|Iraqi Missile Abstracts: 1993|
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Recent Iraqi Actions Related To UNSC Resolution: Violations, Non-Compliance And Non-Cooperation
|US Mission To The UN: Press Release USUN 36-(93)|
|On 1/28/93, the Iraqis admitted
to UNSCOM No. 48/MT No. 1 team that they had made a deliberate and false
statement to UNSCOM No. 3 with regard to missile launchers.
Iraq Launcher Designed By "Supergun" Inventor
|Flight International, 1/13/93, p. 18, by Alan George|
|According to UN documents, murdered Canadian ballistics expert Dr.
Gerald Bull designed Iraq's Al-Abid ("The Worshipper") three-stage, liquid-fuelled
rocket. UN officials obtained documents linking Dr. Bull's company, Brussels-based
Space Research, to the Al Abid project, which include reports from Space
Research's Geneva branch entitled "Preliminary Proposal for Satellite Launcher"
and "Project Bird" that show various configurations of missiles, including
a first stage of four Scud derivatives linked together with a second stage
of a single Scud and a purpose-built third stage; an extreme missile configuration
proposed in the reports is an immense rocket with six Scuds for the first
stage, two Scuds in the second stage and a purpose-built third stage.
The Al-Abid, at a height of 20 m and weight of 48 tons, is composed
of several Iraqi-made Scud missile
derivatives. The Al-Abid was launched in 12/89 from Al Anbar space center,
50 km south of Baghdad, but failed to reach orbit, achieving an apex of
20 km; it flew for only 130 seconds. While it is unclear which configuration
the Iraqis chose to pursue, pictures from an Iraqi television broadcast
suggested that the test launch employed the biggest configuration.
Does Iraq Have The Bomb?
|Mednews, 1/25/93, PP. 1-3|
|US CIA Director Robert Gates has informed Congress that Iraq
possesses approximately 150 ballistic missiles able to strike targets in
Saudi Arabia, Israel and Turkey.
In 1992, the IAEA completed an inventory of approximately 603 Iraqi dual use machine tools which had been identified by inspectors and experts because of the tools "known nuclear end use." Of these 603 tools, 78 were found at al- Rabiya which works out to be 13% of all nuclear machines found in Iraq. Of the 78 machines found at al-Rabiya, 23 operated on four axes or more, and 32 were three axis machines. Additionally, one of the five electron beam welders discovered in Iraq was located at al-Rabiya; it was made by Skiaky of France. The IAEA identifies these and other tools as "relevant to the production of gas ultra centrifuges, which Iraq intended to use to enrich uranium to weapons grade."
Al-Rabiya is an Iraqi weapons plant, which operates under the auspices of the Ministry of Industry and the Ministry of Industrialization, designed as a dual use facility specializing in precision machining. German machine tools made by Maho, SHW, Dorries and Hauser gave Iraq the ability to produce "large-scale pieces" in stainless steel and aluminum, and large steel castings used for calutron casings; previously these castings were imported by Iraq from Voest Alpine, a state owned munitions maker in Austria.
As UN inspectors seek to stop production of conventional arms, Iraq
rebuilds its conventional weapons plants and dual use facilities, including
the Badr complex at al Yusufiah which continues to manufacture CNC tools
under a West German license. Al Amil, a liquid nitrogen plant located about
6 km west of Iraq's Tarmiyah EMIS uranium enrichment plant, also continues
to manufacture under German license; liquid nitrogen is used for "cryogenic
rocket fuels" and as EMIS diffusion pump coolant.
Name Nuke Suppliers, UN Tells Iraq
|Washington Times, 1/26/93, p. A7, by Victoria Graham|
|On 1/25/93, deputy chief of the IAEA Maurizio Zifferero said that a
list of 80 apparent nuclear suppliers, half of which was provided by the
Iraqis and the other half compiled
during weapons inspections, was being studied by experts. Zifferero pressed
Iraq to identify all foreign supporters of its nuclear arms program saying,
"Their statements still must be verified and I am skeptical," and stated
that the Iraqis said that there may be 10 or 15 more companies.
