|Iraqi Missile Abstracts: 1995|
html-editing added by Joachim Gruber
Saddam Concealing Long-Range Missiles
|Washington Times, 2/22/95, pg. A15|
|According to General Wafiq Samra'i, who defected from the Iraqi
military in late 1994, Saddam Hussein is holding back long-range Scud and
Hussein missiles, as well as biological and chemical warheads. Samra'i
stated the information in an open letter written to UN envoy Rolf Ekeus,
but no specific figures were discussed.
|Strategic Digest, 4/95, pp. 493-494, by Pamela Pohling Brown|
|China, along with North Korea, continues to transfer missile technology
to Iraq. China helped Iran develop
the Oghab (Eagle) rocket and also assisted in the establishment of a Scud-B
missile manufacturing in Iran. China maintains a recipient/supplier relationship
with Israel, which Israel may exploit by persuading China not to sell more
weapons in the Middle East.
UN's Ekeus Investigates Past Weapons Cooperation
Voice of the Iraqi People (Clandestine), 6/7/95
|In early 6/95, UNSCOM head Rolf Ekeus visited Egypt to discuss with
Egyptian Foreign Minister 'Amr Musa prior missile cooperation between Egypt
and Iraq. Ekeus sought to check information
received from Iraq regarding the Egyptian/Iraqi/Argentinean Condor II missile
program and Egyptian/Iraqi chemical weapons programs. UNSCOM is not leveling
any accusations at Egypt, nor is it seeking information regarding Egyptian
Iraq Asks Delay On Destroying Missile-Linked Machinery
|New York Times, 7/9/95, p. 7, by Barbara Crossette|
|On 7/7/95, Iraq's representative to the U.N., Nizar Hamdoon, submitted
a letter to the Security Council requesting a delay in the destruction
of five pieces of machinery which could be used to manufacture ballistic
missiles. The letter indicated that Baghdad wants to postpone the destruction
of these machines until the issue of Iraq's biological weapons has been
resolved. In early 7/95, U.N. Special Commission head Rolf Ekeus told the
Security Council that the machinery had been procured by Iraq
to produce U.N.-prohibited missile systems. Although the machinery has
yet to be destroyed, it has already been disabled and disassembled.
Iraqis In Surprise Move Over Missile Tooling
|Jane's Defense Weekly, 7/29/95, p. 13, by James Bruce|
|On 7/20/95, according to U.N. officials, Iraq
began destroying five machine tools that could be used in the production
of ballistic missile components at an undisclosed location. The U.S. claims
to have satellite photos which indicate that Baghdad has rebuilt its al-Kindi
missile research and development facility since the Gulf War of 1991.
U.S. Questions Top-Level Iraqis; Saddam Calls Defectors 'Judas'
|Washington Post, 8/12/95, p. 15, by Daniel Williams|
|On 8/11/95, U.S. intelligence officials in Jordan reportedly began
questioning Lieutenant General Hussein Kamel Hassan Majeed, the defecting
former head of Iraq's post-Gulf War industrialization program. Prior to
the Gulf War of 1991, Hussein Kamel was responsible for Iraq's military
buildup, including the smuggling of military spare parts into the country.
The U.S. intelligence officials hope to obtain information from Kamel regarding
Iraq's pre-Gulf War efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction.
Security Sources: `No Chance' Saddam Will Fire Scuds
Ma'ariv (Tel Aviv), 8/20/95, pp. 1, 2
|In 8/95, Israeli security sources said there was no chance that Saddam
Hussein would launch Scud missiles against Israel. This followed claims
by a leader of the Iraqi opposition
in an 8/18/95 interview on Israel Television Channel 1 that Iraq possesses
37 operational Scud missiles and Saddam Hussein will launch them against
Israel in a "farewell barrage" if his regime collapses. The unnamed opposition
leader, exiled in London, said Saddam Hussein was capable of arming his
Scud missiles with chemical or biological warheads. According to other
unnamed security sources, it is difficult to believe that Iraq possesses
the capability to fire dozens of missiles or to fit them with nuclear,
chemical, or biological warheads.
Hasan Said To Take Arms Program Documents To Jordan
Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), 8/24/95, p. 2
|In 8/95, an unnamed source close to Iraqi
defector General Husayn Kamil said that Kamil told UNSCOM Chief Rolf Ekeus
Iraq had hidden a quantity of long-range surface-to-surface missiles. The
source said Iraq had concealed information regarding these missiles and
the Supergun, the manufacture of which was entrusted to General Kamil in
the al-Fathah area near Karkuk Governorate in northern Iraq. Unnamed sources
estimate work on the Supergun project cost Iraq more than $3 billion. The
UN "dismantled the Supergun before it could be assembled."
