 for a detailed examination of the back-
ground and decision on Program #4.
57 * Ibid .
58 . Ibid .
59 . Ibid .
60. JCSM-672-66, 14 October 1966 (TS).
61. Ibid .
62. Ibid.
63 . George A. Carver, Jr., Memorandum for the Director, CIA, Subject:
"Comments on Secretary McNamara's Trip Report," 15 October 1966 (TS).
A pencil note in the margin in McNamara's hand says, "prepared by
Dick at my request."
64. Ibid .
65 * Ibid .
66 . John T. McNaughton, ASD/lSA, Memorandum for Secretary McNamara,
Subject: "McNaughton in Manila, October 23-25, 1966," £6 October 1966
(S-Eyes Only); with a copy of the Manila Communique annotated in
McNaughton 's hand attached.
67 . Ibid, quoted in the McNaughton memo.
68 . Ibid., quoted in the McNaughton memo.
69 . Ibid .
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70. JCSM- 667 - 66 , 15 October 1 966 (TS); requests an increase in B-52
sorties from 600 to 800 per month beginning in February 1967 .
The Chief", also noted they had a proposal for forward basing the
B- 52 s under study and would forward a recommendation later.
71. Memo to Mr. Vance, 18 October 1966, signed "AGO" (Col Abbot C.
Greenleaf, military assistant to the Deputy Secretary) with a
summary of McNamara 1 s views of an attached JCS study of attrition
factors .
72 . CINCPAC letter to JCS 3010, Ser: 000438, 20 October 1966 , Subject:
"Calendar Year 1966 and 1967 Force Requirement s/Capabilities Programs,"
in three volumes (TS).
73 . Ibid . , Vol. II, p. 1.
74 . Ibid ., Vol. I, p. C-2.
75 . See above, p.
76 . CINCPAC letter 3010, op. cit., p. B-7-
77 . JCSM-702-66, 4 November 1966 (TS) with appendices A-C, p. B-l.
78 . Ibid ., p. A-l-
79 . Ibid .
80. Robert S. McNamara Memorandum for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of
Staff, Subject: "CINCPAC Additional CY I 966 and CY 1967 Force
Requirements," 6 October 1966 (TS), with appendix.
8 1. JCSM-702-66, op. cit . , Annex C, p. 68 .
82. Ibid . , p. 70.
83 . Robert S. McNamara Memorandum for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, Subject: "Deployments to Southeast Asia," 11 November 1966
(TS).
84. For a complete treatment of the issues and background to the Program
jttli decision on ground forces see Task Force paper IV. C. 8 (TS-Sensitive) .
85 . Chairman's Memoranda to the Secretary of Defense, CM-1770-66, 22 September
1966 (TS); CM-1794-66, 29 September I 966 ; and 2014-66, 22 December
1966 (s).
86 Draft Memorandum for the President (For Comment), Subject: "Recom-
mended FY67 Southeast Asia Supplemental Appropriation," 17 Nov. 1966
(TS), PP* 13-14, in McNaughton Book VII, Tab Q,.
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87. Ibid.
88 . Authorized in RT-52, November 12, 1 966 .
89 . Information on both targets is in CINCPAC Command History - 1966 ,
Vol. II, pp. 504-505 (TS).
90. Ibid., and New York Times , Dec. 13, l4, 16, 17, 1966 .
91. Kraslow and Toory, The Secret Search for Peace in Vietnam , (Random.
House, NT, 1968 ), p.
92. See the New York Times , December 25 , 1966 - January 30, 1967 .
93 . New York Times , Jan. 1, 1967 .
94 . JCSM- 727 - 66 , 22 November 1966 (S).
95 . New York Times , December 9, 1 966 .
96. New York Times , January 1, 1967.
97 . CIA SC No. 04442 / 67 , "The Rolling Thunder Program — Present and
Potential Target Systems," January 19 67 .
98 . Ibid .
9 9 . Ibid .
1
100. Ibid .
101. Ibid .
102. Ibid .
103. Ibid .
104. Ibid .
105. Ibid .
106. CINCPAC Command History - 1966 , op . cit . , vol. II, p. 511 .
107. Ibid ., pp. 5ll-5lb.
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