In fall of 1992, Zifferero declared that Iraq's nuclear program was "basically defunct" and that getting the list of suppliers and obtaining long term UN monitoring were the main remaining unresolved issues. In 12/92, Iraq claimed that the 80 names on the list represented approximately 90% of their foreign suppliers. The names on the list have not been disclosed by the UN.
Zifferero, an Italian, co-leads an inspection team with Nikita Smidovich,
a Russian, who is in charge of ballistic arms and other inspections; both
leaders indicated on 1/25/93 that they had been well received by Iraqi
U.N. Team Sets Daily Inspections At Iraqi Missile Research Center
|Washington Post, 1/27/93, p. A16, by Jeffrey Smith|
|On 1/26/93, UN officials stated that Iraq
has placed all of its best rocket scientists and engineers at the Ibn al-Haytham
research facility for possible renewal of prohibited work on long-range
ballistic missiles. On 1/25/93, UN officials informed the Iraqi government
that daily inspections would immediately begin at the Ibn al-Haytham research
center and will continue indefinitely because of concerns about missile-related
activities at the facility. The chairman of the UN Special Commission charged
with eliminating Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, Rolf Ekeus, stated
that "Iraq is employing its best engineers, scientists and managers in
the missile area at the complex." Another UN official stated that these
scientists were "the brains" behind Iraqi efforts before the Gulf War to
develop or improve a variant of the Russian-made Scud missile which can
fly up to 562 mi, the Baadr 2000 two- stage missile capable of flying more
than 625 mi, and a three-stage rocket capable of orbiting payloads in space.
Iraqi scientists at the Ibn al- Haytham facility appear to be working on
propellants, guidance systems and other missile components.
As the UN moves away from periodic inspections aimed at discovering illegal activities toward long-term monitoring aimed at permanently limiting Iraqi military capabilities, other facilities involved in missile and nuclear- related activities may also be continuously monitored like the Ibn al-Haytham facility. A team of UN inspectors is considering naming a "resident inspector" for long-term monitoring to prevent Iraq from reviving long-range missile, nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons programs . Iraq has stated that long-term monitoring by the UN is an "unacceptable infringement of its sovereignty." Since the start of the Clinton presidency, UN teams have been unhindered in their investigations in Iraq .
UN investigators have determined that Iraq is developing about a half-dozen new types of short-range ballistic missiles and is experimenting with the Silkworm cruise missile. Although Iraq is permitted under UN resolutions to keep ballistic missiles capable of flying less than 93 mi, UN and Western experts say that the equipment used for building the short-range missiles could also be used for developing long-range missiles. A US official stated that "We don't think there's anything illegal going on there right now, but it would be a very good place to cheat." Former CIA director Robert M. Gates stated that Iraq still has a "formidable" missile program and that its "most important asset is its large cadre of scientists and engineers who have the technical knowledge to reconstruct their weapons of mass destruction programs."
 Washington Times, 1/27/93, p. A11, "Weapons Inspectors In Iraq Far From Finished."
 Nuclear Nonproliferation Network News, 1/27/93, "U.N. Teams Report
No Problems, Saddam Meets Pilots"; Original Source: Reuters, 1/27/93, by
Hidden Dangers In Iraq Inspections
|Washington Times, 2/16/93, p. E3, by Stephen Bryen|
|There are two major facilities related to Iraq's nuclear program in
Zaarfarniyah: Digila, which is an electronics plant, and Al Rabiya, which
produces both civilian and military goods, specializing in high precision
Iraq's Al Rabiya facility contains state of the art machine
tools from Europe, such as large German machine tools from Maho, SHW, Dorries and Hauser, and is capable of machining complex castings and components such as are used in the manufacture of calutrons and centrifuges; calutrons are one of the means for extracting highly enriched uranium for making
nuclear weapons. According to the IAEA, the Al Rabiya facility has 78 (12%)
of the 603 machines in the Iraqi nuclear
weapons program. Iraq's military-industrial infrastructure is mostly composed
of dual use equipment that can produce everything from chemical and nuclear
weapons to long-range missiles.