Iraq Reveals Capability To Manufacture Scud Engine
|Flight International, 9/20/95-9/26/95, p. 19, by Allan George|
|In 9/95, Iraq told UNSCOM head
Rolf Ekeus that it had indigenously produced its own Scud missile engines
through reverse engineering. Before the Iraqi revelation, it was widely
believed that the only Scud missile engines available to Iraq had been
Soviet-supplied. Prior to the 1990-91 Gulf crisis, Iraq was known to have
the capability to manufacture its own Scud missile airframes. During the
Gulf War, Iraq's shoddily-built Scud missile airframes frequently broke
apart upon descent when fired at Israel and Saudi Arabia.
 Reuter, 8/25/95; in Executive News Service, 8/25/95, "UN What The
New Iraqi Disclosures Reveal." 
R. Jeffrey Smith, Washington Post, 8/24/95, p. A1, A31, "Iraq Reveals Huge
Iraqi Flight Testing Revealed By Inspectors
|Jane's Defence Weekly, 9/30/95, p. 4|
|In 9/95, deputy executive chairman of UNSCOM Charles Duelfer stated
that Baghdad had recently surrendered documents which revealed that Iraq
had previously manufactured rocket motors for Scud missiles, and had flight-
tested chemical warheads. Duelfer said that Iraq had employed a live chemical
agent in one of the flight tests, but did not reveal the location of the
test site. According to Duelfer, the new data will influence the accounting
of Iraq's Scud missile warheads.
Iraq Buying Missile Parts Covertly
|Washington Post, 10/14/95, pp. A1, A20, by R. Jeffrey Smith|
On 10/13/95, U.N. and U.S. officials accused Iraq
of covertly purchasing missile components from firms in Russia and Europe
via a sophisticated network of "purchasing agents and dummy companies."
Iraq is accused of obtaining accelerometers and gyroscopes, special metals
and machine tools, and a French supplied furnace worth more than $1 million
which is capable of manufacturing missile engine parts. According to U.N.
Special Commission head Rolf Ekeus, Iraq has also lied about indigenously
manufacturing certain missile-associated materials which, in reality, it
had imported. Ekeus also asserted that Baghdad had placed orders for other
missile-related "technologies, supplies, and material." Although Ekeus
declined to comment on the source of this material, another U.N. official
stated that firms from Germany, France, and Ukraine were among the suppliers
to Iraq. U.N. officials assert that Iraq does not appear to have assembled
any new Scud ballistic missiles, but has stockpiled and concealed materials,
possibly to manufacture them in the future. Iraq has admitted obtaining
some of the materials to support its Ibn al-Haytham missile research laboratory
near Baghdad and two similar sites, but has asserted that the materials
were intended for the manufacture of short- range missiles only, which
is permitted under the U.N. embargo. According to U.N. officials, these
materials could be utilized in the production of both short- and medium-range
missiles. Iraq has disclosed to UNSCOM that it had attempted to broaden
its 'Ababil-100' missile development program to include the manufacture
of SSMs with ranges of between 100 and 150 km .
According to U.S. officials and court records, a U.S. businessman from Long Island organized a shipment of ammonium perchlorate from China to Iraq in 1993, but the transfer was intercepted en route. Ammonium perchlorate is used in the manufacture of rocket fuel.
Senior U.S. officials have also expressed concern over Russia's sale of missile-related items to Iraq, in an apparent bid by Moscow to reinitiate its arms provider relationship with Baghdad. According to the head of the Strategic Investigations Office of the U.S. Customs Service Connie Fenchel, Iraq is persevering in, and possibly intensifying, its efforts to acquire missile-related technology embargoed by the U.N. UNSCOM stated that it may need to re-open its inquiries in Iraq because of Baghdad's attempts to conceal its weapons programs .
 Thalif Deen, Jane's Defence Weekly, 10/21/95, p. 5, "UNSCOM Accuses
Iraq Of Purchasing Arms."  Flight
International, 10/18/95-10/24/95, p. 6, "Iraq Defies U.N. Arms Embargo."
Iraqi Missile Parts Worth $25 Mln-Jordan Official
|Executive News Service, 12/12/95
Reuter, 12/8/95, by Jack Redden
|On 12/8/95, a senior Jordanian official said missile parts intercepted
on route to Iraq included 115 Russian-made
guidance components worth $25 million. Jordanian authorities seized the
missile guidance components at Amman's airport during the second week of
11/95 . The components were shipped by a Royal Jordanian aircraft in
crates identified as electrical equipment . The Jordanian official added
that the missile components had been imported by a Palestinian from Gaza,
who had since departed from Jordan. The interception indicates that Baghdad
is continuing to violate the U.N. embargo on virtually all trade with Iraq.