Iraqi Artillery Is Said To Threaten U.N. Copters Looking For Missiles
|New York Times, 2/24/93, pp. A1, A4, by Michael R. Gordon|
|On 2/22/93, Iraqi forces targeted
their guns on two UN helicopters searching for hidden missiles, missile
parts, and missile launchers west of Baghdad in a joint effort with a U-2
plane and inspectors on the ground. The UN was inspecting three sites suspected
of housing intermediate-range ballistic missiles . The CIA believes
that Iraq is hiding up to 200 Scuds although inspectors have not yet discovered
any hidden Scuds. The Iraqi coordinator of logistics for the UN team, Husam
Mohammed Amin, stated that "This is good proof that we are hiding nothing.
In fact there is nothing to hide." Amin also stated that Iraq had complied
"100 percent" with UN resolutions requiring the elimination of weapons.
The head of the UN inspectors, Nikita Smidovich stated after the inspection
that there was "no crisis."
Under UN supervision, Iraq has destroyed 151 missiles and the UN has verified Iraqi statements that it has destroyed hundreds more missiles, launch vehicles, and other munitions . UN inspectors must agree that Iraq is complying with Security Council Resolution 687, under which Iraq is obliged to dismantle its weapons programs, before sanctions are lifted . Smidovich stated that Iraq should provide "fully correct declarations" concerning its weapons programs because "we know that some of their declarations are simply false." 
The 2/22/93 inspection was part of a new pattern used by the UN inspection teams giving Iraqi officials short notice and few details on the targets of their searches . A 13-member ballistic missile team joined Smidovich's team in Baghdad .
 Los Angeles Times, 2/24/93, p. A6, "Iraqis Reportedly Aimed Guns At U.N. Copters Hunting Scuds"; Original Source: Reuters.
 Washington Post, 2/25/93, p. A14, "U.N. Council Warns Iraq
On Threats To Inspectors," by Julia Preston.
Report On The Seventeenth IAEA On-Site Inspection In Iraq Under Security Council Resolution 687 (1991), 1/25-31/93
|U.N. Security Council Document S/25411, 3/13/93, by Hans Blix|
|During the fifteenth IAEA inspection in 11/92, at the Iraqi
Ash Shakyli warehouse, an Arburg jet molding machine, acquired for the
manufacture of centrifuge motor stators, was found. The Iraqis indicated
that they did not know of a second Arburg machine in Iraq, and that the
application specific fixture had been broken and lost. The IAEA-17 team
recorded the manufacturer and technical specifications of the Arburg machine
and applied IAEA seals. The Iraqis were asked to investigate the second
missing Arburg machine. It is believed that the second Arburg machine was
obtained by the Iraqis for their missile program.
The updated 11/92 machine tools inventory at Al Rabiya contained 86 items. Eighty of the items were determined to be general purpose and included 63 milling machines, 7 coordinate measuring machines, 5 electrical discharge machines, 3 jig bores, 1 jig grinder, and 1 laser cutter. The remaining six machines [three series-2 Matrix Churchill turning machines, one series-3 Matrix Churchill turning machine, one Dorries turning machine, and one Sciaky electron beam welder], which were sealed, were all determined to be dual-use and subject to control under Annex 3 of the long-term monitoring plan. The Dorries turning machine, one Series-3 and one Series-2 Matrix Churchill turning machine were destroyed. The other two Series-2 Matrix Churchill turning machines were damaged but repairable and their seals were left in place.
With ten minutes notice, the IAEA inspected building 159 and building
293 of the Taji-Nassr State Establishment to determine the utilization
of the machine tools/flow forming machines. In building 159, four of the
flow forming machines were being re-assembled and the IAEA seals were in
place, but three other machines still had not been returned from where
they were hidden during the war. Building 159 also had crates containing
flow forming pre-forms about 28 cm in diameter composed of 25% chromium
and 4% moly steel for the construction of Ababil 100s with a range up to
50 km. The Iraqis were very secretive
about where the machines had been removed to but agreed to show two IAEA
inspectors the location where the four missing dual-use machines were being
stored. During the night one flow forming machine and one machine tool
were returned to Taji and the other two flow forming machines were still
at the location where they were hidden during the war. All of the machines
and seals were accounted for.
Iraq Reopens Factory Hit By US Missiles
|Executive News Service, 3/17/93, by Leon Barkho
|On 3/17/93, Iraq reopened the high-tech
engineering plant al-Nida ("the calling"), which was once used for in an
Iraqi program using electromagnetic isotope separation (EMIS) method of
enriching uranium, after the US bombed the plant with cruise missiles on
1/17/93. The plant contains computer milling, grinding, and turning machines,
and, according to factory director Yahya Nssayef Jassim, more than 3,000
workers and 350 machine tools were used in the reconstruction.
U.N. inspectors, who have stripped Iraq
of its nuclear development capabilities using the EMIS, urge continued
monitoring of dual-purpose machines that are normally used in civilian
industry but may also be used for nuclear enrichment.
Managers Charged With Supplying Scud Missile Parts To Iraq
|FBIS-WEU-93-055, 3/24/93, p. 14
DPA (Hamburg), 3/24/93
|In 3/93, the state prosecutor's office at the regional court in Muenster
charges against the owners of a Westphalian engineering factory
Dietrich Hinze (54) and Peter M. Huetten (61), formerly business managers
of the now bankrupt H & H Metalform GmbH, accusing them of violating
Germany's foreign exports law; both men have been under "investigative
custody" since 2/92. From 1988 to 1990, the German factory is accused of
supplying Iraq with 27,436 individual
parts for Scud-B missiles and a "range of machinery for the production
of artillery rockets," all valued at 46 million German marks. After the
enforcement of embargoes against Iraq, the German firm, which was allegedly
co-owned by Iraq, attempted to smuggle 2,284 parts for Scud missiles to
Iraq, but the shipment was seized at Frankfurt airport. Hinze and Heutten
deny the charges, stating that they believed the items were intended for
peaceful use, but prosecutors say that attempts by the suspects to convey
information on "technology and production of weapons grade uranium by means
of the gas ultra centrifugal process" proves that they were "deeply involved"
in the Iraqi arms program.
Information Bulletin On The Measures Taken By Iraq In Implementation Of Security Council Resolution 687 (1991) During The Month Of March 1993
|U.N. Security Council Document, 4/6/93, by Nizar Hamdoon|
|The UN UNSCOM 48 monitoring team arrived in Iraq
on 1/25/93 to monitor Iraqi industrial establishments, visited daily the
Ibn al-Haytham Research and Design Centre and the Rafah site and left Iraq
The UN joint inspection team UNSCOM 53 arrived in Iraq on 3/11/93 led by American David Franz with its members comprised of biological, chemical, missile, and computer specialists. The UN inspection team, which gave only short-notice before investigating a site, inspected the Muthanna Establishment, the Division of Agriculture and Biology of the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission, the Salah al-Din Establishment, the Salam factory at Salman Pak, Al-Kindi Company, and the Hakam factory. The UN team also made an unannounced visit to the Faculty of Veterinary Medicine at Baghdad University on 3/14/93. The UNSCOM 53 team found nothing to contradict Iraqi declarations. The Chief Inspector also stated that the team's mission was carried out in complete safety and that it experienced no difficulties.
The UN UNSCOM 54 monitoring team entered Iraq
on 3/27/93 and consisted of two groups. The first group, including Nikita
Smidovich, Scott Ritter, and Mark Silver, conducted meetings with Iraqi
officials on bringing an appraisal of the missile program to a conclusion.
The second team, led by Dennis Vincent, continued the monitoring of missiles
started by the UNSCOM 48 monitoring team. The groups visited the Taj al-Ma'arik
factory of the Balat al-Shuhada' Works, the Qa'qa State Establishment,
the Al-Yawm al-Azim factory, the Rafah site, the Al-Mu'tasim Centre at
Iskandariyah, the Dhu al-Fiqar factory, the Ibn al-Haytham Research and
Design Centre, and Project 144.