On 12/9/95, the Russian Foreign Ministry denied reports the shipment originated
in Russia and emphasized Moscow's compliance with U.N. sanctions on Iraq
The Jordanian newspaper Al-Bilad identified the importer as Wi'am Abu- Gharbiyah, a man who operated a trade office in Baghdad and conducted business in Russia . Other reports attribute the shipment to Abu- Gharbiyah, but also to Iraqi businessman `Udayy `Ujam, who resides in Jordan . Abu Gharbiyah is known to have ties with Saddam Hussein's regime . Information from Iraq indicates that Baghdad has instructed Iraqis to shift business from Jordan to Turkey, and is trying to establish a free trade zone between Mosul and Hakho, since the area is free from U.N. supervision .
On 12/5/95, UNSCOM Chief Rolf Ekeus announced that after examining Iraqi documents he had come to the conclusion that Iraq had produced 80 Scud-type missiles and 10 missile engines remained unaccounted for . According to Ekeus, some of the missile parts were acquired after U.N. sanctions were imposed . On 12/8/95, the U.S. commended Jordan's role in intercepting the shipment to Iraq .
 Jordan Times (Amman), 12/9/95, pp. 1, 7; in FBIS-NES-95-237, 12/9/95,
"Seizure Of Iraq-Bound Missile Parts
Confirmed."  Interfax (Moscow), 12/9/95; in FBIS-SOV-95-237, 12/9/95,
"Iraq Denies Contract Signed For Missile Components."  Al-Bilad (Amman),
12/13/95, p. 1; in FBIS-NES-95-238, 12/13/95, "Amman Said Exploiting Seizure
Of Iraq-Bound Parts."  Voice Of
Iraqi People (Clandestine), 12/20/95; in FBIS-NES-95-245, 12/20/95, "Arms
Deal Reportedly Reached With Russia."  Jack Redden, Reuter, 12/7/95;
in Executive News Service, 12/8/95, "Jordan Intercepts Missile Parts For
Iraq-Officials."  Reuter, 12/8/95;
in Executive News Service, 12/8/95, "U.S. Praises Jordan For Seizure."
 Voice of Iraqi People (Clandestine),
12/7/95; in FBIS-TAC-95-007, 12/7/95, "Authorities Seize `Advanced' Military
Equipment Bound For Iraq."  JINSA
Security Affairs, 11/95-1/96, pp. 1, 9, "Iraq Still Pursuing Missile Program."
U.N. Is Said To Find Russian Markings On Iraq-Bound Military Equipment
|Washington Post, 12/15/95, p. 30, by R. Jeffrey Smith|
|In 11/95, Jordanian officials seized a shipment of advanced Russian
missile guidance components enroute to Iraq.
The U.N. estimated the shipment to be worth in excess of $25 million. The
shipment consisted of approximately "100 sets of advanced guidance equipment
such as accelerometers and gyroscopes" which may have been "designed for
use in long-range intercontinental missiles." According to diplomatic sources,
the shipment originated in Moscow and included 30 boxes. It is uncertain
whether the Russian government approved the transfer or if the components
were shipped by criminals. In early 12/95, a spokesman for the Russian
Embassy in Washington said the components "did not belong to Russia." According
to U.S. and U.N. officials, the Russian denial is not credible because
the missile parts were designed for Russian long-range missiles, although
they could be modified for shorter range systems. U.N. documents show the
missile parts were ordered by the Karama research center near Baghdad.
Iraq is allowed by the U.N. to develop missiles with ranges of less than
150 km and Baghdad claims the parts were to be used in the manufacture
of these short-range missiles. Iraq has blamed the incident on a Jordanian
businessman who tried to sell the prohibited parts to Iraq on at least
two previous occasions. According to a diplomatic source, the intermediary
was Wiyam Abu Gharbieh, a Palestinian from Gaza, whose company was listed
on the shipping manifests. A U.N. official called Iraq's explanation inaccurate.
In early 12/95, Ekeus reported that the commission could only account for 70 engines from the 80 intermediate-range Scud missiles that Iraq produced .
 Washington Post, 12/8/95, p. A44, "Jordan Seizes Missile Parts Meant
For Shipment To Iraq."  Jack Redden,
Washington Times, 12/8/95, p. 18, "Jordan Seizes Missile Parts."  Caroline
Faraj and Philip Finnegan, Defense News, 12/18/95-12/24/95, pp. 1, 21,
"Israel Lobbies White House For Military Aid To Jordan."  Andrew Borowiec,
Washington Times, 12/12/95, p. A 13, "Iraq's Breaking Of Sanctions Said
To Include Missile Parts."  Washington Times, 12/9/95, p. A7, "Iraq