German Admits Selling Rocket Parts To Iraq
|Executive News Service, 9/1/93
On 8/30/93, the former managing director of Germany's Rhein-Bayern,
Walter Dittel, confessed in court in Augsburg, Germany that he illegally
sold rocket technology to Iraq before
the 1991 Gulf War, saying, "the charges are basically true." Dittel and
two of his colleagues are charged with violating Germany's export laws
and the United Nations embargo against Iraq. Rhein-Bayern's owner Anton
Eyerle and another executive, Subramaniam Venkat, have denied the latest
charges linking German firms to Iraq's military build-up before the 1990
invasion of Kuwait. Rhein-Bayern executives also are accused of selling
technologies that helped Iraq increase the range of Soviet Scud-missiles
which were fired at Israel and Arab Gulf states in the Gulf War. Additionally,
Rhein-Bayern executives are accused of exporting Styx sea-launched rocket
equipment. The Augsburg trial will investigate whether the executives knew
whether their 150 shipments of supplies to Iraq from 1987 to 1990 were
used for military purposes.
 International Herald Tribune, 10/20/93, "Trial Begins In Germany For 3 Men Accused Of Aiding Iraqi Missile Effort."
 Daily Telegraph, 10/20/93, "Germans 'Aided Iraq Missiles'."
 Faye Bowers, Christian Science Monitor, 9/1/93, p. 2, "German Admits Iraqi Deals."
 Wall Street Journal, 9/15/93, p. A4, "German Is Convicted Of Selling
Materials To Iraq For Weapons."
UN Discovers More Evidence Of Iraqi Links To Condor Missile Project
|International Defense Review, 11/93, p. 842|
|The Argentinean defense ministry confirmed that UN weapons inspectors
discovered two Condor II missile engines, built at the Falda del Carmen
factory, in Iraq and that Argentina
delivered Condor "elements" to Iraq through Egypt prior to the 1991 Gulf
War. The ministry also confirmed that similar factories in Iraq and Egypt
were "twin sisters" of the Argentinean Falda del Carmen plant that produced
the engines found in Iraq. Argentine defense minister Oscar Camilion denied
Argentine involvement and stated, "There has not been any transfer of Argentinean
technology to Iraq, as the technology in question was fundamentally German."
Camilion also rejected statements regarding contractual agreements of expert
collaboration between Argentina and Iraq, but did confirm that German technicians
had worked on the Condor II project. Egyptian technicians also worked with
the Argentine experts, where they gained expertise working on the Condor
II project, but there is no confirmation that Iraqi technicians participated.
Engineer For Hire
|Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 12/93, pp. 29-36, by David Albright|
In an interview with the author, German engineer Bruno Stemmler stated
that the centrifuge deals the German company H&H Metalform GmbH conducted with Iraq were "'only a small part'
of H&H's dealings with Iraq" and that H&H was a major contributor
of technology, machine tools, and specialized equipment to Iraq's missile
and nuclear programs. H&H Metalform GmbH specializes in producing the
vertical flow-forming machines that shape maraging steel tubes. Stemmler
also stated that two H&H directors have been arrested for being middle-men
for Iraqi procurement agents and German and Swiss companies. According
to Stemmler, when the Iraqis asked him for names of German aircraft engineers,
he gave them the name of German rocket scientist Karl Otto Brauer.
who had worked for Germany during World War II, later went to the US and
was involved in US programs, including Apollo; he subsequently worked in
South Africa. At the time he was recruited by Iraq, he was a US citizen
living in Germany. Stemmler said that Brauer had contacted the US embassy
in Bonn before he left for Iraq to see if he was allowed to visit the country.
His trip to Iraq was arranged by H&H. One of Brauer's other colleagues
said that Brauer had declined an Iraqi request to provide assistance to
its missile program. Stemmler said that Brauer probably had not been in
contact with Iraq after the trip.